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This thesis explores the tension between a reflective view of design and design as 
an embodied, aesthetic experience. Most research exploring the nature of design 
follows a tradition of practice-based design research, which aims to empirically 
establish what constitutes design by studying what designers do and say. The 
challenge with this observational approach is that it depends on design as an object 
of study and can therefore only deal with its rational or cognitive dimension. The 
inherently aesthetic and subjective dimension of the immediate perception of 
designing remains largely unexplored in design research. 
To address this lack of research, this project builds on the Classical Prag-
matist non-dualistic view of experience and knowledge. In particular, drawing 
on Dewey’s thesis in Art as Experience, I explore the embodied, aesthetic di-
mension of design through investigating in detail my experience of the activity 
of form-giving. This methodological perspective maintains continuity between 
thinking-feeling in action and in terms of subject-object relations. 
From this non-dualist view, I critique the specific claim made by research-
ers and design practitioners who advocate that designers exhibit an attitude of 
openness that contributes to creativity. Assuming that openness is a quality that 
can be felt, I ask how this quality is felt in my experience of designing, and what 
openness means practically with regard to direct sensory and physical engagement 
and what it conceptually means in the way a designer approaches the world. 
To explore an integrated experience of designing in the present, I follow 
an artistic method of movement improvisation called Butoh. Butoh provides 
a specific context of inquiry for exploring perceptual and physical engagement 
in the present through a heightened state of somatic awareness. The empirical 
work is comprised of four direct experiences from my Butoh training that are 
examined through the lens of Pragmatism and embodied cognition. Together, 
they show how I actually engage my ‘self ’ through concrete sensory, emotional, 
and feelingful frames of experience of form-giving in the present.
This research makes theoretical and methodological contributions through 
developing an embodied, aesthetic perspective of practice-based and artistic ap-
proach to design. It suggests the potential of openness-capacity as a concept for 
understanding and actually practicing the type of creative approach attributed to 
a designer’s attitude of openness. It provides a critique of rational mechanisms 
underlying the contexts of design inquiry, as well as having practical implications 
for design education and the kinds of teaching and learning that support the 
creative, self-directed, exploratory capacities of designers. 
Abstract

This thesis is dedicated to my father, Thad Amacker, 
who died in 2012 shortly before I found out that I would 
have the opportunity to embark on this PhD project in 
Sweden. His death has been a constant reminder for me 
to cherish this time to be able to pursue my interests. 
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Prelude
I am alone on the dance floor. It is dark except for a spotlight and 
what is left of the daylight trickling in overhead from the dormer 
windows. My body is exposed, with only a sheet of crumpled white 
paper draped over my underwear. I kept them on, the fear of being 
completely naked underneath the brittle paper, which I’m sure will 
fall off, knowing that the others will see my nakedness, my flaws. 
Not being truly comfortable with myself, that’s it. 
I release the grip of my hands and stare toward the far wall. I 
am haunted by an impression of wanting to disappear and find 
comfort in my body, my body that is usually an object of my 
disapproval. Trying again to forget or to dismiss the unpleasant 
sensation of having eyes on me, being picked over, and being 
helpless about this, having nowhere to hide. The sheer simplic-
ity of the situation I put my body in with the sentiment that the 
enemy of the enemy is my friend.
From the loudspeaker, twinkling, kaleidoscopic sounds of elec-
tronic music fills the room, and I sense the shape of a field and 
an open night sky with crickets. Here I am alone, outside, un-
constrained childlike daydreams of being a fairy or something. 
Mmmmm…twinkle. I settle into this fictional solitude. A song that 
I listened to yesterday, what is the name of it, comes to me and I 
start dancing, gyrating my hips and arms rhythmically, like a jig, 
stamping and brushing my feet over the black floor, kicking up 
pieces of dry tree bark. In my engrossment, moving backwards, 
my bare foot, there it is, bumps up against something cold. I 
stop dead. 
Was I surprised by that? I knew it was there. I crouch and pick it 
up in my left hand. I study it for a minute, searching my memory 
for it, a stone, and transferring it to my right hand. It is round 
and worn smooth from the ocean, about the size of a baseball, 
a little heaver. 
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Without thinking, the impulse to throw it washes over me, the 
tantalizing possibility of piercing the space. I wind up my arm up 
like a pitcher and lurch forward, aiming the stone at the audience. 
I catch myself, stopping, thinking that this not a good idea, and 
midair my body’s forward movement is left suspended for a 
hair-thin second longer with hesitation, a hurling mass that has 
changed its mind. My right arm suddenly floats and I gently, slowly 
rest the stone back down back to floor. 
I stand up, repairing the moment, maybe, then pausing with per-
haps a little disappointment at not having thrown it. Maybe I 
should have thrown it, the ghost of a question still lingering as I 
back away and continue dancing.
Context of the Present
In this instant when I went from being lost in the sensation of my 
feet shuffling backwards across the ground to almost throwing a 
stone at the audience, there was an impulse, which at least for a 
sliver of a second, meant an uneasy situation for me and the au-
dience. Discussing the performance afterwards, my teacher says, 
“I thought, wow, now she really is going to throw the stone.” We 
contemplate how that kind of unforeseen flash can only come 
from improvisation, i.e., creating in the moment, flowing from a 
mind in action instead of being premeditated or calculated. The 
spontaneity and instinctiveness of the gesture exposed the vulner-
ability of the situation. It required us, the audience and myself to 
be open to the moment, that is, be threatened to break down. In 
this diversion we are mutually present, passing beyond a readymade 
frame of performer and disinterested spectator to a degree of trust 
in and acceptance of not knowing what is going to happen next, 
that also entails an elasticity of mind to adapt to the shaping of a 
relationship in context. 
This reciprocal experience is one point. But equally import-
ant to this thesis is how my instinctive move to throw the stone 
revealed something in my attitude that acts without any aim, one 
not rationalized or consciously intended, but instead is a kind of 
intrinsic motivation, an inner itch, a will. My colleagues’ comment 
that this gesture, though unexpected, was also “true” to myself, 
that it felt authentic to the comedic chords that I tend to play in 
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my performance work, which, from their point of view has a touch 
of unsociability and exaggerated self-awareness. Right, and just 
cartoonish. So in my impulse to throw the rock, there is an aspect 
of my personality that slips out unawares and becomes expressed. 
One fleeting moment, and I begin to wonder: How can this 
say so much about the way in which a person’s imagination and 
expectations are a part their action as it is happening? And how can 
this way of moving in the moment, the freedom in it to move really 
any way, in any direction, reveal or express something about design 
as creative action? These questions lead me to my research, which 
concerns the relationship between subjective awareness in immedi-
ate experiences and thinking about design as a kind of “thinking.” 
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Introduction
Exploring Design as a Creative Practice  
Formed by Artistic Origins
Today, design as a field of study is generally recognized to be mul-
timodal and diverse in content, informed by both art and industry 
(Levy, 1990). Many design practices are still tightly aligned with the 
integrative and synthetic activities of art and craft and, in particular, 
the activity of form-giving which is traditionally understood as a 
fundamental material practice of design (Abidin, Sigurjonsson, 
Liem, & Keitsch, 2008; Hjelm, 2009). This builds on a tradition 
of studio-based training and aesthetic critique coming from a mas-
ter-apprentice model in which, in very basic terms, design students 
learn in a studio environment through the applied giving of form 
through various material means. The formal outcomes are evalu-
ated through the design student’s presentation of his or her work 
while providing an explanation of and self-reflection on his or her 
decision process that is critiqued by expert designers (see Schön 
(1983, 1987) for examples). Thus, for many designers aesthetics is 
seen as central to form-giving and a basic part of the designer’s 
professional knowledge (Hjelm, 2009).
Because design historically entered academic institutions 
under different circumstances from science, it has maintained a 
practice-based view of its knowledge, which consists of the em-
bodied competence or capacities of the practitioner, as in the arts, 
rather than fixed methods or an underlying philosophy of knowl-
edge (Haseman & Mafe, 2009). In one respect, the practice-based 
perspective on design generally embraces a connection to material 
culture in the creation of the artificial and artistic assessments in 
“embodied in the arts of planning, inventing, making and doing” 
(Archer, 1979; Cross, 1982). Accordingly, it also accepts, to a degree, 
that the conceptual unification of design is elusive, if not irrel-
evant, given that design is ‘constructive’ in the sense that every 
design, working from experience, is the result of its particular 
circumstances and characteristics (Koskinen, Zimmerman, Binder, 
Redström, & Wensveen, 2011). Thus, there are contradictory aims 
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with regards to a practice-based perspective in design theory and 
research, since it is also suggested by design academics that design 
practice is understudied and lacking a strong epistemological foun-
dation for its practice (Buchanan, 2001; Niedderer & Reilly, 2010). 
Coming from a background in architecture, which has kept 
explicit ties to its artistic tradition, I began this research project 
with an interest in exploring design as a creative process informed 
by its distinctively arts-based influences. This form-giving per-
spective in architecture and design directs their methods, as in 
the use of sketching and modeling to develop a ‘feel’ or gestalt for 
the qualities of form that express or convey an idea, “the sort of 
expression that will arouse in others what is going on in himself” 
(Mead, 1934/1967, p. 148). Design students trained in an artistic 
tradition learn to make their ideas concrete and available to the 
senses by physically engaging with materials and employing artistic 
conventions of technique and traditional elements of art compo-
sition like shape, line, surface, texture, and tone (Eisner, 2002a; 
Hetland, Winner, Veenema, & Sheridan, 2007). In order to draw 
out what is felt emotionally, designers learn an artistic approach 
and material sensibility of how “to think effectively in terms of 
relations of qualities” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 47). 
In practice, designers regard emotional and empathic di-
mensions as equal parts of their work because they experientially 
involve their senses and perceptive bodies. In many disciplines, 
this use of the body’s interactions with the environment is re-
ferred to as “embodied,” which is meant to capture the role of the 
body and feelings in cognition or what is essentially an integrated 
thinking-feeling (body-mind) experience (Gallagher, 2007; Gibbs, 
2006; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Learning from experience is at 
its center an approach of “embodied meaning-making” (Scarinzi, 
2015) which means there is no separation between perception and 
action (or thinking and feeling). Thus, the role of the designer’s 
aesthetic and imaginative abilities in pursuing qualitative experience 
is requisite to understanding design as an embodied approach. Such 
an approach in this research comes from a holistic understanding 
of arts-based learning and is particularly inspired by the scholar-
ship of Elliot Eisner (2002a) that claims the primacy of the arts in 
self-directed learning within experience.
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Experience from a Designer’s Point of View 
In short, the starting point for a designer is experience. One of 
the main tenets of design thinking, for example, is a focus on user 
experience (Brown, 2009; Dunne & Martin, 2006; Kolko, 2015; 
Lockwood, 2010; Sanders & Stappers, 2008). This is often dis-
cussed as the “fuzzy front end” or generative phase of a designer’s 
“research approach,” where he or she sets out to learn about the 
problem setting and the user. The kinds of methods used are often 
thought to borrow from ethnographic techniques like interviewing 
and observing the behavior of users in their everyday lives. The 
intention is to gain a broad and thorough understanding of the 
experiences of the people that have a stake in the outcome of the 
design. The general concern for users, in this regard, can be linked 
to the diverse grouping of process-oriented design approaches like 
participatory design, collaborative design, co-design, and service 
design that are meant to intentionally engage users in the creation 
of the design. Reasons for using these approaches include obtaining 
a better understanding of the emotional experience or “meaning” 
of a particular design issue and directly co-developing new paths 
to innovation (Sanders & Stappers, 2008). 
The ways in which designers work with experience and have 
an exploratory attitude has been promoted as part of design’s cre-
ative ability in organizations and companies. The view that has been 
cemented in business contexts is that design provides a strategic 
tool for innovation that goes beyond form-giving and product aes-
thetics, with the now-ubiquitous term “design thinking” (Brown, 
2008; Cooper, Junginger, & Lockwood, 2009; Martin, 2009). 
Practitioners who endorse design have been explicit about design 
thinking as an effective way to generate “creative potential” in 
business (Brown, 2016). 
Design Empathy
Designers themselves in the field or context generally have the 
empathetic purpose of generating an experiential or embodied 
reading of users’ interactions with the environment — how they 
perceive, sense, and empathically respond to experiences firsthand 
(Mallgrave, 2013). In this regard, it is fairly consistently under-
stood across design disciplines that designers are supposed to 
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employ empathy in order to move past functional uses and actu-
ally experience things and emotions as users do (Hassi & Laakso, 
2011). More recent design research highlights the importance of 
empathy and emotions for the making of meaning and creativity 
(Lim, 2013), empathy being loosely regarded as the ability to intel-
lectually and emotionally connect with the experiences of another 
person. Some writing about design is even compelled to use like 
terms like “empathic design” or “human-centered design,” rather 
than the term “design thinking,” to capture the specific focus on 
empathy and responses by designers that lead them to gain deeper 
insights into what people feel, want, need, and desire (Mattelmäki, 
Vaajakallio, & Koskinen, 2013; McDonagh, 2008; Sato, 2009). In 
the field of architecture, for example, this empathetic focus on the 
“user” is embedded in what is generally accepted as a phenome-
nological approach from the architect’s own sensorial experience 
of a site or space. 
Open Attitude or Mindset
Along with empathy, the other crucial component of the design 
approach to creativity is often characterized as a “design attitude” 
or mindset. Generally this is seen to be an orientation of openness 
to experience that allows for multiple ways of viewing a situation 
(Boland & Collopy, 2004; Michlewski, 2008). Design attitude is 
identified in literature on design generally as: tolerant of ambiguity, 
experimental and explorative, open to risk, dealing with ‘wicked 
problems,’ embracing discontinuity and open-endedness, an open 
type of abduction (Boland & Collopy, 2004; Brown, 2008; Bu-
chanan, 1992; Dorst, 2011; Hassi & Laakso, 2011; Michlewski, 
2008). And in many ways, such an exploratory or open attitude is 
strongly connected to exploration and learning (Beckman & Barry, 
2007). It plays an obvious role in what is considered an important 
creative characteristic of designers who embrace the freedom to 
think and behave freely, and are open to change. 
From the artistic perspective, it is accepted that new ideas 
come from pushing the boundaries, and for the artist that means 
literally stretching beyond what he or she is physically comfortable 
or familiar with (Eisner, 2002a; Hetland et al., 2007). One of the 
trademarks of artistic practice is not narrowing how the creative 
process can take shape. This requires not being trapped by the 
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safety of familiar territory and being able to work at ‘the edge’ 
and/or to play with different approaches and possibilities. This 
goes hand in hand with the whole idea of design as an exploratory 
activity that creates new meanings, which cannot be objectively 
validated, rather than as a problem-solving approach with a “best” 
solution. Similarly, there is a claim that an essential component 
of a design attitude is being tolerant of ambiguity or having a 
“willingness to engage in a process that is not predetermined or 
planned ahead and detail and where outcomes are unknown or 
uncertain” (Michlewski, 2008, p. 380). Thus, in order to actively 
experiment and take risks without knowing the consequences, there 
is an unmistakable subjective dimension of the designer’s practice 
that includes the sensation of uncertainty and the need to grapple 
with fears and tolerate failure. 
The State of Design Thinking
In recent years, the emergence of the idea that design thinking 
contributes to innovation in various forms like design-driven inno-
vation (Verganti, 2009), open innovation (Baldwin & Von Hippel, 
2011), user innovation (Franke & Piller, 2004), or participatory 
innovation (Buur & Larsen, 2010) has undoubtedly served to el-
evate the implementation of design methods in business beyond 
the design ‘object’ to more strategic issues. In some cases, design is 
advocated as a partner to management (Boland & Collopy, 2004; 
Borja de Mozota, 2006; Cooper et al., 2009). It has also implic-
itly served research that has the aim of investigating how design 
works or how its nature contributes to innovation (Carlgren, 2013; 
Jahnke, 2013).
Design thinking as either a generalized process or thinking 
style, however, sets up a couple of inner contradictions for design-
ers trying to encourage creativity. For one, design thinking is, by 
and large, promoted to management in a language they understand 
as a structured process, a set of methods or skills, or a framework 
for innovation. Yet, it has been well established for some time 
that creativity flies in the face of systemization and management 
(George, 2007; Sutton, 2001). And many designers recognize 
the contradiction that design creativity, in whatever form, is not 
fixed, asserting that “design thinking is killing creativity” (Ling, 
2010). Bruce Nussbaum (2011), one of largest proponents of design 
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thinking, provocatively claimed that “design thinking is a failed 
experiment,” saying that it has caused the profession to “ossify.” 
In this case, “formalizing the tacit values and behaviors of design” 
(Nussbaum, 2011, para. 7) through reasonable and well-thought-
out operations means taking something as elusive and unpredict-
able as creativity and essentially making it rational. 
Furthermore, there is misunderstanding concerning one the 
messages of design thinking, which is that if anyone who uses it 
can “access [his or her] nascent creative capacities” (Brown, 2009) 
what makes it design? Don Norman (2010), another popular author 
on design thinking, calls design thinking a “useful myth,” which he 
clarifies is “a public relations term for good, old-fashioned creative 
thinking.” The selling points of design thinking in this case are what 
creative people in any discipline do, so, while designers are creative, 
creativity is not unique to design (Norman, 2010). Therefore, in 
trying to avoid the trap of set processes or methods, designers who 
are turning straight to design as a resource for creativity, for ex-
ample, for forms of creative intelligence, creative inquiry, creative 
leadership, creative problem-solving, also trivialize and devalue 
the various kinds of specialized practices designers engage in and 
their elaborate training. A recognizable example is a marketing 
strategy of ideo, the design firm credited with making the idea of 
design thinking popular with businesses, which now offers online 
courses for design thinking marketed with the tagline “solve any-
thing creatively.” 
The Problem of the Subjective 
The types of contradictions that arise from promoting “design 
thinking” as a creative method in industry highlight the ways that 
designers develop an implicit understanding of their craft from 
an embodied approach and then feel the need to legitimize their 
process as a managerial concept (e.g., Rauth, Carlgren, & Elmquist, 
2014). What occurs then is a perceived language “gap” between 
design and outsider perspectives from fields like management, 
so that designers are put in the position of having to develop a 
clearer vocabulary to better understand their process, if not to put 
their finger on what exactly makes it creative. From the design 
side, designers feel that this communication challenge leads to a 
general misunderstanding of what the creative aspects of design 
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are and what those specifically mean to a designer. The external-
ization and explicit vocabulary that make design objectively useful 
or transmittable in terms of “design thinking” conversely bounds 
design to the rational legitimization of those organizational and 
institutional contexts.
The tension in trying to conceptually apprehend “design 
thinking” coincides with the epistemological project established 
in design research that focuses on an objective perception of de-
sign’s tacit or practice-based “knowledge.” The taken-for-granted 
research stance of observing design as something external to one-
self entails an artificial distinction between the subjective side of 
experiencing action and reflective thinking about that action. This 
distinction between the experiential (internal) and the representa-
tional (external) is what scholars in some theoretical fields refer to 
as a problem of representation (Hacking, 1983; Latour, 2005; Law, 
2004; Thrift, 2008; Tsoukas, 1998). This problem runs parallel to 
the “explanatory gap problem,” also called the “hard problem” or 
“mind-body problem” (Gallagher, 2005, p. 6), where the very issue 
of not being able to represent subjective “knowledge” in some form 
or another is a scientific problem, i.e., a problem in terms of what 
can be objectively determined. 
This type of observational approach gives rise to a Carte-
sian dualism, since it must reduce embodied experience, and the 
ambiguity of that ‘felt’ experience, to conscious thought. In com-
partmentalizing experience as external/internal, practical/artistic, 
intellectual/aesthetic, one side becomes objectively a “problem” for 
the other. Usually it is the case that subjective emotions, including 
the perceptual ‘feel’ that aesthetic sensibilities and judgments are 
understood to involve, become problematic with regards to rational 
explanation (Gallagher, 2005; Pallasmaa, 1996; Stephens & Boland, 
2014). And because this way of viewing experience stresses mental 
faculties as a more significant intellectual capacity, it perpetuates 
a view of aesthetic “subjectivism” in which aesthetics are based 
on private feelings that are “non-cognitive, non-intellectual, and 
personal” (M. Johnson, 2015). 
Again, this carries over into design. For instance, the way 
that the term “empathy” is preferred in design practice specifically 
without reference to “aesthetics” is indicative of the way that de-
signers are often not willing or not able to make explicit connec-
tions between their embodied practice and the focus on experience 
in the tradition of aesthetic education (Tonkinwise, 2011). Thus, 
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as “design thinking” is increasingly called into the social contexts 
of practice and often institutionalized conditions, design practi-
tioners, similar to design scholars, prefer speaking about design as 
a matter of principles and skills connected to an intellectual view 
of knowledge. It is not uncommon that they attempt to distance 
their practices from aesthetics and their perceived superficiality, 
“fuzziness,” or connection to product styling (Kolko, 2015). There 
is repetition in design literature of refrains like, “While a logic of 
form (aesthetics) or function governs traditional modernism in 
design, today’s radical design practices are guided primarily by 
a social logic” (Blauvelt, 2012, p. 45). An explicit turn away from 
form-giving and aesthetics gives rise paradoxical design efforts, 
like using objective processes to try to “constrain the subjective 
decision-making that must take place in order to realize the work” 
(Blauvelt, 2012, p. 45).
Thus, the embodied characteristics of designing within expe-
rience, the sensations of the freedom to explore and create, suffer 
from theoretical commitments to make sense of design. Design as 
experience is relegated to a substrate of rational experience apart 
from what is subjectively experienced and felt. Ironically, safely 
observing design from the comfort of conceptual clarity and/or 
coherence subordinates bodily feelings and emotions, specifically 
the feelings of vulnerability and uncertainty involved in an expe-
rience of exploration and creating something new. By estranging 
perception from action, intellect from aesthetics, and feeling from 
thinking through formalized objectives and descriptions of a ge-
neric design process, design sits more easily in people’s minds 
instead of in acts of physical engagement. 
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Theoretical View of Embodiment  
from Pragmatism
Because dualistic constructions underlying thinking and behavior 
in research are so omnipresent, the designer’s subjective engage-
ment in the experience of creativity or form-giving has been grossly 
understudied. Correspondingly, scant attention has been paid to 
an embodied approach and aesthetic experience in design in which 
feeling and thinking is not severed. Embodiment and process aes-
thetics have been addressed in design research (Dourish, 2001; 
Falin & Falin, 2014), but there is no contact with the immediate 
sensual, emotional, intuitional, or expressive dimensions of such 
experiences in relation to empirical conditions.
Indispensable in this respect is John Dewey’s (1934) Art as Ex-
perience, which is one of the seminal contributions to a philosophy 
of art and its relation to experience. Dewey’s thesis, which plays a 
central role in this research project, is that theories of aesthetics, by 
being analytical, run counter to aesthetic experience, which involves 
a perceptual continuity of relations and sequences of raw sensa-
tions that can only be found within experience, and specifically a 
pre-reflective (non-objectified) experience. For Dewey, because a 
unified “body-mind” experience integrates corporal motivational 
patterns, imagery, habits, sensations, and emotions, this gives any 
symbolic “meaning” a relational, visceral context (M. Johnson, 
2007). Thus, the contention of a Deweyan view of aesthetics is that 
design, as an embodied experience, could never come into existence 
or find expression and meaning except by the designer’s aestheticized 
transaction with the world. Integral to this, and often overlooked 
in the observation of what designers make and do, is the internal 
affective side of experience that the designer subjectively undergoes. 
Dewey’s vision of art as experience is a reflection of the rich 
philosophical movement of which he was part, known as Classi-
cal Pragmatism, which originated in the United States in the late 
nineteenth century. The Pragmatist school of thought breaks down 
traditional philosophical distinctions by emphasizing direct expe-
rience as ultimate foundation of all knowledge claims. It is already 
well understood in design scholarship that pragmatism is relevant 
to the practical nature of design inquiry and practice (Melles, 2008; 
Rylander, 2012; Schön, 1983; Steen, 2013; Stompff, 2012; Wetter 
Edman, 2014; Östman, 2005). By directing attention to the level of 
concrete feeling and taking the specificity of meaning in context as 
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one of its basic premises, the work of founding Pragmatist thinkers 
is essentially an embodied tradition (M. Johnson, 2007; Scarinzi, 
2015; Shusterman, 2008). 
One of the critical points made by the Pragmatists, to which 
I return throughout this thesis, is that an anti-reductionist view of 
human experience as embodied is defined by a particular ‘felt’ or 
aesthetic dimension. Put another way, by being embodied, thought 
by its very nature is aesthetic or ‘felt’ and therefore not functionally 
distinguishable as rational intellect or cognition (M. Johnson, 
2007; Scarinzi, 2015; Shusterman, 2008). In this work, I use “aes-
thetic” to refer to the inherent aesthetic quality of all experience. 
I also use Dewey’s (1934/2005) distinction of “esthetic” as limited 
to the perceptual or phenomenological phase of experience and 
different from the entire aesthetic experience of art that is both 
appreciative and perceptive. 
Aesthetic experience puts emphasis on the creative and cor-
poral character of action, or “will,” that is sensed and cannot be 
determined by rationally attributed relations. This has profound 
implications for creative action and a sense of ‘self,’ since it advances 
the role of subjectivity and the ability to make non-determinate 
choices that is integral to creative making and doing, and ultimately 
learning, within experience (Joas, 1996). The Pragmatist view has 
to do with physical action and its perceptual, emotional, and em-
pathic dimensions, which anticipate several recent developments 
in embodied cognition theory. It also precipitates a process-based 
or relational ontology in which all traditional metaphysical and 
epistemological dualisms like mind/body, subject/object, reason/
emotion, representation/experience are only abstractions (M. John-
son & Rohrer, 2007).
Research Questions and a Pragmatist Approach
This research is aligned with Dewey’s (2005/1934) notion of creativ-
ity as a quality of experience. In that view, the subjective or internal 
experience of the artist or designer actively pursuing particular 
aesthetic qualities of experience is not separate from objective con-
ditions of experience. Therefore, traditional research approaches 
that start from a Cartesian subject/object distinction and analytical 
criteria that differentiate between cognitive activities do not work. 
Such approaches prioritize outcomes and clear distinctions, and 
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thus, require an a priori view of knowledge and action (i.e., action 
as rationally determined and guaranteeing knowledge). They also 
stabilize the dynamic quality of ‘openness to experience’ to a fixed 
attitude or mindset. 
The purpose of this research project is to embody a sensation 
of ‘openness’ firsthand and to explore what that experience directly 
entails in terms of the qualities of relations. Creative and emergent 
learning behaviors that are considered the source of novelty have to 
do with actual perception in action (Dewey, 1929/1984, 1934/2005; 
Mead, 1934/1967). Therefore, if a creative experience is something 
I actively do and am involved in, to really start inquiring into and 
acting in the world in an aesthetic way — to literally have the open-
ness or freedom to perceive and create something — I cannot in 
advance provide the rational clarity of saying what the “problem” 
is or making explicit a research object. I need to understand the 
subjective, imaginative, and emotional dimensions that contribute 
to giving rise to creative action and the experience of a sensation 
of ‘openness.’ This engages with experimental behavior and the 
physicality and temporality of thought in experience. In short, 
experiencing the continuity of relations requires a non-dualistic, 
embodied approach as per arts-based learning mentioned earlier, 
in contradistinction to an analytical approach. 
According to Classical Pragmatists, direct experience occurs 
when the content of our active engagement in the world is equal 
in terms of what is ‘thought-of ’ and what is directly felt and seen. 
As far as the mind-body is empirically concerned, there is only 
one mode of perception —the immediate flow of consciousness in 
the present (Mead, 1932/2002). In the radicality of this experience, 
feelings of the relations between ‘things’ are as empirically real as 
the ‘things’ themselves. This implies that feelings are not merely 
subjective, but rather both subjective and objective. Even the feel-
ing of ‘self ’ is part of an ever-shifting aesthetic, an experiential 
dimension through which we relate to the world.
 Pragmatists’ views on the loss of subject/object orientation 
in direct experience can be seen as precursor to what today is pop-
ularly known as a creative experience of “flow” (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1990), being when one loses self-consciousness. The Pragmatists 
pointed out the same feeling of a continuity of experience found in 
a pre-reflective, esthetic encounter with the world. James’s (1890) 
phenomenological account of this stream of consciousness is “pure 
experience” where ‘self ’ and world — inner and outer — perceiver 
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and perceived are undifferentiated. Dewey (1934) specifically fo-
cuses on the aestheticism found in the “body-mind integration” of 
this experience, which he calls aesthetic “in the raw.” Mead (1934) 
expands on the role of perception of others and ‘self ’ in human 
action and the spontaneity or novelty which is found in the im-
mediate flux of life, i.e., the present. 
To concretize this embodied perceptual experience, I turn 
to the activity of form-giving, which is considered a central com-
petence in design practice (Hjelm, 2009). To overcome the diffi-
culties with using an aesthetic (embodied) approach in a research 
context that proceeds from objectifying design as a specific form of 
knowledge or “thinking,” it is necessary to further explore the tacit 
assumptions that structure many images of design theory and prac-
tice. The research questions involve paying attention to my direct 
experience of form-giving. This requires a basic research strategy 
of revisiting creative experience to ask the following questions: 
How do I experience openness from an embodied perspective?
This contains the following sub-questions: 
 How do I conceptually understand and embody  
the continuity of experience, i.e., an integrated 
thinking-feeling experience of consciousness?
 How do I methodically explore embodiment from 
a relational ontology, i.e., actively relate within a 
physical encounter with the world?
 What does this specifically mean for design as  
an artistic ability that has a quality or attitude  
of openness? 
Artistic Method of Movement Improvisation
To complement the Pragmatic view of the continuity of con-
sciousness, I use a strategy of movement-based inquiry to progress 
beyond the bias of conceptual objectification toward the objects 
of design. Through movement I act directly in response to the 
world. Thus, movement serves as a basic method for recovering an 
31
aesthetic integration in actual experience. Movement is therefore 
an explicit strategy to not rationally proceed from the ‘mind’ to 
experience to try to identify a problem and to solve it. It is about 
a physical capacity to act creatively, without the security of exter-
nal constructs or knowing where things are headed, but in which 
bodily sensation and emotional feeling are inextricable. 
I must perceive and ‘feel’ my way forward through active 
engagement with the world, which means my perception changes 
with respect to the objects at hand. At the same time, to explore 
the quality of openness, I must literally open myself up to the phys-
ical sensation of uncertainty — a quality said to be part of creative 
experience (Langer, 2014). As a double-barreled experience that 
includes objective intentions, as well as inner perceptions and affect, 
the expressive experience of shaping and giving form is inseparable 
from my sense of ‘self ’ — emotions, past memories, impressions, 
expectations, impulses, desires, habits, and feeling tendencies. 
Therefore, movement improvisation, in particular, offers a 
method for exploring the concreteness of form-giving that hap-
pens within a present, aesthetic mode of physical engagement. In 
this way, the mode common to form-giving in movement and the 
form-giving of design is the total immersion and thinking-feeling 
integration within an activity (a loss of self-consciousness), which 
highlights that movement and design the two are differences of 
degree rather than kind. Since movement as an artifact is ephem-
eral, its material form is the expressive and perceptive body. What is 
left is the distinctively human “bare physical existence” of form-giv-
ing and “the meaning not of what it physically is, but of what it 
expresses” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 209). 
I have selected the particular Japanese form of movement 
improvisation called Butoh, since it is among the most radical in 
its claim to be an experimental and expressive method of move-
ment without a particular style or goal of form. Butoh is shaped 
to a degree by Buddhist philosophy and Eastern practices of the 
body-mind, whose fundamental aim is the cultivation of ‘self.’ Its 
direct focus on bodily experience involves heightened awareness 
of the subjective experience or ‘interiority’ of the individual (body 
as a subject) through technical body training (body as an object). 
Thus, Butoh is an apt artistic method of exploration, since it has 
specific training techniques for being in the present with inner 
sensations and feelings and specifically “opening” the subjective 
‘self ’ to unfamiliar ways of moving and behaving. From my per-
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spective as a designer, Butoh’s explicit methods concerned with 
the felt, internal, and emotional experience of exploration and 
experimentation has the potential to reveal something about a 
design attitude of openness. 
I also selected Butoh because of the accessibility it provides 
to somatic training for a non-dancer. Butoh training is open to 
anyone intending to cultivate subjective awareness and corporal 
sensitivity in order to expand his/her participation in the body’s 
feeling and expressive capacity. Therefore, Butoh offers a means 
for me to become both more concrete in an aesthetic quality of 
openness in physical experience and to furthermore develop this 
as a quality in my design research. 
Overview of Thesis
This thesis should be seen as exploratory and contributing to basic 
empirical research on design as aesthetic experience. It targets the 
areas of design research and education, which embrace embodied 
and artistic assessments of design practice. This research is not 
directed at any particular design field or design practice, but is 
motivated by the kinds of abilities, sensibilities, and dispositions 
that shape an aesthetic approach to inquiry shared across design 
(and art) domains. This has broader theoretical and methodolog-
ical implications for arts-based learning and creative practices of 
exploration in making, doing, and form-giving.
My intention here is to question the observational view of 
knowledge and the ways that this rational discourse narrows the 
conceptualization of design by keeping the reflective, conscious 
experience distinct and separate from a phenomenological, esthetic 
feel of experience. The contention is that the limitation of this 
view has practical consequences for the ways in which knowledge 
is viewed and discussed in design theory, and by extension, for 
how a “design attitude” of openness and creativity is learned and 
developed as part of an aesthetic approach to design education. 
This thesis proposes that a Pragmatist non-dualistic perspec-
tive on experience contributes an understanding of design as a 
fundamentally aesthetic form of inquiry. The aim is to help build 
a theoretical platform for design fields with the intent to develop a 
pedagogical approach to learning from the wholeness of experience 
that cannot be rationally interpreted or reduced to symbolic or 
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rhetorical accounts as suggested by design academics (Buchanan, 
1995; Krippendorff, 1989). In particular, it positions a subjective, 
self-directed capacity as a central feature in an aesthetic approach 
to pedagogy that pertains to the designer’s ability to engage in 
expressive and empathic learning within experience itself. 
Another aim of this research project is to contribute an em-
pirical exploration of the experience of form-giving and to practi-
cally address a lack of understanding for what it means physically 
and perceptually to have an attitude of openness in experience. 
In terms of methods, this work introduces a movement-based 
approach which presents a marked shift from an objective focus 
on the outcomes and form of design to an experience constituted 
by an aesthetic approach of an intensified sensitivity to context, 
listening, and responding through bodily feeling. This practical 
focus sets up a relationship between an artistic or creative attitude 
of inquiry and artistic methods for developing awareness of and 
sensitivity to physical conditions in the present that support a 
quality of openness and an embodied capacity for openness. It 
seeks to present concrete experience-based lessons that deal with 
somatic sensation, as much as with cognitive abilities or methods.
Structure of Thesis
Chapter 1: The Current Context of Design Attitude(s) includes a broad 
review of the context of design research with special respect to 
“design thinking” and the social or relational design paradigm. In 
this review, I draw attention to the aesthetic/intellectual dualism 
in thinking about design, which I claim leaves design in the posi-
tion of a functional or problem-solving method, without taking 
adequate account of the creative character of bodily perception 
in action. This is explored in relation to how a design attitude of 
openness is currently perceived versus how openness as a quality 
of experience would actually be learned and embodied within the 
bodily activity of form-giving.
Chapter 2: A Pragmatist Philosophical Perspective presents aspects of 
Classical Pragmatist theory that I have found relevant to this study 
of design research, starting from their conception of experience. 
I illuminate how insights from the Pragmatists are important to 
considerations of creative and embodied characteristics of action. 
In particular the body, an anti-essentialist view of ‘self,’ and continuity 
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of experience that correspond to an understanding of cognition as 
embodied or ‘enactive’ come to bear on an non-dualistic foundation 
for design as an aesthetic form of inquiry. 
Chapter 3: The Exploratory Study addresses my particular learning 
and experience with design inquiry from my background as an 
architect. I discuss my basic research methodology with respect 
to Pragmatist understandings of “knowledge experience.” I in-
troduce my choice of movement improvisation and the specific 
form of Butoh that I have used as an artistic method to explore an 
embodied approach to form-giving and its relation to a perceptual 
experience of openness.
Chapter 4: An Empirical Context for Form-Giving is a brief outline of 
the context of movement improvisation and a short background on 
the specific form of Butoh and an introduction to its social context 
and some of its training techniques. 
Chapter 5: Four Direct Experiences of Form-Giving constitutes the 
majority of this thesis. The chapter focuses on the empirical models, 
which are comprised of four direct experiences from my somatic 
training with Butoh. The four experiences are entitled, Practicing 
‘Self,’ Meeting Halfway, Embodying Form, and Sense of Process, and 
serve to explore a present mode of aesthetic integration in an ac-
tivity of form-giving. In them I come into direct contact with the 
physicality and subjectivity of action and try to consider a quality 
of openness in that experience at the granular level of sensations, 
memories, emotions, and feelings. I have tried to use different 
styles of writing for the narratives and for the theoretical analysis 
and model building, which include a blend of Pragmatist theory, 
embodied cognition theory, and Butoh philosophy that stems from 
a Buddhist perspective. 
Chapter 6: Discussion of the Embodied Experience of Form-Giving 
contains a discussion of lessons from empirical work with move-
ment improvisation with special regard to somatic awareness and 
how a quality of openness comes to bear on the direct experience 
of form-giving. This discussion sets up creativity, not as an object, 
but within an artist’s active relating to the world (embodied) in 
the present with possibility for creative exploration and learning. 
This has practical considerations for addressing openness from a 
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subjective capacity for action and the qualitative and internal di-
mensions of that experience that is tied to a self-directed view of 
learning in arts-based education. 
Chapter 7: Design Attitude as an Openness —Capacity deals with im-
plications of the empirical work with Pragmatist theory on design 
research and education and suggests directions for further research. 
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The Current Context of Design Attitude(s)
Discourses on Design
Over the past two decades, design has emerged as a generalizable 
form of creative “thinking” and an enabler of innovation in society 
and business (Brown, 2008; D. Dunne & Martin, 2006; Kolko, 
2015; Lockwood, 2010; Martin, 2009). As a result, design has been 
drawn upon in different contexts of practice and overlapping fields 
of study that emphasize applying design not only to material ar-
tifacts, but also to the “intangible” social outcomes of services, 
policies, interactions, processes, as well as to social innovation 
(Manzini, 2007). This expanding interest in design has put design 
scholars in dialog with one another about the shift of design from 
a “material practice” and the dematerialization of the design object 
to performative, relational, processual, participatory, strategic or 
“higher order” (Buchanan & Margolin, 1995) applications of design 
in social contexts (Bjögvinsson, Ehn, & Hillgren, 2012; Blauvelt, 
2008; Redström, 2006; Robertson & Simonsen, 2012). 
Because of the thrust of design and design research towards 
more participatory forms of practice, practitioners in some design 
fields feel those fields are losing the material and physical connec-
tion to the designer. This has spurred questions about what is ‘core 
to design’ and “if everything is design, what then is a designer?” 
(Hjelm, 2009). Given this heightened epistemological situation or 
“knowledge” problem, design scholars have been trying to establish 
a research discourse for design that stresses the need to theorize and 
understand the nature of design practice with greater specificity (Bu-
chanan, 2001; Friedman, 2003; Niedderer & Reilly, 2010). Beyond 
this, the promotion of ‘design thinking’ and a ‘design attitude’ in 
the context of innovation has been instrumental in sharpening the 
research focus on understanding what kind of knowledge constitutes 
designers’ practices, and especially to distinguish what is creative or 
innovative about that knowledge (Carlgren, 2013; Jahnke, 2013). 
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This theoretical trajectory aims toward an overarching phi-
losophy or foundation for design as a particular kind of knowledge 
and a particular kind of research (Frayling, 1993). Although design 
is accepted as a practice-based discipline, there is a reoccurring 
sticking point for practice-based research concerning the nature of 
knowledge and the problem of distinguishing the type of knowl-
edge used in practice (Niedderer, 2007). Being embodied, such 
practical knowledge by its nature eludes the current requirements 
of traditional research, as well as the idea that “knowledge” is even 
an entity that can be readily recognized and identified out in the 
world. Observational and interpretive approaches to “knowledge” 
in practice raise the challenge of needing to reflect upon or even 
validate what researchers refer to as “design” in design discourse 
through objectifying it. In the theoretical approach of qualifying 
design by various means, including situated practices (Kimbell, 
2011), the culture or attitude of designers (Michlewski, 2008), 
the problems it faces (Buchanan, 1992), the meanings it makes 
(Krippendorff, 1989), the kinds of hypotheses or experiments of its 
inquiry (Bang, Krogh, Ludvigsen, & Markussen, 2012), academics 
split off the subjective experience of design from what can be ob-
jectively discerned as a phenomenon called design. 
The ensuing discussion is intended to situate this project as 
practice-based research that addresses design theory and episte-
mology. It does not address design practice. The goal here is to 
not to survey a range of design practices in design research, but to 
instead confront more broadly the dualistic thinking in the kinds 
of explorations made to understand the nature of design in design 
theory, and specifically the changing meaning of design is perceived 
in a new “relational” paradigm (Blauvelt, 2008). 
My particular point of departure to the ongoing design dis-
course has been from the area of design management, where the 
discussion concerning what is considered the ‘core of design’ has 
been perhaps most acute (Dorst, 2011). But instead of finding what 
is core to design, I recognize that what it means to be a design pro-
fessional centers around each designer’s embodied understanding 
of his/her own practice and his/her way of experiencing design. 
What is important to this experience is how designers actually 
come to understand and approach the nature of design and “design 
problems” (Adams, Daly, Mann, & Dall’Alba, 2011) which is more 
than just learning skills, methods or ‘the design process.’ 
41
Research on Design (Thinking)
The assumption behind much of the design research community’s 
commitment to practice-based views of design is that there is a 
“tacit” dimension to practice-based knowledge that cannot easily 
be made explicit (Niedderer & Reilly, 2010). The general problem 
for design researchers in this regard is framed around explicating 
the kind of practical knowledge or “know how,” procedural knowl-
edge, skills knowledge, tacit knowledge, embodied knowledge, 
silent knowledge, or aesthetic knowledge that design entails. One 
main avenue for design research in this respect begins from the idea 
that design is something inside of designers in the way they think 
or reason, like a mindset, an attitude, a temperament, or a way of 
thinking (Cross, 2006; Lawson, 2005). Canonical literature from 
this perspective on how designers think relies heavily on observa-
tion, either describing the actions of the designer from personal 
observation and/or from interviews with designers describing their 
experiences. 
In particular, Schön’s (1983) theory of reflective knowledge 
has been predominant in formulating a view of practice-based 
knowledge within design. He designates his view as “an episte-
mology of practice implicit in the artistic, intuitive processes which 
some practitioners do bring to situations of uncertainty, insta-
bility, uniqueness, and value conflict” (p. 49). From a research 
standpoint, in Schön’s method of calling attention to practical 
knowledge through observations and interviews with designers, the 
designer’s actual experience is already made an object of reflection. 
The struggle with Schön’s reference, like accounts of “design think-
ing” in general, is that of assuming that an interpretation of tacit 
knowledge constitutes an experience of ‘thought.’ It presupposes 
that we can talk about “reflection in action” as an activity separated 
by time and space. This approach however cannot explain what a 
reflective dimension of consciousness, one that would presumably 
happen in action, actually entails or feels like. 
The use of Schön’s thesis of reflection-in-action is just one 
specimen of the kind of research frame employed in design lit-
erature to interpret experience through identifying and parsing 
the object of “thinking” (Ryle, 1962/1949). For example, the way 
Ryle distances reflection-in-action from other exacting terms like 
“knowing-in-action,” which he claims is the mode of ordinary 
practical knowledge, means that he has to qualify the thought of 
professionals as different in kind from that of non-professionals. 
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Presumably, he does this to be able to raise the level of expertise 
and legitimacy within a specialized professional activity by laying 
stress on a sort of cognitive refinement of action through repeti-
tion. Or in the context of creativity, the perspectives that focus 
on the cognitive ability or thinking style of designers are parsed 
and named as future-orientated, abductive, iterative, explorative, 
holistic, integrative, ambiguity-tolerant, empathetic, convergent 
and divergent, intuitive, optimistic, or imaginative (Drews, 2009; 
Hassi & Laakso, 2011; Martin, 2009). The complexity that occurs 
with this, as with the notion of “design thinking” currently, is 
that by allowing this reflective dimension to exist in any of our 
actions and responses to the world, the distinction between one 
kind of reflection (design thinking) and other kinds of reflection 
(other kinds of thinking) becomes less easy to maintain. Schön’s 
example of practice-based reflection, for example, is not specific 
to design. This view actually leads design research to functionalize 
thinking, like that about design as a kind of “knowledge,” in order 
to distinguish it in kind. 
An underlying motive for current design research, particularly 
with respect to the emergence of a social paradigm of design, is 
to specify something still known as “design” at the level of ideas, 
systems, organizations, or experiences. One must assume that an 
intellectual form of interpreting design provides sufficient material 
for making sense of design or that thought provides a higher, more 
important kind of reality of ideas. The thought/action dualism 
explains the view that a conceptual meaning-making of design 
is distinguishable from a material practice. One example of how 
extreme this can be is reflected in Norman and Verganti’s (2014) 
antagonism between “a quest for novel meaning” (design-driven 
research) and “considerations of practicality” (tinkering). In their 
model, the idea of “tinkering” is portrayed as having no goal of 
enhancing meaning, and therefore not seen as contributing to any 
change in meaning. This disembodied research approach shows 
the way that an aesthetic, material practice of making and exper-
imenting in design and reflective processes of intelligence is seen 
to be at odds.
Research Through Design (Method)
For many designers, the theoretical concern of discovering a 
generalized inner form of thinking runs counter to the detailed 
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concrete activities and the artistic, embodied ways of working in 
the field (Kimbell, 2011). Drawing upon artistic traditions, design 
researchers claim “research through design” allows them to pro-
duce knowledge in practice (Bang et al., 2012). Consequently, 
their way around the knowledge problem has been to develop a 
position called constructivist design research (Koskinen et al., 2011), 
which is committed to idea that designers produce knowledge 
based on the skills and capacities of the design field itself (Archer, 
1995). What has developed from this view is a type of methodol-
ogy called research-through-design with the argument being that 
design research is primarily done through existing design practices 
because design practice constructs knowledge through its products 
or processes. 
This approach adopts an empirical perspective that acknowl-
edges that design has to do with the construction of ‘things’ outside 
of designers such as processes, practices, tools, skills, and methods. 
Practice is understood to be comprised of pluralistic and divergent 
methods situated in context (Kimbell, 2012). In this sense, to per-
ceive design as an object of thought, the design process or practice 
becomes the object, which emphasizes analysis and framing of the 
operations or acts performed. Along with this, there is a perceived 
research task of developing specific methods to draw out “tacit” 
dimensions of knowledge, which appear to serve as justification or 
evidence that such knowledge exists (Niedderer & Reilly, 2010). As 
with thinking styles, design research approaches become objectified 
and sorted into categories such as design-oriented to research-ori-
ented, user-centered and empathetic, generative and critical, and 
extend to the application of specific tools from prototyping, probes, 
observation, modeling, sketching, user tests, storyboarding, and 
mock-ups (Sanders, 2008). 
Empirically, research through design focuses predominately 
on the outcomes or manifestations of design research and how 
those become categorized in lieu of the concrete qualities of the 
experiences themselves. This objective focus raises continuous 
questions about the formal criteria according to which to evaluate 
design projects and methods. In some cases, the focus is on making 
professional design practices understandable, explicit, or containing 
an inner logic through which they unfold (Krogh, Markussen, & 
Bang, 2015). The struggle with the practice-based approach, not 
unlike the qualitative approach to “thinking,” is that it makes the 
experience of design an object of reflection. By moving the focus 
44
of design from one form (the design artifact) to another form (the 
design process), the tendency is toward the progressive objectifi-
cation of different forms of design activities. This encompasses 
parsing and describing design as interaction design, service design, 
relational design, co-design, experience design, and so on. Consis-
tent with the Design Methods Movement of the 1960s and 1970s, 
the concern becomes formalizing design practices, particular tools, 
processes, behaviors, and methods for knowledge creation (Cross, 
2001; C. Jones, 1984). From the manner of academic research and 
the instrumental nature of thought, it is predictable that prac-
tice-based research becomes drawn into the externalizing function 
of making methods explicit to have legitimacy or be understood 
as rigorous (e.g., Biggs & Büchler, 2007). The next logical step is 
formalizing methods according to the scientific method. 
Separating Thought from Action
By not empirically addressing the designer’s active perceptual en-
gagement in the situation, literature on design by and large lays 
stress on the observational, reflective aspect of consciousness. This 
conception takes reflective consciousness as a substitute for an 
esthetic, perceptual experience, which in essence perpetuates a 
Cartesian view that separates thought from action. By mentally 
transcending the embodied activity of thinking and its situatedness 
and physicality, such logic establishes something about “thinking” 
or methods that gives design an explanatory power. It loses the 
embodied feel and sense of form-giving, and in that, the designer’s 
subjective experience, ability, and sense of relations. 
In Schön’s (1983) often cited illustration of the architec-
ture practitioner, for example, he relates a designer’s artistry as 
a reflective “conversation with the situation” in which there is 
a physical, material “back-talk” (p. 79). This kind of artistic skill 
that a designer possesses means that he/she understands the feel 
for the media and language of his/her practice. This description 
says something about the conversational quality of artistic work, 
and Schön’s (1983) research should be credited with having taken 
great steps to illustrate a tacit “art of practice” by establishing that 
a designer tests, experiments, and works empirically with an in-
tentionality that might be initially inarticulate or inaccessible via 
verbal consciousness. The problem is that Schön’s work does not 
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provide a qualitative sense of the physical and aesthetic feeling 
for conceptual metaphors or imagery, and how that relates to the 
designer’s understanding experientially of material “back-talk.” By 
picking up on the reflective dimension of consciousness without 
including its phenomenological stream, Schön reinforces the sys-
tematic detachment of objective thinking about the design process 
and a ‘problem situation,’ opposed to the quality of the experience 
and the kinds of sensations not limited to problem-solving had by 
the designer. 
These dualistic approaches that draw on rhetorical and seman-
tic content to analyze collaborative projects, while useful from a sci-
entific point of view, are somewhat problematic from the embodied 
perspective of this thesis. Much practice-based research does very 
little to advance the integrality of an aesthetic practice of design that 
is imbued with physical and emotional qualities. Current design 
literature, especially that which addressed new forms of agency, for 
example, favor speaking about design as a matter of principles, such 
as participation (Bjögvinsson et al., 2012), co-creation (Sanders 
& Stappers, 2008), prototyping, and infrastructuring (Hillgren, 
Seravalli, & Emilson, 2011). 
Design researchers who address the systemic issues surround-
ing design production and consumption, for example, take on the 
function of agents of social change (Barnard, van Dartel, Beek-
man, Pieter, & Lindeman, 2015), activists (Fuad-Luke, 2009; Julier, 
2013; Markussen, 2013), and critical practitioners (Barab, Thomas, 
Dodge, Squire, & Newell, 2004; A. Dunne, 2006) by mobilizing 
processes of collaborative and open-ended forms of production. 
These participatory and relational forms are seen to be distinctly 
art-like and claim to address an aesthetic practice (Markussen, 
2013). While they reflect the kind of work that has been a part of 
participatory art practices for more than the past couple of decades 
(see Kester (2011) for examples), they raise similar questions about 
artistic forms in terms of the aesthetic qualities of the relations ac-
tually experienced (Bishop, 2004). For design research promoting 
social change, the question is if aesthetics is primarily only under-
stood to address questions and issues of “meaning” that are func-
tional and not fundamentally experiential. Much of what is being 
sought and discussed by researchers is around “enabling” people in 
trendy and provocative social forms of design. In applying design 
to issues that are a result of functionalism in the first place (e.g., 
the division between production/consumption), the question is 
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how they change and deal with the concrete feelings of relations 
between production and consumption.
In most cases, it is hard to sense the aesthetic, because most 
accounts of design are descriptive and there are no expressions 
from design researchers about the bodily sensations or qualities 
experienced firsthand (Whitcomb, 2016). The sights, smells, mem-
ories, emotional feelings, and sensations of the live, active body are 
overtly missing. This exposes the kind of instrumentality behind 
methodological claims of participation, co-creation, and empathy 
when designers are not dealing with their own empathic responses 
and reflecting on how they themselves actually open up their own 
perspectives (Whitcomb, 2016). Even the parts of design theory 
where there is work being done on designing for experience from 
an embodied perspective (Dourish, 2001) or exploring overtly 
aesthetic, craft-based approaches to making and perceiving (Falin 
& Falin, 2014), the research discussion is framed in response to 
analytical criteria and theoretical abstractions. 
Between Industry and the Arts
As design education in the universities has evolved over the past 
century, design’s identity has been in part defined by an indus-
trial orientation together with an arts and crafts-based tradition of 
material practice. The connection to industrialization is in many 
ways what defines modern design as a profession and what differ-
entiates it from the arts. It is also a source of tension in design, 
since it is largely through industry and, thus forms of scientific 
management, that design professionals seek legitimacy. For ex-
ample, many aims of design education, such as specific technical 
skills, are seen to be directly aimed at industrial imperatives (Levy, 
1990). At the same time, those recognizing the artistic tradition in 
design identify a worldview (norms, values, and understandings) 
that are in contrast to the values and epistemological approach of 
management (Rylander, 2009). For example, the increasingly overt 
instrumentalization of design as a strategic tool for innovation and 
decision-making, is seen as a problem to designers who identify 
design with embodied and material form-giving (Hjelm, 2009). 
This friction is not the focus here, but it is worth calling at-
tention to the fact that many forms of professional design practice 
today are intricately intertwined with the values of management, 
given that designers, architects included, typically work in orga-
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nizational and institutional contexts of practice. The intersection 
between industry and the arts naturally creates a practical challenge 
for designers who seek to rationalize their embodied approach, and 
yields a label as a “paradoxical practice” (Jahnke, 2013, p. 83). This 
intersection is the “knowledge problem” for design academia. The 
issue thus revealed is that design research collectively reifies and 
determines design as a function of thought apart from embodied 
expression. For example, “design thinking” has been taken to rep-
resent “what designers understand about design and how they go 
about the act of designing based on this understanding” (Adams 
et al., 2011, p. 588). This has an impact not just on the meaning 
and identity of design as a field of study, but also on the way that 
designers themselves seek and create meaning. 
In most practical situations, the human tendency is to concen-
trate on the functionality of carrying out certain processes to secure 
certain desired ends (Dewey, 1922/2002). However, only respond-
ing to objects of thought and not taking experience itself has the 
effect of maintaining a disembodied view of cognition. In design 
research, this anchors design to what is a functional perception of 
“knowledge” and of proceeding from what can be made conscious 
to the “mind.” This continues to align design theory with Herbert 
Simon’s (1969) pivotal suggestion that design is a problem-solving 
activity (e.g., Buchanan, 1992; Cross, 2001; Friedman, 2008). Per-
ception is there a priori in order to act or give form. Perception is 
not something that we do and ‘feel’ to experience meaning. Thus, 
what is a concrete physical activity, a design “experience” in the 
Deweyan sense, is operationalized as proceeding from mind to 
form (Krippendorff, 1989). In a direct way, this narrows the scope 
of the designer’s actions or learning behavior by imposing a precon-
ceived notion of a specific idea or form of behavior called “design.” 
In other words, the designer’s unconscious physical, emotional, 
and intuitional processes that are constitutive of creative action 
are conceptually predetermined. Holding the potential subject of 
design to a course of action and range of acceptable expressions 
and emotions brings about a practical separation of sensory expe-
rience from organizational life, in total, a “narrowed and dulled 
life-experience” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 23).
For example, the received view that design is a specific 
method or “research on the future” (Zimmerman, Stolterman, 
& Forlizzi, 2010), along with the use of tools like visualizations, 
mapping, and design scenarios, becomes a means for securing 
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anticipated consequences that ties design to future-centric, tech-
no-rational activities like management, planning, and strategic 
decision-making. The emphasis on the future, the “future” being 
an object of thought, functions as a prediction (ends) into which 
our action (means) enters (Dewey, 1929/1984). The objects or 
“preferred situations” of design are understood as many different 
things in different fields of design. Design is proposed as “creating 
value” in some shape or other: as organizational change, customer 
experience, problem-solving, strategic decision-making, product 
meanings (Verganti, 2009) social innovation (Manzini, 2007), or 
generally purposed with finding new directions or a “deeper pur-
pose of enhancing the lives of individuals” (Buchanan, 2015). The 
alignment of design activities to productivity and the expectation 
that design reliably produces creative outcomes, which includes the 
framing of design thinking as a creative resource (Kimbell, 2011), 
serve underlying functional or practical imperatives as means to an 
intended result. Thus, design enters into terms already defined, its 
activity already defined, and functions as a prescription for opera-
tions to be performed. 
Design, if understood functionally, can provide a kind of as-
surance of intelligently directed ways of acting. And as “intelligent 
forethought,” design behaviors can be organized toward appro-
priate action (Buchanan, 2008). Hence, this paradigm is bent on 
formalizing practices, and more importantly, on how to discipline 
those activities that can be reliably called “design.” Conceptualizing 
thinking apart from bodily sensations and emotions in experience 
yields the kind of design thinking that is oriented toward narrowly 
practical processes, rational problematization, a clear articulation of 
operations, and possible consensus. Dewey (1928/1981) describes 
this kind of acceptance of institutional arrangements and object 
categories in industry almost a century ago. “Soulless and heart-
less materialism,” he says, is a “condition of action; that in which 
material and mechanical means are severed from the consequences 
which give them meaning and value” (Dewey, 1928/1981, p. 30). His 
use of the term “mechanical” is describes the mechanism of habits 
and routines severed from the thought and feeling that come to 
dictate bodily behavior. 
This means-ends construal of design works to disunite con-
sciousness from present actualities and immediate sensory engage-
ment (Dewey, 1922/2002). In other words, the physical experience 
of design is shaped by a dualistic premise of knowledge creation 
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(Pallasmaa, 1996). With perception and action separated, design 
is no longer grounded in the bodily dimensions of experience and 
multiple layers of memory, imagination, perception, and emotion. 
Design in this one-sided vision can only address questions and 
issues of meaning that are also practical or functional (what can be 
made observable) and not fundamentally experiential (what is felt). 
With regards to this same point of prioritizing thought over 
sense perception, many contemporary design practices aimed at 
innovation and meaning-making are framed around the idea of 
applying a design form in social situations. In many of these cases, 
there is primarily a focus on activities and methods for the partic-
ipation of groups of people and to draw on participants’ or users’ 
“knowledge” and experience. They inherently waste the feelingful 
and expressive potential of design as a creative experience in itself 
to focus on the functional orientation of producing creativity or 
innovation, for example (Jahnke, 2013). In other words, if we take 
meaning-making to be mean more than the activities performed 
within situations which call for “solutions,” many of these design 
activities and projects participating in a search for new possibili-
ties are caught in the functionalist paradigm of reducing human 
creativity to problem-solving (Jahnke, 2013). 
The concentration of design research that aims to make sense 
and grasp design in an explicit, conceptual vocabulary ultimately 
reflects an undeniable cultural desire to discern an underlying order 
to our relationships and our lives. We seek clarity and intelligibility 
in what is specifically a scientific paradigm of knowledge (Dear, 
2006), a paradigm that Dewey (1929) explores in The Quest for 
Certainty. Dewey’s thesis is that the scientific relation between 
knowledge and action is reinforced by a valorization of objective 
methods so that a theoretical quest for certainty in practice be-
comes a “search for methods of control” (Dewey, 1929/1984, p. 
103). Instrumental operations and rules of action provide a trust-
worthiness and practical certainty in which chaotic and changing 
relations can be made to feel tacitly understood and in control. A 
sense of security or comfort is rooted in the understanding, clarity, 
and even predetermination of our actions (Dewey, 1929/1984). 
Dewey’s view reiterates idea of Charles Peirce about the nature 
of humans to seek methods of fixation and belief. We form habits 
through experience, according to Peirce, to appease the irritation 
of doubt and to move toward a “serene, satisfying, and happy tone 
of mind” (Scheffler, 1974, p. 58). In turn, we avoid the sensations of 
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discomfort, insecurity, and loss of control that come from doubt, 
change, risk, or when we act outside familiar territory.
Thus, the sense of security and comfort underlying processual 
and organizational relationships found in management culture dies 
hard (Bauman & May, 2001). The value and expectation of qualities 
like clarity and usefulness, along with the sense of the practicality of 
action, remain unquestioned in how researchers talk about design. 
It is very common to read and hear design described as “useful, 
usable, and desirable” (Buchanan, 2001). This rationalist thinking 
structures our view of design, effectually keeping it nearer to the 
form of modernism and a vision of progress and security in where 
things are going (Bauman & May, 2001). The entire project of 
modernism severs means and ends, production from fulfillment, 
present from future (Dewey, 1922/2002). So for designers to take 
a critical approach to action, it is important to point out how de-
signers’ own tacit expectations also shape the perceived expression 
of the poetic qualities and aesthetic potentials of their action.
The dissonance that arises in design research using a tradi-
tional research perspective, or at least holding knowledge up to 
a rational view, is that the creative qualities of a design attitude, 
which seemingly makes it different from ‘scientific thinking’ and 
able to produce organizational change (Hassi & Laakso, 2011; 
Kolko, 2015; Owen, 2007; Stephens & Boland, 2014), become 
abstractions. The creative actions of risking failure, exploration, 
empathy, the acceptance of ambiguity, and how those take place 
and feel in the temporality of experience, are divorced from the 
subjective perception of the action and the designer, who is actually 
doing the design thinking with the design attitude. 
It is especially tricky when conducting research-through-de-
sign, for example, since many design researchers implicitly assume 
sensibility and judgment by a designer from a practice-based view 
of design, but do not provide a clear empirical connection to the 
experience of their relational forms and/or methods. The ques-
tion that lingers for design research is how relational forms, even 
if artistic, are actually perceived or embodied as ‘designerly’ and 
connected to a creative artistic attitude, as opposed to one that is 
‘managerly’ or ‘engineerly.’ For example, there are claims that such 
interventions are ‘designerly’ in the way that they lend a power of 
resistance (Markussen, 2013). By generically asserting that the inter-
ventions represent aesthetic practice by “opening the gap between 
doing and affect” (Markussen, 2013) or “doing and making,” such 
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projects miss detailing ‘designerliness’ in terms of concrete aesthetic 
qualities — as well as if/how exactly the sensation of resistance is 
perceived and felt in a form of doing and making, and not just a 
feeling that is “evoked in the people” (Markussen, 2013). A similar 
generalization is found in practices that claim to be empathic design 
(Mattelmäki et al., 2013) and build interventions “to trigger new 
empathic responses to inspiring new design openings,” (p. 74) 
without any concretization what empathic responses are actually 
generated and how that works and feels as an experience. One 
question here is if triggering empathy and using aesthetic practice 
are enough to qualify as ‘designerly’ in project outcomes. The 
deeper question is whether the design researcher is indeed openly 
questioning his/her own methods, sensations, and perception of 
experience, whether these projects are truly artistic and empathic 
forms, or do they just assert another form of certainty and control 
under the label ‘design’? 
Designerly work presumably involves a designer’s sensibil-
ity, judgments, and attitudes, which speaks to the tradition of 
designers as “expert subjects” and “professionals with designerly 
ways of doing” (Bardzell, 2011). This involves something internal 
to the designer, exercising intuition and aesthetic sensibilities that 
include paying attention to his/her own feelings and inner states 
and intuiting and sensing what things need changing. But nothing 
is ever said directly about those. The use of creative forms and/or 
tools alone is not enough, since management promoted anything 
from objects and sketches (Eppler, Hoffmann, & Bresciani, 2011), 
social or interactive tools and platforms (Shneiderman, 2002), 
narratives and observation (Von Krogh, Ichijo, & Nonaka, 2000), 
to face-to-face sharing and prototyping (Mascitelli, 2000), with 
the idea of knowledge sharing and/or making tacit knowledge 
available. More critical is that many of these approaches through an 
analytic lens depend on a distinction between ‘self ’ and the object, 
which continually shifts thought to the form of an activity to refer 
to what we determine as “design,” without attention to the content 
of the experience.
52
Subject-Object Integration
From the non-dualistic perspective of this thesis, what haunts the 
design researcher today as a “professional thinker” is the scientific 
sense of instrumentalism in wanting to reliably understand how 
design works and what it is —like a problem to be solved. The 
kinds of current research approaches on design and through design 
assume design, like they assume of science, to be a practice that has 
an formalized behavior or distinguishing feature such as a method 
or way of thinking, when it is the case that in experience itself no 
such distinction exists (Dewey, 1934/2005).Thus, qualifying the 
actionable, subjective expertise of design retains a pervasive subject/
object dualism. This view carries the sense that design is something 
the designer takes on somewhat passively in terms of methods, 
tools, skills, and mentalities, instead of design being an action and 
form of learning that he/she achieves and undergoes. Even design 
expertise is seen as behavior the designer performs and applies like 
‘problem framing’ (Cross, 2004). Thus, the reliance on a form of 
objectivity in the designer’s own learning activities gives design 
“the insoluble problem of how a subjective experience can beget 
objective knowledge” (Dewey, 1916/2004, p. 44). 
The Pragmatists recognized that traditional philosophical 
accounts misapprehend the reflective or objectifying function of 
our consciousness (the naming of it) in place of the pre-reflective, 
perceptual function of our consciousness (the subjective forming of 
it). This confusion restricts the emotional and physical dimensions 
of creative action to a rational idea of knowledge or knowledge gen-
eration. Deeming design pre-rational action is not only problematic 
from the perspective of creativity and embracing open-endedness, 
but also for a profession that continually maintains a human-centric 
and empathic approach. The possibility of exploring emotional and 
aesthetic responses and the content of human experience beyond 
functional and external purposes, particularly those that do not fall 
within the rational paradigm, like fear and sorrow, conflict, and 
insecurity, allow for the understanding of the empathetic qualities 
of care, nurture, compassion, or love during the process of design. 
Assuming that emotion and feeling are integral to creativity 
(Radford, 2004), it is important that design research explore the 
feelings beyond comfort, control, and security provided by in-
telligent forethought. Direct lived experience, however, is where 
subject-object or thinking-feeling are indistinguishable. A designer’s 
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internal will and sensation, used to connect to and engage with the 
physical world of urges, impulses, reactions, affect, and a sense of 
‘self,’ must be taken into account as a part of creative experience 
and a design attitude. Design occurs not merely in experience, “but 
because of it, through interaction with it” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 
12). The sensibility, judgment, and attitude of the designer cannot 
be addressed in a functional way because that circumscribes what 
are considered design behaviors and the designer’s methods for 
creative action. Creativity is bound up with intrinsic motivation 
(Hennessey, 2003), exploration, and the ability to challenge one’s 
own perception and sense of ‘self.’ At some level, an openness to 
experience or a “design attitude” must come from the designer as 
a doer and change-maker so as to direct his/her actions toward 
bodily experience, and this entails exercising intuition and breaking 
loose from old mindsets. A design attitude of openness must be 
empirically confronted in terms of how design is actually experi-
enced and felt in the world and not merely as a search for control. 
Yet, recent literature on design that acknowledges aesthetics and 
form-giving in design go beyond rationalized processes, prob-
lem-solving, visualizing, storytelling, and framing provides little 
in the way of a substantive discussion about the emotional, ide-
ational, and “tacit” sensitivities in the experience of design or a 
design attitude (Tonkinwise, 2011). In-depth discussions about 
the aesthetical practices of design, like form-giving, that “have the 
possibility to embody and materialize issues” (Hjelm, 2009, p. 3), 
are conspicuously absent from design literature.
The Aesthetic in Design
Having a history as an artisan craft activity, subjective expertise, 
aesthetics, and form-giving have been an integral part of modern 
design education (Gropius, 1965). The particular activity of 
form-giving, for which Swedish has the word “gestaltning,” is 
seen to be foundational to the intuitive, tacit, and material un-
derstanding of design practice and is often referred to by design 
authors (Abidin et al., 2008; Hjelm, 2009). The fact is, however, 
that design literature does not much address how the subjectivity 
of the activity of form-giving, that of perceiving and manipulating 
the physical world, is experienced by the designer. Owing to a 
dualistic perception form-giving, and thus creativity, design as an 
experience presents both a conceptual and empirical challenge for 
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design academics. Instead, design scholarship continually reifies 
form and, respectively, the experience of form-giving. This com-
pletely misses the kind of ‘feel’ for a design gestalt or wholeness 
through bodily perception that might say something about the 
creative abilities of designers and a design attitude of openness. 
And instead, design literature, by not explicitly recognizing an ar-
tistic mode of thinking-feeling integration, pushes more and more 
notions of craft, sensitivity, perception, intuition, affect, judgment, 
and expressiveness into the shrinking realm of artistic practice.
In general, scant attention has been paid to aesthetic theory 
in design research (Folkmann, 2010). Where the aesthetic is con-
sidered, design literature turns on the notion of aesthetic with 
respect to something to be regarded objectively, rather than sub-
jectively experienced. Aesthetic is presented in formal terms as 
decision-making about a design object. These concerns range from 
visual appearance and the surfaces of products of design (Crilly, 
Moultrie, & Clarkson, 2004; Karjalainen, 2007; Person, Schoor-
mans, Snelders, & Karjalainen, 2008), elements and images of form 
(Abidin et al., 2008), to pertaining to a discrete type of subjective 
judgment like “styling” or “taste” that deals with “pleasing appear-
ances” (Tonkinwise, 2011). 
This dualistic frame takes a cue from traditional aesthetic 
philosophy, which is associated with analytical constructions of 
what aesthetics consists of in terms of formal qualities and how to 
evaluate them (Folkmann, 2010). Aesthetics in this tradition has 
been synonymous with a form of ‘sensuous knowledge,’ which 
stems from a deep-seated conceptual separation between feelings 
of beauty, as a judgment of taste, and thought and rational logic, 
whose goal is truth. This view of aesthetics is credited to philos-
opher Immanuel Kant who accentuated the perceived contrast of 
art as an experience grasped and admired in and of itself, rather 
than for its uses, notably saying that a key feature of aesthetics is 
“purposiveness without a purpose” (Richie, 2007). Thus, a dualistic 
approach to understand the nature of art and ‘sensuous knowledge’ 
underpins the compartmentalization of the useful, practical arts 
from expression in experience more broadly (Dewey, 1934/2005). 
That design is seen as separate from art at all is due to a much more 
profound split between fine and practical arts stemming from a Pla-
tonic dualism. The former was seen from the perspective of serving 
a poetic aim (poesis), while the latter was seen to be practical or 
useful (technic) (Buchanan, 2001). 
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The favoritism shown toward ‘higher’ forms of cognition and 
intellect in design literature reduces the Pragmatist appreciation for 
bodily, aesthetic engagement as the model of all human learning 
(Joas, 1996). For example, that design is said to be a “reasoned state 
of making and planning for the future” (Buchanan & Margolin, 
1995) is characteristic of a large portion of design theory that places 
value in thinking or design as an intelligent pursuit. Formative writ-
ings in design academia over the past thirty years generalize design 
as a mental phenomenon or act of cognition through a number 
of articulations, like reflective (Schön, 1983), solution-focused 
(Lawson, 2005), reasonably “making sense” (Krippendorff, 1989) 
abductive and ‘designerly’ (Cross, 2006). It disconnects designers 
from their practice and embodied sensibility with materiality, if 
not also generally dismisses internal processes. The preference 
for objective criteria and principals enthrones “the rational, the 
orderly, the manageable” and cuts us off from all experience of the 
unconscious while there is “widespread repression of all physical 
emotion, i.e., all bodily expression of joy, grief, anger, affection, 
fear” (Whitehouse, 1995, p. 244). In much of our institutional and 
organizational culture, we experience alienation from our bodies, a 
lack of contact with feelings, and suppression of emotions (John-
son, 1995; Shusterman, 2006). Organizations manifest a distrust 
of the practicality of sensory knowledge (Gagliardi, 1999). For 
example, that the designer’s use of his/her body in contexts of 
practice identified with objective validation and rational action 
brings uncomfortable feelings suggests that design “will be limited 
by feelings of ‘this is kind of silly’ and questions of, ‘Where is this 
going to go?’” (Stephens & Boland, 2014, p. 2)
This type of institutional fear owes to a mind/body detach-
ment. As Dewey (1928/1981) writes, in an essay entitled “Body and 
Mind,” the cultural situation that has “brought about contempt for 
the body, fear of the senses, and the opposition of flesh to spirit” 
(p. 21). Emotional, visceral meaning is not taken “in connection 
with what it actually does and effects in the distinctively human 
medium,” but treated “in connection with processes which are 
going on outside the body, the processes which it shares with inan-
imate things” (p. 31). Recognizing that habit and human will lend 
toward the objective security found in mental abstraction, Dewey, 
like the other Pragmatists, urged reconsidering bodily operations. 
“The question of the integration of mind-body in action is the 
most practical off all questions we can ask of our civilization. It 
56
is not just a speculative question; it is a demand” (p. 30). Bodily 
experience is not only a practical question, but it is an aesthetic one 
(Shusterman, 2008). The subjective and emotional and affective 
side of experience is where meaning is experienced and created in 
action (M. Johnson, 2007). 
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Creative Action and the ‘Self’
From the Deweyan view, aesthetics takes place within experience —
full, living experience. Aesthetics is literally “of the senses,” concern-
ing the actual motivational patterns, images, feelings, qualities, and 
emotions which give context to meaning in the world, a “process 
of embodied meaning” (M. Johnson, 2007). The main contention 
regarding this embodied view of aesthetic is that, because it takes 
place in the flux of the phenomenological present, it can never be 
rationally interpreted. And without an analytical distinction between 
thinking and feeling, the rational does not take precedence over the 
intuitive and the emotional. Therefore, analytically clarifying design 
from art is not practically helpful. Rather what is important to see 
is something fundamentally “artistic” in design, in an embodied 
aspect or dimension of practice. It is the integration of aesthetic 
dimensions — sensuous, kinesthetic, intuitive, poetic, expressive, 
visceral — and practical dimensions that preserves the wholeness of 
experience in a procedure of making or doing. Thus, a non-dualistic 
view of the aesthetic is understood in integrative terms of the ‘felt’ 
meaning of experience (Dewey, 1934/2005; Gendlin, 1997).
If there is a central concern for creativity within design, re-
searchers studying design are overlooking a central question about 
what kind of experiences are meaningful to designers. This meaning 
takes place in the subjective dimension of content and feelings of 
‘self ’ that are bound up with physical experience and the possi-
bility of acting in the present. Design is not only what one does. 
It is also what is subjectively undergone —how the experience is 
perceived and felt. This idea is found in the Pragmatist orientation 
to experience, where this reciprocal relationship contributes to 
an experience of ‘self ’ (see more on ‘self ’ p. 80). Due to the emo-
tional, felt meaning of experience, design is intricately related to 
‘self ’ and the opportunity to express something personal about 
experience (Dewey, 1934/2005; Eisner, 2002a). The active and vol-
untary agency of a designer implies a concern with how designers 
perceive and appropriate the world through their actions and the 
actual experience of creating new meaning and things. From the 
Deweyan view, aesthetic training also has something to say about 
the designer’s bodily and sensory craft that allows him/her to secure 
feelingful and meaningful form.
Therefore, taken as an aesthetic practice, design offers a ho-
listic experience including the bodily perception and identification 
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of ‘self.’ Research shows that designers value their freedom to think 
and behave differently (Michlewski, 2008), which means part of 
what makes design a meaningful experience is the opportunity 
for self-exploration or testing the ‘self ’ in concrete situations and 
specifically through different aesthetic relations and qualities. In a 
concrete, material sense this concerns the physical opportunities 
to do, make, intervene, manipulate, appropriate, meet, and relate 
to the world. So while designing, an individual is not only giving 
form, but also learning how to create ‘self ’ (Eisner, 2002a). This 
being the case, for many designers the formal outcomes of design 
are not just objects of thought, but simultaneously a manifestation 
of the designer’s relations to the world, a kind of extension of 
their self-identity. There is intrinsic value in the possibility for an 
exploration of ‘self ’ that goes beyond an objectified image of ‘self ’ 
and, furthermore, an objectified image of design. It becomes to a 
personal sense of intentionality and purpose in exerting a physical 
sense of will over one’s own actions.
Therefore, this creative experience is about the range and 
diversity in the ability and perception to act in the first place. The 
Pragmatic perspective of creativity in this thesis, then, revolves 
around how the ability for creative action is tied to a particular 
quality of experience. In the action of designing is where there is 
volitional experience to choose and act in indeterminate and open-
ended forms. This creative experience is where a designer experi-
ences a sense of freewill and an ability to aesthetically materialize 
expression and meaning in the world with respect to his/her own 
learning interests. It should be mentioned that this aesthetic ex-
perience, connected to subjective volitional experience, offers a 
course of action through forms which is not limited to a formal 
ideology of beauty or pleasure, but any desired intensification 
of life’s experiences from the horrific, melancholic, anticipatory, 
remorseful, and disgusting, to the mysterious, and embarrassing. 
Given that creativity is tied to action, this is not about trying 
to identify or capture the nature of something objectively de-
scribed as “creativity” (e.g., Amabile, 1988; George, 2007; Per-
ry-Smith & Shalley, 2003) since this kind of model lends itself to 
trying to control for outcomes of creativity, instead of searching 
for new forms of action and imaginative experiences that give birth 
to creativity. The most notable work in the literature on creativity 
with respect to experience is by the psychologist Csikszentmihalyi 
(1990), who provides accounts of creative activity by people when 
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they are in the experience of the activity. He discusses this with 
respect to an intrinsic motivation for the kind of flow experience 
that reinforces a sense of ‘self.’ Making the present instant more 
enjoyable, he writes, “has the potential to make life more rich, 
intense, and meaningful; it is good because it increases the strength 
and complexity of the self” (p. 70). 
Because Csikszentmihalyi’s view returns us to the qualitative 
experience of the individual, it connects very closely to the Prag-
matist views of consciousness and experience. For instance, Mead’s 
(1934) thesis is about a deeply sought expression of the ‘self,’ to 
do something novel on his/her own, carried out in his/her own 
way that gives rise to creativity. And similarly, in Dewey’s (1934) 
view, there has to be a unification of internal sensation (subjective 
undergoing) and habit (the externalized form of doing) to permit 
any chance for the detection and discovery of innovative and imag-
inative behaviors. With respect to a ‘creative act’ for which the 
outcome is uncertain, the intent is actually toward changing habit 
and routine (Dewey, 1922/2002).
Frame Creation and Form-Giving
The fact that design is about perceiving the world in different ways 
should be familiar to many in the design community, who already 
understand “the creation and use of frames” as a critical part of 
professional design practice (Dorst, 2011, p. 527). “Framing” in 
general is a popular term in design literature, since Schön’s (1983) 
citation of a designer’s process and his/her use of a standpoint or 
frame of reference to view a problematic design situation. While 
design thinking and design expertise are tied to the idea that de-
signers iteratively frame and reframe problems and issues over the 
course of a design process (Cross, 2004), this is not so different 
from other reflective and artistic practices that claim to use frames. 
In arts-based learning, for example, a frame is a search for an aes-
thetic perspective, metaphor, or image that provides a certain way 
of seeing an experience and provides the artist with a specificity 
and focus, like of an emotional tone, for example, to derive the 
form (Eisner, 2002a). 
From the perspective here, a designer’s embodied, experiential 
way of working integrates thought and feeling and what provides 
the basis for what is referred to as “frame creation” in design. This 
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brings me to the point that frame creation is virtually connected to 
‘form’ as an aesthetic activity. Frames rely on a specific perception 
and emotional reference, which “requires in some cases, a disregard 
for the label or function of the thing seen in order to pay attention 
to matters of form, that is to the way qualities are configured” 
(Eisner, 2002a, p. 85). Feeling and sensation are used to secure the 
metaphorical, qualitative, and emotional attributes that cause us 
to be touched or moved by a particular experience. 
Throughout this thesis, I refer to form-giving to concretize 
the aesthetic experience in the context of design. Form-giving is 
described by designers as expressing, materializing, or ‘shaping’ an 
abstract idea through sensory perception (Abidin et al., 2008). It 
places emphasis on embodiment and thus can be understood as an 
activity dependent on the aesthetic sensitivity and perceptive ‘feel’ 
and judgment of form by the designer.
The idea of form-giving in this project starts with form taken 
in the Deweyan sense to be “the operation of forces that carry 
an experience of an event, object, scene, and situation to its own 
integral fulfillment” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 134). Form as an expe-
rience of perception is defined through time and by the nature of 
rhythm or organization of energies, as opposed to a static view of 
an artifact or something visible. Form is an expression of a bodily 
and sensorial journey, “the moving integration of an experience” 
(Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 134), through crescendos and diminuendos, 
compression and release, calm and fury, which incorporate both 
physical and mental structures. 
Because there has been a pervasive neglect of feeling and 
perception in form-giving or bodily dimensions within design 
research, there are a few critical points about form-giving from a 
Pragmatist view worth noting here. First, because form and content 
are inextricable, how a thing is given form is equally as important as 
the form itself. This is an idea of Dewey’s (1934), which is lost in the 
continual treatment of form as one that stands alone as an objective 
reference to thought without the perceptual, emotional process of 
the embodied individual. In a well-known paper in design theory 
literature, Klaus Krippendorf (1989) claims that a form is semanti-
cally informed by content (what he calls “meaning”). This assumes 
a cognitive act on the part of the designer or receiver, in that there 
is a mind that gives meaning to a representational (objective) form. 
This does not consider the physical dimension of experience, which 
inherently involves expressive and emotional content in connec-
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tion to ‘self.’ Thus, Krippendorf ’s suggestion assumes a practical, 
rational orientation toward a cognitive understanding (making 
sense) and the usability of ‘things,’ rather than suggesting the role 
of feeling, effort, and emotion in making sense and giving form 
to experience itself. 
A second point is that an embodied perspective to practice 
indicates that form-giving is not merely spatial and image oriented, 
but is a profoundly kinesthetic, perceptual experience. This again 
refers to the fact that form-giving is not just symbolic or visual, 
but is concrete and rooted in physical sense-making. For instance, 
a designer’s intuition of, “I think with my hands” (Collopy, 2004), 
can be taken quite literally in that his/her perception is actually 
shaped with respect to physiological conditions. The way he/she 
uses his/her tools also shapes the way a designer thinks about or 
‘grasps’ a situation. 
This also means that there cannot really be what has been 
suggested as a “higher order of design” that is mostly concerned 
with the intangible or with thinking or symbolic terms for ideas 
(Buchanan, 2001). Given that perception is embodied, any per-
ception of form and giving of form happen in a particular way 
and are comprised of concrete relations. Form-giving requires the 
particularity of tangible qualities, its significance is in how it feels, 
how it relates, separates, unifies, articulates, structures, prohibits, 
or invites us to experience. Design “thinking” can only happen 
within a medium (even if that medium is only a body). There is a 
reason why many in the design world, from Charles Eames to Mies 
van der Rohe, are famously known for having said that design is 
in the details. For most designers, design is not merely generative 
and imagining possibilities, but is in the realization of the aim and 
its material existence (e.g., Brown, 2008). 
From an artistic perspective, the form and content of an expe-
rience are inextricable. How something is made is part and parcel of 
what is made (Dewey, 1934/2005). If design research views human 
processes from an objective view of form, those experiences feel 
rational and like problems to be solved. It is like trying to achieve 
an outcome with a certain approach, for example, using a design 
tool where if I do this, the result will be such and such, which feels 
different from trying to openly investigate possibilities and explore 
experience through emotion, intuition, fear, and doubt. The two 
are not mutually exclusive, but the quality of the experience of 
inquiry is different in terms of exploration; the first has a predic-
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tive orientation requiring a kind of result or “knowledge,” while 
the second asks an open question which there are many ways to 
answer. These approaches have a different quality of feel in terms 
of the content of the personal inquiry. One has the expectation of 
results or a solution and one is open-ended and what might feel 
like play or exploration. If design research does not promote the 
subjective content of exploration through the qualities of relations, 
which includes the internal feelings of discomfort, uncertainty, and 
ultimately the living sensation of doubt, the form of design relations 
will serve rational, functional forms.
‘Self’ in Arts-Based Learning
The experience of creative action and the ‘self ’ puts us back in touch 
with the embodied understanding of design of designers and how 
that understanding is learned and experienced. It highlights the 
kind of education that designers receive that places this variety 
of possibility for creativity at the heart of the learning experience. 
In a sense, the ‘core of design,’ where designers learn the skills of 
a material practice, is also part of the shaping of a certain set of 
values and/or worldview and the fulfillment of a quest for inquiry 
and meaning. Action is the origin of learning how to create ‘self ’ 
(Dewey, 1938/1997). Take, for example, this quote from Lawson 
and Dorst (2009) that suggests that there is something intrinsically 
more to design learning than just skill and tool acquisition: 
designing is not just something you do, or that you take 
lightly when you practice it, but rather it helps form your 
identity...design becomes a part of one’s being because it 
involves so much that is personal, like your creativity, way 
of approaching the world’s problems, you own history, 
learning style and view of the world. (p. 270)
It is unsurprising from an embodied view of practice that designers 
identify themselves with their work and find it meaningful given 
that they “connect to work on emotional, rational, and aesthetic 
levels” (Michlewski, 2008, p. 387). This internal approach is dis-
tinctive in the arts, which is very much a process of ‘self ’ and the 
development of individual learning. “Work in the arts is not only a 
way of creating performances and products; it is a way of creating 
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our lives by expanding our consciousness, shaping our dispositions, 
satisfying our quest for meaning, establishing contact with others, 
and sharing a culture” (Eisner, 2002a, p. 3).
Therefore, to consider the kind of design attitude championed 
in design literature is to recognize a broader understanding of what 
a design epistemology represents — “an interpretive, emergent, and 
explicitly embodied approach” (Rylander, 2009, p. 7). It should be 
remembered that this epistemology is historically embedded in a 
model of artistic development. There is some importance attributed 
to creativity from an arts-based model of education in design, since, 
for example, the design attitude is very near the disposition upheld 
in arts-based education that “fosters flexibility, promotes a tolerance 
to ambiguity, encourages risktaking, and depends upon the exercise 
of judgment outside the sphere of rules” (Eisner, 2002a, p. 35). 
The work of Elliot Eisner (2002a) in his book, The Arts and 
the Creation of Mind, predicates an art-based educational theory 
based on the way that experience and inquiry is framed in an aes-
thetic paradigm. His work draws heavily on Dewey’s (1934) thesis 
of esthetics and maintains that the importance of what the arts 
teaches lies in the fact that it does not rely on verbal clarity, but 
works directly through qualities in experience. Eisner presents some 
aesthetic ways of working learned in an artistic education such as, 
“noticing subtleties among qualitative relationships, conceiving of 
imaginative possibilities, interpreting the metaphorical meanings 
the work displays, exploiting unanticipated opportunities in the 
course of one’s work” (Eisner, 2002a, p. 35). These ways of working 
undoubtedly relate to the idea that “aesthetic knowledge defines 
design thinking” and is a kind of approach that “engages the body 
in sensory experiences that reframe organizational issues” (Stephens 
& Boland, 2014, pp. 1–2). Arguably, what is not well understood 
from the view of design research is what and how designers actu-
ally learn from an aesthetic foundation that integrates aspects of 
consciousness. Design theory does little to address the learning and 
engaging in the art of form-giving through which meanings and 
qualities of experience are embodied and expressed. 
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A Pragmatist Philosophical Perspective
In order to explicate embodied experience, this research project 
draws upon the writings of the founding Pragmatist thinkers, who 
include Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914), William James (1842–1910), 
John Dewey (1859–1952), and George Herbert Mead (1862–1931), 
along with a few contemporary Pragmatists who have focused on 
the aesthetic side of experience, including Johnson (2007) and 
Shusterman (2008). Additionally, I draw from the emerging field of 
embodied cognition, which offers increasing empirical evidence of 
an active, embodied view of consciousness (Engel, Maye, Kurthen, 
& König, 2013) and complements the Pragmatist non-reductive 
view of experience (M. Johnson & Rohrer, 2007). While an em-
bodied perspective of design is often associated with the philosophy 
of phenomenology, the Pragmatists’ contribution to a notion of 
creativity and subjectivity within experience has received far less 
attention in design.
The Pragmatist notion of continuity between thought and 
action is also supported by the embodied perspective current in 
cognitive science. A number of researchers have discussed the in-
tegral role of the body in cognition and the inherently emotional 
and felt nature of that experience (Damasio, 1999, 2010; Galla-
gher, 2005; Ziemke, Zlatev, & Frank, 2007). These perspectives 
together help to reclaim subjective experience and bodily awareness 
as constituting an experimental, creative means of inquiry within 
design, what some authors refer to as “embodied meaning-mak-
ing” (Scarinzi, 2015). Turning to the Classical Pragmatist writings 
is intentional, since, in this respect, it is recognized that this canon 
offers a complex and diverse resource for radical thought about ex-
perience that is far richer than supposed by contemporary neo-Prag-
matist philosophers of the ‘linguistic turn’ (Kloppenberg, 1996; 
Rylander, 2012). The influence of Pragmatist thought has largely 
remained confined to the United States, where it also has been 
losing ground for many decades, but it provides a pertinent view-
point to many of areas of debate, as well as skepticism regarding a 
theory of action, that have been a part of postmodern philosophy.
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Why Pragmatism for Design Research?
Pragmatist theory is frequently referred to in design literature. 
However, the way in which it is used often lends design research 
an instrumental view of knowledge. Often Pragmatism is employed 
to provide the designer with a practice-based justification for what 
he/she chooses to do or what works best in the casual sense of the 
word “pragmatic.” Design research, for instance, often connects 
to pragmatism by association with Schön’s (1983) ‘problem situa-
tion’ or by organizing design as a process that reflects Pragmatist 
themes such as a “learning by doing process” (Stompff, 2012), 
Dewey’s concept of inquiry (Steen, 2013; Wetter Edman, 2014) 
and logic and reasoning as abductive (Dorst, 2011; Kolko, 2010). 
There is a meta-level connection made between design as a process 
of abduction, inquiry, or learning. But there is no more complete 
understanding as to what those Pragmatist concepts actually look 
or feel like in a ‘designerly’ way, since they are reasonably applicable 
to any field of study. Because of this shallow treatment of what 
designers empirically do and feel in experience, and by extension 
how they work creatively, design research approaches give rise to 
skepticism among many scholars. Without any empirical nuance, 
design appears loosely considered and in line with a ‘pathos of cre-
ativity’ and a kind of undisciplined muddling through or “anything 
goes” approach (Feyerabend, 1975). 
Because of this and what I saw as misunderstandings of both 
Pragmatism and form-giving in design, I felt it was worth regard-
ing the pragmatist approach and design at a more granular level. 
I eventually came to Pragmatist philosophy from my desire to ad-
dress the issue of “design knowledge,” stemming from my research 
premise to clarify a designer’s capacities in terms of an embodied 
approach (see research description in Chapter 3). Reading various 
philosophical views across theories of science and postmodernist 
criticism, I resonated most with the texts by James, Dewey, and 
Mead. I found myself deeply fascinated with their ideas regarding 
inquiry, perception of ‘self,’ experimentation, and experience. I 
thus decided it was worth exploring their critique of Cartesian 
thought and their specific ontological account of perception in 
action. Rather than trying to generate a broad theoretical base with 
multiple perspectives on design, I chose to embark on a longitu-
dinal study of design experience while drawing from a few main 
Pragmatist concepts. It made sense to perform this in conjunction 
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with detailed empirical work on detail and the ‘feel’ of my experi-
ence with form-giving. Together, they complement and sharpen 
understanding of the Pragmatists’ insights on learning from within 
experience, and how that comes to bear more precisely on design 
inquiry as an aesthetic form of inquiry, instead of the habitual 
loose use of Pragmatist terminology in design. This inquiry serves 
basic research on an embodied (aesthetic) dimension within the 
experience of designing. 
Brief Introduction to Pragmatism
Classical Pragmatism, also known as American Pragmatism, grew 
out of the distinctive intellectual and historical context of America 
in the nineteenth century. Each of the original four Pragmatists 
sought a way forward within a number of opposing cultural ten-
dencies and intellectual changes taking place at that time. Each in 
their own way provides a critique of modern scientific foundations 
as a taken-for-granted way of engaging in philosophy that appeal to 
intellectual or analytical processes, and which imposes a distinction 
between thinking and feeling. Many of the inherited dualisms they 
thought to overcome like knower/known, mind/body, abstract/
concrete, observing/perceiving are still relevant as concurring 
themes, not of the least of which is the subject/object problem, 
which today the philosophy of science, feminist theory, and post-
modernist studies all problematize. This concern suggests that the 
Pragmatists were actually ahead of their time in insisting that a 
“science” of experience must be founded upon a merger between 
the naturalized, epistemological division of the logics of art and 
science, which still remain polarized in design research to this day. 
The Pragmatists’ achievement in terms of a mediating or non-du-
alistic view, which has considerable relevance to design, is not only 
to offer a theory of knowledge or an ontological worldview, but 
also to also contribute a methodological approach that is distinctly 
embodied, i.e., sensory and perceptual (aesthetic) experience, and 
not just the functional nature of thought. Subjectivity with feelings 
of ‘self ’ is integral to acting creatively and experimentally, but also 
to acting empathically and reflectively within experience.
In the Pragmatist view, it is the secondary conception of 
talking about an activity from an observational and reflective 
stance that alienates the experience and conditions from how 
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they came to be. Their contention is that this reductive approach 
places weight upon objective distinctions and what are principally 
mental images of human experience, rather than on physical in-
teraction in the immediate present, and thus, what is directly felt 
or seen. On the level of kinesthetic and visceral contact with the 
material world is how the ‘mind’ actively performs within and is 
thus constituted in experience. Therefore, intellect was not only 
a cognitive act, but also part of a stream of consciousness in the 
present that consists of an aesthetic experience of ‘felt’ meaning. 
They inquired into modes of experience, including inferences, as 
well as imaginative and emotional processes that are integral to 
a sense of ‘self.’ And each one addressed areas of experience that 
he felt should not be excluded from science’s purview, including 
in religious experience (James), aesthetic experience (Dewey), 
experience of interpersonal relationships (Mead), and feelings of 
doubt, belief, and inference (Peirce). 
Thus, Pragmatism’s non-dualistic perspective on experience 
has important practical implications for design (Rylander, 2012). It 
is worth revisiting the Pragmatists’ views on experience, especially 
with regard to a non-reductionist, embodied engagement within 
the world. The Pragmatists took seriously the premise that human 
experience is defined by a subjective, phenomenological dimension, 
and particularly one that has a creative will to change the world 
in which it exists. For them, consciously attributed relations, as 
per what can be interpreted or revealed, are not the sole building 
blocks of life. Dewey’s (1934) thesis on aesthetics, Art as Experi-
ence, in particular, is essential for design research because it places 
aesthetics at the center of conveying and producing embodied 
meaning. It opens the door to empirically explore an avenue of 
design research, which must also deal with a subjective, affective 
dimension of experience. 
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Pragmatism vs. Phenomenology  
and Non-Representational Theory
Pragmatism takes the view that direct experience or experience 
in the present constitutes the specificity of meaning or what can 
be objectively called “knowledge” (James, 1890/1950a). From this 
perspective, the Pragmatists adopted accounts of experience and 
perception that were radically different from the established views 
of philosophers like Hume and Descartes, who accepted experience 
as a ‘given’ that it happens to us. In different ways, Pragmatist phi-
losophers argued that persons are not simply recipients of sensory 
data, but that perception is active. This is developed in current 
research on embodied cognition, which contributes to the theory 
that aesthetics is tied to action that subserves the human capacity to 
abstract concepts and symbolically represent experience. Pragma-
tists pointed out the continual nature of bodily experience, the re-
lations between the substances that hold experience together make 
it comprehensible, which entails a subjective feeling of experience. 
The Pragmatists’ view clearly relates to a phenomenological 
lens, in that it is rooted in lived experience and calls to the primacy 
of perception and embodiment. William James has even been called 
the “founder of phenomenology” (Rosenthal & Bourgeois, 1980). 
Existential interpretations of phenomenology from Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty, in particular, sought to include the active body 
(embodiment) in experience. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “body 
scheme” is one of the first major philosophical contributions to ap-
proach the mind-matter dichotomy since Descartes. And similar to 
the Pragmatists, Merleau-Ponty extends an embodied philosophy to 
develop a non-dualistic and context-dependent ontology. However, 
the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Husserl that embraced 
going “back to the things themselves” (Todres, 2000, p. 229) is a 
philosophical discourse that does not resolve the representational 
problem of a conscious mind revealing a world outside the mind. 
Moreover, it is difficult to find a method that connects the empir-
ical with the philosophical investigation of phenomenology, since 
phenomenology begins as a sensorial investigation that rejects the 
value of empirical science (Shusterman, 2012).
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The Pragmatists, on the other hand, emphasized action and 
the empirical over the phenomenologists’ interpretive preference 
for apprehension and descriptions of underlying structures. Prag-
matism argues that perception enables us to act within the real, 
rather than to cognitively derive or represent an essential nature of 
reality. Pragmatists claim that humans do not need to reconstruct 
the world in representations, or for the “mind,” because we have 
evolved to act in a world that is there for us. Our thinking is alive 
in our relations, rather than in intrinsic properties. Where the prin-
cipal assumption of realism and Kantian idealism is in the service of 
truth or knowledge about the empirical world, for the Pragmatists, 
knowing is purposive. Humans naturally intuit, analyze, synthesize 
actively, sort, and gather information in the pursuance of particular 
interests. So while the ultimate aim of phenomenology, and more 
broadly realism, is to uncover the patterns of an essential nature of 
phenomena, pragmatism is not focused on “what,” and thus leaves 
interpretations of the world and phenomena open. The Pragmatist 
assumption of the changing nature and impermanence of reality 
yields an non-essentialist view of the world, meaning that objects, 
including ‘the self,’ have no fixed essence. This view undermines the 
interpretive approach to sensory data that starts from an assump-
tion of a pre-objective or “primordial” consciousness, referred to as 
the “lived body,” that can be revealed to us rather than an integrated 
consciousness of ‘self ’ that is an active process within experience. 
In other words, it is sufficient that one observe one’s own bodily 
consciousness, or “being-in-the-world,” since even the perception 
of ‘self ’ is creative action.
In fact, the difference between an interpretive and a prag-
matic understanding of experience goes to the heart of current 
discourse about design knowledge and the problem of trying to 
represent something that is not objectively observable, as in “tacit 
knowledge.” The conflation of tacit knowledge with being able to 
represent it presents the kind of internal/external split between an 
internal thought or “representation” and action that the Pragma-
tists sought to transcend. The non-essentialist view destabilizes 
the sort of representations or descriptions that treat phenomena 
as objects, and even the idea that research produces “knowledge” 
about phenomena in the objective sense. 
Embedded in pragmatism is a process-based ontological 
view of reality that corresponds to a theme of postmodern criti-
cism, the sociology of scientific knowledge, and ‘non-representa-
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tional’ perspectives of knowledge (e.g., Barad, 2007; Chia, 1997; 
Deleuze & Guattari, 1988; Haraway, 1988; Latour, 2005; Law, 
2004; Thrift, 2008). These perspectives by and large frame knowl-
edge as situated and practice-based and, owing that the material 
world has agency and relationships have presence, point out the 
limitations of interpretivism for handling the material-subjective 
integration of knowledge in practice. Thus, a postmodern critique 
of modern philosophical foundations, calling for moving from 
passivity to action or from an explanatory stance to a ‘perfor-
mative,’ empirical one, can be seen as part of the broad, diverse, 
non-representationalist view of mind found in pragmatism (O. 
Jones, 2007). Many of these postmodernist concerns are revived 
Pragmatist arguments employing a new vocabulary. Thus, playing 
on William James’s (1907) title for a series of lectures called “a new 
name for some old ways of thinking,” one historian, Kloppenburg 
(1996), writes that pragmatism now is “an old name for new ways 
of thinking” (p. 101). 
Because these process-based, ontological views are a kind of 
reinterpretation of pragmatism, they are not in conflict with Prag-
matist ideas. If anything, they can be seen as offering a different 
vocabulary more pointed toward current concerns ethics, politics, 
methods, and epistemology. The point is not to limit pragmatism 
to a linguistic loop of critical thought or what can be read as a 
problem of “nominalism,” the continual naming and re-naming of 
relations that are always open to new interpretations of meaning. 
Without intervention, action, material arrangement, and ideas alone 
have little relevance to an embodied perspective of action — to what 
practical and qualitative difference an action makes. What pragma-
tism offers is a link to an empirical approach toward design that 
includes an embodied, kinesthetic, felt experience. So although a 
major fault laid at the door of Pragmatist theory has been that “it 
lacks sufficient coherence to be deemed a distinctive doctrine or 
‘school of thought’” (Elkjaer & Simpson, 2011, p. 57), it is precisely 
because pragmatism is about concreteness and taking place in the 
“rich ticket of reality” that it offers an experimental attitude toward 
design knowledge. Like design, it takes place in a specific relational 
context, not an objective context. Hence, as capital “t” theory it will 
always lack the coherency and cleanness of a rational narrative. Its 
mutability lies in the inconsistency of human action itself, and just 
as it is said regarding design practice, its strength is in its resistance 
to a single definition (Buchanan, 2001). 
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Taking this into consideration, I should clarify that I am not 
trying to participate in philosophical discourse on pragmatism. Nor 
is my aim here to tackle all of the criticisms leveled against Prag-
matism or to present a unified theory. Pragmatism is considered 
suspect by those committed to a realist or objectivist truth. It is not 
cohesive in the sense of being a meta-narrative, since the question 
the Pragmatists faced concerned the practical consequences of 
applying thought in experience. 
My aim is to methodologically test the Pragmatist approach 
to experience as embodied and to understand what that means for 
designing (in action). Again, because this is an empirical investiga-
tion and application of pragmatism, I am not taking Pragmatists’ 
philosophical perspective as something that is fixed or absolute. 
Rather, as a style or way of engaging with philosophy, this work 
reverts to my direct physical conditions and inward impressions, 
with that being what concretely presents the limits of my percep-
tion and my ability to overcome dualistic thinking.
A Pragmatist Theory of Creative Action
Of the many critiques leveled against Pragmatism, one has been 
its instrumentality. It has been disparaged from a philosophical 
standpoint for emphasizing the empirical or technical requirements 
of science (Gendlin, 1997). Along similar lines, it has been nega-
tively dismissed because of its American turn of thought and being 
distinctly of its time of place, if not somewhat apologetic for the 
status quo or even elevating the useful (Thayer, 1982). Thus, it has 
been perceived as inferior to European philosophical traditions, 
in that it does not offer enough resistance to existing social and 
political relations, and thus is overly optimistic in its treatment of 
capitalism, too liberally idealistic, and politically naïve (Elkjaer & 
Simpson, 2011, p. 57). 
These criticisms are correct, in that pragmatism is in one 
sense an instrumental application of knowledge. It sought to es-
tablish a philosophy for the purposeful and experimental nature 
of thought. Logic itself was considered to be instrumental. James 
(1907) states that, “all our theories are instrumental, are mental 
modes of adaptation to reality” (p. 86). But it is not necessarily the 
case that that early Pragmatists carried the conceit that instrumen-
tality meant useful or utilitarian to the exclusion of the aesthetic or a 
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more phenomenological understanding of experience. In fact, their 
point was the opposite, that there is continuity of experience that 
gives meaning and does not reduce human interests to models of 
science. Such criticisms have much to do with how pragmatism is 
mischaracterized through instrumental representations, and from 
exposure to the routine notion of being “pragmatic” (Stuhr, 2010). 
Interpreting views of Pragmatism through mental constructs or 
cognitive representations, as is often done with Dewey’s views on 
learning from experience (e.g., Boud & Miller, 1996; Kolb, 1984), 
for example, loses the inseparable connection between perception 
and action that is fundamental to Pragmatism, and consequently, 
to its aesthetic interpretation. 
Pragmatism is critical of methods of inquiry that give primary 
attention to linguistic categories or “nominalism” and a construal 
of knowledge which rests upon an a priori relation of knowledge 
and action. Pragmatists claim experience does not involve an ob-
jective problematic reference, thus denying the Cartesian nature 
of the problem (universal doubt) or the idea of the “production 
of knowledge.” Instead Pragmatists consider the concrete to be 
where an individual finds established ways of working inadequate 
and seeks to develop new concepts and practices that work. Prag-
matism works to transcend the scientific constraint of treating 
the world as it ‘really is,’ meaning with properties independent 
of our opinions about them or interpreted by something called 
intellect within which there is logical order (Mead, 1932/2002) 
(e.g., the fallacy of misplaced concreteness), and perhaps more 
importantly, in methods that work to secure a feeling of security 
through control (Dewey, 1929/1984). In some sense, all forms of 
inquiry are aesthetic and practical (having purpose) since humans 
are concerned with transforming the situations in which we find 
ourselves. The continuity of thought is aesthetically constituted. It 
arises in experience and in the realms of human action and freewill 
possessing non-functional, non-linguistic relational and behavioral 
qualities that are not solely a product of rational action.
Pragmatism seeks to liberate the individual from the natu-
ralized validity and authority of received ideas and the dualism of 
Cartesian thought, by raising the importance of self-certainty and 
the right to doubt (Joas, 1996). Because Pragmatists insist on the 
body’s central role in informing our social selves (embodiment), 
as well as artistic judgment and appreciation (Shusterman, 2012), 
it is important to see their ideas as supporting artistic creative 
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dimensions of inquiry, and not being merely instrumental. The 
Classical Pragmatists must be credited for having anticipated the 
major methodological and theoretical obstacles of a subjective, 
first-person account of experience with which scientific views of 
research have yet to come to terms. 
Contributions from Each of the Four Pragmatists
The originator of Pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce, touches on 
the theme of subjectivity in his proposal that within inquiry there 
is a continuity between doubting and believing. Peirce’s major 
contribution to scientific thought was a shift from a third-person 
stance, which required reflection on the relationships to an objec-
tive problem, to a first-person account of the problem situation. He 
criticized strategies of rational thinking about objective “problem 
situations” and the Cartesian doubt that introduces the illusion 
that the meaning or ‘problem situation’ is has a sort of “fixity” 
(Scheffler, 1974). A “problem” is sensed when our established habits 
of conduct are inadequate to achieve a desired end within actual 
experience. In Peirce’s opinion, “real and living doubt” occurs in 
context. And because it arises in a ‘learner’ and involves sensation 
and internal awareness, inquiry has an aesthetic quality, in particu-
lar, an uneasy state of irritation (Scheffler, 1974). Therefore, doubt 
does not qualify all experiences of “thinking,” such as simple prob-
lem-solving, for example, but can be qualified to some extent by a 
deep-seated physical motivation in which an individual ultimately 
seeks trust in perceptual beliefs, not just in theoretical ones. Because 
of this, trust is understood to be obtained empirically. Instead of 
a kind of scientific approach to possessing certainty or wanting to 
avoid error, the pragmatic response is that individuals should strive 
for an experimental attitude to continually learn from, cope, and 
deal with experience in the concrete. 
In this idea, Peirce substantially laid the groundwork for the 
concept of creativity contained in pragmatism (Joas, 1996). His 
move to a feeling of subjectivity highlights a fundamental sticking 
point in the whole Pragmatist project — whether any first-person 
accounts of experience can be made in any way short of the expe-
rience by a body, that is, by a personal self in accordance with the 
feelings and thoughts of a bodily situation. The experience of a 
problem takes on the form of a living question, a corporal sensa-
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tion of doubt. In other words, a question meaningfully posed is 
not a stated problem, but a sense of discomfort, a bodily sense of 
something unresolved. Therefore, for Peirce, the production of 
new hypotheses is not relegated to a cognitive process or logic, but 
it must be constituted through the bodily experience of making 
sense, i.e., the emotional and ideational processes. It must involve 
a “creative act” and creativity must also be subject to the learner 
(e.g., scientist or artist) intentionally interacting in the world 
(Joas, 1996). Peirce, consequently, developed a pragmatic notion 
of creativity in the sciences: an adaptive activity that “nurtured 
with loving care — as opposed to applying force and determina-
tion — unfolds according to its own logic until it is finally ripe for 
testing” (Joas, 1996, p. 135). 
Like Peirce, bodily experience shaped James’s entire approach 
to inquiring into the processes that enable the feeling of self to 
come about. He concluded that the purview of science precludes 
human creativity in its underlying assumption of objective and nat-
ural laws. If things were causally determined as science supposes, 
human actions and decisions could not have influence in the world 
(Joas, 1996). Our feeling that we can exert effort in order to direct 
and control parts of our lives would be an illusion. The feeling of 
intentionality in experience, where there is force of will and belief, 
is, for example, where James sees that there could be ‘truths’ of 
different sorts for (different) individuals. James elaborated on the 
religious and psychological dimensions of the strong feeling of 
self, particularly regarding the belief in freewill and the ability of 
humans to consciously direct attention to the imagination, both 
of which have strong implications for creativity as action. With-
out “belief” in general and the ability for attention to perception 
and thought, people would not be able to experience their own 
creative abilities, such as the feeling of intention or spontaneous 
acts of freewill. James’s theories connected the concrete affective 
side of experience and its importance to the feeling of volition 
and human creativity.
Mead expanded on James’s physiological views to focus on 
the way in which personality structures are constituted by inter-
personal relationships. His concept of human action and ‘self ’ 
is conditional and center-less, in the sense that there is no inner 
logic to which a ‘self ’ unfolds passively. The ‘self ’ is not a result of 
internalized social expectations or self-image. ‘Self ’ resides primarily 
in direct encounters and “feelings” of relations, the perceptive ex-
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perience with environment and social conditions. And because an 
individual has a bodily “pre-personal” ability to act, this is a source 
of spontaneity that can surprise the individual him/herself. In other 
words, the experience of will or spontaneous action emerges in the 
performing and testing ‘self ’ in specific situations, through differ-
ent aesthetic forms and perceptions. And the individual’s ability 
to make sense of relations in new ways has an inherent value of 
self-actualization, intentionality, or self-expression.
Dewey rounded out these views in his contribution to a 
non-dualist theory of aesthetics that pays attention to art and its 
relation to experience as an activity, rather than as an art object. He 
also takes the drastic step of shifting the focus of art as a separate 
sphere of cultural activity to the aesthetic dimension of creative 
experience in general (Joas, 1996, p. 139). In doing so, he distin-
guishes experiences of a holistic coherent nature as ‘an experience’ 
and as having a special quality of fulfilment or consummation in the 
material of experience. In Dewey’s estimation, art is not separate 
from the model of science, but the two are polarized aesthetically. 
Science excludes the acknowledgement of aesthetic, bodily, felt 
qualities, while art is an integral experience of both feeling and 
thinking, and hence, a form that is expressive of creativity, rather 
than merely a statement about creativity. One of Dewey’s major 
assertions in Art as Experience is that what art expresses is the per-
ceived, aesthetic qualities of experience, “not with conceptions 
symbolized in terms” (p. 140). Dewey (1934, 1938) argued against 
the routinization of production in order to present other kinds 
of embodied meanings. This refers not to the meanings of signs 
and symbols (which must mean something), but meaning directly 
embodied and ‘felt’ through relations with things. These relations 
have “assignable meaning” (Dewey, 1905, p. 657) based on a per-
son’s desires, interests, needs, and so on and so are fundamentally 
open in scope (non-deterministic), since they are not based on 
categories of language.
Themes for Creative Action in Design Theory
The following Pragmatist themes are intended to help establish 
the connection between creative action and an embodied approach 
to learning, inquiry, and exploration, which is currently referred 
to in design literature as a “design attitude.” A Pragmatist view 
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of inquiry comes not just from appreciating the physical world, 
but acting, changing, and learning through ‘felt’ relations within 
it. The Pragmatists’ insights into this learning experience help to 
overcome discontinuities between perception and action to con-
sider how embodied learning occurs in experience. They afford 
that learning includes subjectivity with the sensation of freewill and 
the possibility of acting from aesthetic frames like the kinesthetic, 
emotional, inferential, affective, and imaginative, which are not 
attributable to rational action, but used to embody and express 
one’s experience and meaning in the world. These themes together 
provide groundwork for a relational worldview and aesthetic in-
quiry rooted in direct experience.
Body
Pragmatists begin with the body as the organizing core of expe-
rience. In their view, there are no “mediated” experiences, but 
being embodied, there is only a single mode of experience — that 
of the body-mind in the present (Rosch, 2004). James (1982/1890) 
explains this as follows:
The world experienced comes at all times with our body 
as its center, center of vision, center of action, center of 
interest. Where the body is “here”; when the body acts is 
“now”; what the body touches is “this”; all other things are 
“there” and “then” and “that.” These words of emphasized 
position imply a systematization of things with reference 
to a focus of action and interest which lies in the body; and 
the systemization is now so instinctive (was it ever not so?) 
that no developed or active experience exists for us at all 
except in that ordered form. (p. 154) 
The Pragmatists recognized that the nature of having physical body, 
and the consciousness of such, has a two-fold character in different 
respects: One is the perception of being both a subject and object, 
and the other is experience which is both universal and personal 
(James, 1912/2003). This direct experience, where we perceive both 
an object (physical body) and a subject (subjective awareness) our 
individual sense of ‘self ’ is constantly changing (James, 1890/1950; 
Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Mead, 1932/2002). Being active, then, 
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is what it is to “think,” in that we are constantly distinguishing 
material content in the world by way of perceiving what is subject 
and object with regards to ‘self.’ 
In the first condition, it is immediately ambiguous that we 
can be both an acting body and have a body at the same time, both 
“be” a subject and have an object. For example, I perceive that I 
am body. This embodied dimension is a subjectivity that feels and 
acts in the present, what I associate with a mental experience. At 
the same time, I also have a body that I think of as “me” or “mine.” 
This body is an object of awareness, the physical object of my ‘self.’ 
James illustrates this contradiction, “Its breathing is my ‘thinking,’ 
its sensorial adjustments are my ‘attention,’ its kinesthetic alterations 
are my ‘efforts, its visceral perturbations are my ‘emotions’” (James, 
1912/2003, p. 80). Identifying this duality in the basic structure of 
consciousness, the Pragmatists begin from the fact that the imme-
diate, subjective encounter of moving, manipulating, and feeling 
one’s body as an object is subjectively the same as manipulating 
and feeling physical material outside one’s body (Mead, 1932/2002). 
Our body is an intentional object of our perception. And perhaps 
more importantly, this intentional corporal engagement in the 
world includes an ongoing subjective formation of ‘self.’ For ex-
ample, we use words like “myself, I, or me” (James, 1890/1950a, p. 
238) as objective references to our bodily sense of continuity, and 
this continuity we attribute with a particular personal identity 
(James, 1890/1950a). Our actions involve a form of self-referential 
intentionality (Ziemke et al., 2007, p. 274).
Because we have seemingly two dimensions of ‘self ’ that are 
perceptual (phenomenological, esthetic experience) and reflexive 
(conceptual understanding) (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), in modern 
philosophy and in science, this experience has contributed to a 
dualistic structure of perception and action (also the mind/body 
problem). Conscious thought is seen as a way of distinguishing 
content, that is, material in the world, by way of distinguishing 
what is subject (inner, thinking) and object (outer, material) with 
regards to ‘self.’ We then label the subjective to refer to internal 
mental activities in contrast to objective states of affairs in an ex-
ternal world (M. Johnson & Rohrer, 2007). 
The second condition of bodily experience, that of the uni-
versal and personal, means that we all have bodies and, in that 
way, we share something common in experience. But at the same 
time, each of our experiences is singular. My experience of my 
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body is mine alone. There is something internal and unique to my 
own body, my own way of behaving, my own bodily functions, et 
cetera. In one way, I can only formulate what I sense and what I 
feel, my particular medium, furnished by my body. And yet how 
is it I can relate to your experience of sadness, your pain, your 
ecstasy, your joy? There is something materially ‘felt’ that appears 
be universal in human experience, which suggests there is “nothing 
intrinsic in the individual experience” (James, 1912/2003 p. 80). 
The sheer physicality of our bodies (form) means that emotions, 
effort, attention, and feelings are not purely immaterial, which 
makes it difficult to refute that the experience of particular qual-
ities (content) is not shared among all humans. As James grants, 
“‘a feeling only is as it is felt,’ there is still nothing absurd in the 
notion of its being felt in two different ways at once, as yours, 
namely, and as mine” (p. 70). 
At this intersection of ‘self ’ and the world is where, the 
Pragmatists claimed, meaning comes about. And because this 
meaning is both symbolic and visceral (abstract and concrete), 
it does not and cannot exist inside a ‘mind’ or in mental repre-
sentations, but is actively played out by thinking and the feeling 
of relations. This does not call upon symbolic interpretation to 
provide a sensation of certainty in an abstract meaning or ‘truth.’ 
Thus, the experience of having a body and feelings of ‘self ’ are not 
purely subjective, but has the following universal characteristics 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 269):
- is grounded in dimensions of everyday experience.
- has a place and time. 
- is perceived between the self and the world, not an 
inner world of “thinking,” but a point of relation, a 
meeting with the outside, the interplay of experienc-
ing a physical body and the control or manipulation 
of physical objects and/or environment. 
- enters social relations. 
- has an emotional projection, that is, the conceptual 
projection of ‘self ’ onto someone/something else. 
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‘Self’ as Changing 
Taking that our bodily experiences are the center of our mean-
ing-making, the Pragmatists understood that we both physically, 
kinesthetically, and emotionally relate to the world, while contin-
ually objectifying, reflecting on, and learning from that experience. 
For the Pragmatists, this ongoing transaction and the continuity of 
it is organized with respect to a sense of ‘self ’: “The human body, 
and the way it structures human experience, also shapes the human 
experience of self, and perhaps the very possibility of developing a 
sense of self” (Gallagher, 2005, p. 3). So in other words, an actual 
sense of ‘self ’ is a feeling comprised of concrete sensorial relations 
and is corporally attained. Thus, ‘self ’ in the Pragmatist view can 
only be constituted through subjective and objective relations 
(Mead, 1934/1967). 
From the non-essentialist approach of pragmatism, becoming 
closer to the experience of the immediate present is to paradox-
ically find there is no nucleus of ‘self,’ but only an experience of 
‘self ’ that is ever-shifting and center-less. While the center of self 
appears to be one’s body, Pragmatists assume that we have a force 
of will that seeks to consciously make sense or organize experience 
into a ‘self ’ (Mead, 1934/1967). Humans have consciousness that is 
creative, active, and pliant because it is based in the conditions and 
continuity of bodily experience. Personal continuity is for James 
and Mead really a feeling, precisely in James’s words, “Self is felt” 
(James, 1890/1950a, p. 298). The bodily feeling of me-ness is felt in 
our moment-to-moment acts of attention, interest, response and 
the ways we choose to conduct ourselves. The feeling of a subjec-
tive stream is often connected to an essentialist view of ‘self.’ In the 
widely perceived view of selfhood, humans ‘possess’ a self in terms 
of a subjective mind, as proposed in phenomenology, for example 
(Shusterman, 2008). This includes a kind of basic innermost iden-
tity of ‘self ’ comprised of an ego, a personality type, a mindset or 
otherwise discernable characteristics of personal essence — basically 
the thing that makes “me” me. We goal-orient ourselves, and thus 
orient a ‘self ’ because we identify and derive our sense of self using 
the object of our thought. This view has contributed to the idealist, 
Kantian argument that thought is an expression of an individual’s 
inner ‘self,’ as in the way that art is considered totally subjective or 
coming from an artist’s mind. Beyond this, an essential or unwaver-
ing attitude towards the ‘self,’ just as a person can have a personality 
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‘type’ or unconsciousness that can be revealed or understood by a 
conscious mind, has served the traditional practice of psychology. 
By treating an “independent consciousness,” which is intellectu-
ally formulated apart from a material body of habits and actions 
(Dewey, 1922/2002, p. 85), ‘self ’ is concluded to be within our own 
personal possession. In that sense, a ‘mind’ is basically enacted by 
a body. From this view, it can be seen why a large part of psychol-
ogy focuses on fixing a ‘self,’ for example, rather than learning to 
be comfortable with the ambiguity and doubt engendered by the 
changing experience of ‘self ’ (Epstein, 1998). 
From the Pragmatist viewpoint, ‘self ’ is better understood 
as an organizing activity. Embodied habits and patterns frame our 
interactions with our world and the sense of continuity we call 
‘self.’ 1 The experience of habits are not just individual responses, 
but are socially produced, transmitted, and reinforced (Dewey, 
1922/2002; Mead, 1934/1967). Thus, there is continuity between 
habits and social norms, which is always present and necessary to 
inform meanings of behaviors. The experience of ‘self ’ is always 
to some extent social. This view of the socially constituted ‘self ’ is 
particularly manifest in Mead’s (1934) work, Mind, Self and Society, 
in which he suggests that the ‘self ’ is in development in experience 
and not in a final or essential form. ‘Self ’ is not wholly subjective or 
inside the mind, but rather is intersubjectively organized through 
objective conditions. In particular, the conscious activity of self 
that involves abstraction and reasoning is shaped, developed, and 
consolidated by cultural activities and conditions, which he terms 
symbolic interactionism. Therefore, ‘self ’ as an activity of conscious-
ness, is a double-barreled experience. It has both a reflective aspect 
and an esthetic aspect, which Mead linguistically terms the “me” 
(object of consciousness) and the “I” (subject of consciousness) 
respectively. 
Another important aspect of the Pragmatist understanding 
of ‘self ’ is its agency to act creatively, or at least spontaneously and 
not in premeditated ways. This concern is important to James’s 
1. This is close to the scientific perspective of embodiment, in which both the conscious 
sense of ‘self ’ and that of subjectivity are felt through bodily experience (Damasio, 1999). 
The sensation of ‘self ’ can be seen as an ongoing organizational process, naturally incor-
porating the feelings of bodily activities, responses, motivations, and resistances that have 
built up over time, through experience. They are physically established through neurological 
pathways in the body (M. Johnson & Rohrer, 2007).
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image of non-deterministic freewill. He goes to lengths in Princi-
ples of Psychology to paint a picture of a naturalistic and embodied 
volitional sense of ‘self ’ that makes decisions over the course of 
life. In his view, because we feel ‘self ’ as both subject and object. 
Subjectivity is the feeling of volition over the body as an object, 
rather than a different kind of ‘thought.’ Subjectivity is at some 
level a consequence of the body, in that we guide our thoughts and 
body and thus feel “the birthplace of conclusions and the starting 
point of acts” (James, 1890/1950a, p. 303). While a force of will is 
crucial to intentionally acting on beliefs and emotions, we cannot 
definitively prove that choice and acts of will exist. Therefore, 
James appeals to arguments that speak to feeling that we have 
choice over our action and that we have a feeling of interest and 
attention. He contends that if there were no spontaneous acts of 
will, then the physical sensation that we have of exerting effort and 
directing control over our bodies and equally over our life would 
be an illusion. “But the whole feeling of reality, the whole sting 
and excitement of our voluntary life, depends on our sense that 
in it things are really being decided from one moment to another, 
and that it is not the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged 
innumerable ages ago” (James, 1890/1950a, p. 453). 
Continuity
Pragmatists emphasize the continuity of perceptual experience, a 
notion which responds to the constant change of thought directly 
apprehended in experience. Because continuity emerges as a sen-
sation of movement through time it is a “definite sort of experi-
ence” (James, 1912/2003, p. 26). There is an aesthetic, bodily ‘feel’ to 
thought, like the way that ‘trains of ideas’ have an esthetic character 
and James and Dewey preferred metaphors like “stream” for “flow” 
to speak to the relational, dynamic nature of our consciousness. 
They sought to call attention to how this sensation serves as a uni-
fying element to thought that “does not appear to itself chopped up 
in bits…It is nothing jointed; it flows” (James, 1890/1950a, p. 239).
James’s was particularly concerned with the relational sensa-
tion of thought, as he terms it, “transitives,” that are intuitively pres-
ent in direct experience. He remarks how one experience follows 
another in consciousness, but these discrete states or “substantives” 
are not at all disconnected. We are continually inferring connec-
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tions. Experience is something we actively do rather than what is 
given or revealed. Accepting the continuity of consciousness, an 
important point for Pragmatists is that the conjunctive or synthetic 
relations of experience give things a sense of “wholeness” opposed 
to only disjunctive elements (James, 1912/2003). This perceptual 
sense of wholeness is critical to Dewey’s theory of aesthetics, in 
which he criticizes reducing our understanding of experience to 
parts and seeking to impose distinctions. Dewey raises the point 
that aesthetics can only be understood and appreciated holistically 
in direct experience. He repeatedly emphasizes the continuity of 
bodily experiences as a matter of sensory material that cannot be 
made a matter of intellectual thought:
Qualities of sense, those of touch and taste as well as of 
sight and hearing, have esthetic quality. But they have it 
not in isolation but in their connection; as interacting, not 
as simple and separate entities. (p. 125) 
Another point of continuity for the Pragmatists is that sensory 
experiences are not given, but are something we achieve. To denote 
the active performing of associations and constructions, the Prag-
matists consistently used terms like attention, discrimination and 
inference, adaptation, et cetera. For example, James (1890/1950a) 
claims that thought itself is selective, “It is always interested more 
in one part of its object than in another, and welcomes and rejects, 
or chooses, all the while it thinks” (p. 284). And Dewey, rather than 
thinking of what we do as a response to an outside world, considers 
that the original unit of behavior is an act. Using the example of 
sight, he writes that “the real beginning is with the act of seeing; it 
is looking and not a sensation of light” (Dewey, 1938/1982, p. 263). 
Because the individual participates directly in sensorimotor coordi-
nation, there is no conscious distinction between motor response 
and the shaping the sensory stimulus. Any categories of ‘things’ or 
objects of thought, including ‘self,’ are a matter of attention. And 
the physical effort of attention is inherent in the way we corporally 
approach ‘things’ the world. Thus, we directly relate to conceptual 
categories through movement impulse and perceptual action — in 
essence by embodying them (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
The overall point of continuity stressed by the Pragmatists 
is that human existence is concerned with action and behavior. In 
fact, the term pragmatism is derived from the Greek word pragma 
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that means “action” or “practice.” Experience is concrete and “the 
use of most of our thinking is to help us change the world” (James, 
1907/1982 , p. 133). This is not merely about the practical, but also 
posits that there is no division between abstract meanings and 
ongoing sensorimotor interactions in the world. 
This view and James’s postulate that the “mind” is not discrete 
from the physical world and that “reality” is a function of percep-
tion have been accepted in recent years as embodied consciousness 
or ‘enactive cognition’ theory (Damasio, 2010; Gallagher, 2005; 
Langer, 2014; Noë, 2009; Scarinzi, 2015). In the ‘enactive’ par-
adigm, our cognitive processes emerge not only as abstractions 
or deriving mental representations “which might then provide a 
database for thinking, planning, and problem-solving” (Engel et 
al., 2013, p. 202). Rather, because the body is necessary as a point of 
reference in action and our ability to affect the world around us, we 
are not able to extract ourselves from the “rootedness of thinking 
in bodily experience and its connection with the environment” (M. 
Johnson & Rohrer, 2007, p. 22). 
The perceived challenge of embodied cognition to the philos-
ophy of science today is the same as it was for Pragmatist writers 
over a century ago. There is a profound inclination in a scientific 
approach to thinking to separate conceptually and atomize expe-
rience through analysis or “disjunctive relations,” which subordi-
nates the connective sensory “stuff” we cannot put into words as 
merely “mysterious” and “elusive” (James, 1912/2003). James calls 
this operation, where there is a choice to be made between this or 
that, a matter of subtraction. He contends that in the present flux 
of experience we cannot wholly distinguish between subject and 
object, or in other words, between the knower and the world. We 
are always making corporal sense of relations, and to do so, we 
house memories and embodied associations to shape and perceive 
our ‘self ’ in relation to the world around us. We can speak about 
the subjective and objective at the same time because to ‘know’ the 
object, the subject must be present. He writes: 
Experience, I believe, has no such inner duplicity; and  
the separation of it into consciousness and content comes, 
not by way of subtraction, but by way of addition — the 
addition to a given concrete piece of it...  
(James, 1912/2003, p. 5)
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With regard to this idea, James (1890/1950a) repeatedly observes 
that our attention to language can divert us from kinesthetic, ‘felt’ 
meaning, for instance, that, “language works against our perception 
of the truth” (p. 241). By naming parts of experience, for which, at 
any point, a thousand different names could be given, words serve 
to ossify and break up the undividedness of the subjective stream. 
In common experience, the present experience is continuous, oc-
curring through connective relations, while the reflective naming 
of it is discontinuous. Words lay emphasis on parts, the division 
between inner and outer worlds, the causal organization of events, 
instigating assumptions about ‘realities’ of the physical world, as 
opposed to real sensations of that experience within a physical 
world. Perceiving an activity through the function of naming it 
can only help exaggerate distinctions of objective content. Thus, 
this view of knowledge serves to perpetuate an indefinite process of 
discriminating and identifying parts with respect to symbolization 
(Dewey, 1949/1989; Gendlin, 1997), but it does not necessarily 
move us any closer to the visceral meaning of experience. 
This discussion can be seen as a distinction between the oper-
ations of scientific inquiry and artistic inquiry suggested by Dewey 
(1934/2005), and as the distinction between a statement and an 
expression within experience. “Science states meanings; art ex-
presses them” (p. 87). Scientific inquiry, by naming the conditions 
for existence, states meaning. Cognitive interpretations that are 
meant to correspond with reality are like directions or “sign-posts” 
that objectively stand apart from the emotional dimension of ex-
perience. Artistic inquiry, by contrast, expresses meaning because 
it operates from an integrated experience that does not separate 
itself from the subjectivity and the “inner nature of things” (p. 
88). It operates singularly in experience to include what the artist 
senses, perceives, and undergoes. In the artistic approach, there 
is continuity between representation and expression, rather than 
the reliance on representations correlating to an objective view of 
‘reality,’ and thus, art has a difference in meaning.
Without going much into the issue of representation here, 
about which the Pragmatists have written much more, the idea that 
I want to convey is William James’s point about language: there 
is not a congruent relation between representation in “thought” 
and experience. The way that words possess a thing-like quality 
cannot match the sensuous “affectional” qualities of experience. 
In other words, the real failure of putting things into words is in 
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the assumption that words can act as a kind of direct, one-to-one 
reference to our inward receptivity of bodily feelings and sense im-
pressions. With regards to this non-dualism Mark Johnson (2007) 
writes, “we must never think of the formal, patterned, ‘objective’ 
side as somehow copying the ‘subjective’ side, for that would entail 
that the words could stand in for, or represent, the subjective side 
and thereby replace it” (p. 82). The challenge of relying on con-
scious thought to grasp reality is that this separates, divides, and 
attributes symbolic relationships to what is continuous and fleeting 
in direct experience.
With regards to this point, the Pragmatists caution against 
making the mistake, as objectivism in research tends to do, that 
there are two distinct sides of experience, and especially that there 
is tacit dimension (unconscious) and an explicit, prepositional 
(conscious) dimension. This dualistic trap, in which such dimen-
sions carry the same kind of meaning to our “minds,” poses the 
problem that they are simply different in kind (Gallagher, 2007). By 
extension, the unconscious could purportedly be made conscious, 
in a Freudian sense. By attributing thinking to an internal image, 
we forget about the continuity between our symbolic processes 
and our physical bodies in space, engaging in social activities that 
give rise to those processes. As Dewey (1916/2004) puts it, “One’s 
own thinking and explicit knowledge are already constituted by 
and within something which does not need to be expressed or 
made explicit” (p. 6). 
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The Exploratory Study
Pragmatist Methodology  
and Radical Empiricism
Pragmatism has been described in some detail to serve as the the-
oretical frame for this inquiry and the methodological approach of 
starting from experience and working in experience. The method-
ological view of pragmatism holds that bodily and sensorial engage-
ment is inseparable from symbolic, reflective forms of “knowledge.” 
In Dewey’s (1905) anti-dualistic coinage, “knowledge experience” 
takes place in the intersection between the subject and the world, 
where mental and physical sensations of ‘self ’ are irreducible. There-
fore, exploring this embodied experience necessarily involves myself 
as a subject of the research, which is connected to my ability to 
actively sense, meet, mold, and manipulate my surroundings.
I am explicit in stating that my embodied approach to un-
derstanding design does not serve a methodological concept that 
functions to create objective validity or is imbued with rigor, from a 
traditional scientific frame of “knowledge.” This view requires sep-
arating the explanation of method from the active participation in 
situations and thus reduces method to its conceptual or formalized 
view. Pragmatism as a methodological approach cuts through this 
tension between scientific value for rational clarity and an artistic 
value for embodied practice. In order to be open to the diversity 
and richness of human perceptual experiences, Pragmatists appeal 
to us to learn about consciousness through the primacy of direct 
experience. Their approach is both phenomenological and empir-
ical, in that it appeals to concrete perceptual experience “just as we 
feel it and not [to] confuse ourselves with abstract talk about it, 
involving words that drive us to invent secondary conceptions….” 
(James, 1912/2003, p. 26). Pragmatists argue that the aesthetic con-
tent we feel and infer in direct experience, but cannot consciously 
observe or explain in words, should be available to inquiry. James 
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(1912/2003) calls this kind of non-dualist methodology “radical 
empiricism,” in that feeling as a real material experience is empir-
ically “radical.” In other words, because we feel stuff, thought is 
not just conceptual; “the relations that connect experiences must 
themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation expe-
rienced must be accounted as ‘real’ as anything else in the system” 
(James, 1904/2000, p. 315). Feelings constitute both an objective 
and subjective element.
From a Pragmatist position, the logic of modern science starts 
with a methodology that disregards the fact that in the immediate 
experience there exists a body-mind integration. Scientific method-
ology proceeds from analysis, more specifically from the naming 
and specifying of parts, instead of primarily being present in them. 
Mead (1932/2002) clarifies his view of what he sees as an epistemo-
logical problem with regards to the primacy of affective, ineffable, 
continuously transitioning qualities in immediate experience: 
The condition for the experience may be found in the 
pressure of the hands or of other different parts of the body 
against each other; but the action upon us of the thing 
from its inside is a fundamental character that cannot be 
thus accounted for. (p. 125)
Thus, by trying to communicate and account for relations using 
analytical means, relations are functionalized rather than felt. The 
“apartness” of analytic reflection means there is an inability to 
sense viscerally how perception and expression arise from physical 
experience. As Dewey (1938/1997) points out, “Observation alone 
is not enough. We have to understand the significance of what we 
see, hear, and touch. This significance consists of the consequences 
that will result when what is seen is acted upon” (p. 68). 
The Classical Pragmatists agreed that all thinking originates 
from direct experience and that methods arise, and are therefore 
situated, in the course of action. Their view, which is basically a 
commonsense view, recognizes this thought-feeling continuity in 
our everyday experience. This method of inquiry, derived from 
the Latin word methodus meaning “way of going,” happens within 
experience, which ‘knowledge experience’ Dewey (1905), in his 
anti-dualist way, interprets as a “pattern of inquiry.” This pattern 
of inquiry is common to all human thought that is carried out 
in action. Experiencing and inquiring are simultaneous because 
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experience is put to a subject as a living question to which he/she 
must continually respond. 
Adopting a Pragmatist methodological approach, I am con-
cerned with how my embodied experience of design research qual-
itatively feels. This is bound with movement and action — the con-
tinuity of experience. Taking into account James’s view of a feeling 
of ‘self,’ it is not that universal feelings and thoughts exist, but that 
there is a corresponding idea of a personal nature in ‘I think’ and 
‘I feel’ (James, 1890/1950a, p. 226). How this feels for me cannot 
be objectified because it is active within experience. It can only be 
experienced. Thus, addressing continuity of experience requires an 
embodied instead of an analytical approach. 
Therefore, because my inquiry is embodied, I can say that I 
have developed and structured my study in a systematic way that 
connects to my interests, my circumstances, and the kinds of re-
sources to which I have access. My inquiry is driven by motivation, 
bodily sensation, impulses, and urges that defy stability, linearity, 
and furthermore a nature or essence. With respect to creativity, it 
is argued that the separation of the sensual from the rational, pure 
thought from the relational, the intellectual from the poetic is not 
tenable, nor desirable (Radford, 2004). Feelings of change and 
ambiguity are acceptably embedded in my experience of inquiry, 
and these are, moreover, the source of my actions, learning, think-
ing, and creativity. This process should not be misunderstood as 
unconstrained or ad hoc. It consists of a constitutive background 
of habits and practice established in terms of physical action that 
establishes what Dewey (1922/2002) calls a “pattern of inquiry.” 
Practice-Based Research
Because Pragmatism considers knowledge as action, it has been 
established as having affinities with research in design (Melles, 
2008). Specifically, research in art and design over past several 
decades has assumed the existence knowledge creation within and 
through practice, a strategy of practice-based research or prac-
tice-led research (Gray, 1996; Haseman, 2006). As discussed in 
earlier chapters, in design this approach has been widely embraced 
as research-through-design or constructive design research, which 
frames “the possibility of design being done on the basis of design 
practice or through practice, i.e. by artistically/creatively making 
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objects, interventions, processes etc. in order to gain knowledge” 
(Bang et al., 2012, pp. 1–2). Practice-based research strategies are 
generally concerned with advancing practice and the nature of 
practice, coming from Donald Schön’s (1983) understanding of 
the reflective practitioner, and include the practitioner’s strategies, 
such as reflection in action, participant research, and action research 
(Haseman, 2006). 
Drawing from this understanding of practice-based research, 
I build on the conceptual framework of design from a Pragmatist 
perspective and embodied approach to the empirical work, spe-
cifically the activity of form-giving. Schön’s practice-based view 
of practice and ‘the problem situation’ still have a strand of Carte-
sian dualism in terms of addressing creativity and action through 
reflection. His methods for observation proceed independent of 
the feelings, sensations, and emotions involved in what gives the 
problem situation meaning in relation to aesthetic qualities or a 
perception ‘self.’ Current efforts to use rationalized and obser-
vational approaches to describe and account for design practice 
reinforce assumptions about a form of thinking that lean closer to 
an analytical process rather than the integrative, creative one ‘design 
thinking’ is intended to promote. Empirically, design research 
has focused predominately on the objects or outcomes of design 
creativity. Without experiencing, we have no theoretical account 
of form-giving or its possibility. Much is empirically unexplored 
in design, in particular with the roles of feeling, emotion, and 
creativity in the embodied experience of designing, especially the 
focus on the imaginative experience of creativity that gives birth 
to ideas, rather than to the outcomes of creativity. 
This said, the aim of this practice-based research is to expand 
design research and education with respect to “thinking” and cre-
ativity. Strictly speaking, this inquiry is not focused on clarifying 
an outcome of design as an object external to myself, but rather in 
the quality of the experience of designing. 
Movement-Based Inquiry
In view of the fact that design tends to favor the object over expe-
rience, design fields like architecture have supported experiential 
approaches as a way to consider firsthand encounters of design, 
and criticized the dominance of visual representation techniques 
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in their practice (Pallasmaa, 1996). Movement has been used as 
an embodied method to heighten designers’ intuitive, emotional 
reactions and their multisensory awareness (e.g., Bronet & Schum-
acher, 1999; Orru, 2016; Sara & Sara, 2006), as well as to generally 
explore relationships to space or place (Johansson, 2013; McLean, 
2016; Merriman, 2010) and architecture (C. Brown, 2010).2 
My personal selection of movement-based inquiry and my 
methods grew out of my desire to meet the empirical conditions 
of experience as the thinking and action of designing (form-giving), 
not the abstraction of thought from action. By movement-based 
inquiry, I am referring to a basic mode of bodily experience, in 
order to inquire into and refer to my concretely “‘felt’ experience” 
(Gendlin, 1997) in this research. There are many differences in the 
approaches to movement and somatic practice that include Sensory 
Awareness, Focusing, Authentic Movement, the Alexander Tech-
nique, the Feldenkrais Method of Awareness through Movement, 
and Body-Mind Centering (Gendlin, 2003; Don Johnson, 1995). 
I refer to some of these in this investigation. Generally, they share 
a direct focus on bodily experience and therefore provide a vocab-
ulary for empirical work so as to illuminate the intricacies of my 
experience in that respect. In terms of a concrete strategy, I specif-
ically embedded myself in the context of movement improvisation 
(see Chapter 4 for a description), and the rationale for that choice 
is discussed in a following section.
Movement exploration offers a strategy for implementing 
the radicalness of Classical Pragmatist empiricism found in the 
immediate present of relations. Likewise, the experiential facet of 
movement serves a common starting point for exploring design 
thinking as embodied and as holistic aesthetic experience. As “live 
creatures,” we are constantly interacting with the environment 
around us, exploratory, and animate (Dewey, 1934/2005). It is 
originally through moving and acting directly in the world that we 
come to inhabit a world that has meaning for us. In this continuity 
of experience, I experience my “thinking” as not only cognitive 
2.  There are also examples of physical body-based methods like bodystorming, role play, 
staging, and experience prototyping that are being used in design practice, since they offer 
the opportunity to test and help identify perceived problems or opportunities for design 
solutions (Buchenau & Suri, 2000; Schleicher, Jones, & Kachur, 2010). However, these 
methods are generally used to replicate an experience, as a form of active prototyping, and 
not used explicitly to investigate perceptual experiences of relations.
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functioning, but my bodily movement, urges, and impulses are 
indistinguishable from emotional, motivational, and ideational 
processes. Therefore, rather than revolving around a logical con-
struction first, the exploration of a basic physical capacity offers 
a core aesthetic form of inquiry or “an immediate realization of 
intent” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 89). Because movement is inherently 
expressive and qualitative, movement creation can be thought of 
as constituting an expression of my “design thinking.” 
In a profound and intimate way, somatic training reveals 
how I give form in action and how I actually relate to the world 
around me. Coming into contact with my bodily habits and the 
ways that I cope and respond to the material reality especially 
highlights how much the “artistic” is corporal (Eisner, 2002a). I 
learn my own possibilities for creative action in the concrete and 
my artistic potential and ability to have an experience of openness. 
Somatic practice ultimately gives me some insight into my physical 
and emotional nature, capacities, and limitations. 
Although the act of movement, and hence creating move-
ment, does not leave a mediated “form” behind to study, movement 
is an “emotionally expressive use of the body-mind” that “gives 
form to feeling” (Dale, Hyatt, & Hollerman, 2007). Movement 
creation follows the Deweyan view of form presented above, in 
that it is not the material that determines aesthetic experience, 
but the kind of qualities of relations, the intensity, and effort, and 
thought and emotion are significant in their immediate presence. 
In other words, when you strip away the specificities of whatever 
the material is to explore the action of form-giving itself, the expe-
rience of creating movement or giving form to feeling is the same 
as with any material craft. In the case of movement, the material 
is my body, which allows me to refer directly to experiencing — a 
tangible transaction in/with the world.
An Internal Feel
Because this places attention on the bodily dimensions of creating 
in the present, it carries the assumption that I must “know” design 
as an internal sensation and affect, which is not fixable in observed 
conditions, but is a feeling. This draws upon the Pragmatist view 
of continuity. Instead of taking my relation to “knowledge” to be 
objective and not in a search for methods of control, I am exam-
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ining the relation between thought and action. This experience 
I cannot talk about. It requires experiencing — moving between 
thought and action. 
Because everything we do is structured through movement, it 
is the nature of our bodies and kinesthetic sense that is foundational 
to shaping our possibilities, “We are literally feeling our way along 
the course of our lives” (Juhan, 1995, p. 376). By example, move-
ment of the body contributes to the primary feeling of ‘self ’ that 
cannot be reduced only to conscious processes. “In our experience 
of movement, there is no radical separation of self from world” (M. 
Johnson, 2007, p. 20). In particular, exerting effort or force of will 
over one’s body as an object informs a volitional awareness of ‘self.’ In 
this physical feeling of volition in action, an individual experiences 
a sense of control or agency over how he/she moves his/her own 
body, a body that is thought of as ‘mine’ and thus possess a sense 
of ownership and ability to guide thoughts and body (Mandrigin 
& Thompson, 2015). 
Self-control and object control are inseparable experiences 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 270). The experience of control over 
one’s movement is where we learn what we can do and make sense 
of ourselves through moving (Sheets-Johnstone, 2011) and by rec-
ognizing that we have material influence and the ability to put a 
‘personal stamp’ on our surroundings. When an individual explores 
a sense of ‘self ’ in relation to the environment, 3 stability in the sense 
of ‘self ’ is materialized through the selection and establishment of 
repetitive behavior or “habits.” The sensation of preserving learned 
patterns ultimately results in a sensation of personal control or 
security. We secure our perception of ‘self ’ and with and of ‘things’ 
through habit. Conversely, breaking patterns and habits of behavior 
(or movement) presents a feeling of uncertainty, a feeling which 
represents or an absence of personal control.
With attention to this connection between movement and 
perception of ‘self ’ and ‘things,’ part of my intention in this inquiry 
was to challenge my perceived sense of security that emerges from 
maintaining learned patterns of behavior and set ways of acting. 
3. In the enactive view of cognition, we are sense-making beings whose purposive knowing 
allows us to enact and bring forth significance in our bodily interactions in the world. John-
son (2007) states that, “purpose implicates in the most organic way an individual self. It is 
in the purposes he entertains and acts upon that an individual most completely exhibits and 
realizes his intricate selfhood” (p. 289).
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My choice of movement-based inquiry is explicitly intended to 
move away from security in methods and tools — patterns of be-
havior — and toward how it feels to explore and create in ways that 
are not easily rationalized — an exploratory feeling. Movement, 
therefore, serves a practical concern for how I embody an experi-
ential quality of openness via the way in which I conduct inquiry 
and the way that that experience feels. 
Dewey (1934/2005) remarks that openness is qualitatively felt. 
He describes this quality as “roominess, a chance to be, live, and 
move,” saying that, “lack of room is denial of life, and openness of 
space is affirmation of its potentiality” (p. 217). He is writing about 
the need of the artist to feel a personal freedom to explore and ex-
press and to work openly from qualities of relations in experience. 
The artist cannot proceed mechanically from the same conditions 
and the same constrictions on categories of thought, but must 
proceed from direct esthetic, sensorial, and emotional contact with 
the world in which categories have yet to be determined (Dewey, 
1934/2005). This sense of freedom to explore changing perception 
carries also the feeling of an unbounded sense of ‘self.’ 
Movement allows me to reassess my patterns and habits, 
which is interesting from the perspective of creativity and arts-based 
practice. This sense of “familiar” in terms of formalizing methods, 
or a sense of norm in methods, produces a way of doing things 
that has a perceived “trustworthiness” and expectation (Dewey, 
1929/1984, 1922/2002). It provides a continued adherence to certain 
framed conceptions, which has a controlling purpose. Therefore, 
by physically expanding my repertoire of design through engag-
ing in a wider range of movement, I expand the capacity for my 
own expression and form-giving. I do not simply want to assume 
methods that I knew from architecture (e.g., drawing, sketching, 
mapping, photography, digital modeling, or collage) as represen-
tative of design experience. I am seeking new terms through which 
I can find where I can push the boundaries of my understanding 
of what constitutes an activity of form-giving.
The Integrated Present
Movement-based inquiry also turns attention toward the temporal 
dimension of creative action. Since the present is where the novel 
is assumed to take place (Mead, 1934/1967), the integrated now is 
97
how I relate to a Pragmatist notion of creativity. In this view, cre-
ativity does not necessarily mean coming up with a unique object, 
but is in the use of perception and the imagination in the moment 
of action, when an individual is in the middle of discovering the 
possibility of experience (Mead, 1932/2002). Since this occurs at the 
level of direct experience, there is a possibility to unify dualistic cat-
egories such as research/practice, design/management, subjective/
objective, inner/outer, understanding/ sensation, reason /emotion, 
and to experience dynamic relations instead of remaining at the 
abstract level of thought at which they were created. 
A critical aspect of action in the present is that it shifts focus to 
the quality of experience, in that how we move changes our quality 
of perception. Our perceptual activities are typically object-oriented 
in character, which means our interest naturally moves toward 
the external goals of our movement (Shusterman, 2008). In our 
desire to effect change or to impose a force of will, we tend to lay 
stress on objective conditions (Dewey, 1922/2002). We name. We 
recognize. Our movement is typically instrumental. This is what 
the Pragmatist perspective is about; that how we think in action 
is a kind of “purposive knowing.” Yet, as the Pragmatists point 
out, our cultural leaning toward the reflective dimension of our 
consciousness, the instrumental over the experiential, is “one of 
dominant tendency rather than a rigid dichotomy” (Shusterman, 
2006, p. 26). To act, make, and do anything in the world, we can 
proceed from categories as though they were things and we can 
proceed from the feelings of concepts. 
The experiencing of moving of our bodies is also aesthetic, 
so movement is not purely functional, but carries a qualitative use 
of energy and is expressive not only of thought, but also feelings, 
moods, attitudes, and emotions. A somatic practitioner can spe-
cifically learn to follow the pre-conceptual flow of feeling, which 
often is fleeting, vague, and escapes attention in favor of practices 
of identifying and naming. Therefore, the ability to stay with the 
sensation of experience, without discriminating and identifying, 
requires a degree of cultivation, since culturally we are disposed to 
start from external goals and/or an outward image of self (Shus-
terman, 2006). It requires inward attention. 
Dewey’s (1934) thesis is that artistic experience puts equal 
emphasis on the inward impressions and the sensations of bodily 
perception of experience. Art involves an ability to select and attend 
to aspects of our physical experience by simultaneously being able 
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to undergo and affected by that same experience. Movement-based 
methods, for example, demonstrate movement as an aesthetic 
method that is emotionally expressive of thought, instead of thought 
being instrumental. They allow us to deemphasize the objectifying 
tendency in our doing and thinking and to invest greater value 
in the pre-reflective, esthetic ‘nowness’ of action, and thus, the 
creative action of perception. The focus on movement does not 
silence reflective consciousness, but it allows us to become closer 
to an integration of aspects of consciousness in the present, and 
the integration of thinking-feeling. For example, in teachings on 
somatic and meditative practices, physical training techniques are 
not simply about ‘getting in touch with our feelings’ but entail 
the empirical, artistic ability to concretely feel and sense, to “get 
out of our heads and return to our senses” (Epstein, 1998, p. 112). 
In this way, an empirical approach to movement turns atten-
tion to how different the models of scientific inquiry and artistic 
inquiry are with respect to the “instant field of the present” (James, 
1912/2003). As the Pragmatists insist, the scientific method fore-
grounds qualities of intelligibility and clarity in the tools of analysis 
used to observe a natural order of things. This expression of ratio-
nality emphasizes getting rid of the active perceptive experience 
of form, which includes being present and feeling and perceiving 
connections, a stream, the so-called “transitives.” A subtler influence 
of a scientific cast of mind, Pragmatism points out, is that it denies 
that continuity of experience; it does not let the world be felt. 
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The Research Journey
Given that the embodied logic of my research comes from my ex-
perience, it helps to give some background of my research context 
as to how and why I arrived at this current line of inquiry. My par-
ticular design background comes from an architectural education 
in a studio-based tradition that emphasized starting by doing and 
working from experience. In that artistic tradition, I was encour-
aged to develop a personal approach to the discipline and gained 
exposure to a range of visual arts, representational approaches like 
freehand sketching, technical drafting, figure drawing, painting, 
and digital modeling and rendering, as well as woodworking, de-
sign-build construction, building physical models and mock-ups, 
as well as phenomenological and site-specific techniques. Thus, I 
learned to inquire and communicate primarily through drawing, 
modeling, constructing, writing, and discussing my ideas. I con-
sidered designing a hands-on way to make my ideas available to 
the senses (i.e., form-giving).
I came to the University of Gothenburg in 2012 to begin 
my PhD study associated with the academic field of design man-
agement. This research was part of a European-funded project, 
specifically the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions Initial Training 
Network (itn) called desma (design + management). This frame-
work was supported to provide researcher training, and specifically 
the desma project can be seen in the context of the bourgeoning 
interest in design, as pointed out in the introduction, as it relates 
to innovation and creativity. 
Within the structure of the desma project, I filled the “aca-
demic hub” researcher position by being situated at the University 
of Gothenburg. At the university, I am under the rubric of the 
Business and Design Lab, which is a collaboration between the 
School of Design and Crafts (hdk) and the School of Business, 
Economics and Law. The specified research objective at the start 
of my project outlined in the desma framework was “clarifying 
designers’ skills and methods in innovation processes.” 
From the beginning of my research project, I intended to 
work from the perspective of my design background in order 
to approach the question of what it is I actually embody as a de-
signer, meaning what kinds of attitudes and design competencies I 
embody from my education and experience with architecture and 
environmental design. Having worked with design in various con-
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texts of learning, professional practice, teaching, and conducting 
research over the past fourteen years, I have a broad repertoire of 
approaches and changing relations to what I call design. However, 
in that time, I have never identified design with the use of certain 
methods, but more as an experience of exploration and learning 
in a hands-on way. 
I intuitively, and inarticulately, felt that design had something 
more to offer in terms of a creative approach than was being dis-
cussed in any of the texts I had read in design management litera-
ture, and, moreover, in design literature. So in this respect, I was 
not interested in speaking about the technical skills of design like 
drawing or prototyping, but rather motivated to explore the way 
in which the view of cognition and “thinking” in design connects 
to what is understood as a creative attitude. I wanted to speak to 
how or what designers learn from the training and pedagogy of 
an arts-based education, instead of trying to make an argument for 
why design is important. 
Early Research Case Studies
From the initial premise of “clarifying a designer’s skills and meth-
ods,” and within my context at the university, I had a great deal of 
freedom to explore. Not knowing where to start, but, as a designer, 
knowing that I had to start doing or trying something, I tested 
ways to achieve clarity about a notion of design “knowledge.” I 
initially worked on developing a collaboration, since I wanted 
to work with the “collaborative design” that is related to Design 
Management. Looking back, I can say I had an objective view of 
“collaborative design,” meaning that I saw “collaborative design” as 
a kind of medium or phenomenon. I specifically had an interest in 
artistic and entrepreneurial collaborations taking place informally, 
from my long-running research interests in how people appropriate 
spaces that align with their values. Therefore, in the conventional 
approach to conducting social and architectural research, I sought 
out case studies, specifically in the form of artistic, entrepreneurial 
projects. This led to a problematic and time-consuming process of 
pursuing a social milieu in which to work in Gothenburg. Having 
come to Sweden independently and being an English-speaker, I 
felt like an outsider not knowing anyone or the language. I was 
on my own to find a collaborative setting, so I looked at contexts 
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through networking, contacting people, writing research pro-
posals, visiting workplaces, and lots of meetings. I also attended 
many seminars, and visited and spoke to numerous persons and 
organizations in the hopes of meeting people and developing a 
collaboration or case study. 
This work included, but was not limited to, the following net-
working activities primarily in Gothenburg: Helping with studio 
work at Chalmers Center for Urban Studies in Hammarkullen; 
starting work with the University of Gothenburg’s Institute for 
Innovation and Social Change; attempting a collaboration with 
PhD students at hdk and Chalmers University of Technology; 
writing to multiple artists/designers in Gothenburg and Stockholm 
to set up meetings with them; writing to multiple professors at 
the university about discussing their work (either artistic practices 
or research with social groups); visiting, touring, and speaking to 
the founders of multiple collaboration/coworking spaces in Go-
thenburg, including Entrepreneurial Hive, Frilagret, Pavement, 
the Collaboratory, and Lusthuset; visiting artist cooperatives in 
the Gothenburg area, including Lindholmen Konsthall, Hey! It’s 
Enrico Pallazzo, Truckstop Alaska, and Not Quite; inquiring about 
opportunities with social design groups at Malmö University; 
meeting with the Performance/Performativity group at Gothen-
burg University and trying to setup a working relationship; con-
tributing to workshops with the Critical Heritage Studies Group 
at Gothenburg University; attending workshops with the cre-
ative organization tillt; meeting with architects from Chalmers 
about a maker space; attending start-up meetings in Lindholmen 
for entrepreneurs; attending creative networking events run by 
ada and Brewhouse; visiting kkv and Röda Sten to ask about 
collaborative or working opportunities; attending architecture 
seminars at Chalmers; visiting and meeting with directors at the 
Interactive Institute at Chalmers; looking for opportunities with 
the City of Gothenburg’s Älvstranden Utveckling in Frihamnen 
and Utveckling Nordost in Bergsjön. Other networking activities 
outside of Gothenburg included: Meeting with artist-researchers 
from Senselab in Montréal; proposing research with Engine Ser-
vice Design firm in London; proposing research with City Mart in 
Copenhagen; and starting collaborations with desma researchers 
on desma activities.
These searches yielded the opportunities to work on three 
case studies that had aspects of a voluntary or self-organizing con-
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text that were important to me, including two types of co-working 
collectives in Gothenburg and a social enterprise in London (See 
Appendix). In each of them, I participated in organizing collabo-
rative design workshops, which is a common method of partici-
patory design (Sanders & Stappers, 2008), and aimed at engaging 
members in imagining a vision for the organization. Although I 
did not end up using these case studies in my research, they were 
transformative in helping me realize that this form of design is not 
how I identify with my experience of design and/or form-giving. 
In each case, I did not encounter the sense of openness that I was 
seeking in a design experience. By trying to serve a rational purpose, 
these cases really seemed to miss out on the opportunity for acting 
and improvising in the moment and the quality of that experience.
Through the combination of these early experiences, I even-
tually became frustrated with the way that I was looking at my 
design problem and attempting to engage in some concept of 
“collaborative design” through a case study approach. I was equally 
discouraged by the framing of design knowledge in relation to 
practice as it was presented in the relevant literature and discus-
sions within the field of design, such as the difference between 
propositional knowledge and knowledge associated with practice 
(Niedderer, 2007). Here I found a major limitation in terms of the 
idea of “knowledge” itself because I wanted to get at ‘something’ 
intrinsically experiential with design, instead of reducing my ex-
perience by making myself an object of my research.
Generally, I felt estranged from my bodily and sensory en-
gagement in actively and materially exploring experience. This 
feeling eventually became the basis for my inquiry and methodol-
ogy. It is one that I have continued to make sense of and reframe 
in closer detail in this thesis. Such an experience of tension is what 
the Pragmatists, most notably Peirce, warranted as the source of 
inquiry. He suggested that discomfort, a feeling of “real and living 
doubt” gives way to action, the impulse of resolve. Thus, this affec-
tive dimension means that in our living experience, we (all humans) 
have an intentionality to resolve that dissatisfied state (Scheffler, 
1974). In line with Pragmatist thinking, I perceived internal feelings 
of instability in my experience of inquiry and within the context 
of academia.
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Empirical Testing
In the same vein, I was trying to feel out creative latitude for how 
I could and wanted to actually make meaning of my experience, 
by trying to experiment with what I was calling “design experi-
ence.” In order to really approach this sensation of openness, I felt 
I needed to work outside the boundaries of what is objectively 
considered design. I had to be willing to use my body more, to 
physically expand my ways of doing things and my perception 
and expression of design, in ways that do not objectively look like 
design. So what I was really asking was what my bodily possibilities 
were for exploring, feeling, or understanding design as having a 
sensation of openness. 
I was seeking to expand my work with my physical practice 
of design and my possibilities for acting, and thus, my experience 
of design. I needed to intuit and ‘feel’ my way forward, to interact 
and learn my way around, finding a way that was subjective and 
personal (used myself and my perception), but also poetic, imagi-
native, and sensual. Therefore, the choice to conduct collaborative 
interventions, sensory experiments, mapping exercises, and to play 
with models, videos, images, sound, et cetera, became part of the 
framing, through which I was trying to develop a particular form 
of representation to help me say what I wanted to say about design 
as an exploratory experience (see Appendix). 
The choice of form affects what would be experienced by the 
‘reader’ of my research and thus how he/she would see design. “The 
decision to use a particular form of representation influences not 
only what can be represented but also what will be experienced. 
We tend to seek what we are able to represent” (Eisner, 2002a, 
p. 23). So, in this sense, in my early experiments, I was trying to 
keep myself very open in terms of the kind of experiences that I 
thought would represent or express design, because I knew I was 
trying to convey something more than design theory and research 
currently offer. Therefore, I specifically tried not to impose too 
many constraints on the material and methods I would use and 
thus on my inquiry and “thinking.”
While I tried to keep an unrestricted and playful approach 
to an experience of “design” as long as possible, I also wanted 
to avoid preconceptions and dualisms, like design/management, 
designer/user, artificial/natural, that underlie an understanding 
of “design” in an analytical research context. Instead, I wanted 
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to question how “design” or “management” is actually perceived 
in experience. In that early process, I worked incrementally and 
reflectively, systematically trying out various actions, seeing them 
each as an activity of research, so as to understand my perceptions 
in those actions. I was looking, sensing, applying, and examining 
at each moment to understand how I was developing concepts in 
experience. This hands-on, form-giving approach is similar to how 
I would approach my work in architecture. It is in part a physical 
procedure of experimenting with modeling techniques and mate-
rials to investigate spatial or formal relationships, which are also 
in part conceptual and metaphorical ideas.
I encountered improvisational movement methods including 
a form of practice called Butoh in July 2014, while participating 
in an artistic methods course on movement in Borås, Sweden (see 
a description of Butoh on p. 117). This course was co-led by the 
Swedish dancer Carmen Olsson, who teaches a specific physical 
training framework derived from Butoh called Body Weather.4 I 
was inspired by this somatic practice, since it put me in contact 
with feeling and my body, which was something that was lacking in 
my context of studying design methods, theoretical discussions of 
“design thinking,” my frustrating quest for a “collaborative design” 
case study, and conducting design experiments. It struck me as 
a practical means for recovering an inner connection by paying 
attention to my experience, instead of looking for an experience 
outside myself.
In many ways, my choice of Butoh was circumstantial, and 
had I had access to other forms of somatic practice, I might have 
gone down another route. That said, however, I was undeniably 
drawn to movement, probably in part because of my background 
in dance, but also because of the loss of contact with a material 
practice of designing that I sensed during the theoretical phase 
of my research. I realized I needed to make sense of my research 
through bodily experience, or more precisely, to feel my “thinking” 
as embodied in my design research. 
4.  Body Weather Training is associated with the founder, Min Tanaka, and is concerned 
with deepening the dancer’s connection to and attunement with his/her environment, since 
each person is thought to be not just changing but changeable. Tanaka is quoted as saying, 
“The body is not a set entity. It constantly changes, like the weather” (Marshall, 2006). The 
training is designed to stimulate what one could call an improvisational mindset, or the 
capacity and awareness of participants to take part in the creation of a performance. Each 
person plays a creative role and has equal access to the material and in investigating what it 
means to “dance” or “perform.”
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Reflections on Butoh as a Method 
My interest in Butoh is as a designer and for design practice, so I do 
not intend to explore the performance aspect of Butoh. Obviously 
being an outsider, I would not do the practice justice from the 
depth of knowledge of experts in performing arts. I am following 
Butoh as a method specifically to point to the potential for design 
to expand its practice in a very broad way to a foundation of aes-
thetics. In many ways, this begins with basic somatic awareness 
and sensitivity toward the body. By training our inward attention 
to thinking-feeling patterns at deeper level than is usual in ev-
eryday behavior, Butoh somatic practice serves as an example of 
experiential inquiry into body-mind integration. Butoh is used to 
help people out of their habits and to be perceptually open. It is 
an artistic mode of integration in the Deweyan sense, where there 
is a “dropping away” of the conscious sense of ‘self ’ (as an object). 
Butoh is not without its share of criticism and internal incon-
sistencies. It should be seen as emerging from within a particular 
cultural history and performance tradition in which many practi-
tioners choose to situate themselves, like, for example, contempo-
rary or postmodern dance. As previously stated, Butoh admittedly 
carries a certain ideology of form in terms of trying to free or empty 
performers in order to expand the body’s capacity for movement. 
From that premise, there are many visions of the craft to which I 
personally do not subscribe. One is that there is a natural state or 
collective memory of the human that lies dormant in our bodies. 
Nor do I adhere to the theme of spiritual metamorphosis or ca-
thartic release as being the aesthetic core of Butoh (Fraleigh, 2016). 
Furthermore, while Butoh is often claimed to not have a particular 
style, what emerges is often an ostensible vocabulary with similar 
elements. These include “extreme images of deformity or insanity” 
(Hamera, 1990, p. 55), a focus on death and darkness, “acutely 
controlled and contorted sequences” (Allain & Harvie, 2014, p. 
136), dancers performing with squatted postures, whitened bodies 
and shaved heads to create a stripped or raw presence (V. Sanders, 
1988). Among Butoh’s variations, some groups have developed 
the dark flavor for which a lot of Butoh is known, cultivating a 
practice associated with grotesque imagery and “a mixture of erotic 
obsessions and body sufferings” (Naranjo, 2010).
Beyond this, because Butoh is culturally specific to Japan, 
there are some critics who think it is suspect as an “export art” 
read through the “Western gaze” (Waychoff, 2009, p. 40). In this 
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respect, performers have a cultural responsibility to not merely 
adopt the tradition, without realizing one’s own cultural approach 
to it. For example, in the Japanese pedagogical tradition of strong 
discipline, the training from a western sensibility can be seen as 
uncompromising and strict, “demanding personal sacrifice” and 
“crossing over into everyday life” (Allain & Harvie, 2014, p. 135). 
In my experience talking with people, they expressed criticism for 
things such like the requirement to faithfully observe Butoh mas-
ters, an over-obsession with the body, and following prescriptive 
exercises in a form that is said to resist fixity and routine. 
It is easy to become mired in these fragmented questions and 
discourses solely around the practice of Butoh, but I do not see 
these as criteria for defining Butoh, nor for dismissing it. I have 
merely tried to recognize such complexities and understand my 
perspective within this art form, for instance, that my curiosity in a 
Japanese art form could be questioned as an interest in the “other” 
or a kind of exoticism. However, I do not naively accept Butoh 
as an overly neat analogy or panacea to design or even to somatic 
practice, and I do not see it as good or bad in the objective sense 
of an “artistic method.” I understand it as pragmatically serving my 
particular research interests at a particular time. Basically, Butoh 
allowed me to ‘see’ what I needed to ‘see’ for this research project. 
In its approach, Butoh offered a specific, internalized and 
somatic way of working that I felt I needed to take to explore the 
body as the generative source of action and immediate spontaneity. 
It was a first step in pushing myself to see “design experience” 
in terms of a creative technique and practice for knowing ‘how’ 
as much as knowing ‘what’. Because Butoh was presented in a 
very stripped down and banal manner, as a kind of mind-body 
exploration without any particular goals beyond the exploration 
itself, it felt very accessible. We simply started using our senses and 
moving around in our environments. It was a form which allowed 
us to move at our own pace, and to develop our own learning 
and sense of purpose within it. I had some idea that it could be 
used as an open-ended method of exploration. In an anti-dualist 
sentiment, Butoh supports a critical perspective to self- awareness, 
the material conditions of the body-mind, personal volition, and 
self-discipline not found in a “western” research context of analysis 
and reflection. It was also a method for promoting expression and 
experimentation that I was not able to experience or find within 
the design contexts to which I had access. Particularly because 
107
of Butoh’s improvisational nature, I could give attention to the 
‘nowness’ of my action and participate fully with my fears, drives, 
and impulses as those physically arise rather than intending my 
action and movement toward a goal or final form. 
Empirical Material
After the first Body Weather session with Carmen, I began to seek 
out more opportunities to investigate these movement methods. 
Over the next year and a half, I attended a selection of Europe-
an-based courses in Body Weather and Butoh based on access and 
resources. Currently, there are a limited number Butoh and Body 
Weather workshops taking place in Europe. They occur over the 
course of a week or weekend, predominantly in the summer, and 
in many cases happen in remote places, as a means to connect and 
explore the landscape. My choice to attend particular workshops 
was pragmatically based on factors like timing, travel feasibility, 
teaching language, connection to personal contacts, along with 
the written descriptions of the workshops’ philosophy and format 
(see Appendix,). They were taught by dancers, who might be 
considered second- and third-generation Butoh practitioners in 
Europe. In addition to Carmen Olsson, these included Frank 
van de Ven (Netherlands) and Christine Quoiraud (France) who 
studied and trained in Japan at the Bodyweather Laboratory 
with Min Tanaka; Anita Saij (Denmark) who studied directly 
under Kazu Ohno; Sumako Koseki (France); and Tove Elena 
Nicolaysen (Norway).
One of the longest courses I participated in lasted nine weeks 
at the Art Culture Center – Bækkelund, run by Anita Saij on Born-
holm Island off the coast of Denmark. Bækkelund is conceived as 
a cooperative living environment, in the tradition of Min Tanaka’s 
Body Weather Laboratory, where inhabitants contribute to daily life 
and everything is shared. Participants help maintain the grounds 
that include a garden and a horse stable, in addition to their daily 
dance training in order to become more connected in their patterns 
of social and environmental engagement. 
Without a particular emphasis during those sessions, I took 
things as they came and did what made the most sense at the time. 
When it felt appropriate, and as much as possible, I took photo-
graphs, made audio recordings, and filmed a few videos. In a few 
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workshops, the teachers explicitly asked that we not take photos 
since doing so “takes us out of the experience,” meaning that we 
become observers, rather than remaining within the subjective feel. 
I also took copious notes both during and after classes. 
I also did not specifically “interview” any of the participants, 
but I had extensive interactions with them and the teachers over 
the course of the workshops. I actually did not feel comfortable 
with the idea of formally or informally “conducting interviews” 
because I did not want to effectively feel like a researcher in those 
training settings. I think this would have distanced me from the 
others and the practice itself. While I presented myself as a re-
searcher exploring the art form and asked for their consent to take 
photos and sound recordings for my research, I never made myself 
specifically an observer by sitting out and observing the course. I 
participated as a fellow student, learner, explorer, and artist. To-
gether with the other participants, I had many informal conver-
sations in different settings regarding our thoughts, experiences, 
motivations, impressions, and interests in this type of work. The 
Butoh practice itself includes copious discussions about the work, 
including the performers sharing feelings and reflections, and the 
teachers describing the philosophy of Butoh. As a result, I felt I 
garnered quite a lot of insight through this arrangement without 
having to rely on “interviews.”
Given the ethical considerations this raises, I tried to follow 
these experiences in a way that would contribute to my own learn-
ing and values. Since the focus of my work was to tap into an 
embodied perspective, my intention was not to try to have an 
objective approach to the data. Because of this, I did not feel like 
I was “using” other participants in an exploitative sense as the 
subjects of my research. My approach was necessarily subjective, 
so their conversations and impressions of the experiences that they 
shared were only used to point out how our interpretations and 
circumstances are individual. 
Analysis of Empirical Material
Even after I had attended a number of Butoh and Body Weather 
workshops, I was still unsure about how to make sense of and 
pull together all the materials I was collecting and how they ex-
plicitly related to design. At this point, the research was similar 
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to ethnographic research in that I had been in the “field” and my 
approach was situational and iterative (LeCompte & Schensul, 
1999). I had let myself “get close the data” and “to know well all 
the individuals involved and observe and record what they do and 
say” (Mintzberg, 1979, p. 586). I felt like I had accessed a level of 
understanding with members of the Butoh community so that I 
comprehended somewhat the philosophy and worldview that guide 
the behavior of the community and their ‘culture’ of practice. From 
my weeks of training, I had over twenty hours of audio recordings, 
and hundreds of photos, notes, and sketches. 
From the beginning of my project, I was forthcoming about 
sensing and intuiting the kind of lessons I expected to learn and 
why I was drawn to an aesthetic foundation of inquiry. I intention-
ally did not set out to do a certain kind of analysis or with a certain 
approach or aim to code the information in a qualitative tradition, 
such as “grounded theory,” or with an expectation of an inductive 
analysis or to generate a conceptual framework. Instead, when I 
finally sat down with all of the collected data at the end of 2015, my 
primary interest was in how to convey the internal, somatic feel of 
the Butoh work. What had come up early on in the research was 
Dewey’s (1934) point about artistic ability that requires “showing” 
the reader and not just “telling” the reader. So a main aim of the 
empirical work was a desire to express something of what I actually 
felt in the experience — and especially something of the uncertainty, 
discomfort, and fear of being in the unknown. 
I will note that this underlying intention is why I subscribe to 
the Pragmatist view of abduction. I was always forming a view or 
hypothesis of openness, while conducting this inquiry. The physical 
engagement and active forming of experience are contrasted to the 
qualitative research premise of grounded theory, for instance, in 
that the researcher can stay open to experience, and in the reflective 
analysis drop preconceptions or at least a “personal bias” by using 
methods of reflectivity (Glaser, 1978). This assumption of an in-
ductive and linear progression for conceptual discoveries assumes 
that, one, there are objective methods, and, two, a cerebral ability 
of keeping an “open mind” is detached from physical experience 
and the tacit associations, recollections, expectations, and intuitions 
inherent in a researcher’s actions. This supposition of qualitative 
inquiry, that the researcher frees him/herself reflectively in this 
way, is a major reason for my interest in Pragmatist theory and in 
a methodology that uses movement as inquiry, as the foundation 
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for opening up my perceptive experience. Pragmatism brings to 
the fore how methods in research aim to observe phenomenon 
and emerging data from different lenses, but does not confront 
the question of how the researcher actively influences and manip-
ulates his/her view of the world. Like everyone, I will always have 
former preconceptions, experiences, and interpretations. Moreover, 
I take action through experience, while reflecting on the empirical 
consequences of my actions. This understanding contributes to my 
Pragmatist methodological stance in design inquiry that includes 
the subject of design (the designer), who normatively interprets 
and changes phenomenon. 
With respect to the form of analysis, it was not clear to me 
whether what I was feeling was better conveyed in an overall im-
pression of the process or in concrete experiences. I also felt that 
I wanted to do something with all of the visual and audio docu-
mentation and continued to sift through all of those for the kinds 
of feelings they evoked in me. I also started trying to write about a 
few of the experiences, because, at that point, I knew I wanted to 
be precise about instances and feelings in the work. In that process, 
there were certain moments that I kept coming back to, memories 
that stuck out from the rest of the work I had done. I admit that I 
did not go through my notes and look for patterns or generalities, 
but instead I allowed myself to be drawn to the sensations that 
those memories caused to emerge. 
At the same time, I was taking an academic writing course. 
For that class I wrote about those evocative moments and explored 
them in relation to Pragmatist and embodied cognition theory, 
as well as Butoh’s Buddhist perspective. I admittedly was feeling 
insecure in trying to express the feeling in the moment using writ-
ing. The first drafts were very crude and unstructured, but I was 
advised to keep trying and not worry about the interim results so 
much. I started experimenting a little more with my writing style 
to try to match the feelings of the movement experiences using the 
written word. I also tried to clarify to myself what it was in those 
instances that actually interested me. The form of the writing for 
the empirical section grew out of this iterative process of going back 
and forth between the writing and the point I was trying to make. 
This is also why the theory is directly connected to the empirical 
work, rather than presented apart from it in the discussion chapter. 
Since the empirical work was part of a strategy to directly connect 
to the theoretical material, it emphasizes for the reader the bearing 
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of what the Classical Pragmatists aimed to convey about the living 
integrality of experience. 
Through this process, I noticed a theme of the specific kind of 
tension that was in the moments that most interested me. It was in 
the struggle to not to break from my perceptual experience — the 
here and now — and to lose my ‘self ’ to the movement. I realized 
that this is where the ‘real work’ in the Butoh practice is. It then 
clicked for me that this intersection — the tension(!) between the 
reflective “mind” and the esthetic present — and the physical shift in 
awareness required to remain present is where the majority of this 
research lies. From this realization, I gained clarity with regard to 
what I was trying to say with the particular moments I had chosen. 
I settled more specifically on four moments that each seemed to 
say something slightly different with regard to my internal struggle 
and the specific feelings that those moments caused to emerge. 
Focused on those four experiences, I wanted to go into as 
much detail about what I was feeling and thinking during those 
brief moments. Of course distinctions between form and content 
break down, so this became an arduous process of trying to clarify 
with some specificity what points those sensations and feelings were 
compelling me to make — it was process of words. I needed the 
text. Because of this, the photographs, sketches, and other materials 
I had collected over the course of my project were used to tell a 
parallel story of action, form-giving, and movement, rather than 
trying to “capture” or represent what I had done. I acknowledge 
that I certainly would have ended up with different conclusions 
had I worked through a different media to do the “analysis.” The 
sense of struggle came from the paradoxical nature of what I was 
trying to do and the fact that it was important for me to be able 
to articulate or verbalize something about form-giving in design, 
an experience that is mostly wordless and rests in the tacit ability 
to be open and comfortable with a ‘feel’ for things and ambiguity. 
In this sense the forms of text and analysis create a contradiction 
in using an aesthetic method and approach — that which requires 
experience — to become clearer and make a research case through 
a logical form of analysis. In the end, my movement in the writing 
process returned to where I started theoretically, that is to trying 
to close in on opening up.
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An Empirical Context for Form-Giving
Overview of Movement Improvisation 
As a context and category for this research, “movement improvi-
sation” in the arts proves interesting, since it is one that involves 
taking risks and views art as a domain for any kind of radical ex-
perimentation from both an artistic and a theoretical research 
perspective. To introduce this context, I use the term “movement 
improvisation,” which comes from explorations of the physical 
experience of movement by contemporary practitioners who are 
interested in expanding the range of what might called “dance im-
provisation” (Blom & Chaplin, 1988; De Spain, 2014). Movement 
practitioners generally have a critical or philosophical aim in using 
the art form to push the boundaries of what is termed “dance” in 
life more broadly. It is a generative concept, intended to open the 
possibilities for collaboration or research among practitioners who 
otherwise find the term “dance” limiting.
Given the variety in the kinds of approaches to, questions 
about, and ideas around movement improvisation as an art form, 
there is unquestionably dispute among theorists and practitioners 
concerning what actually constitutes “improvisation.” A discussion 
of such terminology is not germane to the topic of study here 
and falls outside the scope of this work. There is a great deal to 
be said by other scholars about the historical and cultural context 
that is associated with improvisational practices and what today 
is known as movement improvisation. To briefly frame the phil-
osophical context here, movement improvisation was born in the 
early 1960s and continued into the 1970’s, a period marked by 
experimentation and changes in ways artists thought about their 
processes, their roles, and their relationships to audience/viewers. 
All these were generally united by an interest in contextualized and 
nonhierarchical art. This shift in thinking brought a resurgence of 
improvisation to many fields of art, from music to visual arts to 
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architecture (e.g., Situationist International and Fluxus), as artists 
began breaking away from the rigid structures of modernism. Guy 
Debord, core to the Situationist International, identifies the move-
ment as “an experimental investigation of the free construction of 
daily life” (as cited by Bishop, 2012, p. 83). Particularly with the 
artists of this period, the forms of improvisation are often elusive, 
slipping from performance, to trainings, to happenings on the 
street, and between solos, group explorations, and duet activities 
like Contact Improvisation.5
It is important to appreciate that artists used improvisation 
as a critique of what they saw as the separation between the art 
object and process, production and consumption — between the 
work itself and the experience of the work, because this criticism 
plainly connects to John Dewey’s thesis that art is experience. Im-
provisational artists hoped to convey Dewey’s theory in the intrinsic 
relation between art experience and everyday experience (Baas, 
2011, p. 15). They shared Dewey’s concern that categories of thought 
dictate choices and opportunities, and for them, scripted or cleaned 
up forms of performance and art were criticized as agents of se-
curity, comfortability, and the mechanical. By privileging the here 
and now and the “experiment,” the term which improvisers often 
used to describe activities for which the outcome is unknown, they 
sought to affirm the democracy of the present as a space of action. 
Also, by engaging with spectator participation through events 
and happenings, each individual could have equal and heightened 
access to the experience of making the event. This aesthetic experi-
ence had the subjective affirmation in feelings in bringing about a 
“form” (or gestalt), instead of simply focusing on the object itself. It 
demonstrated that everyone ultimately has the right to investigate 
his/her creative capacity. 
5.  Contact Improvisation, developed by American choreographer Steve Paxton, grew out 
of initial performance sessions in 1972. An early definition of contact improvisation given 
by Paxton (1979) is an improvised dance form “based on the communication between two 
moving bodies that are in physical contact and their combined relationship to the physical 
laws that govern their motion — gravity, momentum, inertia. The body, in order to open to 
these sensations, learns to release excess muscular tension and abandon a certain quality of 
willfulness to experience the natural flow of movement.”
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Brief Background on Butoh Method
Butoh is a Japanese dance form of movement improvisation that 
emerged during Japan’s post-war period (the late 1950s) in con-
junction with the impetus for movement improvisation discussed 
above. It is credited to Tatsumi Hijikata (1928–1986) and Kazuo 
Ohno (1906–2010), who returned to Japan after studying modern 
dance in Germany, and were interested in experimenting with 
the practice of dance more fully as a medium of perception and 
expression, deliberately questioning established ideas about dance 
and beauty (Allain & Harvie, 2014; Hamera, 1990). They sought to 
develop a form of performance that was culturally Japanese, rather 
than copying classical styles, and that maintained a connection to 
the movements of day-to-day life and ordinary bodies, rather than 
those of trained dancers. 
1. Hijikata Tatsumi (Tadao, 1968)
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2. Kazuo Ohno (McLaren, 1985)
Loosely translated, Butoh means “earth dance,” and one of the say-
ings by the founders is that it is “born from the mud” (Bergmark, 
1991). Tatsumi Hijikata, for example, “believed that by distorting 
the body, and by moving slowly on bent legs, he could get away 
from the traditional idea of the beautiful body and return to a 
more organic natural beauty” (Frost & Yarrow, 2016, p. 111). Orig-
inally called Ankoku Butoh, which means “dance of utter darkness,” 
(Fraleigh, 2010, p. 55) Ankoku was later dropped from the title, 
since Butoh’s range of expression is seen to be beyond what is 
dark (Yeung, 2002). The practice is understood to require that, 
“[t]he dancers must confront all aspects of themselves — even the 
ugly, dark parts — to give an honest representation of this process 
onstage” (Yeung, 2002, p. 2).
Because of this psychological endeavor, Butoh is described as 
both a philosophy and a movement practice, due to the fact that 
it comes from a combination of training techniques in movement 
and concentration, and a repertoire of choreographic and improvi-
sational principles. Many practitioners describe Butoh as open and 
relevant to anyone interested in investigating the body in relation 
to time and space. The Butoh philosophy of art and life that is 
practiced by Butoh masters is in their “daily interactions with the 
world,” a consequence of which is that discipline and especially 
training are a large part of the movement practice and pedagogy. 
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The principals apply to life in general, so training in the Butoh 
context is not just done to generate performance material and the 
practice does not simply switch on during a performance. Training 
and practice are the nuts and bolts of a corporeal process, an un-
ending material process of producing a certain kind of body-mind 
relationship so as to perform in a certain kind of way. 
Butoh training has many philosophical influences from Bud-
dhism, which treats the body-mind as an interactive whole. Butoh 
ground training methods, while varying from practitioner to prac-
titioner, flow from various influences ranging from Eastern and 
Western dance forms, sports training, meditative arts, martial arts, 
and samurai practice, as well as various theatre practices (e.g., Noh 
theater, physical theater, miming, circus arts, flamenco, and street 
performance). The intention behind them is generally to develop a 
conscious relation both inside one’s self and to one’s surroundings. 
Therefore, Butoh’s point of entry for affecting the body-mind is by 
contact with the body. This process of exploration includes paying 
pointed attention to little-attended aspects of the body-mind, in-
cluding tics, facial and bodily distortions, one’s posture, and other 
involuntary movements and gestures. 
Butoh has training techniques, yet it resists routinization, 
which is due teaching by masters who stress that every person 
“must find their own Butoh,” (Waychoff, 2009, p. 51) their own 
way and form of moving, in order to be true to themselves. By 
working with and cultivating subjective experience as a medium, 
Butoh techniques are seen as a way to support dancers, movers, and 
performers in defining their own relation to movement practice, 
instead of learning a set form or method. Often repeated about 
the genre is that the number of definitions of Butoh is equal to the 
number of people doing it. 
Therefore, where there seems to be some consensus about 
Butoh is in the understanding that it is not a static entity with 
any particular aesthetic. Instead, it is understood by Kazuo Ohno 
as “living art,” since “the essence of life is change” (as cited in 
Waychoff, 2009, p. 45). It is an art that is mutable, with practi-
tioners having their own interpretations of what it is that involve 
their own inner experience and change. In that way, the dancer’s 
body-mind integration is the subject of the movement, rather than 
a particular aesthetic form of movement. Because of this focus, 
Butoh training intentionally breaks from structured dance forms 
like classical ballet, where movement is codified or put into steps 
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and language, and whereby the dancer’s stream or flow of the body 
is rationalized or objectified in the pursuit of a conscious aesthetic 
form of movement. 
Butoh-Pragmatist Connection 
Like the Pragmatists, Butoh begins with a naturalist perspective 
with regards to movement, meaning that there is a kind of original 
human nature, what they view as a primary “raw” self-interested 
experiential function of our bodies constituted by impulses and de-
sires. “The organism” (Mead, 1934/1967) or “live creature” (Dewey, 
1934/2005) are two terms Pragmatists use for this sentient, percep-
tive state of esthetic engagement without a linguistic awareness. In 
the Pragmatists’ thesis, there is no “ontological rupture between 
‘lower’ animals and humans” (M. Johnson & Rohrer, 2007, p. 
32), in the live interactive coordination of the organism and its 
environment. The human activity of impulses naturally becomes 
shaped and influenced by the particular social environment(s) 
of the organism, an adaptive pattern that embodied cognition 
calls “coupling” (M. Johnson & Rohrer, 2007). The individual 
learns to influence his own conduct — bodily movement and ac-
tivities — through symbolic interaction and the kinds of social 
conditions and expectations that shape and crystallize impulses 
into dominant habits (Mead, 1934/1967). Thus, the “mind,” refer-
ring to the uncanny human ability for abstract conceptualization, 
emerges through forms of social communication, interaction, and 
expression. Said differently, what we understand as a distinctly 
human “bodily experience of meaning” is enacted and “given voice” 
through socially and culturally transmitted behavior (M. Johnson 
& Rohrer, 2007, p. 47)
Similarly, Butoh founders claim that all human movement 
begins with impulses, the body responding to needs that arise 
from interaction with the environment. They consider this natu-
ral body, or subconscious body, that occurs from the stimulation 
and response of the senses to be subverted by social condition-
ing. Specifically, the body is believed to be subjected to a kind of 
reasonableness of mind, in the form of social customs and habits 
that place restrictions upon movement expression. This isolation 
of body from the mind is seen to be duly manifested in the split 
between man and nature, since the body is connected to nature. 
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Words like “flesh,” used in Butoh, explicitly contrast the perceived 
purity and immateriality of the “mind” by being grounded with a 
feeling of contact with the living body — the breathing, wrinkled, 
imperfect, suffering, dying body. 
From this point of view, Butoh culture celebrates human 
impulse and instinctual responses, the supposed irrationality of the 
body. Through movement, the idea is to release the whole person-
ality or the entire spectrum of aesthetic and emotional expression 
of experience, including the dark and the absurd, the miniscule 
and exaggerated movements and otherwise repressed impulses that 
are withheld from typical social activities due to embarrassment or 
shame. With this philosophy, Butoh training is geared to strip away 
or help break down the layers of collective habits and rationality, 
in order to allow the body to “speak” for itself, i.e., a natural or 
unconstrained expressiveness. Butoh’s somatic practice is therefore 
radical and experimental in the Pragmatists’ sense of being oriented 
toward inner experience rather than one that is objectively oriented 
toward external appearance or end results. 
3. Body Weather landscape (van de Ven, 2003)
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Butoh Training and Setting
Because the body is required as a point of reference and the source 
of experience for Butoh, it is necessary to learn Butoh through a 
training process, sometimes referred to as a laboratory. This training 
mostly consists of workshops given by Butoh masters throughout 
the world. It is way of working and networking, and is intentionally 
kept informal or relaxed while being structured, since participants 
must travel to the workshops in order to directly experience the 
movement and engage the body-mind. Most typical workshops 
are full-day classes beginning in the morning, with a lunch break, 
and then more sessions in the afternoon. Most people who attend 
these classes are not aspiring dancers with previous training, but 
individuals, usually with some sort of interest or practice working 
with the body, such as artists, performers, or architects, who found 
out about Butoh through word of mouth.
Through trial and error, the teachers have discovered that 
the practice must be properly learned through exercise training. 
Any written media and videos published for teaching the practices 
are intentionally scrubbed and now teachers generally prohibit 
note-taking by participants who intend to try to share the proce-
dures with others through verbal or visual means. They insist that 
the transference of these methods involves embodied knowledge 
and must be mastered through repetition like any other craft or ac-
tivity. This physical interaction with the practice is thus an integral 
part of the culture of Body Weather, for example, since the meeting 
situations also assign meaning to the overall philosophy and the 
kinds of attitudes, interactions, and social dynamics it contains.
4. The training studio
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Basic Butoh Training Strategies
There may be questions here about using an artistic method in the 
context of design, but form a non-dualistic perspective there is no 
distinction between practical and aesthetic with respect to method. 
Nor is there a distinction between art and design in the way that 
many in design consider design to be different from art because 
of its concern with the practical or the “real world” (Koskinen et 
al., 2011, p. 98). In that regard, it is important to see that Butoh 
is practical in the sense that it has been designed with a strong 
philosophical outlook and with strategies for its intentions. Its 
matter of form, and the way it is taught and practiced, are not 
merely aesthetic, for performance, or for shock value, but there 
is a strong intention and philosophy behind the work, tying it to 
human experience and the physical body. It is both conceptual and 
grounded in real life experience.
I briefly present three Butoh strategies for training with so-
matic awareness, “unified body,” “soft focus,” and reflective dis-
cussion, as a way to point out how Butoh uses a philosophical 
understanding to inform its practical approach to operationalizing 
an integrated body-mind. These are not meant to paint a picture 
of the entire practice, since each practitioner of Butoh finds his/
her own way to work with the material, but these strategies are 
emblematic of Butoh’s explicit focus on subjective awareness and 
philosophical approach through a means of physical training. 
“Unified Body”
Foundational to Butoh is a natural posture of the body that is the 
dancer’s primary position, a kind of neutral position or a “point 
zero”. The posture is intended to train the body-mind to relax 
by developing the dancer’s contact with the center of energy (ki) 
through breathing.That is to say, the experience of the unified 
body relies in letting the mind connect with ki-energy. Like in 
Butoh, ki-energy is a pivotal concept in body-mind disciplinary 
training methods of the traditional Eastern meditation, medicine, 
and martial arts (Yuasa, 1993). Ki is difficult to grasp through ex-
planation and not practice, but a very reductive interpretation for 
my discussion is that intentional, trained breathing allows the 
practitioner (subjective feeling) to connect to the material substance 
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(object) of his/her body. Therefore, the training of the breathing 
is the training of a self-apprehension, a perceptive sentient body. 
Learning to center our ki with the unified body helps generate 
awareness and feeling for the body.
5. Training the unified body (photo: Patricia Suarez Hermosilla)
To execute the unified body from a standing position, the feet are 
parallel about the width of a fist apart and the entire sole resting 
lightly on the floor. The practitioner tries to settle the gravity of her 
body in the lower abdomen while lengthening the spinal cord and 
centering the head with the head and chin pulled in. The effect is 
that the upper half of the body should be relaxed and open, while 
the body’s energy (ki) is centered and rooted in the earth. From 
the outside, the posture should look effortless, but internally it 
is warfare and it requires considerable technical training. On one 
level, there is simply the physical dexterity and endurance necessary 
to hold the posture correctly. Especially when holding the uni-
fied body from a squatted position, the legs and back are usually 
screaming in pain after a few minutes. On another level, there is 
a mental disjuncture when trying to remember all the elements of 
the unified body together and at once, e.g., breathing, shoulders 
down, squatting low, maintaining ki, focus out, open chest, chin in, 
balancing the sky. It is intensely challenging not to become tense, 
to look natural, all while “enjoying the beauty.” 
What makes the unified body so difficult to grasp intellec-
tually and to develop as a practitioner is its embodied contradic-
tion(s). The key is to not think about it, but to embody it. The 
unified body does not subscribe to general dichotomies used to 
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express thought, so aesthetically one must be able to simultaneously 
embody two seemingly contradictory traits. The examples Sumako 
gives are of joy and pain, playfulness and death, imperfection and 
beauty, calmness and precision, efficiency and irregularity, sublime 
and subtle, consistency and change. These qualities can exist in the 
same space (our bodies) and not contradict one another. Therefore, 
the experience of the unified body is a practiced incongruity because 
we are at once “strong and flexible” or with “beauty and strength.” 
It is not one thing or another, but rather one inhabits both things 
at once a “but, and.” 6 The body is grounded, firm, full of energy, 
while also soft and delicate, light, responsive, and receptive. This 
kind of dual energy of being able to control and surrender is the 
psychosomatic basis for all of Butoh performance — or that which 
the Butoh performer strives for — being both fully aware and pres-
ent, but also empty of discriminating thoughts. The unified body 
is not about conceptualizing, but searching and pushing oneself 
to relate through unification.
“Soft Focus” 
A particular element of the unified body that we practiced in 
training is what I will refer to here as “soft focus.” “Soft focus” 
is a concrete practice for the performers to be more centered and 
somatically aware of their surroundings and internal feelings. In 
training it is described as reversing our habitual ways of looking 
and sensing, going out toward what we want, instead allowing the 
world in and opening ourselves up, “Participants are asked to look 
at the surrounding and at other people without desire” (Bogart & 
Landau, 2005, p. 31). The purpose is to metaphorically not narrow 
ourselves by a vision of preconceived expectations. By allowing 
information to penetrate our sensibilities, we literally learn to move 
in new ways (Bogart & Landau, 2005).
6.   This use of dichotomies is considered a more general trait of Japanese aesthetics that is 
based in a temporal perception of life. This aesthetic is marked by “an expression that lies 
in the brief transition between the coming and going of life, both the joy and melancholy 
that make up our lot as humans” (Juniper, 2003, p. 1), manifesting the Buddhist tenets 
of perishability or “impermanence.” So instead of aesthetic qualities being singular, the 
mixing of opposing qualities offers a fuller wholeness of observation, the perception of the 
temporal. By consequence there is a multidimensionality of form that ideally carries a sense 
of uncertainty of something that remains indefinable or “beyond.” 
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In Butoh, “soft focus” is practiced by having a diffuse visual 
focus, our attention not on any fixed point (or what is “seen”), 
but over the whole body and around the body as one feeling. It 
originates in a focus on the present by accentuating a constant body 
perception. As in meditative and martial arts, we practice contin-
ually pulling our attention back to what are considered automatic 
maintenance of the body’s physiological systems, like posture and 
breath.7 Also, because there is a cultural dominance in the sense of 
“looking” or “the gaze,” as it is called, that puts an objective focus 
on our movement activity. In Butoh training we often work with 
our eyes shut or practice a diffuse gaze where our eyes are relaxed 
and we take in information through peripheral vision. Beyond this, 
when we train inside, the studios are intentionally mirror free to 
prevent our attention from being literally diverted to a reflective, 
external view of ourselves.
We must be fully ‘in’ our bodies and allow our awareness to 
go both everywhere and nowhere at once. Some teachers refer to 
this as being aware in “3-dimensions” while others call it a “third 
eye.” The teachers describe how our skin, our backs and feet, all our 
body parts should be awake and letting our relations guide us. By 
having a focus on the internal feeling of the movement, we can let 
it come naturally and unhindered by the objective thought of what 
we are doing. In a way this is an art of focusing on the feeling of 
a situation as a whole body. Anita’s direct way of explaining it is, 
“Don’t look with the eyes.” In the exercises she frequently reminds 
the group: 
You don’t need to look at your foot or your hand to know 
where to place them! Before you touch, you don’t need to 
look at the place, because when you look out, or you look 
at the spot, then you don’t feel yourself…. Take a feeling of 
yourself! First!
7.   From the perspective of embodiment theory, normally in routine behavior, the body 
disappears or “tends to efface itself” by having many motor operations that are a matter of 
reflex (Ziemke et al., 2007, p. 275). Our body-minds tend to offload a lot of our cognition 
onto our subconscious through routine behaviors or patterns. An example of this offloading 
is in localized, daily, physical activities and the details of such bodily movement. These are 
in a way hidden to us consciously because our physical habits are so familiar. This automatic 
operation of much of our movement is done so that our “thinking” activities can be geared 
to other external goals.
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Practice with “soft focus” is about becoming conscious of our 
non-seeing capabilities. It is similar to the way cognitive scientist 
Tim Rohrer describes the instant when our consciousness of the 
body returns to us:
Whenever we are forced to move about in the dark, we 
are forcibly reacquainted with our bodily sense of space. 
Problems ordinarily solved beneath the level of our 
conscious awareness become dominant in our cognition; 
we find ourselves noticing subtle changes in the floor 
texture underfoot, carefully reaching out for the next step 
in the stairwell. (Ziemke et al., 2007, p. 340)
6. Training soft focus (photo: Anita Saij)
Reflective Discussions
In Butoh we always follow up an exercise by informally discussing 
it afterwards, either in a group or with a partner. Such reflections 
form an essential part of Butoh training, where there is the move-
ment as directly experienced and expressed and the movement as 
stated by language. There is no pressure to sound smart or clever, 
with the opinion being that the reflection is simply a process of 
memory. The movement is instantly gone, already behind us and 
only half remembered. Sitting in a circle, figuring out what to say 
is really like a second improvisation, very circumstantial, and this 
time, an unedited first-time-putting-it-into-words. How do we 
symbolically make sense of whatever just happened back there? It 
is like trying to replace a living, breathing thing with an overtly 
conscious and makeshift sequence of symbols. 
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We each test a memory aloud; motioning, gesticulating, 
pauses and “umms” are substitutes for our lack of words. We 
search for feelings, movements, sounds, any memories and vis-
ceral responses that come up, making our way through the web 
of impressions, swells and shifts of emotions. Frequently, we just 
have to laugh at the kinds of inadequate descriptions that fall out 
of our mouths. They are extremely abstract and peculiar to anyone 
listening. Just a few seconds of trying to verbalize the experience of 
streaming movement makes it instantly apparent how the kinds of 
feelings and motives that manifest themselves, the different sensory 
modalities, kinesthetic, emotional, and intuitional processes taking 
place, have little to do with language. There is a space between 
what we say and what we feel. 
In the reflective discussions, the words themselves are not 
intended to directly represent the content of each our movement 
experiences. The reflections are more accurately about examining 
the kinds of meaningful qualities and patterns within each of our 
own experiences, the source of ‘felt’ meaning in movement im-
provisation. Our discussions always call our attention back to the 
connection between the feelings and emotions and thoughts of 
the improvisation, which presumably is where meaning emerges. 
Therefore, in the context of Butoh practice, the improvisa-
tions and reflective discussions about them can be seen as playing 
an integral role in a somatic discipline of integrated awareness. We 
revisit the improvisations at a reflective distance to garner insights 
about the ‘felt sense’ of the movement, while also noticing our own 
embodied responses and patterns. The verbal reflections help us 
remember by clarifying our mental attention, so each experience 
becomes an opportunity for learning for the next time. We learn to 
“observe” or sense more exactly invisible and ineffable processes, 
our inner emotions and dialog, and our changing subject-object re-
lationships, what we were paying attention to, like the space of the 
room, the image of our body, the time it took us to get from one 
place to another, the feeling of gravity, the sound coming from a 
plane overhead, or that we were simply not “in our body” enough, 
for instance. This, in turn, helps us focus differently and change 
our behavior the next time. In other words, the reflective capacity 
of meta-awareness helps stimulate and extend our different levels 
of awareness and capacities during the movement experiences.
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7. Discussions after manipulation exercise.

131
5
Four Direct Experiences of Form-Giving
To make the empirical connection between form-giving of move-
ment improvisation and form-giving of design explicit, I want to 
first describe the way that an improvising body-mind collapses 
conceptual distinctions between subject and object in experience, 
since the subjective encounter of moving, manipulating, and feeling 
my body as a material object is the same as manipulating and feel-
ing physical material outside my body. Movement improvisation 
methods allow me to focus on the temporality of my perceptual 
experience, in particular, on my sentient engagement in the present 
as a critical aspect of the design activity of form-giving.
Dewey’s Live Creature
In my experience of movement improvisation, the immediacy 
of physicalizing my thinking and, specifically when I lose aware-
ness of my ‘self,’ is consistent in the quality of feeling with when I 
am involved in the specific form-giving (gestaltning) activities of 
design, like the making, doing, and crafting of design. Of course 
an entire design process is a process form-giving, but here I am 
concerned with the direct act of thinking-feeling through a material 
and giving that material form. An important part of design, like 
any artistic process, is in this sentient engagement with and in an 
activity form-giving. 
In the Deweyan view of art as experience, the artistic is a 
perception of when it happens, rather than intrinsically of what 
it is. Dewey (1934/2005) states, for instance, that art and science 
are not different in the “intrinsic content of experience,” meaning 
that, “it is not because of self-obvious and self-contained traits of 
the immediate terms that Dante’s world belongs to poetry and 
Newton’s to scientific astronomy. No amount of pure inspection 
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and excogitation could decide which belongs to which world. 
The difference in status and claim is made by what we call experi-
ence…” (p. 16). Thus, the artistic is that which takes place in the 
immediate flow of a kinesthetic, visual, and tactile modality, when 
hand-eye coordination and perception is engaged in the building 
of an architectural model or drawing, for example. Form-giving 
in action involves a direct sense of agency, the testing out of re-
lations and movements empirically, the sequencing, spacing, and 
flipping between reflections and perceptions. Both improvisation 
and making have a relative quality of being present with and aware 
of the materiality of experience, notably perceiving relations and 
feelings, and the creation and perception of expressive form. 
To speak of the integrative character of this consciousness 
is to go beyond the things that I can verbalize, to the sensations, 
movements, and connection between doing and responding. When 
I am moving, I do not have specific images in my mind, but rather a 
tactile, kinesthetic perception of the motor activity. So even when I 
start some improvisation exercises with an image sensation, I don’t 
see images as pictures or an internal representation, but I have what 
feels to be an inner wordless dialog, a kind of running form-sensa-
tion-form, “organization of energies” that merge, flower, bloom, 
and dissipate. Having contact with bodily sensations and a feeling 
of connection with my surroundings, my moving, new actions, 
impulses continually emerge. New impulses, new impressions, new 
curiosities, new tests — one state giving rise to succeeding ones.
In the empirical examples, when I am immersed in the present 
and my self-consciousness disappears, I have observations about 
the kinds of movements I am making, but I do not identify with 
them. That is, I am not conscious of my ‘self ’ or my movement 
from the perspective of how others see “me.” This experience that I 
move through is perhaps a meta-awareness of witnessing thoughts, 
where I am always semi-conscious of the timing, direction, spacing, 
and effort of my movement: its arrangement, what movements I 
have made, what I need to do to make it more dynamic, or where 
and how I am moving in relation to the others and the room. My 
perception of bodily motion involves a physical level of attention. 
There is a relationship between my thoughts and the situation, 
atmosphere, the environment, the others, my mood, memories, 
and energy level. I am generally observant of space and time and 
dimensions like near/far, low/high, back/forward, slow/fast. The 
thinking comes in impulsive bursts, not consciously in words, 
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movement with a desire, idea of form, direction, or shape of action, 
but no intended outcome. In that sense, the action is in the shape 
of a statement but with the character of a question: 
Some feet here, go to the floor now. Roll backwards. Run to the other 
side of the room. Run as fast as possible. Faster. Go until you feel 
the need to stop. Go more. Faster. Repeat that earlier move with 
the arms. Change the pace. Enlarge it. Make it as large as possible. 
Larger until it becomes something new. 
This sensation of the way I work in the present can perhaps be 
best described as moving forward from sensation to sensation. I 
focus on the corporal feeling of flow from one body part to the 
next, on the impressions and responses that arise from the quality 
of the movement(s). In this way I would say I mostly generate 
form through a feeling of motion through experience — both in 
design and in Butoh. I tend to try out particular motions and dy-
namics with my body to see how they feel in time and space and 
the kinds of emotions they bring forth. In my physical qualitative 
experience, there is no distinction between whether the emotions 
and images cause my movement or the movement causes the 
emotions and images.
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Highlighting this immediate sense perception, it is helpful to zoom 
in briefly on the visceral activity of designing. In architectural prac-
tice, for example, drawing a line has a purpose of visualizing space, 
since a line represents a wall in an architectural plan. For anyone 
that is not familiar with this, on paper, a line expresses qualities of 
separation (as a physical wall) between one space and another. The 
physical act of drawing a line experientially generates a feeling and 
quality of separation based on the motion, pressure, thickness, et 
cetera of the line. A line (wall) as it is drawn, therefore, is both an 
object (concretely what is drawn, the wall) and an experience (a 
subject/object relationship with the line and space around it, the 
‘wallness’). There is always a figure/ground relationship in this 
sense with things themselves and the act of perceiving the things. 
Here for instance is a diagonal line (now the figure), but 
there are two spaces on the lower left and on the upper right 
(now the ground):
So different qualities of lines visually represent different qualities 
of separation between the two spaces: 
Hard, distinct, decisive  Blurred, transitional, straight   Light, uncertain, indecisive
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The act of drawing a line, then, naturally involves my em-
bodiment of these feelings of relations, particularly how I under-
stand the relationship between an object (figure) and its context 
(ground). I refer to the figure-ground relations from Gestalt princi-
pals of perceptual organization, which are generally taught in basic 
design composition. Designers learn these “emergent qualities of 
interactive aesthetic Gestalt” (Shusterman, 2012, p. 12) in which 
a visual field is perceived as articulated into two components, the 
figure or focal object and the ground or background. Gestalt means 
“form” or “structure” which represents an irreducible interpreta-
tion of perception, specifically the understanding that an overall 
form as perceived is greater than the sum of the parts. Because the 
perception of object-relations depends on feedback from kines-
thetic, visual, and sensorimotor operations, the associated quality 
of gestalt is characterized by two-directionality. 
In this perceptual experience of gestalt, every time I place a 
line on the paper, I flip between the sensation and feelings of the 
relations, as if I feel their presence in space, and thoughts about 
what kind of spatial relationship is being represented, how the 
line is conveying an emotional tone or mood. I am imagining the 
kind of experience that the wall in relation to my body and the 
type of space it would produce, would actually feel like. There is 
an aesthetic analysis of (figure/ground) relationships happening 
during the act of drawing. My thinking is often:
There needs to be a wall here…what is the spatial relationship be-
tween these two? large/small, surrounding/middle, top/bottom…what 
quality of wall should be here? What if the spaces were actually just 
one kind of space with two overlapping qualities? If the two spaces 
have a connection to one another but are disconnected physically? 
Could it be that the wall is low and short? Transparent? Perforated? 
Light and sound can pass through…There should not be an actual 
visual connection, but there is still a sense of connection through the 
sharing of shadow and sound. This conveys that there is something 
beyond, not directly able to know the other space but aware of it like 
in your periphery. 
Making decisions of perception that the wall should be light and 
perforated to convey a feeling of connection requires me as a de-
signer to imagine my experience with a wall in space and I do it 
by trying my thought out in the world with pen on paper. Like 
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movement improvisation, there is little distinction between the cir-
cumstances of fully engaging my body-mind. In both experiences, 
I am making aesthetic choices about what feels right in relation 
to the qualities that I hope to achieve. I am feeling the physical 
consequences of particular actions. 
Introducing the Experiences of Form-Giving
The following section is comprised of four empirical models that 
explore physical action, sensation, and emotional perception in 
form-giving in the present. The physical techniques of impro-
visation and formal conditions in Butoh (see p. x for a descrip-
tion) relate to an integrated consciousness in the present. Each 
of the experiences comes from a movement exercise that offers a 
concrete instance of being focused in the present in an activity of 
form-giving — the immediate corporal and felt sense of thinking 
and constantly changing inner relations. 
The four experiences of form-giving come from specific in-
stances in my Butoh training exercises. Each experience forms an 
empirical model used to highlight the continuity between objec-
tive reflection and that sense of self-control and self-preservation 
with bodily, phenomenological presence without differentiation 
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of ‘self.’ In different respects each describes highly detailed and 
contextualized empirical situations of an aesthetic mode of inquiry 
and form-giving. They suggest the complex dynamics of that phys-
ical experience, including action, sensation, intent, imagination, 
emotions, memories, and states of mind in which I learn to notice 
patterns. This in turn helps me discover my capacity for expression 
and feeling. These four experiences are arranged in the following 
sequence: Practicing ‘Self’, Meeting Halfway, Embodying Form, 
Sense of Process.
I would like to point out that a limitation of the analytic form 
of model-building in the following section toward my physical 
experience is that it strips away the direct, felt experiences of the 
body and by extension objectifies the body via explanation. Because 
direct experience takes place in a specific relational context, not an 
objective context, it will always lack the coherency and cleanness of 
rationalization’s presentation of an either/or logic. The mutability 
of thought is in human action and it will always resist definition 
and classification. Artistic work is characterized by tensions in 
perception (Dewey, 1934/2005), and since this tension is what 
I grapple with in this thesis, the following texts inherently have 
contradictions. However, it is understood that in the exercises 
themselves I directly unite what is an apparent incongruity in that 
it is a both/and: I am both tense and relaxed, real and fictional, 
reasonable and unreasonable, playful and disciplined. 
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One: Practicing ‘Self’
The paint is chipped at the far wall. There is a clock hanging there, 
ticking. Bodies to her left and right, moving shadows out of the 
corners of her eyes, silently being pushed forward, the floor creeks 
beneath, singing to them. They are reminded that it is a gift. The 
edges of her body, the atmosphere, the room, some things old, 
some new, come and go. A kind of repetition of everyday motion 
expanded and intensified in the span of each moment. The base of 
her foot coming down meeting the bare floor, the back one lifting 
up, mockingly always both at any moment, having contact and 
passing through the air. No real outlines, toes, navel, skin. A band 
starts playing outside. The bass shakes the walls of the studio or 
her innards. The teacher is giving instructions for them to follow: 
See how the music that comes from outside can nurture 
you... And then, for yourself while you are walking, just 
observe the emotion that you have inside. Give it a name. 
For yourself. Recognize it. Observe it, and accept it for 
yourself.
Her mouth is slightly open, nostrils flaring. The dancer’s breathing 
is audible. It isn’t looking or listening, but feeling. These words are 
not right. They are circling around. This, that, molecules, chem-
icals, fluids, guts. Like trying to get settled in bed to sleep, the 
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frustration of not having the right position. Not. Quite. Right. That 
arm that is stuck under in the weird positon with no place to go. 
The inners are just a blur, or whatever it is. A feeble heartbeat. 
Silence. An irreducible calm. Softness? Indifference? Does she 
really have to know what it is?
And while you continue walking, find an image that goes 
with this emotion. It can be a natural image. It can be… 
whatever image that comes, yeah? And this image that 
you found, that just came, put it in your chest. And how-
ever you understand what I am saying is correct, yeah? 
So don’t try to understand. Just do whatever feels right 
for you with the words that I am giving you.
There are half-formed pictures, flickering with no real sense if 
they are coming toward her or moving away from her. It’s like 
shining a small flashlight into a black cave only to see shapes 
and shadows, particles of light and energy. She’s trying to focus. 
Things are changing every second. There is something light, like 
paper, almost resting and not completely weightless. It is so insub-
stantial sitting doesn’t describe what its mass fails to do, at least, 
the other surface does not seem to register it at all. It becomes 
clearer that it is ocean water, rippling and glittering… and there is 
a piece of small plastic, like the lid of a yogurt container riding on 
the surface of the water, bobbing up and down with the currents.
So put this image in your chest. And let your chest start 
to move from this image, which comes from an emotion, 
which comes from you in this moment. Maybe the image 
is a texture, maybe it has a color, maybe it is warm or 
maybe it is cold, it can be hard or it can be soft, maybe it 
feels good, maybe it doesn’t feel so good. How can this 
image express itself through your chest? How can this 
image become alive inside of you through your chest? 
How can the walls understand what is inside of your 
chest? Without speaking, without telling, without trying 
to do anything… 
She tries to let the rippling movement traveling through her body. 
For a second she is a little frustrated with having this image 
appear, wishing she could change it. She catches herself. 
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Damn, how banal. Isn’t this water theme getting old? How is she 
going to do the flowing thing again? Is there anything new with this? 
Why does she keep trying to do this movement? Sigh. Try not to be 
disappointed in her. She’s trying her best, dammit. 
Her spine, hips, arms, neck now undulating without her consent. 
Everything moves like it is waving, foregoing her brain, pushing 
her body to answer the question — How does it feel on top of the 
water? How does it feel? Feel. Feeeel. 
Like.
Lii  ke
tight.    ward
  still   ward
  for ward
  quiet ward
  for
for
  had   wired. Tired. She was mired.  
     (you’re fired.)
tight.  gliding   ward.
Ward. Ward’s. Remember Ward’s?  Star wars.  Let it go, girl. 
Work it.   Wired to. 
Star overhead. Overheard. 
Overhearing. star’s conversations. The Stars.
Star struck banter ful. Bountiful.   Fully full   guly ful.    
   Fugly. Really fugly. Really fugly ful. 
You are!
Star bright. Briiight. 
  (I I I saaaiidd bbriiiighhtt!)
  Tonight. 
     light it up. the
Fight  it. Tight  ward. Light  ward. Star  bright.  
In your face,    sucka.    
  POW,        punch,  boom!
You’re hired.       
 It’s all in a day’s work.
Night, tight. tuck in light. Sight!
Take in that sight.    Don’t  fight. 
 hope, 
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  hope,              Which?
  nope, hope
  nop 
  no
    go back
       n
             trap
                   back nnnnnn
b e h i n d   ‘ i n 
f
 e
   l
     l 
falling      words     behind    worse.   
Feeelin’ worse, hoss.   
was it pride     ?
worry too 
    What up,  shawty   ?   
Question mark! Maker’s mark.   Pointers make.   Point made. 
          Time shame. 
       Shame prime. 
Half mad.                    A damn prime 
                   shame. 
Mad cow.       
                 Slime time prime
  (don’t do that on television)
Don’t. back  back it up  hay   tide
 Away.      Rip                tide
        
      Bona      fide
Prime time       Caroline.     
      Ridin’   fide. 
Sweet. 
Lookin’ fine.     Fiiiiinnnnnneee.  Damn.    Hot  damn.   Fine. 
      Hot  Hot
                        dig
        git
             y
Dust bust.  Rust  first.  First. how old.     
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                 dooog.
Dragged from the fold. 
 
 So bold.  Booold.                 Bustin’ 
               Like that,    random boy.
Calypso. 
You don’t know.       
                
At all.        
            
                                
                  
Attta all.        Atttaboy.      Boy oh boy 
At all...   
At all…
   Question mark. 
     X marks the spot. 
       Comma   comma  
       shhhhhh....
Cold moving front. 
A little.    violent.    Here.    tiny-unhinged.   
Variable-tiny-unhinged cloudiness.  Unpredictable.  
Pulling-tiny front.  Arms flapping — wildly front.  Legs, there.  
Here. There. Falling out.  Down  from under.   back there.  
Legs. Here. Legs.  Flailing cloudiness back there legs here.    
Southeasterly legs there.   here.   there.
Lashing down where legs. there. where. Disconcerting emotional 
rushes there-tiny-here. there.  Rising, crashing legs down there. 
Passing.  haywire here.   where.   here.   there.
A taste of anger. Tastes like iron there.  dark around. 
Hotness at the center.  moonstruck. 
Dripping sweat except for a hint of light. To the side dark around 
here arms flashing batty side.  
Dark balmy around and the  grey bit moving  behind 
flickering.  torrential flickering dark spots flailing legs  around 
raining arms pulling front.
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Thunder-storming now down clouding all around.  Neck heavy. 
Turbulent flickering dark grey spots.   Frantic specks of light. 
Feet-upward peddling storminess shadow showers. 
A mild barely fury tiny-there. Slapping skin flickering flapping 
flicking.  Skin. Skin. Skin. Skin. Skin. Skin. Flickering skin. 
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———
Immediately after the exercise, in our usual way, we try to put 
words to the aesthetic sources of our movement, the kind of sen-
sations and feelings that give it meaning, and likewise, the kind of 
physical-mental strategies that we notice that we developed over 
the course of the improvisations. Sitting in a circle and our teacher 
asks us about our experiences, “What happened with the image?” 
I hear myself describe finding the image of the piece of plastic 
riding the ocean ripple and how I specifically tried to embody that 
movement by letting the flowy motion grow and change through 
my body. I recall that I felt a sense of disappointment when the 
image came to me, that I was worried it would be boring, that I 
didn’t know what to do with it if I thought about it. But then when 
I just let go and literally rode the movement out, things started 
to happen, and I even became a little violent. This caught me off 
guard because I would have expected the movement to remain 
kind of tranquil, maybe indifferent, but somehow slack. But that 
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is what happened when I let my body really conform to the kind 
of emotions that came up. They went a bit dark. I don’t know if 
this is the right way of talking about this but I’ve already started.
I notice that this theme of floating or ‘going with flow’ has 
been an attitude that I have been trying to practice more in my 
everyday interactions like with my work, relationships, and life in 
general. So I do not really know where this image came from when 
we were asked to listen inside ourselves, whether it is a matter of me 
seeking to act in a way that is different from my typical behavior. 
But there is something in ‘the back of my mind,’ however inartic-
ulate and subconscious a view I have of myself.
Why am I saying this now?
The other students take turns describing the images and influences 
that came up for them:
S: I saw a color. I couldn’t have an image, only like a color. And 
yellow. So yellow. And I think maybe if the...I think that maybe 
we should have an image from the start, when we start to work. 
I think it would be a different color or different texture. So it was 
nice to see that it ended up being yellow because I didn’t feel 
yellow when we started (laughs). So it felt like a journey. Yeah.
T: And how did you react to the image?
S: Really, like, slowly. Really little things, but I felt more like, a 
whole…and very solid (gestures with her hands pressing). So it 
felt like opening. Like my body just really slowly opening up. So 
I just lied down on the floor and felt my body just like open up 
without feeling…anxiety. 
G: I thought it was interesting because the word that came up was 
resistance. And when I was walking I didn’t really —
T: As an image or as a word?
G: It was a word and then it came an image like, uh, (gestures 
by putting arm straight out with palm open signaling “halt”) the 
hand doing like this. And that was like when it was like related 
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to the chest it was like very…because it didn’t like actually until 
after you said put it in your chest, then I saw it as an image. And 
it was like very clear, and I thought like, “Wow, it’s like a stop sign.” 
(laughs) And uh, it was like going through different parts, and, but 
different parts came up things from my experiences where I kind 
of...would like to stop to myself, in other ways...like from different 
parts of the body telling different stories. And even if I am aware 
of these things from before, it was like coming up now. And in 
the end it was going a little bit with the shoulders (gestures by 
holding shoulders). 
M: I saw a forest first, and then I was like, whew (pushes air from 
chest and gestures with arms crossed making X) a red X. Which 
was...and I know these movements from before, this (demon-
strates with body a kind of struggling) really allowed myself to 
go…just like all the way to the roof. Just spreading that, whatever 
it is in the body. And then I had a moment, this frenzy or this panic. 
I know this place or this panic. It’s like, what!? It’s like, too small! I 
was just like, the walls were a problem and everything is…I’m more 
than the form. I don’t know how to describe it. Because it’s really 
like, I just wanted to like say, “Fuck this place, I just want to go.” 
Yeah, like in a big space.
A: Myself? I have these movements and symbols that keep coming 
back in this workshop. And uh, movement like, circle and line. 
Which is really different for me to do (laughs). The symbols are 
the stars and the banana. (Group laughs.) And they are also very 
different. And then it is the complexity of like, how these things…
what is in between the things, like, what is in between the banana 
and the arms? And the line is a lot connected to the arms. Because 
it is usually this (gestures with arm out straight), but it is like 
what is between, like, line and banana, but also what is between 
the arms and the banana, and between the hips and the banana, 
and the feet and the banana. (Group laughs.) And, it is very…the 
forms and the symbols are saying something. It keeps coming 
(laughs). And this crying, like, stress. And the stress, or movement 
or motion of crying…or stress or something is very connected to 
the circles. 
147
An Imagery Exercise
These associative descriptions from the dancers are from an im-
provisation exercise to find an image from within and explore 
it. The way that we explored an image and then discussed what-
ever thoughts we had is typical of Butoh training. Commonly 
the teacher gives verbal instructions that draw students’ attention 
to particular inner sensations, body parts, actions, or spatial and 
environmental relationships. We each move independently in the 
space using the soft focus technique, which involves having our 
eyes slightly closed in order to connect to the movement inter-
nally. These exercises take any number of forms since they are each 
led up to from different circumstances, but typically they start 
by layering movements and sensations from simple motions like 
walking, rolling, or shifting body weight. The formats also vary 
with the structure (few instructions or increasingly many), timing 
(lasting ten minutes or going on for hours), setting (music, props, 
fabrics, masks, ground coverings), and dynamics and organization 
of the group (working as whole class or individually, half the class 
working and the other half watching, working in smaller groups 
or pairs). On many occasions, because a lot of Butoh focuses on 
practicing in/with nature, the exercises take place outdoors and are 
framed as specific responses to the surroundings through touch, 
temperature, light, or sound.
Butoh, specifically among dance practices, is one that works 
with strong imagery and the improvisations are typically set up 
by questions or propositions surrounding such imagery. The in-
structor, for example, will ask how it is to move in particular ways 
with very detailed images in mind and the students investigate 
“finding their way through this image.” From the perspective 
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of the teacher, the imagery comes from two directions: one is 
from the “outside-in” which is where the teacher gives a series 
of descriptions and prompts that the improvisers enter into by 
searching for a feeling related to those; and second is from the 
“inside-out” where the students are asked to find their own images 
based on how they feel. Some examples of the kind imagery and 
structure of the prompts that the students are asked to respond 
to are as follows: 
- you are blind and the surfaces of your body can smell
- imagine someone pulling your leg so you fall to the 
ground, become the kind of shock and adrenaline you 
feel when that happens
- feel 10,000 points in your body, move them all, like 
micro-spasms
- melt to the ground like shattered glass as slowly as 
possible, as if over the course of many years, feel all 
the parts and what is happening there
- move as the sound of the rustling leaves, explore how 
the sound of wind moves in the different parts of 
your body
- imagine that all of your body parts move with a 
snake-like quality, now explore that movement with 
the personality of: a princess, an absent-minded scien-
tist, a capricious child
- map the inside of your ear using your body, consider 
all the minute details, curves, fluids, nerves, hair 
fibers, the way sound vibrates it, etc.
Such prompts in imagery are focused on details to help the impro-
viser realize the “concretion of feeling and perception” (Dewey, 
1934/2005, p. 193) in the present. Students are encouraged to move 
and develop movement from whatever impulses are felt in response 
to such images without a reflective awareness or judgment of the 
thinking mind. Moving first is a way to enter into our thinking, to 
discover first its form — its contours, rhythm, energy, progression. 
Sumako tells us, “to follow a specific form of movement you need 
time to understand what it is.” This embodied view of experience 
willingly draws from felt motivations “that lie beyond words, and 
only in sensing and moving can those “thoughts” be expressed” 
(De Spain, 2014, p. 54). 
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The attention to imagery is pedagogically intended to help 
the improviser stay with the corporeal consciousness of the phys-
ical movement itself, the feeling of the stream of motion (e.g., 
hand to mouth, motion of jaw opening and closing, saliva filling 
mouth, sensation of sweetness, sensation of chewing, et cetera) 
without the focus on the identification of the movement (e.g., 
kind of activity: eating).
The teachers want us to focus on the kinesthetic, spatial, and 
corporeal sensations of the movement and the qualitative dynamics 
of that sensation (e.g., quick, restrained, jagged, smooth). Doing 
this brings up the practical fact that the quality of movement stim-
ulates a feelingful, emotional response internally. The others and I 
can feel that our emotions are directly tied to the movement. For 
example after one exercise a dancer describes the simple experi-
ence of opening her hand and the kinds of emotions it physically 
brought forward, 
I was really, uh, surprised that it really connected with my 
core, and like the emotions in my core. So when I, it felt 
like when I was closing, I could feel like, um, kind of dark 
feelings gathering, like that (motions with closed fist), and 
I felt closed. But when I opened the hand, they resolved. 
So it felt like I could feel tension, tension, tension, (closing 
fist) and then when I opened up…it (opens fist and sighs 
out with breath), it like resolved. So, yeah. I didn’t think 
it would be like so emotional. But it wasn’t like hard 
emotional to do, but more like…this is weird! (laughs)…
Yeah, that was just weird and it felt more like holding the 
emotions, stuck in here (motions to stomach)…dissolved.
Awareness of ‘stream of thought’ in the present
Focusing on motor imagery provides us with an opportunity to 
develop an awareness at the phenomenological level of the feeling 
of relations. I use the term awareness to indicate a shift in attention 
from objective identification to the present, which is a term James 
preferred over the term “thinking,” since it values sensory attention 
and the general embodied nature of perceptual and motor activity. 
This open awareness carries a kind of wholeness in receptivity that 
is integral to our ‘felt sense’ of the situation, meaning that as we 
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become aware of our concrete movement, we notice its meaning is 
fundamentally qualitative and aesthetic (Gendlin, 2003; M. John-
son, 2007). Our perception of motor activity cannot be reduced 
to states like snapshots but rather there is an intrinsic connection 
between the form of movement and content. “The act itself is 
exactly what it is because of how it is done. In the act there is no 
distinction, but perfect integration of manner and content, form 
and substance” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 114). This allows us to under-
stand and describe the movement experience in aesthetically specific 
and sensitive ways, how it feels as importantly as what we are doing. 
For example, our discussions following the exercises illustrate 
to us that movement is not just observable from a stationary view, 
but is perceived through time and juxtaposed through changes 
and differences in physiological conditions. We find it is nearly 
impossible to objectively describe our bodily movement without 
evoking our own sense of the movement and its expression. In 
class when we try to illustrate how the movement was executed 
in the most functional sense, labeling the shapes, direction, type, 
timing of movement or form a symbolic interpretation, like for 
example, when A. talked about her experience of being between a 
“line and banana,” the rest of us are all left wondering what in the 
world that meant. We all laughed. But the joke is really trying to 
use the words to describe our perceptual experiences. The idea of 
a line and banana stresses the humorous disjuncture between A.’s 
very concrete sensorimotor experiences and the abstractness of the 
symbols she relays to us. Her words without the physical sensa-
tion are nonsensical. What we quickly discover is that to perceive 
our motion, even to perceive what, there is still need the need for 
an aesthetic interpretation based in part on how the movement is 
qualitatively (e.g., whether it was light, smooth and buoyant or stiff 
and abrupt, and so on). Our bodies in motion inevitably activate 
qualities of feeling so it is impossible to separate the description 
and the aesthetic quality, nor would we want to. This is what gives 
some degree of expressiveness, suggestiveness (Dewey, 1934/2005).
But seriously, a line and banana? 
Therefore, movement as a method of inquiry implies appreciation 
for the feature of awareness of feeling. This is the feature of thought 
that the Pragmatists stressed as the continuity of experience. Most 
notably James speaks to this aspect of consciousness as a ‘stream of 
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thought’ in which nothing is disjointed, but relations are experi-
enced directly and continuously. Dewey (1934) also stresses this in 
terms of the aesthetic, wherein any “form” requires in experience a 
temporal dimension of actively sensing transitory relations. This is 
an organizing experience of rhythms or energies that is felt in “re-
lation of accumulation, opposition, suspense and pause” (Dewey, 
1934/2005, p. 163). Perhaps it can be best imagined like a piece of 
music, is a stream of sensory relations, a sequence of phrases and 
emotional arrangements, the ineffable ebbs and flows, light and 
shadow, warmth and cold.
Because Butoh involves a highly focused state of conscious-
ness, it cultivates a moment-to-moment corporal awareness in 
order to learn to inwardly attend to this ongoing flow, the sense 
of movement of feelings instead of fixed states. So in the discus-
sions when we talk about what we feel in the improvisation, we 
are each talking about how we concretely feel and structure sensory 
information through a stream of sensations, memories, thoughts, 
ideas, and impressions of the experience. 
According to embodied cognition, movement necessitates 
a feeling (Damasio, 2005). The durational quality of experience 
alone, and thus all movement experience, is inherently comprised 
of the kinetic, dynamic qualities of how we move from one thought 
to the next. Meaning for humans is not actually about “seeing” a 
whole picture or having all the data possible in order to stabilize 
thought, but meaning is derived from having a feeling of how 
things are progressing and how things relate qualitatively and tem-
porally in terms of: direction (e.g., forward, stuck, going in circles); 
rhythm or flow (e.g., jumping around, sustained, suspended, rising 
and falling); and dynamics (e.g. limp, heavy, forceful, gentle). All 
humans experience form not as simply object-based as an entity, 
but as relation-based. From an arts-based view it is that form and 
content are inextricable (Dewey, 1934/2005; Eisner, 2002b) or in 
Marshal McLuhan’s turn of phrase, “The medium is the message.” 
The inner perception (how the dancer feels) is complementary to 
outer form or expression (how the dancer looks). 
The Continuity of Thinking-Feeling
According to neuroscience and the perspective of embodiment, our 
sensorimotor systems integrate, link, pattern, and associate move-
ment and response in our bodies (Damasio, 2005). This embodied 
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characteristic of our “thinking,” the feeling, is now appreciated 
as not just a process of cognition, as in a supposed inner process 
performed by the mind, but as a coordinated body-mind interac-
tion situated in an environment, a kind of ongoing sensorimotor 
processing (M. Johnson & Rohrer, 2007). The perceptual signals 
that I and the other performers fumble around to describe have 
been evidenced by cognitive science research to be the mapping of 
our body-mind interaction in motor-spatial structures. 
Specifically neural patterns of activation, dubbed “image 
schema,” shape our sensorimotor experiences, which, according 
to cognitive linguists, work as body-mapping structures and give 
our sensorimotor experience a pragmatic meaning (M. John-
son & Rohrer, 2007). Because they help us make sense of and 
“engage a world that we can understand and act within to further 
our purposes” (p. 33). In this view, it is not that humans derive 
mental models and then act, but that we act through direct the 
application of aesthetic and metaphorical frames, which serve as 
visceral “contours” we overlay onto our sensory encounters. There 
is both the concrete and immediate esthetic encounter along with 
a sense-making, metaphorical frame abstracting that experience 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
Although image schemas are thought to comprise a large part 
of our thinking in action, we are not consciously aware of them. 
Mark Johnson (2007) contends these images carry an aesthetic, 
emotional prominence, with the implication being that movement 
is a cardinal function of meaning and abstract thought. For him, 
they “constitute a preverbal and pre-reflective emergent level of 
meaning” (p. 37). As in embodied cognition, the physical sensation 
of movement between one thing to another, the kind of qualita-
tive ‘felt sense’ that is perceived and expressed, is foundational to 
the formation of the very meaning of our “thoughts” (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999). We therefore express something abstract and mean-
ingful about our experiences only directly from the way our bodies 
interact with and perceive the world, and this experience is not 
mental or physical because it is both a thinking and feeling activity. 
The view of “decision-making” or choice from embodied 
cognition theory is that we are wrapped up in aesthetic feelings 
and situated in the countless particulars of any current situation. 
Thought is not developed through an internal language repre-
senting an external world, but we naturally engage in flexible and 
adaptive behaviors. Thus, action and behavior is not consciously 
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caused by “rational” thought. In all our behaviors are motivations 
and impulses that have a nonconscious attitude of self-interest. In 
the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio’s (2010) view, for example, 
much of our sensory processing involves the deliberate seeking of 
our own well-being. In his opinion, the internal force to implement 
movement, notions we refer to as “will” or “desire,” “precedes 
explicit knowledge and deliberation regarding life conditions” (p. 
35). Regarding this he writes, “I am not downgrading consciousness 
but am most certainly upgrading nonconscious life management 
and suggesting that it constitutes the blueprint for attitudes and 
intentions of conscious minds” (p. 36). 
Damasio’s view of will is like James’s, in that there is a case 
made for some physical effort of will contributing to a person’s 
stream of thought and subjectivity. Our feelings of attention, in-
terest, and thus action, are integral to our bodies’ specific condi-
tions of space and time.8  We are perpetually sensing changes in 
our physiological conditions and naturally assigning a kind of 
“value” to things in terms of our moment-to-moment imperative 
needs and conditions. Our pre-reflective instinct pushes us toward 
feelings of ‘good,’ meaning even if we do not explicitly know what 
feelings of ‘good’ are, we corporeally feel that we are not sensing 
something ‘wrong’ or discomfort. It is a psychological process of 
inference like a “gut feeling”:
You are troubled by the felt sense of some unresolved 
situation, something left undone, something left behind. 
Notice that you don’t have any factual data. You have an 
inner aura, an internal taste. Your body knows but you don’t.” 
(Gendlin, 2003, p. 38)
Experiential practitioners accentuate that the body ‘knows’ what it 
feels, wants, and desires even if these things are not in our aware-
ness as thoughts (Don Johnson, 1995). 
8.  From James’s perspective decisions are made when two conflicting values present them-
selves and a choice has to be made between them. Concentrating on the physical sensation 
of such action, any “choice” of movement (action) holds continuity with an instinctual 
sensation of preservation of the body. The philosopher Shusterman (2008), drawing from 
James, writes that the body is the “initial core of self-interest” so at some fundamental 
level in somatic experience our behaviors and interests are instinctively and aesthetically 
motivated by visceral information. “Our interest in friends and mental powers ultimately 
derives from their relation to caring for the body’s needs as necessary for basic self-survival” 
(Shusterman, 2008, p. 153). 
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The Continuity of Inner-Outer 
With an integrated consciousness in the present, there is also a 
much more fluid perception of subject /object or inner/outer. The 
impression of being a bounded ‘self ’ distinct from the world be-
comes porous. Improviser Ruth Zapora describes her sense of 
presence thus, “There’s no skin…There is nothing like that. It 
doesn’t work that way. In my experience, nothing feels outside and 
nothing feels inside. It just is. It just arises” (De Spain, 2014, p. 87). 
Instead of a distinction, one feels a connection, the dual mode 
of moving and being moved and a consciousness of both. It is an 
“interaction, the blurry melding of the inside and the outside when 
the conceptual walls that separate and delineate who we are and 
who we are not become porous” (De Spain, 2014, p. 81).
We are permeable and able to experience simultaneity of con-
nection and separation. The specific, conditional aesthetic feelings 
of immediate social relationships serve both to delimit and define 
and to connect and associate (Dewey, 1934/2005). We are concur-
rently meeting and separating, specifying and empathizing, always 
poised between inner and outer. What is happening in moments 
of decision according to James’s (1890) view of thought is that we 
are being selective in terms of what information regarding basic 
subject-object (figure-ground) relationships that we perceive and 
act upon. James calls these principals of thought “intentionality,” 
that thought that always appears to deal with objects independent 
of itself, and “selectivity,” that thought that is interested in some 
parts of these objects to the exclusion of other (Scheffler, 1974).
An individual can sense that self-apprehension between ex-
ternal stimuli and boundaries of ‘self ’ are constantly changing, 
that he/she is engaged in a kind of figure-ground (subject/object) 
organizing of ‘self.’ This experience of “containment,” according 
to embodiment theory, is “one of the most fundamental patterns 
of our experience” (M. Johnson & Rohrer, 2007, p. 32). Bonnie 
Bainbridge Cohen (1995) creator of the School for Body-Mind 
Centering, describes movement experience, saying that it is, “in a 
way, separating out. It’s feeling the force that is in this body. But in 
order to embody ourselves we need to know what is not ourselves. 
It’s a relationship…‘This is the end of me; this is the beginning of 
something else’” (p. 186). 
In Buddhist teaching, which does not subscribe to the Carte-
sian dichotomy of “inner” and “outer,” the skin of the body is not 
understood as what forms the boundary wall between an internal 
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and external world of consciousness. From an experiential view, the 
“mind,” or consciousness of ‘self ’ in the present is always mediating 
between a sensation of our own bodies (I feel internal to my skin) 
and the outer world (the world outside my skin) (Yuasa, 1993). 
The “mind” in this sense is not located spatially inside a body but 
methodologically a conscious mediation of feelings of relationships 
in the world as both object and subject. Thus, an meta-awareness 
or meditative attention marks the “sphere where the distinction 
between what is in me and what is before me loses its meaning and 
initial validity” (Batchelor, 1997, p. 42)
Such a non-dualist mode is how professional improvisers 
describe how they simultaneously possess or flip back and forth 
between maintaining a reflective distance, an observational view of 
what they are doing, and the internal sensations they are generating 
(De Spain, 2014). This has a kind of meta-awareness of witnessing 
both perceptions external to ‘self ’ and internal to the senses. De 
Spain’s (2014) interviews professional improviers to ask about the 
experience:
Ruth Zaporah: I’m tracking my somatic, my physical 
experience, my sensory, energetic, emotional experience. 
But I’m not tracking it as if it were an object, I’m just  
“in” it. (p. 46)
Simone Forti: ...there’s what you focus on and then there’s 
everything that you’re not focusing on, but you’re also 
aware of it and it also influences you. So there are these two 
modes of influence: the focused and the out of focus. (p. 56) 
Barbra Dilley: I’m not sure I can really say what I think 
about. It’s very freeing to me because there’s some almost 
in-between place of thinking and words and doing and 
response. (p. 55)
This artistic work involves a kinesthetic and perceptual awareness as 
part of a feeling of form and “sense of a situation.” Anita interprets 
this experience as a dialog between what is inside and outside the 
body, “It is a multi-dimensional experience. It has a kind of time 
in it, a rhythm…You pay attention to what is going on in the 
environment around you.” Similarly in my improvisations, my 
relationship to what I am doing constantly shifts. Sometimes I get 
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lost in the focus and determination of where I am headed, how I 
am responding to the environment, what the others are doing, or 
my relationships to them, our spacing, changing dynamics, levels, 
tempo, or directions. Other moments my attention moves to the 
inward sensation of movement, the emotions, the kinesthetic per-
ceptions of my various body parts. Yet, there is no rupture in the 
actual consciousness of what I am doing and how I am feeling or 
what I am undergoing. 
‘Self’-Awareness of Habits and Patterns 
The center-less notion of ‘self ’ in pragmatism parallels the orien-
tation to experience of ‘self ’ in Butoh, grounded in a Buddhist 
view that holds that the question of ‘self ’ is not about an entity, 
but pertains to an unfinished self, a self that is in practice (Epstein, 
1995). This Buddhist teaching, as in the practice of meditation 
where the focus is on the cultivation of the ‘self ’ through attending 
to the present (Yuasa, 1993), describes the experience of ‘self ’ as 
“selflessness” or “no-self” (anatta) (Stanley, 2012). 
In this Buddhist sense, Butoh teaches “uprooting the con-
viction in a ‘self ’ that needs protecting” to allow a connection to 
our surroundings, feelings, and one another (Epstein, 1995, p. 45). 
The practice appeals directly to the senses which undermines the 
distinction between objective and subjective ‘self.’ The performer 
methodologically works on releasing his/her self-consciousness 
in the form of ego or objective identification and on finding an 
accommodating sense of ‘self ’ or a subjectivity that is changing. 
Empirically, each of us is actively ‘self ’-perceiving and forming, 
rather than playing ‘self ’ out. ‘Self ’ is in part a physical-mental 
exertion taking place under direct conditions of the present so we 
are understood to be “engaged in a process of creating…[our self] 
in a specific and deliberate way” (Batchelor, 1997, p. 71). 
In this vein, many in the Butoh community identify the devel-
opment of the practice with a strategy of emptying the self some-
times referred to as “emptiness.” The experience of emptiness has 
been critiqued by some practitioners, since a body in the present 
is deeply informed by a past and oriented toward a future (Taylor, 
2010). However, emptiness should not be misunderstood as noth-
ingness, but more precisely as being empty of the presuppositions 
we engage in during experience in order to interpret, structure, 
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or make sense of it. “Emptiness” (sunyata), is considered one of 
Buddhism’s core psychological tenets and a mode of perception 
which is expressed as just being one’s conditional nature, devoid of 
an intrinsic identity (Epstein, 1998). It adds nothing to and takes 
nothing away from the esthetic awareness of events. Therefore, 
emptiness refers to a release of self-apprehension and the kinds 
of narratives and worldviews that we continually shape. In the 
experience of emptiness, even the idea of ‘things’ are empty of 
preconceptions:
Whatever emerges in this way is devoid of an intrinsic 
identity: in other words, things are empty. They are not as 
opaque and solid as they seem: they are transparent and 
fluid. (Batchelor, 1997, p. 77)
 
In this way ‘self ’ is always under question and to some degree made 
part of the movement inquiry. In practice we are challenged not to 
work from an identifiable character of ‘self,’ but from the sensorial 
immediacy of imagery that allows us to transform. Our teacher 
Sumako, for example, imagines this way of continually discovering 
ourselves and liberating the “I” through movement as “finding 
new drawers into our personality.” As she explains it, we are like a 
chest of endless drawers and the work in Butoh is to keep finding 
hidden drawers in ourselves and opening them. 
The notion that “the physical condition is in some way also 
the psychological one” (Whitehouse, 1995, p. 242) comes up over 
and over in our improvisation work. We inevitably ‘get in touch’ 
with the unconscious and longstanding habits, coping behaviors 
and defensive patterns that we embody. In our discussions we 
develop a reflective awareness of the tendencies and consistencies 
that we have when structuring our movement-thinking. Many of 
the dancers acknowledge that, when improvising, before there 
is a chance to think about what they are doing, they are already 
here and now, making certain movements and finding recurring 
threads of emotional and thinking patterns. Conscious thinking is 
too slow. For example, they mention knowing “these movements 
from before” or ones that “keep coming back,” like E who demon-
strates her movement holding her head and saying, “Suddenly I 
was back in that.” 
Am I the source of my movement?
158
The physical reality of our behavior is “a serious discovery of what 
we are like — for we are like our movement. People discover what 
parts of their bodies are not available, do not move, are not felt” 
(Whitehouse, 1995, p. 245). We might keep particular movements 
suppressed to keep from dealing with certain uncomfortable experi-
ences. As an example of this, a Finnish dancer told me that after she 
watched videos of her improvisations she realized that she always 
kept her neck very still so the next time she performed she inten-
tionally made a lot of head movements. That night after performing 
she had nightmares. She had unlocked some buried feelings, which 
taught her that the immobility of her neck is an evasion of painful 
memories that she does not want to feel, some event she needed to 
mask, in order to not have emotional contact with it. Our bodies in 
their postures, gestures, and movement are metaphors for our lives 
and can be stiff and distorted by a need to forget pain. Ruth Zaporah 
(1995) writes, “What we keep hidden we are hiding from” (p. 61).
When we share our experiences of the improvisations in the 
discussion, we find that if each improviser is faithful to their own ex-
ploration, the inquiry is actually not just “anything” or by chance. We 
inevitably tend to seek movement and experiences we know and with 
which we feel comfortable. So while we receive new stimulations and 
have a flowering of spontaneous actions, we are inextricably bound 
to our personal schematic structures and patterns of activation. Each 
of us has our characteristic patterns, qualities of movements, and 
ideas that are so hard to break free from. “Our ideas truly depend 
upon experience, but so do our sensations. And the experience upon 
which they both depend is the operation of habits — originally of 
instincts” (Dewey, 1922/2002, p. 32). 
Consequently, making an instinctual “choice” of movement 
has a bodily disposition (James, 1890/1950b). In other words, our 
instincts of what feels ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ give us a potential energy or 
pull toward a certain movement (Gendlin, 2003). Again, Antonio 
Damasio (1999) uses the term “somatic marker” for these sensations 
in our body. Thus, new movements we make are, in part, inspired 
by our past experiences, which suggest the kinds of habitual ways 
of thinking-moving-feeling in which we engage. A body is physical 
matter that carries memories, or in the teacher Anita’s phrasing, 
a “history” of past events. Each of our “histories” unconsciously 
shapes and influences our present existence, our physical movements 
and behaviors — how we see and sense the world, how we think, 
respond, and feel. 
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The somatic educator Deane Juhan (1995) describes how 
we establish senses of normalcy in our movement behavior by 
connecting with a certain way of doing something. He states, “We 
continue to do a thing the way we learned it, the way in which we 
first established our ‘feel’ for it, in spite of the fact that subsequent 
problems developed as a result” (p. 373). Juhan illuminates how, by 
maintaining these learned patterns through repetition, the feeling 
contributes to a sense of continuity and stability of body image, 
which implies what he calls “a conservative tendency inherent in 
the feeling of normalcy” (p. 374). In other words, we tend to want 
to preserve learned patterns. “If the individual tries to move in new 
ways on his own, his overwhelming tendency is to favor patterns 
of movement that feel familiar to him — movement that he has 
characteristically used before” (Juhan, 1995, p. 374). Thus, preserved 
patterns contribute to our sense of ‘self ’ and what we feel we ‘know’ 
by providing us with a feeling of comfort.
Expressly by coming into direct contact with our corporal 
limitations or restraints, we learn how and when we can let go or 
even push the boundaries of our perceptual experiences. If there can 
be a release of the habit or pattern, you can literally let your ‘self ’ go 
beyond the familiar. Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen of the Body-Mind 
Centering practice points out how this potential for ‘self ’ literally 
rests in an individual’s perceptual-motor processes. “Those that 
aren’t accessible are not going to be used in their everyday life — for 
thinking or for action. Each of the patterns are potentials within us, 
but until we actually do them, they’re not accessible to us” (Cohen, 
1995, p. 193). Our habitual use of space, approaches, postures, and 
attitudes define us, and yet simultaneously give us the agency to 
change how we sense the world around us and how we perceive 
ourselves. There is no ‘self ’ except as an unfulfilled possibility. 
In this concrete way, Butoh can be seen as a practice of open-
ing ‘self,’ or as some say, a “self-exploring process” (Kasai & Takeu-
chi, 2001). It is understood that there is ‘self ’ exploration in the 
experience, which is not merely self-expression. To cite Dewey 
again, “If an art product is taken to be one of self-expression and 
the self is regarded as something complete and self-contained in 
isolation, then of course substance and form fall apart” (p. 111).
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The Potentiality of the Present
Part of Butoh’s artistic critique lies in the view that, in everyday 
situations, the demand is on the individual, by and large, to behave 
according to social expectations, thus, limiting expression of move-
ment. For many in Butoh, it is important to break free from in-
visible mental and social constraints and to disrupt habits so as to 
achieve “free instinctual movement, to be spontaneous” (Fraleigh, 
1999, p. 63). The aspect of Butoh that focuses on unconscious 
movement is thought by some practitioners to be cathartic in the 
way that it allows natural, automatic or “primal” impulses of the 
body-mind (Fraleigh, 1999). Others describe it as more therapeutic 
in terms of a psychosomatic exploration (Kasai, 1999). 
Seeing this through a Pragmatist lens, Mead’s (1934/1967) 
theory of ‘self ’ emphasizes this very indeterminate quality of the 
physical present. In his view, because experience is not given, self 
is not given. We must act in order to understand or objectively 
reflect on such actions as a ‘self,.’ As Mead writes, “we can never 
become selves unless the action in which we are involved includes 
action toward our own organisms” (p. 149). 
Mead makes an analogous claim to the view in Butoh that, 
in most social settings, there is social control in the form of the 
attitudes of others, which we carry in us. The terms he uses are 
the “I” and “me.” He writes that both aspects of “I” and “me” are 
essential to the full expression of the ‘self,’ but in any social setting 
“the relative values of the ‘me’ and the ‘I’ depend very much on 
the situation” (p. 199). In his opinion “the expression of the ‘me’” 
tends to determine our conduct “over against the expression of 
the ‘I’” (p. 210). In this sense, Mead asserts that the image of “me” 
acts a censor. “It determines the sort of expression which can take 
place, sets the stage, and gives the cue” (p. 210). In other words, 
self-consciousness toward a certain organization of attitude or 
behavior can have the effect of control. 
Roughly put, because we mostly relate ‘self ’ through iden-
tification, we have a hard time staying in the immediate present, 
because our tendency is to remain in control of “me” as an object 
of our consciousness. This self-consciousness relies on holding 
patterns like thoughts of “this is not me,” which come as memories 
or projections. So when we can let go of “me” in that sense, the 
present “I” is when consciousness is not bounded by an identifi-
cation with a past and a future. 
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Therefore, in the course of the present, what Mead calls the 
“locus of reality,” the unknowability of one’s ‘self ’ begets a space 
for novelty and inquiry. Mead describes the possibilities of the ‘self ’ 
as belonging to the “I”:
what is actually going on, taking place, and it is in some 
sense the most fascinating part of our experience. It is there 
that novelty arises and it is there that our most important 
values are located. It is the realization in some sense of this 
self that we are continually seeking. (p. 204)
For Mead, the present experience of “I” is where novelty arises. 
“It is because of the ‘I’ that we say that we are never fully aware of 
what we are, that we surprise ourselves by our own action” (Mead, 
1934/1967, p. 174). 
To spur a sense of freedom, spontaneity, and experimentality, 
Butoh methodologically employs improvisation. Improvisation 
involves a deep appreciation for the fact that everything happens 
in action and brings attention to the ‘nowness’ that action. Our in-
structors accented the potentiality of direct experience, highlighting 
the physical basis of action and the “what if” of action within reach 
now. Right now. Movement potential “is the generative source of 
a creature’s immediate kinetic spontaneity. A creature’s initiation 
of movement, including the initiation of a change of direction, is 
always from a particular corporeal here and now — positionally, 
energetically, situationally, and so on” (Sheets-Johnstone, 2011, 
p. 65). Becoming grounded in one’s perceptual processes reminds 
the improviser that outside of the empirical experience of the now 
everything is immaterial (Zaporah, 1995).
In Mead’s sense of “I” and “me,” Butoh specifically helps to 
‘dial down’ the relative value of the “me” in order to improvise and 
be in a non-objectified present. Non-rehearsed, instinctive behavior 
and response by the “I” is the way in which the ‘self ’ is expressed 
(Mead, 1934/1967). Therefore, by practicing ‘being present’ by 
literally relaxing our self-consciousness and identification (of the 
“me”) we allow for greater expression of the “I.” It is a situation 
that holds those values of the “I,” which Mead writes, “are found 
in the immediate attitude of the artist, the inventor, the scientist 
in his discovery, in general in the action of the “I” which cannot 
be calculated” (p. 214).
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In my experience with improvising, I usually don’t reach a point 
of fully letting go or being empty of the mental chatter until I 
become so tired that I actually just stop caring what I am doing. I 
stop trying to have a sense of personal control over the movement; 
my thoughts no longer wander into self-reflection, particularly 
into the realm of the self-critic, the perfectionist. Anita picks up 
on this pattern of mine in the body training and tells me, “It is like 
you give up, but then you go again. This is when something new 
happens.” I realize it is at this point when things go mentally quiet 
that I really just start to listen to the sensation. When I reach the 
edge, a point of physical and mental exhaustion, is the moment is 
when I give myself potential. 
For me, in a paradoxical way, being fully present is almost 
scary because it is when I lose control over my narrative. Yet at the 
same time I am excited by it. I personally feel a sensation of free-
dom unlike almost anything I feel in my daily life, by being able to 
move and engage in a world free of constraints or judgment And, at 
the same time, I feel vulnerable and expose myself to emotions and 
parts of myself I normally turn off. I often feel an inescapable sense 
of embarrassment after the improvisations, a jolt of self-awareness, 
which brings unwelcome feelings of being apologetic, like waking 
up with a hangover and remembering things I wish I hadn’t said 
the night before. I have a conflicted relationship with this creative 
process, especially in allowing the impulses that I see as alien to 
my ‘self ’ and being willing to be open to other ways of acting and 
other identities. I have to let go of wanting to identify so closely 
with the improvisation.
I’m a coward. Seeking approval. Eager to please. 
Our teacher Sumako speaks of this experience as “body on the 
edge,” taken from a performance by the Butoh master Hijikata 
entitled, “Body at the Edge of Crisis.” Metaphorically being ‘on 
the edge’ signifies the fundamental uncertainty of the experience 
of ‘self.’ Similarly, the improviser Barbara Dilley speaks about the 
experience of uncertainty in the concrete, claiming: 
The thing I think is very interesting in improv is danger 
and the unexpected and the harm that can happen because 
people are working at edges on an interior level. They’re 
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working at different edges of kinesthetic experience or 
thrill — you could even say thrill — and then get caught 
in and tangled up in stuff they can no longer track… (De 
Spain, 2014, p. 71)
The “stuff” she speaks about getting caught in is the sensation of 
when movement becomes a flow experience that we are not con-
sciously trying to censor or even understand rationally. From the 
turn of phrase, you can ‘lose yourself ’ in relation to how you see 
yourself and how you would typically move. Physically this has a 
sensation of literally being ‘out of control’ or as they say “on the 
edge.” Not knowing what is happening or going to happen for 
some individuals can feel thrilling. Like Mead’s (1934/1967) “I” in 
the present, it “gives the sense of freedom, of initiative” (p. 177).
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Two: Meeting Halfway
The air is still, energy from the movement training settling down 
in the space, our bodies quieting, hearts pumping, blood moving, 
thoughts starting to rest. Our teacher asks us to find a partner. It 
is a vicious instant, apprehension rising in the back of my throat. 
It is like waking up in the morning and becoming conscious of 
that thing that you regret having said or done the day before, 
becoming frighteningly awake to a memory. This exercise is the 
returning thorn. I feel my flee instinct, a desire to go somewhere, 
but I brace myself. A sigh comes, my resignation of knowing what 
he is asking of us. 
Fine. It doesn’t matter who. I just want to get this part over with. 
I halfheartedly look around to the other dancers. K.’s and my eyes 
meet. Two wordless, thinking creatures. An unspoken agree-
ment that we will work together passes between us. She has an 
unruffled composure, which momentarily softens me. Is that a 
slight smile at the edges of her eyes? My face must read dismay, 
trepidation.
We already know the instructions. We walk toward one another 
and ask in a whisper who wants to go first, going through motions 
of courtesy, offering each other the apparent chance to decide. 
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But I know, and sense that she knows, that I want to be the first 
one on the floor. The peacekeeper in me would have politely 
given her that role if she asked, but I can sense that she is truly 
ambivalent about which role she takes. I shrug and without dis-
cussion go lie face up on the yoga mat, unnaturally quick, forcing 
myself to calm down. Feeling my back and skin against the floor, 
my chest pressed open, I wiggle a little, rotating my head and 
neck upward and sending a shake down through my arms, legs, 
muscles, tissue, bones to voluntarily relax. Or is it involuntarily? 
I don’t know anymore. I release my hands. I see K. standing over 
me looking down. I close my eyes. 
Try not to think. Try to forget she is there.
Sssssshhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh. There is only the sound of 
the long concentrated hissing of my elongated exhales, winding 
out past my normal breath by a few counts. I try to push out the 
air out from the lower part of my diaphragm, feeling muscles and 
space in my abdomen that I don’t usually come into contact with. 
With my new attention to my breathing, the surface of my body 
that is touching the floor disappears. For a fleeting instant I forget 
why I am here and am left with the inward and outward movement 
of air from my contracting and expanding chest. 
K. is intentionally giving me this time to settle into my body, to 
become “light” and “ready to take the movement.” I am supposed 
to be like a puppet, inert physical matter for her to handle. The 
sweat on my clothes begins to get a little cold. My skin is clammy.
I smell like sweat. Let it go. That’s part of it. Don’t worry about it. But 
I smell. How much does she smell me? She is going to touch me. She 
is going to smell me. She is so close. 
Sssssssshhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh. K. is hovering over me. Her 
body near me. She gently lifts my right hand and then the rest of 
my arm, rotating it in the shoulder joint. Up near my head, then 
out, across my torso. She pulls it out away from the floor and 
my shoulder lifts off the mat. A space opens up in my shoulder 
socket. Her hands are lightly groping around my upper arm and 
my shoulder. 
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Thoughts about what she is doing pass through my head and I 
try to put my awareness on my breathing. I can feel my attention 
drift and fixate on the body part K. is moving at any moment, like 
an untrained puppy eager to run to anyone or thing that moves. 
I don’t miss anything. Not a thing of what is going on. Where she 
is, where her arms are.
At some point my left arm is behind me while I am bent forward 
at the torso. I am suddenly reminded of all the ways that people 
can move their bodies and I am struck with the sensation of sud-
denly returning to my body. How did I forget the flexibility of my 
own body, its range of movement? For a short moment, being 
outside my physical body, I am thinking about how K. is moving 
me. It strikes me how limited this view of movement is. Without 
intentionally physically moving my body, I forgot how far I can 
stretch my elbow back and that I can bend my torso forward at 
the same time. 
After working on my left arm, K. lifts my upper body from the 
wrists by pulling my arms out from the floor and over my head. 
She whispers, “Let me do it.” Now I do not realize that I am helping 
lift myself up.
Now my legs are being pulled up off the mat and then bent at 
the knees and pushed up to my chest like in a fetal position. She 
then pulls them open and jiggles them around. 
Ughhh. No, the fat and flesh on my thighs is shaking. Does she think I 
am fat? Can she feel the fat on my butt?
My legs are splayed open which has a sexual sensation, and I try 
not to focus on the feeling of vulnerability, the violation of privacy. 
This is not sexual. This is not personal. I am only flesh. 
Sssssssshhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh.
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When we switch roles K. settles into the mat and begins her 
breathing. I’m unsure about where to begin. I try to give myself 
permission to not try to be too inventive. The last time we did 
this exercise I got caught up in trying to provide an interesting 
experience for my partner, looking over at the others, worrying if I 
was doing it right, if I am massaging enough, if I am experimenting 
enough with rotation and bending of the limbs. I am supposed to 
be listening to K.’s body to see what it needs, where I can stretch 
and push her. I’m scanning her body. Thinking. I start with the arm 
because it seems simple, less invasive, smaller. 
The legs are bigger. They feel a little more personal than the arms. 
Just start easy. 
I go to her hand and work up her wrists, elbow, shoulder. The 
whole arm now. Simple. I move to different parts of her body. I am 
timid, lightly moving her around, trying to be gentle. 
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Should I go to the right leg now? How do I lift her body up? How 
much should I move it? 
I slide down to work on her feet for a few minutes, lift her knees 
up and around, up to her arm again, then to her back. Then I try 
pushing her body weight onto her left side and swing her right 
leg that is now on top. 
I shouldn’t roll her over. Have I tried enough with different parts? I’m 
running out of parts. What else is there? Push up on her knee more. 
Don’t hurt her. Try massaging her back. What should I move next? I 
haven’t rotated her head and neck yet. Don’t touch her rump. What 
are the others doing?
I see T. massaging his partner’s face. I copy him. 
After each exercise we are asked to speak with our partner. Hon-
estly, I do not like either the role of giver or receiver, but I think it is 
easier for me to give than to receive. When we discuss, I tell K. that 
I need to work harder on receiving, telling her that, “I really hate 
receiving.” I say that it is really hard for me and that I’m working 
on figuring out how to disappear. She reminds me that I’m not 
supposed to fall asleep, “You are trying to not be here but here at 
the same time.” I think about it. I need to still be mentally present 
and aware, but not in physical control. It is a question of how to 
have complete physical relaxation but still be phenomenologically 
perceptive. 
To my surprise, K. tells me that loves receiving, that she can 
really relax. She likes having someone else take control. I am sur-
prised, thinking, “Wow, I wish I could be that comfortable. My 
focus goes to all my insecurities…” It is remarkable how different 
this experience is for each of us, how trusting she is and able to let 
go and how much I seem to suffer.
We talk about the exercise more and she tells me that when I 
am giving that I am too, she searches for the right word and says, 
“poke-y,” gesturing with her hands. K. says that my movement from 
one body part to the next is not fluid. “You jump around,” she tells 
me. I recognize this as well. I do not just let the movement have a 
natural progression and perhaps an arc. It should be more intuitive, 
following a bodily rhythm, in effect giving a physical coherency to 
her. Instead, she can feel my arrested focus jumping around from 
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one spot to the next. She can virtually feel that I am anticipating 
my moves. She can feel I’m not listening to her. 
She points out that I also do not “go for it” enough. In my 
trepidation, I do not push her body, and likewise, her mental focus 
to new places. I am too careful not to challenge her or take any 
risks. I can go further. “More, more, more,” she reminds me of 
our teaching, “You will know when my body can’t go any further.” 
The instructions for the role of giving are that we should 
listen and discover what our partners need. We should stretch 
them — literally their limbs — to a point slightly beyond where 
they normally go. We are to help them release tension and create 
“spaces” inside their body. By finding literally “spaces,” he means 
physiologically stretching the limbs, rotating at the joints, mas-
saging between the muscles and bones, opening up the anatomy 
of the body.
K.’s feedback catches me off-guard. I consider how much I 
struggled internally with how she was receiving my manipulations, 
mostly that I was trying to not be invasive or cause any pain. Now 
I see I was overly cautious, too gentle with her. My shyness got the 
better of me, and in a sense I backed away from the assignment 
to push my partner and help her find tension and new extension 
in her body. 
“Damn,” I think, “here I thought it was the receiving role 
of the exercise was the part I need to work on, but it turns out it 
is both.” In both roles, I am not opening myself up to feeling the 
interaction. 
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This “manipulation” exercise, as it is referred to in Butoh, is a typ-
ical part of the training that involves partner work. This particular 
example is an improvised manipulation, meaning our actions with 
one another are improvised through the frame of manipulation, 
which entails having one person fully giving their weight into 
gravity and the other “manipulating” them. Within Butoh there are 
arranged manipulation procedures that involve a detailed series of 
stretching and relaxation postures, while also paying close attention 
to the breath and breathing. From the outside, this manipulation 
training looks like physiotherapy between two people, one person 
lying on the floor and his/her muscles and tendons being stretched 
and massaged by the hands of another person. The dual purpose 
with this bodywork is to, one, physically loosen the body through 
contact with it, and, two, loosen a “defensive mindset” through 
the sensations of passive and active movement with a partner. The 
practical emphasis on how to physically relax in the present simul-
taneously helps cultivate a mental attitude of relaxation. 
The psychosomatic exploration at this intimate level is aimed 
at the dual character of the human movement experience: the sen-
sation of moving and being moved. Many improvisational movement 
practices explore the relationship of moving and being moved 
through partner work, since the dual character is foundational to 
its social significance in performance work. In the pedagogy of 
improvisation, the relationship between moving and being moved 
are brought together through this kind of micro-collaboration. A 
defined window into the experience of relating to another through 
the very up-close-and-personal contact with another person’s phys-
ical presence. 
Many of these types of partnered explorations grew out of 
initial experiments by the founders of various practices of move-
ment improvisation. For example, one well-known duet form that 
overlaps with many exploratory somatic practices is Contact Impro-
visation. The use of partner work is one ingredient in movement 
practice that helps bring bodily awareness to the primary sense of 
movement. We are taught in improvisation that the way we each 
relate to our ‘self ’ — an intersubjective process — is through others, 
through the meeting of body-minds. This is the foundation for 
the horizontal, relational structure of the practice in which it is 
assumed that we need others to do the training. Constant feedback 
is necessary. In Butoh we ask, how and when can we learn from 
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one another? How do we challenge one another? How do we trust 
one another? We are always relating, receiving new information, 
meticulously attending the meeting. We train our self-awareness 
and sensitivity for how we are relating. In the moment you touch 
and are touched, you are moving your partner is moving, one 
minute you are focusing on your tension, the weight of the body, 
your partner’s breath, quality of movement, on her supporting 
you, on you letting go.
A Partnered Exercise
Personally I wonder why the manipulation exercise is one of the 
most difficult — most uncomfortable — parts of the Butoh training 
for me. It is something with the closeness and exposure that I feel 
in having to directly relate and work on that relating that taps into 
hidden deep-rooted responses that I carry. Why is it hard for me to 
let myself have contact with someone? By “contact” I mean not just 
physical contact, but also the internal affect that comes with our 
direct physical involvement. Coming from an embodied outlook, 
it holds that what is happening internally is fused with my activity. 
In Butoh during a manipulation exercise, these moving rela-
tions are delicately explored through the roles of giving (moving) 
and receiving (being moved). In those roles, there is the potential 
in our heightened interpersonal awareness on the present to have 
the experience of both the sensation of moving and being moved 
in the same instance, as it is said in practice, “the coming together 
of what I am doing and what is happening to me” (Whitehouse, 
1995, p. 243). In aesthetic terms, this is the quality of contact that 
each partnership seeks in these manipulation exercises — one of 
mutual connection. 
This aesthetic quality is in the passing moments. There is 
a feeling that action and reception fold into one another. Here 
the sensation of mutuality that “pervades the entire experience in 
spite of the variation of its constituent parts” (Dewey, 1934/2005, 
p. 38) makes the exercise “complete,” whole, or “fully esthetic.” 
Mutuality comes about when what is physically “done” and sub-
jectively “undergone” in experience are intimately connected. “As 
we manipulate, we touch and feel, as we look, we see; as we listen 
we hear…In an emphatic artistic-esthetic experience, the relation 
is so close that controls simultaneously both the doing and the 
perception” (p. 51). Dewey terms this “interpenetration” where in 
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experience there are not two separate operations of one of physical 
material and another upon inner stuff, but that “two functions of 
transformation are effected by a single operation” (p. 78).
In the entanglement of giving and receiving, the both of us 
should remain actively open to one another, empathetically listen-
ing and responding, allowing us to have the immediate aesthetic ex-
perience of mutuality or connection. “Receptive perception” (p. 49) 
is the phrase Dewey (1934/2005) uses about the artist that is of that 
is both giving and receiving simultaneously. According to Dewey, 
this ability, “embodies in himself the attitude of the perceiver while 
he works” (p. 50) is what makes the experience aesthetically one of 
connection. Taking that we exist only in relation, between subjects 
(one another) and subject and object (subjective present and ‘self ’ 
as object), we must allow and admit that perceptual alterations 
and affection change us, changes relations to ourselves, “someone 
is moved as he listens” (p. 109).
———
In this exercise with my role as giver, I lost the aesthetic experi-
ence of giving open and freely with K. because my movement was 
driven by my deliberate focus on trying to be creative by creating 
different sensations, moving around from body part to body part. 
In this way, my effort and attention is felt to be introspective or 
“me”-oriented, so when K. said that my movement was to “poke-
y,” she could feel my self-consciousness. I am disjointed and mi-
cromanaging the moves I think would be interesting, instead of 
reciprocating and listening to her, and really giving us a “space to 
come together” or to “become one,” as it is said in Butoh. 
Dewey (1934/2005) would say this is “non-esthetic” because 
it loses succession. It has “arrest, constriction, proceeding from the 
parts having only a mechanical connection with one another” (p. 
42). To put emphasis on the aesthetic of mutuality in the partner-
ship, my attention and effort has to be more with the sensation of 
the relating than with an attachment to myself. I am passing too 
quickly into reflection about what is, what has happened, or what 
should happen, and am not staying with the immediate perception 
of the kind of feeling for distances, rhythm, dynamics — a symmetry 
in our present energies. This expresses the calculated character of 
my “thinking,” which Dewey (1938) describes as “a postponement 
of immediate action” (p. 64). He says it can make the present 
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have a mechanical quality because it “is stoppage of the immedi-
ate manifestation of impulse until that impulse has been brought 
into connection with other possible tendencies to action” (p. 64). 
I restrict the natural, sensual, and unexpected energetic exchange, 
the flow of movement-thought. 
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Concretization of Qualities Through  
Feeling and Effort
Our physical effort carries an intensity, an intention, a force of will 
that another person can literally sense. This “energy” or “effort,” 
as it is referred to in movement studies, like Laban Movement 
Analysis, can be seen in relation to James’s notion of subjective 
“will” acting between one body and another. Because our intentions 
take on perceptible bodily forms, “the qualitative use of energy” 
is regarded as a cornerstone for movement studies, which is both 
functional and expressive part of movement vocabulary. Effort 
includes attention to the strength of the movement, the control 
of the movement, and the timing of the movement. For example, 
Dewey’s understanding of organizations of energies is not much 
different from such movement studies that understand and develop 
expressiveness of movement dynamics to include emotional color, 
texture, and inner intention of the performer as the means through 
which artistic meaning is conveyed.
In the exercise, for instance, when I am giving the manipu-
lations, it does not only matter what I am doing at any moment, 
whether I am wringing K.’s arm, massaging her face, rotating her 
foot, but also there is a quality and expression of how engaged I 
am with her. The “whatness” of my thought, feeling, desire, and 
purpose is carried by the corporeal and energetic character of my 
touch. This has already been said in the sense that content and form 
operate in tandem in experience, accounting “for the existence of 
some degree of expressiveness in the object of every conscious 
experience” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 127). In the materiality of this 
experience, what K. senses is the effort of my movement, my flow 
and timing (bound/free, quick/sustained), my physical force and 
direction (heavy/light, direct/indirect). This form of nonverbal 
communication between our physical bodies involves “what is said 
and how it is said, the substance and form” (p. 111). 
Dewey devotes entire chapters to energy and expression in 
Art as Experience, which express his thesis that qualities of mate-
rials in direct experience are not a verbal or intellectual matter 
for artists. “There are values and meanings that can be expressed 
only by immediately visible and audible qualities, and to ask what 
they mean in the sense of something that can be put into words 
is to deny their distinctive existence” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 77). 
Because art as an experience is characterized by immediacy, Dewey 
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contends that producing works of art is an ordering of qualities of 
material spatially and temporally, which expresses the meaning and 
intent of an experience to others, what he calls an “organization 
of energy.” In this experience of energies, “The artist selects, inten-
sifies, and concentrates by means of form: rhythm and symmetry 
being of necessity the form that material takes when it undergoes 
the clarifying and ordering operations of art” (p. 190). Thus it is 
the energies of form, what he refers to as rhythm and symmetry, 
that are made significant in experience by the artist. This why and 
how art is expressive and communicative, “the fact of energy…
made central: its power to move and stir, to calm and tranquillize” 
(p. 191). So like in all arts-related practice, this bodywork is to 
gain an intimate and inner awareness for emotional and physical 
processes, for where there is a sense of effort, and the willingness 
to experience the flow of energies. 
We are learning the substance of artistic perception and ex-
pression, particularly how to express and feel between one another 
emotionally and energetically. This is part of the artistry of Butoh 
practice. It is a concrete question of physical and emotional com-
munication — how to read and respond to one another’s gestures, 
how to corporally adapt to real and living contact, how to express 
receptivity. Thus, on one level how to physically sense trust and an-
other we learn to concretely express our intentions at this visceral, 
sensory level of communication, one that is tangible yet inaccessible 
to words. We learn, for instance, technically how much physical 
force to apply, how to attain a sense of one another’s psycho-phys-
ical presence, and how to adapt and adjust our actions accordingly. 
As others in movement improvisation say, “The detailed perception 
we acquire through practice is reflected by precise expression. In 
order to express ourselves in detail, we must know and control our 
body and mind” (Zaporah, 1995, p. 30). 
Our teacher Anita relates the manipulation exercise to riding 
a horse and how, as dancers, we can also learn to be precise with 
reading and speaking viscerally to one another’s body. To physically 
demonstrate, she grabs my forearm and applies different pressure 
on my skin with her hand. There are different messages communi-
cated through touch, in the quality of the action and the pressure 
and upon the skin. She explains that in this work, we practice to 
“carry the energy” which can corporally, gesturally, kinesthetically 
send the meaning we want:
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First, she applies a very, very light touch, so diffuse and delicate 
it is almost ghostly. Her hands and skin barely touch mine at all. 
———
Next she pushes a little more with her fingers that I sense on the 
skin. It is not firm but feels slightly more honed in and compressed, 
quiet and soft, almost angelic or slightly distant. 
———
Finally she applies more pressure that is channeled and compel-
ling sending a message beneath my skin that has the sensation of 
warmth and assurance to “go this way.” 
Each of her examples expresses an inner intention in its energetic 
and physical form in the way that “different ideas have their dif-
ferent ‘feels,’ in their immediate qualitative aspects, just as much 
as anything else” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 124). 
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Meaning in the Local and Specific
Given this qualitative foundation, in practice, every time we engage 
with a new partner to intimately find a sense of connection, we 
must dexterously sense and adapt to one another in a short amount 
of time. We both silently try to get to know and adapt to one 
another, to sense when things feel mutual and when we are com-
municating well with one another. Specifically we are taught to 
“sense the motion and movement” of one another’s body by testing 
how it moves and feels, reading his/her body, movements, energy, 
facial and bodily cues, and quality of touch and pressure, learning 
how much contact and pressure to exert to have your partner re-
spond. In essence, we learn how to be more adept at sensing one 
another through the concurrent, unassimilated feelings of giving 
and receiving.
 In the particularity of that meeting, the present is the oppor-
tunity for the partners to figure out how to connect by finding an 
expression and sense of mutuality. I explicitly mean “expression” 
in the etymological sense that Dewey presents as “a squeezing 
out, pressing forth” (p. 66), something being formed. The act of 
expression is a construction through time. Rather than patterns 
of holding or preserving as mentioned elsewhere, we allow a new 
interaction and consequent transformation of material and expres-
sive feel of mutuality. 
This coming together is both discovered and actively formed, 
an “intimate connection” where “subsequent doing is cumulative 
and not a matter of caprice nor yet routine” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 
51). Both participants must be present with a willingness to meet 
the other halfway, according to our teachers, to learn from the other 
and to teach the other. “This is the meeting. It is communication,” 
as our teacher Anita says. The experience of connection is allowed 
to be brought to a “fulfillment” when we are not acting in a way 
that is simply automatic or “mechanical,” but becomes aesthetic, 
meaning received by means of the senses. It is a physical conver-
sation, a flow of movement and wordless information between 
partners. It is essentially a dance. 
There is no recipe or formula for mutuality, and in the Dew-
eyan sense, it takes on a distinct, aesthetic feel in each partnership. 
We start from the experience of giving-receiving in the concrete 
to determine meaning. Instead of trying to force the connection, 
this practice brings us back to directly discovering our unique re-
lationship and discovering what mutuality means in this situation 
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here and now, for the first time. Therefore, in practice we cannot 
just presume that mutuality is already there. We cannot take a 
shortcut to expression by executing a form, going through the mo-
tions, performing automatic behaviors. We are active and affected 
throughout, so that “the expression is emotional and guided by 
purpose” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 52). 
The Pragmatist point is that any concept, like the concept of 
mutuality, has meaning embedded in the specific. In order to ‘grasp’ 
it in this instance, we must directly experience it, “we cannot pos-
sess it in its full force, until we have felt and sensed it, as much so 
as if I were an odor or a color” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 52). We make 
sensory information about our connection accessible by feeling it 
in the flesh, by making it tangible and perceptible, not principally 
by trying to understand it intellectually. In fact, it cannot only be 
intellectual but must be aesthetic. 
You play right, I’ll play right. 
This demands that we train a sensitivity in our movements and 
gestures to seek and ‘know’ the particular sensation and expression 
of mutuality or connection. Thus, the feeling of psychosomatic 
connection we are seeking between partners is not an ends, but a 
means. These exercises are about training in that means — to gain 
trust. They are “listening” exercises, our teacher Anita explains, 
we must learn “listening in the body.” She emphasizes that why 
we work this way in a kind of micro-collaboration, “to teach the 
body to trust.” We do not reduce the ‘felt’ emotional experience of 
trust and the ability to apprehend it through physical expression 
and affect. 
Willingness to be Moved or Affected 
Once we become more skilled at the artistry of the body (material), 
with sensing its form and energy, we are able to feel changes in 
the body-mind as they are occurring and we are able to challenge 
ourselves to not simply act in ways habitually exercised or ‘learned 
by heart.’ I need to know ‘where I am,’ what my capacities and 
limitations, are in order extend and show trust to my partner. A 
visitor to one of the training classes put it as, “It is impolite to your 
partner to not know what you need.” You need to know what you 
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need and how your partner can help you in order to fully meet 
them. This is because by first knowing our patterns and gaining a 
sense of our kind of process allows us, to some degree, to release a 
feeling of self-control to give into that process. 
It is important to point out that in movement practice, the 
sensation of release is not the same thing as losing control. Sumako, 
for example, teaches us that the relation between us and others or 
the environment “is not losing power,” but that getting in contact 
with that relationship “gives us power.” It only feels like losing if 
we associate a possession of ‘self ’ with control. “It feels like losing 
self-dignity,” as she puts it. Releasing is not passive or a loss. In 
Butoh there is no such duality of action-passive. Instead it is un-
derstood there willful intention. Thus, when Sumako says we are 
not losing, she is acknowledging that we do not just become pas-
sive, but that there is actually a shift in where the intention and 
perception of control is located. It is a different kind of control, 
moving from a state of self-preservation to one of availability and 
the potential to be moved. Particularly, it is an effort to release 
the inherent desire to feel bodily control in our natural “manipu-
latory reactions” (Mead, 1932/2002, p. 131) toward objects of our 
consciousness. Dewey writes:
 
The esthetic or undergoing phase of experience is 
receptive. It involves surrender. But adequate yielding of 
the self is possible only thorough a controlled activity that 
may well be in intense. In much of our intercourse with 
our surroundings we withdraw; sometimes from fear, if 
only expending unduly our store of energy; sometimes 
from preoccupation with other matters as in the case 
of recognition. Perception is an act of the going-out of 
energy in order to receive, not a withholding of energy. 
To steep ourselves in a subject-matter we have first to 
plunge into it. (p. 55)
———
Turning back to the exercise, we can say that there really is no guar-
antee of a connection or forming of trust between K. and me. The 
collaboration cannot have a feeling of force. It comes equally from 
both our abilities to convey trust and expectation. Paying close 
attention to the sensation of trust is to notice that it involves acting 
on a feeling not of certainty, the feeling of security in knowing what 
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will happen, but what James (1896/1982) terms “belief.” There is, 
in fact, nothing for me to act on beyond the belief and expectation 
that K. will play her part, that she will ‘pull her weight’ and take 
care of her side of things. It takes a conscious release on my part to 
let K. meet me halfway, giving her space to do her work by being 
secure in that uncertainty and not wanting to grasp, control, or 
escape from the situation. Even more so, when she is giving the 
manipulation, I have to believe that she will respect me as I do her, 
and that she has my interests at heart. 
Take a leap.
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———
This brings me back to the willingness to trust and James’s point 
that the creative and aesthetic existence of humans cannot exist 
without trust. In his view, if every action involves a choice, we first 
act with a force of will and liveliness measured in our “willingness 
to act.” Therefore, a willingness to act inherently involves a sense 
of trust (belief) because we must repeatedly act on what we cannot 
know. “There is some believing tendency wherever there is willing-
ness to act at all” (James, 1896/1982, p. 187). Because we must act 
with a feeling of uncertainty, in a larger view, trust is what makes 
it possible to achieve anything socially. Given a felt sense of will 
and agency, we have continually to ‘put ourselves out there,’ to act 
on the good faith of others. James maintains that this makes the 
experience of action a social matter. We have to trust. Because it is 
something felt, it cannot be a scientific matter based on objective 
evidence and reasoning. In The Will to Believe he writes:
A social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is 
what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty 
with a trust that the other members will simultaneously 
do theirs. Wherever a desired result is achieved by the 
cooperation of many independent persons, its existence 
as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in 
one another of those immediately concerned. (James, 
1896/1982, p. 203)
James’s (1896/1982) also argues that an internal belief in a collab-
oration helps create the collaboration in actuality. This is related 
to his view of pragmatic relationships and the notion that truth 
is not independent of the activities and interests of what he calls 
“believers.” So by virtue of happening in the world, any energy of 
intention or will of the “mind” is also a physical exertion (action) 
that helps create the fact. As humans we tend to produce the ev-
idence of what we were already thinking. James makes this clear 
in a statement about the practical kinds of questions that are not 
scientific generalities, but are:
a certain class of questions of fact, questions concerning 
personal relations, states of mind between one man and 
another. Do you like me or not? — for example. Whether you 
do or not depends, in countless instances, on whether I 
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meet you halfway, am willing to assume that you must like 
me, and show you trust and expectation. The previous faith 
on my part in your liking’s existence is in such cases what 
makes your liking come. (p. 202)
The point James is making is that there is no way to be certain 
of these activities from a scientific perspective because they are 
human relations the meaning of which we are actively and always 
creating and recreating. How can you be sure that you are in 
love? It is not as though you can weigh and measure it. There is 
nothing intrinsic in the experience of love. What evidence do you 
have to qualify it, other than at some point trusting and deciding 
that you are in love? It is a feeling that you must believe you feel, 
meaning it is also a choice to use the word “love” to describe 
what you are feeling. 
———
Trust, as being dealt with here, comes from an ability to let go 
of an amount of self-related preservation and thoughts about the 
future, in order to share in a common space, a meeting with an-
other person in the moment. To sense mutuality and to be willing 
to trust, to believe that another individual shares in the value of 
the connection, we do not simply place the social good above the 
individual as a decision. We should avoid talking about trust from 
another recurring polarity in our thought about action — that 
between the “individual” and the “social.” A person’s movement, 
behaviors, and feelings of action in relation to other people is 
much more multidimensional and complex than this kind of 
classical division (e.g., individual/social) with which symbolic 
abstraction provides us (M. Johnson & Rohrer, 2007). Just as 
in the integration of our perception of sensations of inner/outer, 
because a consciousness of ‘self ’ is intersubjective, this arises not 
simply from the brain or body, but is partly constituted through 
social interactions and relations (Mead, 1934/1967). We embody 
both the social and the individual. So while the organism’s basic 
“will” is self-interested, this understanding is not limited to the 
autonomous or private individual (separate ‘self ’) that is consid-
ered to be deeply ingrained in a kind of possessive individualism 
of western culture (Joas, 1996). In the context of internality, there 
is not simply heroic subjectivity or the transcendental ego acting 
upon the world. The world is also acting upon the subject. We are 
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inherently empathetic and self-reflective, taking in the attitudes of 
others with ‘self ’ (Mead, 1934/1967). 
The view that stems from Buddhism is that connection be-
tween ourselves and others, and between us and the environment, 
is already present; it is the natural state of things. We are not 
separate or distinct, but, in fact, we must learn to let down our 
defenses in order to allow the connection. This demands the re-
verse of force, to “let things come.” And instead of self-ownership, 
there is a surrendering of ‘self ’ in order to connect. Dewey (1934) 
reflects a similar view, alleging that the discrimination of ‘self ’ is 
not native and original to our nature:
Intrinsic connection of the self with the world through 
reciprocity of undergoing and doing; and the fact 
that all distinctions which analysis can introduce to 
psychological factors are but different aspects and phases 
of a continuous, though varied, interaction of self and 
environment… (p. 257)
Willingness to Show Trust to Have a Connection
In this way, trust goes back to the sensations of giving and receiv-
ing. There is no way to experience trust without yielding some 
amount of the feeling of self-control. Trust involves a meeting of 
movements and being moved in ourselves, an interpenetrating 
experience, as the author David Levithan describes it. “To get 
something, you must give something away. To hold something, 
you must give something away. To love something, you must give 
something away.” 
Again, Sumako reminds us that, “this is not about keeping,” 
connecting this thought to the adage that the more one has, the 
more he/she fears losing it. She says, “When you feel like you 
have nothing to lose, it can be freeing.” The ‘self ’ is not matter of 
possession. It is also always being let go of. The goal is to not exert 
an ego, not be steadfast. The emphasis is on the relationship be-
tween simultaneously surrendering and holding, when the feeling 
of giving takes precedence over, or at least has equal value to, the 
value of holding on, self-interest, the feelings and force of habit. 
Charlotte Selver (1995), a pioneer in Sensory Awareness practice, 
describes how in working with the body you must go into each 
partnership anew and lose your habitual stance:
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This approaching each activity anew means a person who 
is awake and changeable. When one becomes more awake, 
when one loses one’s restrictions, the organism becomes 
a very movable and elastic entity. The more one loses the 
tendency to protect oneself, the more one becomes trustful 
on one’s own abilities…with all this comes movability and 
elasticity. (p. 20)
Selver’s phrase “movability and elasticity” is telling of the kind of 
subjective perception we train in Butoh, particularly through the 
receptiveness of the body. It can be seen that we are not learning 
methods as a matter of securing habits, but the converse: We are 
learning methods to remain sensitive to environmental conditions, 
to break patterns, to foster change, and to maintain an attitude and 
demeanor of openness or “movability,” as Selver calls it, “always 
meeting new whatever reality brings” (p. 17). 
A useful way to describe the empathetic, affective ability of 
the artist to be moved is the term “plasticity,” in the sense that Wil-
liam James (1890/1950a) used it in discussing bodily structures of 
habit. “Plasticity, then, in the wide sense of the word, means the 
possession of a structure weak enough to yield to an influence, but 
strong enough not to yield all at once” (p. 105). For James, since the 
manifestation of mental life is best described in terms of properties 
of matter, the body is the site for influencing the change of material 
and the conditions for new thoughts, new ways of thinking, new 
sets of habits.9 In embodiment theory, this is described as, “the 
adaptive significance of a continuous bodily sensitivity in the form 
of an internally structured corporeal consciousness of movement 
or of movement potential” (Sheets-Johnstone, 2011, p. 65).
In the book, Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey (1922/2002) 
also discusses the concept of plasticity, saying that it is the exercis-
ing of “reorganizing potentialities” in habits of behavior, using it 
to metaphorically signify a “willingness to learn,” (p. 97). There-
fore, it is comprised in part of a psychophysical willingness to 
9.  It is worth pointing out that the importance of James’s view of plasticity is gaining 
traction as a result of findings in neuroscience in recent years. Where it was once thought 
that organisms build neural “maps” of their sensory environments, suggesting a static view 
of neurons that exist in reference to an outside world, new research shows a view of adaptive 
neural plasticity. Neurological “mapping” activities are constantly patterning and reforming 
which means, as James’s theory suggested, our “behavioural adaptions have anatomical 
underpinnings in the plasticity of the neural maps” (M. Johnson & Rohrer, 2007)
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re-make old habits in “the continuous modification of action…
the cumulative carrying forward of old activity into new” (p. 85). 
It is not simply acquiring and copying the ways of others. Nor is 
it being completely pliant. It is both — having a marked, colored 
behavior, an accumulation of previously embodied customs that 
is felt to belong to one’s personality, while being receptive and 
responsive, in partial opposition to his/her environment, able to 
question assumptions or habits of thought. To not just be carried 
along by force of habit and to extend ourselves by learning is an 
important psychosomatic aspect of adaption, “otherwise we shall 
simply do the old thing over again, no matter what is our conscious 
command” (Dewey, 1922/2002, p. 35). 
Anita often repeats physical instructions as a technique to en-
courage us to let ourselves be emotionally open, “Keep your front 
open, chest open, face open to feel open to others. This is the key to 
empathy. You can’t curl up or shut down.” The failure to recognize 
that this practice of receptivity is both physical and mental, Dewey 
(1922/2002) says, is a continued separation of mind from body, 
“supposing that mental or ‘psychical’ mechanism are different in 
kind from those of bodily operations and independent of them” 
(p. 33). It is reaching down into the meaning of the motions and 
gestures and committing to a concrete action of “will” or intention 
to “meet the other halfway.” There must be an internal willingness 
to trust in this process and this we can feel.
During an exercise we are blindfolded and Anita whispers 
for us to put one hand out. I am waiting with an open palm, not 
sure what to expect. Anita comes near to me and tells me to relax 
my hand. “Don’t grab,” she says, “Let it come to you. Do not 
force.” She lightly places an object — what feels like a small, smooth 
stick — into my hand. It is very delicate with some small pieces 
attached to it. She lets me examine it sensitively through touch 
without opening my eyes. “It is a gift, welcome it.” 
Anita is demonstrating the discrete corporal aesthetic of being 
receptive and welcoming. Without saying anything, a person can 
sense, even from the subtlety of such a hand gesture, the difference 
between an attitude that welcomes presence with warmth and an 
attitude that is slightly more wanting, asking, grabbing from the 
other person. In the Deweyan sense, it is expression of learning. 
“Learning is the opening of ourselves to the experience of life. The 
opening is a motor act; the experience is interaction between sensory 
and motor happenings” (Cohen, 1995, p. 203). 
192
This corporal work is an example of becoming precise in 
how to open up our perception and exhibit a kind of inner stance 
of plasticity. We are navigating with another person with a whole 
‘felt’ sense of empathy that we must also project onto our physical 
interaction. Empathy requires releasing the desire to control, a 
metaphor of which is holding a butterfly in your hand: If you hold 
it too tightly, you will crush it. If you hold it too loosely, it will fly 
away. When we practice physically altering our movement, stance, 
and posture, the way that sensorimotor information about material 
and interpersonal conditions reaches us also changes. We acquire 
an internal sensitivity to change that simultaneously manifests the 
ability to allow for change. To be open to receiving, there has to 
be a part of the image of ‘self ’ that is endlessly generous, trusting, 
tolerant, elastic. Receiving is in the same motion as giving.
Take off your cool. 
———
Going back to the exercise, lying on the floor, I am to be physically 
passive yet available. I cannot help K. with moving my limbs, so she 
must feel the dead weight of my arm or leg or head or other body 
part. If she lets go at any point, the gravity should be in my limp 
body and my limb should immediately fall to the floor like a sack 
of rice. This spontaneous release of a body part from their grip is 
the giver’s check to see if the receiver has fully relaxed. 
The more I focus on my experience and the physical sensa-
tion of the role of receiver (the one being moved), I find that it 
is especially provoking for me to feel like passive weight, to feel 
dependent and to release myself to this side of the partnership. 
There is an emotional memory that attaches to the feeling of giving 
the responsibility for physical control over to someone else, to lit-
erally not help myself and to feel inert and not able to take action 
for myself. My physical aversion to feeling dependent on anyone 
triggers a visceral response of tension and stiffness. Because having 
your body in your possession (as an object) is a way to exercise 
control of the ‘self,’ to let go in this way becomes a decision to yield 
a degree of my perceived agency. 
I reaaally hate this. Can’t I just choose the path of least resistance? 
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More specifically in the case of my own bodily reception in the im-
provisation with K., I mentally attend to my component thoughts 
about all the parts she is moving, those dozens of points of contact, 
so that my energy and attention is in my thinking. I actually try not 
to connect to the feelings of contact with K., the fact that she is 
touching me, examining me, perhaps smelling me, her nearness to 
me, having the weight and responsibility of my body. I escape into 
a kind of defensive character of thinking “no,” “don’t touch” the 
negativity of which is like lasers that tense my body. Unbeknownst 
to me, she can feel my resistance. My ‘thought,’ as invisible as it 
might seem, has a behavioral material effect. Even when I believe 
that I am relaxed, K. finds concretely in my body that I am tense. 
She has to shake my arm a little to remind me to relax. 
So to connect with K. and to let go of my self-preservation, 
my insecurities, and my concern for what is happening, I have 
to practice releasing my connection with a childhood experience 
of the sensation of feeling dependent. More explicitly, I have to 
disconnect from the emotional identification of dependency from 
my past, feeling needy, a burden on a single mother, in order to feel 
something new in the experience of being deadweight in someone’s 
hands. The key to doing this is that I must learn not to take the 
visceral sensations of feeling inert and passive personally. I have 
to remember this is not about “me” and keep my attention to the 
physical sensation of the present. Then I can literally and meta-
phorically be available and movable. Then I can share the same 
emotional space as K. 
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Three: Embodying Form
Move without tension? How the hell to do that? Is this a joke?
I am lying on my side, thinking about how to begin. My eyes are 
closed. They have been closed for a while since we have been 
meditating for a couple hours. I’m feeling separated from the 
others. We have not talked to one another in two days. We have 
been practicing working in silence, meditating for many hours 
at a time, and laboring outside in the garden during a thunder-
storm. The discipline required over the past 48 hours has been 
grueling. I have been wrapped in my own thoughts, but focused, 
noticing the minutia of how I am interacting with other girls, their 
gestures, their expressions, the actions between one another. The 
silence has been dragging on, making me second-guess myself, 
wondering if they are mad at me. I don’t have the normal confir-
mation I need by making them laugh. I have to behave differently, 
express myself in exaggerated ways. Tired, weighed, lying here. 
The quiet has been calling me to sacrifice my sliver of dignity, 
for the group surely, I turn to juvenile physical comedy in their 
company, telling myself I am lightening the somber mood. The 
mood is somber, right? I project my insecurities into the silence, 
compulsively checking in with the others, scrutinizing, looking 
for visual cues, making sure everyone is happy, happy with me. 
My self-consciousness has been ramped up, features intensified, 
nuances and colors magnified, sounds piquant. 
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Now, the darkness melts into the labored silence. I have no idea 
how the other dancers are moving. I’m even more cut off. I cannot 
look to them for help. There are measured footsteps, birds chirp-
ing outside. I lie here for minutes, seconds, minutes, millimeters, 
nothing moves. Is it insecurity that covers me? There is a weight, 
Anita’s prod for us to move without tension is rattling in my head. 
I start by trying to raise my arm, but all I feel is the enormous 
weight of my body, the bones, the muscles, organs, fibers, fatty 
tissues, heavy with fluids. Shapelessness. I’m lifting water now. My 
thoughts have a determination against my inert flesh. Talk! Parts 
of my body twitch with the thought of movement. There is lifting 
in my mind’s eye, but my arms don’t seem to move. Imperceptible. 
Millimeters. It is strained, swelling, like my body, or antibody, is re-
jecting my resolve. What is working against what? Myself against 
my mass against gravity. Outlines are invisible. There is the flat 
surface of the ground meeting my underside, mingling senses, 
sadness, food, organs, passions, temperatures, the sense of time 
spreading out, filling the room. There is the heavy effort, the in-
evitability of death, the strain and exertion, struggle, a dense and 
vibrant resistance. My heart is pulsating. I’m warm. 
The teacher’s voice passes into my purview and is murmuring 
something about moving slowly and kindly. She is asking us to 
think about a time when someone was dependent on us, and what 
that felt like, nursing someone, “What kind of movement can your 
body have if it is completely kind, giving?” I am immobile. 
What does she mean move without tension? 
I’m becoming a little frustrated with this assignment, thinking 
it is implausible, illogical, impossible. What kind of task is this? I 
try to imagine a time when someone was completely dependent 
on me, when I had to take care of someone. Have I had to en-
counter this sensation in my life? I‘m searching instances. Have 
I ever nurtured anyone? How close have I been to people? I’m 
trying to think about people I’ve been close to. I am unexpectedly 
overcome with melancholia, sorrow even. I feel alone, noticing 
my solitude. I start to remember my father in the hospital when 
he was dying and how I couldn’t help him. His bloated and blue-
tinted skin stretched out over the hospital bed. I push this fearful 
thought away, looking for a quick replacement to get away from 
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that rushing wave of emotion. I don’t think I have had anyone 
dependent on me. The sadness swells. I’m probing instances to 
latch onto a concrete feeling. A parade of memories and pale 
images roll by, family friends, moments, encounters, touches, hugs, 
embraces. The thought of children, but I don’t have one…a sick 
family member…my ex-boyfriend when he broke his collar bone…
Fluffy and far-flung recollections float by, like searching through 
a mist of corporal impressions and sensations, a foggy morning, a 
kind of belabored reverie. Looking for something vivid that sticks 
out in all the circuitry, roaming. A feeling. Someone needing me. 
Really needing me. Only to recognize that maybe I’ve never had 
to take care of anyone.
Anyone out there? 
I have only been completely dependent on myself? Do I even 
know what it is to be selfless, have someone dependent? What 
is it to move in a way of absolute kindness? Have I ever carried 
total generosity? Should I be helping myself, or helping someone 
else? I remember having a conversation with colleagues once in 
university about whether altruism exists. And they said it couldn’t, 
that every action on someone’s part is motivated from a selfish 
need. I remember asking would this word exist if there wasn’t also 
the emotion. The word wouldn’t have any meaning or…Thoughts 
condensing, my body! Still impotent. 
Am I thinking too much? Feeling too much?
I’m still testing how to move, if I can move parts of my body. I look 
for a kindness, a lightness. Can I move my skeleton at all? I roll 
a little to my side to test if gravity can take over my movement, 
if I can use my weight. My fingers spasm. It seems to require 
too much force on my part. I would have to feel the tension. Can 
I exert force in a soft way that I do not feel tension? I imagine 
lightly lifting my leg, like on a cloud. A feeling of space opens up 
between my muscles, joints, bones. 
What is tension?
I still feel tension hanging in the air. The movement feels forced. 
It’s unclear. I feel the question repeating itself and it is no longer 
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making sense, like when you repeat a word so many times it just 
becomes a sound, detached from something you once thought 
you knew. Tension, tension, tension, tension, tension, tension, 
tension, tension, tension, tension, tension, tension, tension, ten-
sion, tension, tension, tension, tension. Or did you ever know it? I 
move very little, from side to side, my neck, arms, and legs a little, 
the possibilities of moving wane and drop into a void. I cannot 
reach any kind of action, any kind of certainty, any conclusion. 
Nonsensical. Nonsensical, nonsensical, nonsensical, nonsensical…
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The teacher says 30 min have gone by. I feel myself back in the 
room and my thinking flip back to atomized time. I had forgotten 
about time and space, only mutating between memories and 
sensations. 
She walks past us and prods us again, “Can you get off the floor 
and dance like this? Don’t sleep. Can you move like dancers? Try! 
Move kindly, without tension. If you cannot do this then you can 
leave the studio.”
I find myself swimming in the thickness of the search, trying 
harder to move, but the frustration only brings tension. 
Drowning. The more I think I don’t understand, the more I feel 
I’m failing the assignment. Thoughts about whether I am trying 
too hard push me back into the earth. She said we should get 
off the floor, and I try to sit up to see what it means to move. 
She said we shouldn’t feel our body. But now my focus is only 
in my body and on the tension. What did she mean? Drowning. 
My eyes are still closed. I’m so tempted to look, wondering if I 
am doing this wrong…well, wondering if the others are off the 
floor…I have no comparison. I am alone. Am I the only one barely 
moving? Okay. I let myself cheat a little, opening the smallest 
crack between my eyelids to let light in. If I don’t actually see 
anything it isn’t cheating, right? From my position I can’t make 
anything out. A cheat wasted. I am back in the darkness, now 
mad at myself for having left it. I stand up and try lifting my arms. 
I don’t want to be the only one not moving. Yet, I feel like I am 
lying by getting up. Of course I feel tension. I am not being true 
to this assignment. I don’t want to pretend. The strain of con-
centration, now only tension, overwhelms any other perception 
I have now. Everything is tension, is it not? My concentration on 
moving is shattered, travelling in the opposite direction of the 
assignment. It is just circling thoughts. How do I get out of this? 
What is the problem here? Why can’t I find kindness in myself? 
Did I forget? I scold myself. I only find walls, obstruction, gravity! 
Only gravity. Gravity again. Gravity is unkind. Still looking for a 
way out. Can this earnestness be kindness? Or does it need to 
be light? I don’t know any more if moving without tension can 
bring kindness. I think I should leave as Anita asked us to do. I 
want to be authentic to this assignment. 
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I’m doing this wrong. 
Self-recrimination sets in. I feel myself giving up, accepting defeat 
in spite of the unlikeliness of me not persisting, from everything 
I have experienced of me, who I think this me is. I am growing 
remote, absent, outside myself, disappointed in this image, almost 
knowing that in this moment there is something incontrollable, my 
mind or body is already determined, and I cannot stop my form. 
I am watching it, while it gets up to leave. 
I open my eyes and make my way noiselessly through the silence 
and between the shifting shapes. A. is also standing outside the 
studio, and without gesturing, we reflect in one another’s eyes. 
Frustration? Yes. Frustration. Disappointment in myself. My head 
wags to myself. The rest of the day passes in silence. 
An Emotional Exercise
The next day when our vow of silence is lifted, we discuss the 
exercise and I record it. Since only myself and L. left during the 
exercise, I am surprised to learn that the other girls felt a similar 
misunderstanding and struggle to move. We are alone in a group, 
sharing the same time and space, emotional duress, and yet you 
are not there with them at all.
 
A: … you do an exercise which is about, move without tension, it 
is really difficult. It is really, really difficult…We were like this (acts 
dead by releasing body and hanging) I cannot move! Tight like a 
(makes a sucking shhhwwww sound). How to do? 
D: (shoulders slumped, sighs) But it brought soo much into my 
body, like, that struggle. To move without tension that was like…
it wasn’t the word gentle… 
A: Kind.
D: Kind!
Anita: Yeah, because gentle is too soft, huh? “Be kind” is more 
complicated, huh? 
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D: Yeah, it just…Wow! It moved me in, like, a really deep, deep 
place…to be in my body like that. Especially on the floor! I just 
felt like…
A: Struggling.
D: Yeah! Yeah. And then also — but then the kindness…being 
kind with the struggle. That was what was so moving about it. It 
was like…I can’t move! And it — anger! So much anger. So much 
frustration. So much like (gestures with arms out and hands in a 
grip) and then the tension in my body immediately (snaps fingers) 
with that. And then remembering to be kind. And the softening 
in that. And then just accepting that I was going to be on the 
floor. (laughs)
Again, our conversation after the exercise makes evident how using 
our bodies to conduct the inquiry has immediate aesthetic signif-
icance, meaning it is a matter of both form and content. As the 
other dancers picked up on, the visceral feeling of the body, just 
the “weight” of it, is fraught with an emotional gravity to exert a 
force of will. The more each of us felt that we could not move, due 
to the perceived weight and strain of our bodies, the more we took 
on a psychosomatic response of sorrow. In trying to be “kind” and 
to “move without tension,” we found fear, suffering, and pain. It is 
difficult to touch on the feelings, to embody them and make out the 
contours of kindness, without touching on the contrary — pressure, 
compression, strain, tension. Like with the exercise using giving 
and receiving, Buddhism teaches that every emotion, feeling, and 
sensation contains within it a seed of its inseparable opposite. It is 
the back and forth, the yin and yang, the figure and ground, the 
intensity and extensity, the movement of energy between, rather 
than being one or the other. 
D: The thing that I discovered is that there’s a difference be-
tween…weight and — I found that I could lift my arm without ten-
sion. And it was very, very, very heavy. And it felt like I was lifting, 
like, I was dragging so much, but it was actually, there was an 
effortlessness to it. And it — I was sort of — again, I keep coming 
back to this idea of kindness. And for me the kindness was, like, 
sending out, sending out…and like, then the arm just lifted. And 
there was no effort…It was like a surrendering up…because when 
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I when I felt anger and frustration, trying to move my body (mo-
tions with arms pressed down at sides) without moving, without 
creating tension, it was futile. And then with the kindness came 
so much sadness. Like, sooo muuuch…
A: It is so strange, huh? That it is so near. When the true kindness 
comes, it is full of sadness, huh? You know, it is not on the surface.
Searching for a physical connection to kindness, I personally only 
found tension. I looked for real memories, concrete instances of 
being a caretaker to bring into my current situation. I ended up 
dwelling on emotional burden and my autobiography, looking for 
this instance in my past from which to draw. I made the mistake of 
falling into self-identification and the “me” and “my” possession of 
those specific memories. Fixating on the past gave way to a literal 
strain because I was stabilizing the memories, rather than letting 
them be the genesis of moving in the present. In a reverse way, 
the freedom to move became stifling for me because I started to 
feel like I needed to mentally know what I was supposed to do, like 
I was misunderstanding the exercise. 
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Expressive Form-Giving Through Emotions
This Butoh improvisation exercise trains with an investigative 
technique of emotional embodiment and the physical sensation of 
form-giving. Butoh begins with the perspective of embodiment that 
entails an internalized shift or “transformation” by performers rather 
than beginning with external appearance. We learn to take part in 
the material means of form-giving with emotions — the experience 
of how it feels to be kind, to move without tension, to be giving 
over and beyond just “getting to” the form of kindness, like what 
kindness looks like or how it is portrayed. The transformation or 
qualitative change sought in this exploration is a “thorough and 
complete interpenetration of the materials of undergoing and of 
action, the latter including a reorganization of matter [our bodies] 
brought with us from past experience” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 107).
In this instant, the word kindness suddenly ceases to have 
meaning for us, without the concrete evocation of the experience. 
What does kindness actually feel like? There has to be a literal 
connection — neural, felt between the concept of “moving without 
tension” (kindness) and the action, the physical response. Seeking 
motor imagery through the sensation revealed to me and the others 
how emotions make up the ways we imagine and make sense of the 
lived experience of “moving without tension.” There is an inherent 
question of how to physically manifest that concept to embody it, 
so that there is a meeting in the emotion (content) and the physical 
movement (form).
In particular, methodically working from emotional feeling 
and sensations is how we engage an expressive use of the body, 
which is sometimes referred to as “filling in” by my teachers. “Fill-
ing in” is a corresponding experience to the philosophical stance of 
emptiness that Butoh practitioners are expected to have. “Filling 
in” form presumes the Buddhist teaching that “Form is emptiness, 
emptiness is form,” which implies that the experience of empti-
ness paradoxically allows for “filling in” form. So from a Buddhist 
perspective the somatic form of expression confirms “a two-way 
ownership, referring qualities back to entities that possess them 
and referring experience to ourselves as the one who experiences” 
(Tarthang, 1994). This is much like an aggregated definition of 
dance proposed as “consciously organized energy that gives form 
to feeling” (Dale et al., 2007, p. 581). 
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———
Our teacher Anita illuminates her perspective of “filling in” by 
grabbing a sheet of paper and sketching the outline of a building. 
She points to the lines explaining that this is how we normally look 
and conceive of a form. We decide how it is seen on the outside. 
We concern ourselves with the form in terms of a product (end).
Then Anita starts scribbling with the pen. She eventually fills 
out a shape similar to the first but without drawing any external 
lines. She says this is the artist’s way of embodying form through 
the content, through sensing it, feeling it, empathizing with it. 
It is the “internal integration and fulfillment” of matter and form 
(Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 40).
———
As Anita describes, unless we emotionally feel (content) the kinds 
of qualities we wish to fill in or express, our physical expression 
(form) will not have the desired effect. This is how the aesthetic 
experience of the Butoh art form is secured. It is an embodied way 
of working common to art practice in that, “What is aesthetic is 
pervaded by an emotional tone made possible by the process of 
being engaged in a work of art” (Eisner, 2002a, p. 81). 
In Butoh practice we use two interrelated approaches to 
embody or ‘fill in’ form, what could be seen as an outside-in ap-
proach and an inside-out approach. The outside-in begins with 
the form of the emotion, which is when, in this case we display 
the shape, movement, and demeanor of the emotion we are in-
tending to represent. This goes on to stimulate an emotion in the 
performer. The inside-out begins with an inner quality of being, 
tapping into an “essence” or inner-ness of some quality that again 
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stimulates an emotion. Both routes are really the same in terms of 
expression and effort and the continuity between emotion (con-
tent) and emptiness (form). Both awaken the need to imagine and 
feel. As Ruth Zaporah instructs, “if nothing is going on, pretend 
there is” and “be in the nothing” are useful for triggering feeling. 
Neither is to be about “portraying” emotions, but emotion is part 
of what moves the dancer. It is the motivation and trigger to make 
form-expression.
———
For me, in the cases of the outside-in approach, I have an emo-
tional block and dumbly stand there. To even try to begin with 
the form of an emotion, I have to imagine being someone/thing 
else or go outside myself to really be able to embody that energy. 
When Sumako asks us to express anger (ANGER!!!), it is almost 
as though I do not know where to begin. She tells us to “go wild,” 
“lash out like animals” or “act violently,” and I am not even able 
to start to enter into the movement. To even contort my face in 
an extreme way to show anger, I feel ridiculous and immediately 
become paralyzed. Shyness — shame really — becomes my default 
emotion. I realize that I am not used to showing or connecting to 
the energy of rage much at all. It is a sensation that I have spent 
my entire life trying to repress. I revert back to shame again and 
again. Shame. 
Do not be a hysterical woman. 
The inside-out approach, by beginning with a description of the 
type of movement, like “moving without tension” instead of “kind-
ness,” for example, provides me with an entry into emotions from 
a more objective place. For instance, if I am instructed to explore 
the energy of thrusting my arms out wildly, I find that I am less 
emotionally invested in terms of the idea of letting myself go wild. 
So if emotions and feelings come up for me along the way, they 
arise more as a discovery or flow in recognition not because I was 
just trying to mimic the emotion. Focusing on the quality, energy, 
and nuance of the movement helps me stay emotionally detached 
from myself, so to speak.
When we discuss these types of exercises using emotion, 
like the work with anger, some of the others say they also have a 
hard time performing emotion. I identify with a comment from 
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an artist who says she was shocked to find that she really did not 
know how to illustrate an emotion. Then she remarks that she 
remembered Sumako told us to, “Think of the inner part, not the 
outside,” saying, “It’s not you.” Sumako’s comment, she says, gave 
her “freedom” or “permission to let go.” Like me, she has to let 
herself feel the emotion without identifying it as herself. Working 
this way, I start to realize that there are many emotions on a daily 
basis with which I avoid contact. I actively try not to express or 
feel them, or have contact with their energy. I sense that I have 
a limited emotional vocabulary of expression, and consequently 
feeling, because I work within professional environments and cul-
tures that ask me to constrain those ways of behaving. So to have 
an expressive body, my “instrument” in this art form, I need get 
in touch with those feelings. 
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Learning Discipline with Embodiment as a Tool
The perceptive experience of emptiness in Butoh is intended to tap 
into an inner awareness of feeling as a step toward an expressive 
body. To recall an earlier discussion, Buddhism teaches that the 
‘clinging’ nature of self-identity is what separates us as objects of 
thought from one another. So by learning to not identify with 
the ‘self ’ as an object of our possession (“me”), we can empty our 
physical presence of the self-identification. In that sense, when 
we are not bounded by our egos, we allow connection between 
inner-outer and self-other. 
Because emotion is not physically abstract for performers, 
we must learn with some accuracy where and what emotions are 
stemming from inside the body and how we are responding. It is 
a “matter” of my body to directly sense in order to express that 
experience. Emphasis on this kind of physical-emotional awareness 
is similar to Buddhist meditative awareness or a kind of “intimate 
distancing” (Stanley, 2012). In “intimate distancing” one learns to 
distinguish one’s personal memories and attachments to an emo-
tion from the raw physical energy of the emotion. This requires 
loosening one’s possession on the ‘self ’ identified with control of 
the body, which goes hand in hand with learning a methodical 
attentiveness to internal, proprioceptive (or perceiving of self) 
systems. Such systems are by which the body-mind “judges spatial 
parameters, distances, sizes; monitors the positions of parts of the 
body; and stores information about laterality, gravity, verticality, 
balance, tensions, movement dynamics...” (Blom & Chaplin, 1988, 
p. 18). This impartiality from the objective “me” should not be seen 
as the same as trying to mentally detach from our bodies (Stanley, 
2012), but more as a shift in attention and meta-awareness of ‘self ’ 
and emotion in the present. 
From a scientific perspective, this type of emotional distinc-
tion is described as the difference between the sensation of moving 
energy and emotional attachment (Damasio, 2005). What we think 
of as emotion is the experience of energy literally moving through 
the body. The Latin root of the word emotion, emotere, means 
movement or energy in motion. Emotion involves changes in 
bodily ‘states’ that are felt as sensations. Of these there are two 
general ones: contraction as tension and expansion as calm. As 
Dewey (1934/2005) articulates, “there is rhythm save where there 
is alternation of compressions and releases” (p. 186). So the feeling 
of those changes, in the movement of emotional energy itself, is 
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supposedly neutral, simply a connection of “intensity and extensity” 
(p. 186). It is our experiential and psychological identification with 
the physiological experience that causes an emotional response 
(Damasio, 2005). Thus, for example, we perceive happiness or 
sadness, which are positive or negative emotions, because the signal 
of the bodily state triggers perceptive experiences from the same 
system. As William James theorized, when the body conforms to 
the pattern characteristics of emotions, we feel those emotions and 
attach positive or negative associations to them (Damasio, 2005).
As my experience with the kindness exercise shows, with-
out somatic discipline and introspection, the “filling in” approach 
is incredibly challenging. It actually requires that the performer 
become closer to their emotional vulnerabilities by being physically 
and mentally open and allowing the embodied feeling of emotions, 
not exactly emotions themselves. By learning not to attach ‘self ’ to 
the emotion, but to witness its presence, “filling in” celebrates a 
capacity for empathy, expression, and a connection with others. It 
is similar to how performance artist Laurie Anderson (2015) quotes 
her Buddhist teacher’s instructions, “You should learn how to feel 
sad without actually being sad.” As an embodied approach, it relies 
on performers accessing the emotional energy and somatic change 
in the present, while maintaining a meditative attitude toward the 
emotion, with what Buddhists would call “bare attention” (Epstein, 
2004, p. 31). The improvisational dancer Nancy Stark Smith speaks 
to the required meta-awareness, stating, “…you have a sense that 
I could change any minute and it doesn’t matter that much — it 
matters and it doesn’t matter — and we’re looking at it from an 
abstract point of view as well as a personal point of view, that you 
can switch levels on it” (p. 144).
In calling attention to the difference between emotions and 
feelings, the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (2005) notes the 
skill of actors and opera singers to recognize the same specificity 
of physiological changes going on. In neural terms, he describes 
the embodied approach as feeling an emotion, which is when the 
perception of the substrate of emotional processes is in “juxtapo-
sition to the mental images to that initiated that cycle” (p. 145). 
He says the ability to generate the emotion “requires special talent 
and maturity to rein in the automated processes unleashed by the 
real emotion” (p. 142). 
Therefore, it is possible to train embodied consciousness, 
for example, “embodied actor training,” which “is able to focus 
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on the feel in the body, often ambivalent or enigmatic, instead 
of conventionally categorised feelings. In embodied training, the 
fundamental question is: How does it feel?” (Tuisku, 2017, p. 41). 
One specific technique involves learning to shift or relax the focus 
of our control to a broader esthetic awareness of our body in the 
present. Ruth Zaporah (1995) gives a description in her improv 
practice of learning how to consciously examine emotions, with 
the following example of shame: 
In a training such as this, they being to examine shame 
and the physical expressions of it. Again, they feel shame 
spontaneously arising, but this time shame surfaces within 
a different context. As they experience shame, they notice 
a configuration of elements (breath, temperature, tension, 
quality of motion, voice, etc.) that comprises shame. It’s no 
longer stigmatic “shame.” It’s just a feeling and sensation 
that can be noticed. (p. 58)
Said elsewhere, a major component of Butoh practice, as with so-
matic practices more broadly, is in learning to perceive and navigate 
our own personal relationships to incoming sensory information. 
“Because our senses stand between intention and action, they can 
affect us deeply. In conscious and unconscious ways, we learn to 
control them, to filter them, to bury and uncover them in our 
awareness” (De Spain, 2014, p. 106). Instead of controlling our 
emotions via our habitual responses and possessive patterns of 
behavior, meaning that, instead of keeping or pushing away the 
emotions in habituated ways, we learn to control our defensive 
behaviors to “let them pass,” as my teachers say. 
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Attending to Details with Sensation and Imagery 
Pointed out previously with regards to the manipulation exercise 
and trust, we practice embodying experience by finding ways to feel 
it, instead of trying to understand it intellectually. For our teachers, 
having a ‘feel’ is about reestablishing contact with our bodies, the in-
tention in the feeling, or as Anita says the “will” or the “imagination 
to do.” In this way, they constantly stress that the work is very con-
crete and not insubstantial or impractical. We should feel the whole 
physical and mental body to inform the movement, instead of only 
“looking” or “thinking.” Sumako, for example, repeats again and 
again when we are doing imagery exercises that, “It is matter.” She 
instructs us, “Don’t just contemplate. Incarnate! You can feel it. Make 
it come alive.” For her, the movement does not simply come from 
an image as a mental visualization in the head. Rather we internalize 
the image; we embody the emotion and feeling of it. She teaches, 
“We are not just demonstrating the good and beautiful and so on. 
We take desire, our pride, subconciousness of the whole body, and 
are just passing, carrying that. We are the medium.” She emphasizes, 
“It is really change — physical change and chemical change.” 
In our training, Sumako says that the challenge for us is how 
to find the vividness and detail in the images, the sparks in your 
imagination that are going allow you to honestly react to express 
or fill in. “The question,” she says, “is how to make the body believe” 
It is tremendously difficult to falsely create feelings, like adrenaline, 
for example. You cannot pretend. She says, “You’re going to have 
to imagine a cockroach (screams loudly and jumps back with a 
shocked face) whatever it is…find it, use it.” The more we invest 
in the imaginary, the ‘fiction,’ the more the sensory detail becomes 
tangible to us and, in this way, more real to us. This is not unlike 
other movement practitioners who describe how they teach their 
students to improvise, like Steve Paxton, who writes:
I try to teach them what to feel in order to understand 
the physics of what I’m talking about, because if you just 
present physics they don’t feel anything. They just make 
little models in their minds and it takes a while to get into 
the body. So I start with feelings. (De Spain, 2014, p. 103)
This materialization of feeling, as my teachers say, is not merely 
simulating emotions for theatrical effect. We ground concepts and 
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images in the flesh as an investigation. Sumako, for one, makes a 
strong distinction between contemplating and feeling because by 
using the body, you can actually feel what we are talking about. She 
also discriminates between feeling and sentimentality, saying, “You 
don’t have to create it. It will be there. Let it be immediate, not 
sentimental. Let it be the emotion, not how it should look.” One 
day she elaborates her view by telling us that we can understand 
this aspect of Butoh by reading The Doors of Perception by Aldous 
Huxley. Describing the book, she says: 
I remember a flower. He sees a flower…and he says that 
the contour, the outside line of this flower disappears 
and only a kind of…I don’t know, essence...a kind of just 
“flowerness,” you know? Itself. We don’t need a form. We 
are the center of that. And then he describes after about a 
chair. And, uh, he says I am the chair and that that chair is 
me. So there is no more separation with the thing and me. 
So these descriptions are very near what I ask (laughs) you 
to be. When I say, “lose your wall…you are the air.” I mean 
it. It is not just an expression. I am the air. The air is me. 
It should be really this. It is not to just believe that you are 
air. It is completely different. It should change something.
As described before, Butoh’s particular attention to expressive use 
of the body is said to involve the ability to use highly detailed imag-
ery. This precision in imagery, which is a bit of an obsessive feature 
in the practice, is portrayed as more than, “Just sitting under a tree. 
It is also knowing what the ground under you feels like. What the 
tree tastes like. It must be exact, down to the eyelash, down to the 
smell you are thinking about in the side of your nose” (Yeung, 
2002). We learn that the depth and granularity of our movement 
is how the experience carries a sense of connection with another 
person. “It is not just about moves,” as Sumako says, it is “10,000 
pixels,” the gritty details, not forgetting to add that, “You must 
express for us to feel.” So we must feel to express to feel to express... 
The imagination is a source of content for both memories and 
anticipating things. Because the use of the imagination in our kind 
of movement is connected with tangible sensations like textures, 
temperatures, shapes, mood, and smells, it virtually brings the 
“thought” of imagery to life. It makes the movement “authentic” 
from the perspective of Butoh, i.e., the involvement of our entire 
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person, in full force, with our sensorimotor and emotional expe-
rience. In this sense, it ‘makes’ the expression of our imagination 
real. It becomes a belief in a present sense of ‘reality,’ or as in James’s 
(1890/1950b) words, “For the moment, what we attend to is reality; 
Attention is a motor reaction” (p. 322). You are making it come 
alive so others can feel it. It becomes believable. 
It's not a real problem, just a luxury problem. 
The committed integration of sensing, feeling, and fantasy means 
that the closer we seemingly get into the detail via feeling and sen-
sation to believe in the imagery, the more it is like we are making 
things up to truly go into that feeling. It feels both more real and 
more illusory at the same time. Dewey (1934/2005) writes that 
this empirical-emotional tension arises because there is always a 
deepened perception along with a physical medium in the arts, 
“There is something physical, in its ordinary sense of real exis-
tence…there is an experience having a sense of reality, quite likely 
a heightened one” (p. 209). 
But it is by virtue of having material existence, by which any 
art (form), can be expressive of feeling. There must be a material 
to express a meaning. Dewey (1934/2005) continues, “the mean-
ing not of what it physically is, but of what it expresses” (p. 209). 
Thus, in the Deweyan sense, we are exploring the sensory potential 
of the “material” of the body. We are learning to use our bodies 
as an artistic material to “convert it into an authentic medium of 
expression” (p. 208). We are learning the qualitative, emotional 
feel of the use of that material (our bodies). 
The Continuity of Feeling-Expression
The Butoh emphasis on the body as a direct means of perceiving 
and relating to the world is not so distant from the Pragmatist 
notion of the body as a common object of our communication. 
For Dewey, bodily experience is the common substance of expres-
sion, so while everyone’s experience is individual, it is not private 
(Dewey, 1934/2005). As Shusterman (2008) puts it, “Bodies provide 
a common place for the meeting of minds, whose intentions, be-
liefs, desires, and feelings are expressed in a bodily demeanor and 
behavior” (p. 145). This Pragmatist view subscribes to the idea that 
physical expression is something inseparable from thought-feeling, 
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that through movement and in immediate contact with reality, 
action and intention precede verbalization. Actions are direct ex-
pressions of a so-called “mind,” or conversely the “mind” is a ‘felt’ 
quality that takes shape through action. 
James (1904/2000) presents this the very idea of “mind” that 
can only be directly expressed through the body, what he labels as 
a “conterminousness of different minds.” He writes: 
Why do I postulate your mind? Because I see your body 
acting in a certain way. Its gestures, facial movements, 
words and conduct generally, are ‘expressive,’ so I deem it 
actuated as my own is, by an inner life like mine. (p. 40)
He goes on to say that we resonate with one another’s experiences 
through the empathetic responses in our bodies:
 
In that perceptual part of my universe which I call your 
body, your mind and my mind meet and may be called 
conterminous. Your mind actuates that body and mine 
sees it; my thoughts pass into it as into their harmonious 
cognitive fulfilment; your emotions and volitions pass into 
it as causes into their effects. (James, 1904/2000, pp. 40–41)
Cognitive science currently demonstrates some of the workings of 
James’s physiological view of intersubjectivity, in which he suggests 
that our understanding of one another involves activating kines-
thetic sensations and empathetic responses within our own bodies. 
We do not simply register another person’s body as an object or a 
representation, but we physically resonate with and feel that per-
son’s movement, behavior, gestural expressions, and reactions. It 
is a pre-reflective and direct intersubjective understanding that is 
not a symbolic or intellectual achievement. 10
In this way, the attitudes or quality of mind that each per-
former brings to the training physically reveal themselves. For 
instance, as much as I try to intellectualize why I respond phys-
10.  Specifically a person’s movements, their motor activities, activate the same neuronal 
areas in our systems as the person’s so that there is physical, structural equivalence or cou-
pling between the other person and ourselves. Scientists point out that this “inter-corporeal 
communication,” meaning when a person “sees” how other people move or how another 
person’s face is like their own face, this is automatically registered as a proprioceptive sense 
of how it feels to move in the same way (Gallagher, 2007).
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ically in a certain ways, my Butoh teachers can immediately tell 
me things about my own patterns of thinking in the ways that 
I move and gesture, my timing, energy, posture, et cetera For 
them, motivations of desire, force of will, impulses, and emotions 
cannot be consciously faked and they can perceive if someone tries 
to “fake” or hide impulses or expressions in his/her performance. 
The bodily experience communicates, in a palpable way, the inner 
landscape, the force of will behind the thoughts. “Emotions are 
attached events and objects in their movements…And even an 
‘objectless’ emotion demands something beyond itself to which 
to attach itself…” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 41). 
Bodies speak, people mumble.
Our physical manner of expressing inner, ‘felt’ experience comes 
instinctively from the body. This is a striking discovery of working 
with physical movement: The body, if you like, cannot lie. Felden-
krais quotes someone as saying that, “Words are more to hide our 
intentions than to express them” (Feldenkrais, 1995, p. 139). He 
continues, “I have never met anybody who cannot tell a friendly 
touch from an evil one. Touching, if unfriendly even in thought, 
will make the touched stiff, anxious, expecting the worst, and there-
fore unreceptive to our touch” (p. 139). Mary Whitehouse (1995), 
a body movement therapist and founder of Authentic Movement 
practice writes that:
Our impressions of people are gathered fully as much from 
physical attitudes and gestures as from words and clothes. 
Nervousness often shows itself in little extra movements of 
hands, feet, and face; tension, in raised shoulders as well as 
voice; fear in limited and carefully controlled movement, 
and so on indefinitely. They are all communicated to us by 
others and by us to others, whether we know it and describe 
it in words are not. Often other people are more aware of 
our condition than we are able to be ourselves. (p. 242)
Pursuing a Qualitative Experience with ‘Authenticity’
In short, there is an inner and outer integrity to the movement 
experience, in that how we perceive also expresses that inner feel-
ing. The emotional perception is essential to the act or gesture. It 
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has expressiveness (Dewey, 1934/2005). So when our teachers say, 
“let it become true,” they are referring to this integration of form 
and content, going from surface to substance, from appearance to 
realness, to respond with the fullness of presence (being) rather 
than particular mental projections. For them, expression is “not 
on the surface.” Anita remarks, “It is maybe not the things that are 
in front. Go deep. You have a feeling in the body.” She elaborates 
her view on this during her reflection on the kindness exercise:
They have a lot of responsibility to express there and to 
touch. This empathy is not funny for the Butoh dancer. It 
can also be very painful and daaark. And to carry all this is 
something…You are not afraid for chaos — I’m not afraid 
for chaos, or dead or whatever like this. I don’t dance 
for show. I am too alive, huh? No. It is not like that. The 
seriousness is there. The gravity of the body is really — just 
bringing the gravity of the body brings in the perspective 
of the dead. It is nature. When we die, we are in the 
ground...If no life, we cannot stand up. So this conflict 
is interesting. How can we be alive inside…and we’re 
not able to stand up? How is it possible? Is it dance? Is it 
choreography? Can you bring it to the stage this situation? 
For the dancer, it is an improvisation; it is a reality. It is 
improvisation into reality. And it needs a lot of empathy. A 
lot of empathy. 
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It is said that Butoh’s intention in form is to expose or to restore 
a natural state to the body, since in its tradition there is a philo-
sophical aim for an “authentic” way of moving and being in the 
world (Taylor, 2010). Butoh references an early ritualistic function 
of theater and dance, which aimed to connect with and celebrate 
ancestors by seeking a kind of truthful or intrinsic nature of dance. 
Its art form, as an investigation of a more authentic expression of 
the body-mind, is not solely for enjoyment or pleasure, but explic-
itly for a connection found between the performer and audience. 
By extension, Butoh’s art form is not about inventing some-
thing new with movement. Its significance, and perhaps creativity, 
resides in the refined aesthetic qualities of the movement. Formal 
movement itself cannot really be new in the sense that is an object 
that we possess, so the specific qualities of a performance are inde-
pendent of the categories of new or not new. For example, given 
the physical difficulty of holding movement at an abnormally, and 
in many senses excruciatingly, slow pace, it is an art of subtlety. 
So for both the mover and the viewer, it is not about “having” an 
experience of new or interesting, big, exciting, excess in that way, 
but about meeting present experience with a fullness of intent. It is 
a form of persisting with the body-mind that pushes the performers 
to get down to the fine levels of our being, to be more alive and 
present with whatever qualities are found there. In fact, the work 
can be seen as a liberation from strivings to get, to have, to own, 
or to objectify someplace or something. 
Likewise, notions of truth, honesty, or beauty in Butoh are 
understood with respect to internal attention and emotional ex-
pression and not objective judgments of taste. Consequently, in 
practice there is no judgment in method or style, meaning how 
the improvisation should be performed. The approach of “filling 
in,” for example, is irreducible to the appearance of style or a type 
of physical form. It is drawing from actuality, an immersion of 
person and world, a lived experience of emotion, feeling and em-
pathy for others. This parallels other perspectives on movement 
improvisation: 
The audience may not actually understand what you are 
‘doing’ (what you are exploring, what connections you are 
making, etc.) What they really follow is your engagement, 
your experience of the moment; its joy, its terror, its 
humanity. So while moving, trust in the process. Turn off 
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the critic, invest in the now. And let the rest take care of 
itself. (De Spain, 2014, p. 80)
Its expressive form is honest by virtue of coming from a human 
body in its “immediate sensuous effect” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 130). 
So what is meant by honest, genuine and authentic in this context, 
terms used by Dewey (1934/2005) is ‘truth to form’ in terms of the 
expression found in the materiality of the experience:
The resultant emotion is impersonal because it attached not 
to personal fortune but to the object to the construction 
of which the self has surrendered itself in devotion. 
Appreciation is equally impersonal in its emotional quality 
because it also involves construction and organization of 
objective energies. (p. 193)
People relate to the energetic presence, “those potencies in things by 
which an experience — any experience — has significance and value” 
(Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 192). For example, improviser Ann Halprin 
describes how her level of intensity goes up during performances:
And it’s not because I’m afraid of not looking good or not 
doing right. I don’t judge myself. I gave that up a long 
time ago. I’m not concerned about an audience’s judgment. 
I’m concerned that we have a connection, and that what 
I’m doing as I’m doing it is connecting with them. (De 
Spain, 2014, p. 62)
For instance, in Butoh our emotional reactions of liking or disliking 
are not inhibited, but are carefully brought out and distinguished 
as responses to the aesthetic quality of the movement. This helps 
the practitioners learn not to conflate the esthetic, emotional ef-
fectiveness of the qualitative us of energy with judgments of good/
bad or pleasurable/unpleasurable with respect to the outcome or 
content, such as the improvisation style or appearance or the emo-
tions stimulated. In other words, just because we do not like the 
way a performance makes us feel or the way it looks should not to 
devalue appreciation for the fact that it moves us and that the work 
comes from “the intimate depths of the artist” (Richie, 2007, p. 24). 
Anita asks us one day, “What do we look for, what is beauty in 
improvisation?” We all give different answers, but they all revolve 
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around a sense of a loss of ego by the dancer such as, “letting the 
body be an instrument,” “just following the movement,” “going 
completely into the dance,” and “being focused and connected in 
the present.” Our answers reinforce the idea that performing for the 
audience is not about the dancer’s own self-identity or self-expres-
sion. Anita says sometimes that “no one cares about us,” meaning 
that what is important to others is not who we think we are, but 
the sense of connection we feel to their presence. We empathically 
connect to the experience of the person that is unabashed, unself-
conscious, sincere, and natural and we share their experience of 
happiness, anxiety, relief, pride, pain, hope, fear, or curiosity. We 
seem to agree that what captivates a viewer is the dancer’s focus or 
immersion in perceiving the world, how ‘in the moment’ he/she 
is, and his/her degree of emotional rapture. 
The value of this experience, then, is the absorption in the 
present experience, the connection that is ‘felt’ within it. It is the 
very possibility for an integrated consciousness where an esthetic 
quality pervades. Dewey writes, “This absorption is characteristic 
of esthetic experience; but it is an ideal for all experience, and the 
ideal is realized in the activity of the scientific inquirer and the 
professional man when the desires and urgencies of the self are 
completely engaged in what is objectively done” (p. 285).
According to the psychologist Csikszentmihalyi (1990), this 
type of absorption in the present is a marker for a “creative” experi-
ence. His reasoning for this is that people are internally motivated 
by different forms of activities, regardless of what they actually are, 
but the important thing is that they are activities which provide this 
level of quality of experience when involved in them. He notably 
terms this quality of enjoyment in an experience “flow” because, in 
his research on experience, respondents describe “the feeling when 
things were going well as an almost automatic, effortless, yet highly 
focused state of consciousness” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, p. 110). 
His research reflects Dewey’s thesis that it is not the objective form 
that determines “creativity,” but an aesthetic quality of experience: 
So we have to assume that it is not what people do that 
counts but how they do it. Being an engineer or a carpenter 
is not in itself enjoyable. But if one does these things in 
a certain way, then they become intrinsically rewarding, 
worth doing for their own sake. (p. 107)
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When we align our physical activity with the subjective and cre-
ative enjoyment of it there is often pleasure. “Full absorption in 
what we do feels good, and pleasure is the emotional marker for 
flow” (Goleman, 2013, p. 22). It bears repeating that the emotional 
marker that makes such an experience pleasurable and consuming is 
not “pleasure” in an objective sense. Csikszentmihalyi (1996) writes 
that flow experience, “often involved painful, risky, difficult activ-
ities that stretched the person’s capacity and involved an element 
of novelty and discovery” (p. 110). And in terms of stretching, the 
challenge must be to the right degree. Otherwise it can give way 
to frustration or anxiety. He notes that the experience must have 
the right mix of challenges and competencies so that “we feel that 
our abilities are well matched to the opportunities for action” (p. 
111). Again, it is a feeling of a relationship going well, balancing 
between boredom and apprehension.
In art-related practice, this integrative experience is where 
there is the connection between representing and expressing. “Rep-
resentation may also mean that the work of art tells something to 
those who enjoy it about the nature of their own experience of 
the world: that it presents the world in a new experience which 
they undergo” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 86). Effort, motivation, and 
intention — a force of will — is in part what physically moves other 
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materials. Thus, not to belabor the point, but it is the intensity and 
focus of the engagement of the artist, which involves pain, diffi-
culty, effort and the feelings produced that gives us an emotional 
connection with any material form. 
In this artistic approach, we can see honesty with regards 
to expression operates in line with a Pragmatist stance to ‘truth,’ 
which moves away from scientific truth claims as a goal, i.e., for 
knowledge to say something about how the world is. Opposed 
to the scientific position that seeks certainty in representation, 
a notion of being true to nature, artists seek a kind of ‘truth to 
form’ via the immediacy of what we can actually sense and feel. 
For the Pragmatists, to act in the material world, we organize our 
experience of it and that depends on material change, intervention, 
change, and manipulation. This pragmatic idea of replacing truth 
with method is about empirically testing in experience how well 
actions work to serve a purpose. A skill of method in a practitioner’s 
quality and way of perceiving, expressing, and intervening in the 
world only matters with respect to consequences. Because our 
embodied “logic” is a matter of habits and patterns of behavior for 
coping with reality, ‘truth’ is constituted through subjective-objec-
tive relationships, that is, how a subject is interacting in the world 
internally and externally. It is more of a conversation with what 
we feel and believe and how we act as real, rather than an outside 
theory of knowledge. Therefore, with respect to a sense of ‘truth,’ 
the experience of art is not just about understanding, but it is 
about feeling. Being fully understandable is not what makes art as 
experience valuable (Dewey, 1934/2005).
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Four: Sense of Process
We are all sitting in a circle looking at the teacher. He has been 
telling us about the practice of slowing down and how that allows 
us to have a new experience of movement. Now he softly asks 
us to all take 20 minutes to get out of our chairs and to go onto 
the floor. Looking at the distance between the seat of the chair 
and the surface of the ground, I immediately begin computing.
20 minutes — how long is that? We just did an exercise that took five 
minutes, so four times that. 
I try to project into the future how long that might take, imagin-
ing myself doing it before actually doing it, trying to spatialize 
20 minutes…He is giving us a few more directives, reminding us 
that all of our body parts should be moving at the same speed 
so if we need to scratch our nose or something, we have to do 
it at the same slow speed, and that we should not try to plan 
the movement ahead but follow gravity, where we feel our body 
naturally tending to go. “Don’t only move functionally,” he says. 
Okay, I got it. 20 minutes. 
I’m still absorbed trying to get a sense of what 20 minutes looks 
like. The teacher looks at his stopwatch and I am waiting for his 
signal to begin. He’s still looking at his stopwatch. It seems like a 
really long time that he’s looking at his stopwatch. A pause just 
hanging in the air. “Okay, begin,” he says.
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As if I had forgotten what was coming, suddenly I’m here, hello, 
and intensely aware of my body, everything outside of this 
moment disappears. My hands gently resting in my lap, the weight 
of all the parts, the way that the flesh of my thighs and buttocks 
spread across the chair, my feet gently resting on the floor. There 
is the wet taste of air.
My mouth is slightly open? 
My focus moves to my mouth closing as slowly as possible, while 
I feel the rest of my body come down to meet my lips and jaw that 
stays in the same position. 
20 minutes. Am I moving? Or just sinking? 
This is what, thirty seconds? 
I’m starting to feel the bad posture my mom always corrected, 
letting gravity pull my chest downward and slightly forward. It 
feels like my insides, organs bones, are sinking into one another, 
my lungs meeting my spleen, meeting my liver, meeting my kid-
neys, meeting my stomach, meeting my intestines, all space being 
squeezed out, doubling over, headed toward the floor. Creeping. 
My shoulders slouch. Neck folding in. Head dropping slightly. 
Navel folding in. Inch by inch my upper body descends invisibly 
and slightly to the right. 
The weight of my hands slips over my thighs into the seat of the 
chair, the elbow of my left arm lowering into my thigh while my 
right arm slips off the chair and is now dangling off my shoulder. 
Thank god for that shoulder. There isn’t a control of the move-
ment so much as giving in to the gravity, just releasing one tiny 
bit of structure or resistance at a time. It is shaping me. A joint 
here, there, at my finger, nose, neck, elbow, knee, foot, knee, 
hip, spine, shoulder, knee, spine, finger, wrist, pelvis, neck…The 
sudden awareness that brings a discontinuity to feeling, quantum 
hops spacing one joint from the next, arbitrary shifts in focus. The 
skin around my face sags, a flash of a sense memory, imageless 
and at the same time a feeling of d rooping
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The tiniest of sounds enter my purview, trailing in and out. The 
rustling of cloth around body parts, faint squeaks of the joints 
between meeting parts on the wooden chairs, birds chirping out-
side, somewhere the sound of steps of a person walking, it is 
like hearing a slow-motion weight change, the house breathing, 
a drone of motion. Are the sounds coming to meet me or am I 
seeking them out? 
The stillness is arresting in its depth. We keep going as if there 
was no choice anymore, trapped in one super. slow. speed. My hair 
is hanging from my head, which is completely withdrawn into my 
neck. I am feeling the sense somewhere of an off-white, yellow 
color, not quite happy, not quite vintage. Double, triple, quadru-
ple chin. The blood entering my forehead. My entire body falling 
to more to the right, creasing, muscles twitching, joints jerking. 
Take your time. Don’t press. It’s only been 5 minutes, maybe. 
I’m trying to judge the distance of where I think I should be in 
five minutes. I start to feel my bodyweight move off the surface 
of the chair, and onto my legs, mostly my thighs, and I’m trying 
to postpone the inevitable by keeping my butt as long possible 
on the edge of the chair. It starts to slide. 
Nooooooooo… 
Now the entire strain of holding the crumpled, peculiar position 
goes completely onto my legs. Thighs! Pain. I’m telling myself it 
is to be, as if it is natural against all that I feel. Relentless pain. I 
feel pain as my knees are bending and warping. Arms dangling. 
My entire body now wants to just fall to the floor, giving itself 
into gravity. I no longer want to know this heavy lump and yet 
I’m stuck with it, trapped in it, left with quavering muscles trying 
to hold up it up at this agonizing pace. 
Hold the position.
There is tension in my face. I’m trying to figure out how to actually 
get out of this impossible position, realizing that I can’t go any 
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further with the way my legs are. I am stuck, trapped in my own 
body or mind? Calculating how I’m supposed to get out of this, 
I’m unsure of how to solve this problem but my body is still falling. 
The problem is passing and I’m trying to keep up. 
Do I turn my legs to one direction more or spread them apart?
My right leg is entering into a contorted position and there is 
nowhere for it to go unless I slowly begin sliding it backwards 
behind the other leg. Each second, or millimeter, or whatever, 
is lasting longer than the one before it. My limp fingers are just 
beginning to meet the floor. 
Hold. hold. No. I have to get my knee to the floor.
What is this game I am playing? Is it my own fabrication? No, it is 
there. Pain in the muscle tissue. Real pain. This is all I can think 
about now. It isn’t a word really. I just am pain. After being so 
cramped my right leg jerks into another position. Damn. Problem 
solved. That was completely out of sync with the slow speed. I 
feel like I lied a little to the exercise, to myself, to the others really, 
hoping they didn’t see it. I wonder if I would care if I were alone. 
I catch a breath with the weight of one knee on the ground. But 
even with my weight on three limbs, the sheer malformation of 
my legs and back is unbearable. Did I forget how painful it was 
only few moments ago? Gravity does not like me. This feels like 
a realization I’ve had many times before. 
Pain is the only measurement. All there is holding on. Just. a. little. 
longer. My body hunched over in a palsied twist, there’s no more 
meandering or gentle tilting. Things are more direct now. My only 
goal is to get down. My focus homes in on my right elbow that is 
so close, so close to the floor really. It is right there. 
Hello floor. 
My elbow approaches the ground and the same thing that hap-
pened with my leg happens again. The anticipation or sheer 
keenness of putting my weight down, and my body naturally 
lurches forward wanting to release the tension. Simultaneous 
disappointment. Self-aware again, I try soothing myself — I just 
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didn’t have the strength, okay? — and I partly notice some of 
the others spasm as their weight meets the floor. Emotionally I 
relax a little. 
I’m guessing it has been about fifteen minutes and my body is 
almost fully on the ground. I sense that my movements have sped 
up, parts of my arms, legs, any muscle just jumping ship to the floor. 
In a brief moment I stop caring that my movement is unmeasured. 
I’m just happy to let all my parts have contact the ground. Oh 
sweet, sweet ground. My head, legs, everything sinks even when 
it feels like there is no more space. Air keeps finding a way out and 
my muscles are able to keep inching down, if it is even down any-
more, every crack of space, closing. Vacuum tight. I sense darkness 
where my body had an outline, just the pressure of weight. Floor 
is me. I keep trying to push my limbs out, finding parts to flatten. 
“Time.” 
———
It takes us a minute to pull ourselves up from the floor, to reorient 
ourselves back into time, the room, the chairs, one another. I’m 
physically tired after controlling my body with such attention. The 
teacher asks if anyone wants to say something about their experience. 
Several of the performers mention how meditative they found 
the experience and how they completely lost track of time. Or 
some lost track of where they are in space, which direction they 
were actually moving. One of the artists, G., remarks that she had 
a moment of not knowing if she was up or down or which way 
she was moving. Another artist confessed that he “enjoyed the 
darkness.” He tries to clarify, “There was a lot of space…I don’t 
know if it was more in the body, it was more like in a room with 
lots of space, but I wasn’t physically in the body.” He and some 
of the others observe that when going so slowly the movement is 
mechanical in a way, not really smooth. 
Remarks about emotions come up for everyone, how all the 
bodily sensations are so near to emotions or feelings. One guy 
concluded that, “it was good to allow myself to feel tired, feel sad-
ness… irritation…” Then other dancers affirm that they experienced 
a polarity between the struggle and the “giving up” or the “wanting 
to do it slow” and just “wanting to get it done.” One girl describes 
how she watched her feelings of anxiety transform, saying: 
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But, you know, when you feel it, it’s like, ohhh... I shouldn’t 
feel this stress, and then, ah, I can feel this stress. It’s maybe 
good or okay to just try to accept (gestures by opening 
posture and breathing out) ...and the stress is very much 
in me today so I just try to go with it… (speaks softly) and 
just have to accept.
Because the experience is slowed, things that would otherwise be 
insignificant become markers, and the time is vivid with the passing 
thoughts, out-of-body moments, awareness of what others are 
doing, physical sensations, twitching body parts, and many levels 
of perception melding. When thinking and moving are given more 
space, you zoom in on every passing detail and the way feelings 
and intentions change. 
A Slow Exercise
In Butoh training we often we work with ultraslow movement 
called “bisoku,” which means “subtle speed” in Japanese (Fukuhara, 
2013). Bisoku requires the dancer to move all body parts at the same 
slow speed, which is expressed as “one millimeter per second.” It 
requires vigilant attention to the control of the body’s movement 
through time. Bisoku consists of movement tasks like walking, falling 
to the floor, opening or shutting a hand, or opening the body from a 
fetal position. That the body could take 20 minutes to go from being 
closed to open introduces a tangible change in our typical experience 
of the duration of time, and in the way we move our bodies. Since 
we move our bodies and carry out our actions at fairly regular and 
predictable speeds, we are, “unconsciously aware of the normal 
rhythm of things (walking, talking, gestures, etc.) in a way that 
allows us to turn our focus to anomalies (changes from the norm 
in terms of time or space or whatever)” (De Spain, 2014, p. 116). 
In this way, the bisoku exercise, even if it is a “prosaic idea” 
of simply slowing our movements (De Spain, 2014, p. 116), is an 
intricate way of investigating the conditions of our habitual move-
ment and thinking patterns that helps us make microdiscoveries 
about our perception, our movement, attention, thinking, energy, 
physical strength, et cetera. Stretching the perception of time in 
particular intervenes into our expectations of conventional forms 
of action, meaning the bodily speed at which our intent is normally 
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acted. This is not about adding more activity or making something 
happen, but it lets us peer into what is already there — the granu-
larity of our thoughts and the sensation of each passing moment 
and of the changing process of intention. It is simplicity wrought 
with complexity.
Merging Action and Awareness to Stay in the 
Present
Slowing relations through the bisoku technique requires full partici-
pation in the present, so that the experience “is not merely a means, 
but actually partakes in the nature of the end” (Batchelor, 2015, p. 
56). As with the rest of Butoh practice, this brings a fidelity to the 
process and self-awareness of the performer, or as it is said, has a 
“transformative” effect. The Butoh philosophy toward physical 
work is aimed at nurturing an aliveness in every moment and an 
attitude of continual exploration as much as getting to some kind 
of result. This is mirrored in the way that Butoh training is valued 
as performing in the sense that both contribute to self-cultivation. 
They equally pertain to enhancement of the ‘self ’ by way of keeping 
the body-mind integration near and active and keeping a connec-
tion to one another and the environment (Yuasa, 1993). 
For example, as much as I struggle in the bisoku exercises and 
the eternal gaps of feeling like I just waaant toooo geeeet thiiiis 
ooovver wiiiith, the experiences are always intense and memorable. 
I learn to appreciate that about bisuku: It is making an experience 
in the present. It is not about reaching some conclusion, but rather 
revisiting experience itself. In the slowness there is a rare chance 
to perceive and question my physical responses and relations. I 
have the time to notice the tiny, mundane, nuanced thoughts, 
sights, smells — what am I sensing this time, what is that knot in 
my neck, how do I deal with the itch on my nose, now my arm is 
twisted, why am I thinking about last week — which normally pass 
by unnoticed. This elaborates, intensifies, and elongates the sen-
sastions, colors, and textures of my feeling. This depth of feeling is 
Dewey’s (1934/2005) formulation of an aesthetic experience, “Such 
an experience is a whole and carries with its own individualizing 
quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience” (p. 37).
In the embodied sense, the concrete exploration of move-
ment in space and time aims at what is felt and therefore what is 
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individual. Thus, the novelty of the performance is considered to 
reside in the fact that it is an individualized experience. Dewey 
says that “immediacy and individuality” are the traits that mark 
our concrete existence. Each individual finds different meanings, 
personal realizations, and “manners of response” in their relations 
to the same conditions in the world. Dewey writes:
A new poem is created by everyone who reads 
poetically — not that its raw material is original for, after 
all, we live in the same old world, but that every individual 
brings with him, when he exercises his individuality, a 
way of seeing and feeling that in its interaction with old 
material creates something new, something previously not 
existing in experience. (p. 113)
Like in the slow exercise when we are instructed to not only move 
“functionally,” the teachers often remind us before exercises to have 
a “nice experience,” insisting that we should be there to “let the ex-
ploration go deep,” “meet each other,” “experiment together,” or to 
“just play.” There is acknowledgement of the enjoyment, pain, social, 
and aesthetic experience of movement. The work “is not about rush-
ing through,” as they say. From the perspective of a creative “flow 
experience,” Csikszentmihalyi (1996) calls this kind of enjoyment 
of what we are doing as an end in and of itself “autotelic” (p. 113). 
Many times this seems to be what the Butoh experience provides, 
the kind of movements where, “there is no reason for doing them 
except to feel the experience they provide” (p. 113). 
Given the focus on the quality of experience and not the end 
goal, the use of slow movement clearly overlaps with the medi-
tative arts in which our present awareness reveals the defensive 
or avoidant dimensions of our thinking that often are about not 
being present, wanting to escape, the desire to be somewhere else. 
By practicing at not shying away from unpleasant feelings, we are 
able to be with the present and take in the range and depth of life’s 
experiences, which in Dewey’s (1922/2002) words, “increase the 
intrinsic significance of the living” (p. 267). If we do not control 
or shut ourselves off through our defensive habits, we are able to 
discover how and when things get difficult, painful, or uncom-
fortable for us. Butoh art form often attempts to find consolation 
in physical and mental toil, to accept the sensations of agony, fear, 
and doubt as much as the sensations of pleasure, beauty, and ease. 
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Thus, there is an expression of pain, futility, distortion, and struggle 
that is a part of the Japanese aesthetic tradition, but not necessar-
ily common to Western culture (Richie, 2007). It is a feeling for 
qualities that allow humans to cope with fears and the pain and 
fragility of intimate and personal relationships with the world, 
those beyond the desire for comfort and safety (Bauman, 2001).
To turn briefly to pragmatism, an ongoing idea in this thesis 
is that the current dualisms of mind and body, thought and action 
are deeply rooted in our cultural sensibility, which relies heavily on 
objectification of experience. This is because we identify with think-
ing about the past or future. The more we identify with time as a 
projection of our thinking, the remembered past or the anticipated 
future, the harder it is to physically be in the physical sensation of 
the present. As Dewey (1922) argues in Human Nature and Con-
duct, we tend to let our thought about future happenings determine 
the present, instead of appreciating the significance of the sensual 
present. In other words, by giving the future so much power over 
our thinking, an instrumental relationship to our bodies arises. 
Dewey states that making the future a sole aim, “is to throw 
away the surest means of attaining it, namely attention to the full 
use of the present resources in the present situation” (p. 266). In 
such a space-time detachment, we subordinate our body’s actions 
to a projected ends-in-view, every step taken in anticipation of some 
projected result or expectation. The future continuously appears 
in our thinking as a series of “what nexts,” focusing our present 
state on acting toward the ends (Dewey, 1922/2002, p. 36). Our 
bodies, our physical presence in a sense, become a controllable 
factor, secured in terms of producing an outcome we can foresee. 
The movement practitioner Mary Whitehouse (1995) describes this 
detachment thusly. “Movement has become a means to an end, 
usually a rational and purposeful end, and takes place automati-
cally in response to hundreds and hundreds of mental images of 
going someplace and doing something” (p. 243). We do not listen 
to our own feelings and corporal presence. In Dewey’s view, it is 
important to remember that the future is not physically within 
our control and to not become totally mindless of the qualities 
‘felt’ in the now. By intellectually preoccupying the present with 
prescriptive feelings of right and wrong, we cut ourselves off from 
the experience of choice and potentiality in the moment. 
Giving the present over to comfort and security of the 
planned is a habit of behavior that Dewey (1922/2002) qualifies as 
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“mechanical.” In these cases, by Dewey’s estimation, people do not 
have to think or feel because they play out habits and behaviors that 
they have acquired by “previous mechanical exercises of repetition 
in which skill apart from thought is the aim” (p. 71). Behavior and 
action can be thoughtless and emotionless by being taken up and ex-
ecuted through routine habit and patterned behaviors and activities. 
In this case, we no longer pay attention to sensations, but routinize 
our corporeal activities in a patterned way to not feel many parts of 
life, to not feel pain, discomfort, vulnerability, uncertainty. Again, 
Mary Whitehouse (1995) says it is like “living in our heads” which:
the body faithfully reflects, since it must move, acquiring 
a whole series of distortions, short circuits, strains, and 
mannerisms accumulated from years and years of being 
assimilated to mental images of choice, necessity, value 
and inappropriateness. At this point movement is in spite of 
instead of with the help of the mental life. (p. 244) 
Paying attention to the present by no means completely frees us 
from goals or future plans. Instead for Dewey (1922/2002), it im-
plies recognizing the amount of control we actually have is securing 
our bodies’ action in the present. Because habit is “the thing which 
is closest to us, the means within our power” (p. 37), he advises 
that we acquire habits infused with thought and feeling to foster 
an inner suppleness and ability for continuous modification. In-
stead of stiff formality or routine, individuals must be “alive and 
sensitive to consequences as they actually present themselves” (p. 
51), attentive to his/her reflexes and impressions, to the context, 
and to one another. 
Form-Giving in Space and Time
In this way, an embodied approach places emphasis on the space 
and time of the present — to perceive and express without antici-
pation or expectation and to learn from that experience. It starts 
with framing the body as a present way of knowing rather than 
a controlling it as a means toward some expectation or particular 
outcome. Our inseparability from knowledge and enacting knowl-
edge is “an entry into an investigation of the relationship of self 
to the world we inhabit, other kinds of virtuosity — of attention, 
of choice, of connection, of revealing the nature of experience 
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in the moment” (De Spain, 2014, p. 13). We can only bring our 
thoughts-feelings into our awareness by physically activating them 
through experience. We have to feel our way. I often hear the other 
dancers say, we just “have to allow the movement to happen,” to 
“see where it takes us,” or to see what the body operating in the 
present “tells us.” 
Such a tolerance for non-identification offers time to inves-
tigate our “preconceptual” experience or a felt dimension of ex-
perience (Gendlin, 1997). In Dewey’s (1934/2005) phrasing, it is 
a “space of time” to physicalize and spatialize thought and feeling 
into form. As with “filling in,” instead of a superimposing form 
upon a material, we allow the body-mind a means by which its 
“material effects its own culmination in experience” (p. 153). 
Butoh, like other art practices, connects space and time in 
the present, materializing a necessary “roominess” for the artist’s 
process that must connect and flow at his/her own pace. Hijikata, 
one of the founders of Butoh, used the phrase “revolt of the flesh” 
to describe this attitude of giving the body freedom to explore. 
Butoh was conceived by Hijikata as a reaction to “traditional Jap-
anese modalities and the cultural conventions undergirding them” 
(Hamera, 1990). In his view, because the life of the body includes 
the life of the mind, the less we control and inhibit the body, the 
less we control and inhibit the mind. Butoh, therefore, grew out 
of his methodological search to abandon the perceived restraint 
of Japan’s formal behavioral patterns and classical definition of 
beauty. Contextually the practice offers this metaphorical “space of 
time” to access a psycho-social experience of other extremes — the 
unpredictable, naive, spasmodic, magical, violent, mysterious, 
grotesque, playful, and imaginative (Hamera, 1990). 
Our teachers invite us to “feel our way.” It is not always that 
we can make immediate sense of our action cognitively because a 
felt, qualitative sense of a situation involves duration. This is not 
about doing things efficiently, but instead we are literally making 
sense by being able to pay attention to the environment, our inner 
feelings, and the expressive and imaginative features that emerge 
in the moment. 
Context Without the Pressure of “Reality”
As the various exercises have illustrated, Butoh’s strategic use of 
relaxation, slow movement, play, and imagery serve a philosophical 
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purpose, to help the performer to pay attention to the present with 
greater somatic awareness. The work is expressly about empha-
sizing present experience to fully explore and investigate with the 
body-mind. This resonates with Csikszentmihalyi’s (1996) research 
on creative experience, for example, in that it specifies the impor-
tance of not having distracting thoughts, to be able to immerse 
oneself in the activity at hand. He writes, “Another typical element 
of flow is that we are aware only of what is relevant here and now…
flow is the result of intense concentration on the present” (p. 112). 
As he says, many moments of creative experience are ones without 
expectations and worry of failure.
When we are not distracted by noise of goal-oriented tasks 
and self-oriented thinking, there is a “silence” where an integrative 
or open awareness allows us to assemble information in imagina-
tive, unexpected, and non-linear ways (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; 
Goleman, 2013; Gross, 2014). To “accept invitations as your body 
presents them” (Zaporah, 1995), by letting wandering thoughts 
and feelings find expression, gives our bodies in a sense “time to 
speak.” Relaxation techniques and establishing a sense of free-
dom are specifically intended to help performers restore contact 
with feeling and an integrated consciousness, a creative “flow” 
or, as explained above, the release of the “I.” Such an experience 
cannot be forced because it entails letting loose and the easing of 
perceived external pressures. For example, our instructor Tove 
relates to our slow exercise in terms of each body needing his/her 
own space and time:
That is very interesting in relation to the concept of space 
and time, which is what we are working in this exercise — is 
how to take our space and time (claps hands together at the 
words ‘space’ and ‘time’). And that is different for every 
person. And that is different every day, and that is different 
every moment. Uhhh, so I don’t know what is your space 
and what is your time. You know. I don’t know. I just 
give you exercises, and you observe what happens… So I 
propose to you today in this class to take your space and 
time. Just do whatever you need to do. If you don’t relax, 
then don’t relax. Don’t push it because if you push it you 
will never relax. You know? Just take your space and take 
your time to do whatever your body and your mind and 
your emotions need to do. And that goes for everybody? 
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If I give you an exercise and you don’t want to do it, then 
you don’t do it. If I say go to the left and you want to go 
to the right, then go to the right. I will give you guidelines 
that you can take or not. That is also important in the work 
because it is only guidelines. And then you will find your 
own space and time. 
 In this way, the pedagogy of Butoh is not geared toward a pursuit 
of an aesthetic ideal.11 So the process does not carry the sensation 
of a rightness or wrongness in an objective sense — that there is a 
right way or a wrong way of doing, of moving. By stressing the 
performer’s own sense of responsibility and choice — to take one’s 
own sense of space and time — the work does not feel prescriptive 
in terms of a feeling for what one should or shouldn’t do. It is 
about discovering this space and time of action. For example, the 
dancers are encouraged to “just try,” to feel, and in particular to 
“make mistakes.” Sumako often repeats that is the struggle for us, 
to try to make mistakes. “It is not interesting to stay in control,” she 
says, “Don’t be afraid. Don’t try to be nice. Let go.” 
Our teachers recognize that the pursuit of “rightness” can pull 
the performer away from being present and available to the now, 
and the freedom of choice in the present. They continually reject 
our attempts to define or judge how things should look, instead 
focusing on there being a sense of the unfamiliar or discomfort, 
being in the unknown. Therefore, instead of feelings of “right” or 
“wrong,” we talk about feelings of comfort (our patterns of behav-
ior) or discomfort, which serves as a proxy for where we can extend 
ourselves. The feeling of discomfort is a welcome sign because it 
means we are touching on a feeling of possibility, specifically our 
limits and claims to identity. We necessarily introduce and activate 
the physical sensations of vulnerability or discomfort to break out 
of our own patterns and create “a palpable hint of what it would 
be like to respond differently” (Juhan, 1995, p. 375). 
11.  One of the challenges with Both practice, as with any practice, is the gradual formal-
ization of a movement vocabulary or repertoire. Because similar elements appear across 
many Butoh performances, there is a fear of stylistic clichés within the Butoh community 
(Waychoff, 2009). In order to fulfill Butoh’s initial task of remaining open and fluid, it is 
understood by many practitioners that it is up to each individual to continue his/her own 
investigation of looking for unfamiliar movement (to him/herself) and personal expressivity. 
For this reason, some practitioners, including the ones I studied with, “refer to themselves as 
butoh-influenced” to avoid a stylistic claim of Butoh (Waychoff, 2009, p. 51).
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In particular, the teachers emphasize the use of imagination 
to give performers a greater sense of empowerment and freedom 
to explore. Imagination engenders images of the possible, allowing 
the performers to disconnect from self-conscious discriminating 
thoughts about ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ or even what is ‘real.’ At the 
same time, the imagination enables us to empirically try without 
consequences from the ‘outside world.’ It opens the sensory poten-
tial of the body. “The interaction of flesh and feeling and fantasy 
enrich the moment and stimulate new movements, and sensations, 
and ideas, and embodied metaphors” (De Spain, 2014, p. 131). This 
is especially the case with respect to the sense of ‘self ’ and what 
we embody as ‘real’ about ourselves — who we think we are, how 
we think we move. 
In addition to imagery, a frame of playfulness is used to elicit 
an exploratory and curious attitude without fear of failure. Exercises 
are sometimes framed as experimental or even ‘silly’ to channel 
a greater range of unconscious behaviors (actions, movements, 
perceptions, and aspects of being), without the fear or shame that 
inhibits ‘serious’ adult behavior. The metaphor that comes up for 
unlocking a light and playful outlook from our teachers is to release 
a “childlike” part of ourselves. This “childlike” feeling in the present 
that Butoh refers to is similar to what Mead (1934/1967) calls the 
“naïve attitude of the ‘I’” (p. 206) or, as it is said in meditation, 
a state of naivety, “without knowledge and understanding, like a 
three-year-old-child” (Batchelor, 2015, p. 43). Instead of an objective 
concern for doing things in a certain way, following the creative 
nature of the child, to be free and spontaneous in play before we 
are socialized to place judgment or reflect upon our actions. This 
echoes the experimental improviser Deborah Hay, who observes 
that in her work the sensation of asking a question has a “lightness” 
(McDougall, 2014). She encourages questions or propositions 
that are unanswerable or impossible to truly comprehend, so that 
the exploration cannot be “wrong” or fixed by mental phenom-
ena but rather can be imagined conditions that have, as she says, 
“potentiality.” 
The approach of a lightness and a sense of play should not be 
conflated with the idea that the work of improvisation itself is not 
disciplined, or that it is recreational or frivolous. “Play” is a psycho-
somatic state, loosened from the kind of mental boundaries that 
the self-consciousness of ‘being taken seriously’ operates within. 
Play, then, is the mode of exploration. A mind that is free to play is 
239
a mind free to wander and imagine, free to follow the feeling and 
attitude of the body, free to shift attention to the “illogical” and 
nonsensical and sensual. In discussing the philosophical implication 
of play, Dewey (1934/2005) states:
The very existence of a work of art is evidence that there is 
no such opposition between the spontaneity of the self and 
objective order and law. In art, the playful attitude becomes 
interest in the transformation of material to serve the 
purpose of a developing experience. Desire and need can 
be fulfilled only through objective material, and therefore 
playfulness is also interest in an object. (p. 291)
Developing a Relation to One’s Own Process 
To work improvisationally we find that there has to be appreciation 
and trust for one’s corporeal perception beyond what can be said 
or articulated. This goes straight to the processes of embodying 
the feelings for working in experience. We are learning directly 
through use of our bodies. “Just as the body changes in the course 
of working with the psyche, so the psyche changes in the course of 
working with the body” (Whitehouse, 1995, p. 242).
Each dancer learns and forms responses that become the 
source of his/her particular ways ‘knowing,’ for example, “I know 
emotions because I feel them myself” (De Spain, 2014, p. 143).This 
artistic way of learning is contrary to a traditional way of learning 
through analysis, differentiation, sorting, and compartmental-
ization. Working within experience, it is important for artists to 
become familiar with their own inner experience with their pro-
cess — their structuring of thoughts, perceptive and sensorimotor 
capacities, intuition, and passions. It is an interaction between 
‘self ’ and the world, involving physical transformation, learning 
how to listen and sense within our own bodies, developing our 
own unique language and tools of movement, responses, attitudes, 
and presence. 
An improviser, like any artist, viscerally needs to ‘know’ or 
sense what their limits, patterns, weaknesses, and strengths are and 
therefore become comfortable with his/her own “process” or way 
of working. They learn to understand the “constraints and affor-
dances of a material” to use it as a medium of expression (Eisner, 
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2002a, p. 97). Barbara Dilley, a pioneer in improvisation, speaks 
of the movement artist’s trust in his/her process as, “learning to 
layer through familiarity, a repetition of improvisational practices, 
mindfulness of what it is that you are doing, establishing a comfort 
with the flow of energy in a moving body” (De Spain, 2014, p. 
49). Particularly in somatic practice, performers must continually 
train not just their physical agility and strength, but their percep-
tual capacities as well. As pointed out above, we learn to relate to 
our processes with both self-reflection and meta-awareness. In 
other words, relating to our own process goes hand in hand with 
self-awareness and learning to pay attention to our own habits and 
patterns, perceptions, interests, and preconceptions. And in this 
way, we develop trust in ourselves by having our own tools and 
approach to understanding and taking responsibility for our own 
action and effort. 
In particular, by working in experiential ways that embrace 
acting moment to moment, the improviser learns to emotionally, 
intuitively, and imaginatively navigate through unfolding situa-
tions. It is an activity of adapting ourselves. There is a physical 
emphasis on the uncomfortable feelings that arise and are unfore-
seen by constantly putting the body off its guard. This serves the 
task of creativity and changing perception rather determining our 
conduct in the present by trying to anticipate or fixing techniques 
of execution. Charlotte Selver (1995) of Sensory Awareness speaks 
of how a discipline of bodywork provides the occasion to discover 
that one can trust oneself: 
This is the practice. While people are attending to the given 
task, the attitudes which they bring with them clearly show. 
At first, only other people see it, but by and by, people feel 
it themselves, and they discover how they acquired these 
attitudes…It takes patience and time to discover what the 
gesture says…They discover it in themselves. (p. 21)
This means we develop trust in our perceptive and intuitive abili-
ties without always being able to conceptually grasp the situation. 
We have to trust that we can do the work in our own way, but it 
is also about being able to open ourselves to a relational process 
that is not determined, fixed, prescribed, safe, or controlled. This 
especially requires an attitude of acceptance of the fact that human 
error, inaccuracies, needs, drives, insecurities, and surprises are 
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part of this process. A level of acceptance for things as they come 
is what allows the artist to become comfortable with an inevitable 
sense of uncertainty and ambiguity to reamin with the effort in 
the present, without worrying too much how things will end up. 
In a similar vein, those in movement practice, like Ida Rolf (1995), 
generally learn “the feeling that it’s all right to be insecure” ( p. 178). 
By calling attention to the body, the discipline teaches accepting 
and trusting this feeling. Ida Rolf describes her teaching as a way 
to live with practices that are completely insecure, saying that it 
is, “to get secure in an art in which there is no security. Your only 
security comes from relationships” (p. 177).
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Staying with the Problem 
When an individual’s own action is the locus of exploration, the 
endurance and self-discipline needed to follow and stay ‘true’ to 
the exploration, as in the bisoku exercise, becomes acute. Of course 
there is a level of physical skill and technique required to maintain 
the same level of intensity over the course of the twenty minutes. 
There is a lot of information to deal with suddenly when you get 
your knees into a bent position. There are questions about how to 
get your body from one position to another and physically con-
trol it and, at the same time, not deliberately force or guide it. It 
requires a kind of craftsmanship, to use a design word, to execute 
in an even manner. But in addition to the physical strain, there is 
a level of concentration and dexterity required to “stay with the 
problem,” as Anita describes it. There is the pure muscularity and 
effort to stay concentrated, engaged, and to “not hop over.” We 
cannot drown in thoughts of pain, but we have to keep showing 
empathy in the situation and receiving perceptual information to 
continually touch “how it is to be there as a human being.” 
After an exercise of melting slowly to the floor, Anita stresses 
that last ten millimeters are the most important saying that, “This 
is where the problem lies.” How do we keep going down the same 
way and not “lose it?” The movement must stay specific and be-
lievable “down to last millimeter,” she says. To do this, our level of 
energy has to remain the same until the end and not just fall apart 
when we reach the ground, as she says, we should not just become 
a “dead body on the floor.” So when I’m there squatting with my 
legs quaking, my muscles aching, and the only thing I hear from 
my body is to “stop.” Then my legs jerk. This is a slip-up to me. It 
is bad craftsmanship in the sense that it disrupts the feeling of the 
form, the form being the illusion of a slow measured melt to the 
ground. And then there is the fact that I am going slowly, which 
only elongates the mental agony of seeing my process in action. I 
do not exactly have enough time to plan ahead, but I also cannot 
quickly move on and forget about what I have already done. I am 
here with it...giving into to the conditions of actual experience, the 
gravity, the pain in my legs, my lack of strength, and my desire to 
cheat. I am observing it while doing it, simply having to accept it 
for what it is.
It is a living thing. 
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So figuring out how to “stay with the problem” and trusting in 
ourselves, our own way with our own abilities, is how we become 
“good explorers,” according to Anita. We develop an improvisa-
tional skill of interweaving phases of sensing, opening awareness, 
and responding. For example, to “stay” has a physical and emo-
tional dimension, which pushes me to not give up when it is tough, 
or when there are unanticipated consequences. It entails that I 
‘keep with’ my process — however it is going — noticing the flaws, 
habits, preconceptions, and so on to open up. Given this uncertain 
path, I have to also keep responding in action, literally adjusting 
movements and directions and changing paths with respect to my 
intention. The physical reality of the situation is simultaneously 
being enacted and (re)evaluated. Therefore, trying to stay present 
and open also practically teaches me where I need train to become 
physically stronger and technically precise with my body to be able 
to hold the position. In short, I have to develop “tools,” as our 
teachers say, meaning our embodied “tools” of sensitivity, aware-
ness, and physical expression (Zaporah, 1995, p. 17). Therefore, 
the “tools” to do the work are not just a mechanical routine, but 
working with craftsmanship, artistry. Each and every time is an 
improvisation, a new lesson.
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Practicing an Attitude of ‘Letting’
The training of a personal awareness for our physical and emotional 
process is framed from a non-reactive or observational stance. This 
attitude or meditative ethos with regard to the practice of Butoh is 
expressed by our teachers as “letting things come.” “Letting things 
come” connects back to the willingness to be moved and a sense of 
plasticity in an empathic and nonjudgmental attitude.
 “Letting things come” is about allowing the moving sensa-
tion of events and rhythms, without stabilizing our knowing or 
getting clear on what is happening (Tarthang, 1994, p. xxxi). This 
quality of being open and present to change and impermanence is 
often mixed with doubt and what Buddhists call “suffering,” since 
it accepts larger existential questions and ceaseless transformation. 
For example, Buddhists teach that, “Form is emptiness and emp-
tiness is form” (Batchelor, 2015, p. 55). This kind of quixotic state-
ment represents the meditative attitude of ambiguity and doubt 
that is inherent in the continuous questioning and cultivation of 
‘self ’ within experience. There is a creative, human characteristic of 
continually needing to and wanting to reexamine and question how 
it is to relate to the outside world. From the Buddhist perspective: 
…the more we grasp emptiness, the more we feel real — that 
the core, the incommunicado element, is really a place of 
fear at our own insubstantiality. This is why we defend it 
so fiercely, why we do not want to be discovered, and why 
we feel so vulnerable as we approach our most personal and 
private feelings of ourselves. (Epstein, 1995, p. 38)
Therefore, instead of following a tendency to move toward pre-
scriptive views of how things should or should not be, there is a 
relaxation, there is an acknowledgement of doubt and uncertainty. 
“Instead of clinging, it lets go. Instead of insisting that things 
exist in a certain way, it accepts their mysteriousness. Such un-
knowing loosens our hold on the immutability of the familiar” 
(Batchelor, 2015, p. 43). 
Butoh, like meditation practice, uses adjectives like “gentle” 
and “kind” to describe the quality of an attitude that does not 
use force. For example, they use language like, “gently allow the 
environment to come to you.” The tenor of this approach is dis-
tinctly unguarded and open since there is seen to be a need for 
humility, compassion, generosity, trust, tolerance, and acceptance 
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to promote connection to others and one’s surroundings. For 
Dewey (1934/2005), “Craftsmanship to be artistic in the final sense 
must be ‘loving’; it must care deeply for the subject matter upon 
which skill is exercised” (p. 49). This involves empathetic feelings 
for human qualities such as kindness, tenderness, nurture, care, 
intimacy, warmth, and affection. 
The idea behind “letting things come” stems from the view 
that the creative character of reality is in the fact that it is imper-
manent and changing. In Buddhist teaching, creativity is already 
there for us, happening all the time. It requires, on our part, more 
of an attitude or behavior of letting it happen, rather than blocking 
it. Letting ourselves be open to what comes in the “unknowing 
present” allows us to be part of the ceaseless mutation and ultimate 
freedom in each passing moment. In Butoh practice, we often 
work to simplify our actions in order to notice this. Our teachers 
remind us, “don’t try to be creative” or to add more action, but to 
have more attention. Slow down. 
In my experience, the attitude of “letting things come” in 
improvisation work brings up a palpable feeling of exposure and 
fear. That the work happens in a moment-to-moment irreversibil-
ity before I have too much time to edit and self-correct makes me 
feel uneasy, uncomfortable…unprotected! I don’t have my filters. 
To work without judgment I have to work on surrendering to 
the moment, which means letting people metaphorically see me 
naked. Really letting them see my underbelly, my process — how 
I am thinking, struggling, feeling insecure, and making mistakes. 
Instead, I have to learn to accept or witness the imperfections and 
unfiltered moments I immediately wish I could go back and edit. 
I have to develop a kind of plasticity in my sense of ‘self,’ an ability 
to yield a sense of ownership and have tolerance and forgiveness 
for my own imperfections and mistakes. 
As a self-involving process, “letting things come” resonates 
with the Pragmatist concept of “fallibilism” in inquiry, which comes 
from Peirce’s view that uncertainty is a given and that mistakes are 
going to be a part of any empirical, experimental, human process. 
It requires also having empathetic feelings toward oneself and one’s 
own process, a process that is not mechanical. I have to let myself 
be caring to myself, to not be judgmental or too hard on myself, 
and to give myself time. I have to let myself be both flawed and 
lovable. By the same token, my process can become a more authen-
tic medium, having a human expression of coping in the world. 
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Ruth Zaporah (1995) uses the term “relaxed awareness” (p. 
41), while another improviser, Steve Paxton, states, “What I try to 
do is to not intend and to find out” (De Spain, 2014, p. 70). And 
the improviser Deborah Hay describes this as a quality of exploring, 
but not “trying to reach out for anything” saying that:
The experiment is “here” (she gestures in the space 
immediately in front of her), and my work as a performer 
and as a dancer and as a choreographer is noticing what’s 
happening here and here and here and here (as she repeats 
the word, her focus reengages again and again in front of 
her). (De Spain, 2014, p. 38)
In Buddhist texts, this quality is expressed as, “Waiting; but never 
expecting. For expectation involves conceiving of something…As 
soon as we conceive of what we are waiting for and make it into a 
thing, we are no longer waiting” (Batchelor, 2015, p. 61). Instead of 
trying to make things happen, we express empathy by making “the 
space for what we want to come to us” with the acceptance of “still 
getting what we do not want” (Batchelor, 1997, p. 23). In experience 
there will always be the things we do not want — sickness, sorrow, 
pain, grief, despair — the feelings we shy away from. The empathy 
“to let” negative perceptions come allows a fuller aesthetic range 
of experience. Again Dewey (1934/2005) writes:
There is about such occasions something of the quality 
of the wind that bloweth where it listeth. Sometimes it 
comes and sometimes it does not, even in the presence of 
the same object. It cannot be forced, and when it does not 
arrive, it is not wise to seek to recover by direct action the 
first fine rapture. (p. 151)
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Accepting Feelings That Are Knowable but Not 
Nameable
The emphasis of Butoh practice is on an integrative experience 
where the value and meaning of such an experience does not lie 
outside the experience itself. We answer questions in experience 
by letting the integration of imagination, emotion, thought, and 
feeling be the source of our discoveries and conceptualizations. 
Therefore, the meaning of what we do is not found in generalized 
abstractions and treated as an object to itself. With respect to explo-
ration and inquiry, this work is a form of artistic inquiry that does 
not make claims on objective experience in that way — there can 
be no objective reality to get. We simply are in a ‘reality,’ actively 
organizing that reality, moving, gathering, sorting, communicating, 
and modifying sense data. It is only through our internal sense of 
things that we have contact with ‘reality,’ which exposes a kind of 
experiential inquiry that a person cannot approach with certainty. 
This is because being open to discovering experience happening 
in the present is not intended toward an object of thought with 
subject-object or means-end preconditions. It is not premeditated 
in that sense. The authority for what we ‘know’ from experience is 
found in the localized and specific, the here and now that makes 
a direct difference. As the exercises show, to ‘know’ the sensation 
of trust or kindness, it entails an active aestheticizing function of 
consciousness, the perceptive “forming” of it.
Therefore, this artistic practice is an ongoing process of dis-
covering and identifying meaning. Direct experience is incapable 
of being reduced to a problem that can be referred to objectively, 
since you can never extricate feelings of ‘self ’ from the experience. 
As an artist, you move consciously in and out of what the actual 
experience of the “problem” is. Therefore, you will not have the 
same feeling of certainty, stability or even finality in an answer. It 
will always change. 
Instead, we learn to expand our ideas about our tools (our 
body-mind) and our craft (movement). It is an ongoing process 
of making microdiscoveries about our attention, what we observe, 
what motivates and moves us, why we react the way we do. Its 
method involves deepening the intimacy within the here and now 
by getting in touch with the sensation of feeling. By observing the 
way we internally mediate our movements, we can become more 
disciplined and precise in the physical work and closer to an inte-
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grated body-mind, unbroken flow, or a “unity of consciousness” 
(James, 1890/1950a). 
It is clear in Butoh, for example, that we develop a bodily 
awareness or sensitivity to form by magnifying the feeling of move-
ment experience. “As science takes qualitative space and time and 
reduces them to relations that enter into equations, so art makes 
them abound in their own sense as significant values of the very 
substance of all things” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 215). To develop 
this awareness, we must give time and space, as we are taught 
by our Butoh teachers, for these kinds minuscule, illusive, often 
nameless reflexes and sensations to be magnified and felt in our 
own practice. One day during a discussion after an exercise where 
we moved our hand very slowly, one of the Butoh teachers said 
about our observations: 
We don’t normally…many people…outside in the society 
and in our everyday life, we don’t connect with the inside 
of our body physically. We do connect with emotions and 
things because that is so fast (snaps fingers). The body 
has many reactions that we never get to know because 
we’re not present. So, so many things are happening in 
the hand in one day that we don’t — we have no idea what 
happens. And when you feel this (motions, tck, tck, tck, 
tck) mechanical thing in the hands, its actually the joints, 
that you’re giving them kind of attention because you’re 
moving so slowly, opening space, and you’re giving them 
space, and you’re giving them presence, and they’re not 
used to… (laughs) the body is not used to being seen, or 
felt, or heard, no? 
249
The value of many of the exercises is in having this silent kind of 
“behavioral inquiry” (Dewey, 1949/1989). Practically, the perspec-
tive of Buddhist meditation in Butoh asks the individual to stay 
with this kind of open-ended awareness as long as possible, what is 
seen as a kind of state of forming or pre-reflection. The application 
of this awareness is rendered as follows: 
we note qualities, characteristics, and interactions  
without assigning them back to objects that possess  
them. For example, we might identify a red color,  
a specific shape and texture, and a pleasing fragrance 
without making the normal connection to the name  
‘rose.’ At a more subtle level, we could even allow this 
naming tendency to operate, without accepting its 
conclusion as final. (Tarthang, 1994, p. 21)
Dewey’s perspective is remarkably similar to this view, which con-
siders part of artistic process to be about letting go of the charac-
teristic of our thinking that seeks premature closure or imposing 
coherence and definitions upon experience. To the Buddhist it is 
about accepting the unsayable: 
We can know what it means when someone is happy,  
even though there is no language to communicate this 
feeling and no logic to define it. We can sense such 
happiness and experience it in our own bodies and  
minds. (Tarthang, 1994, p. 35)
The point here, then, is that the Butoh exercises, being a physical 
exploration, take on Dewey’s (1949) transactional form of inquiry, 
which recognizes and preserves the seamless integration and con-
tinuity of method, expression, and process. Our relations are inde-
terminate between consciousness and action. Like in any arts-based 
practice, we are learning to qualitatively organize what is directly 
experienced. In these exercises we circumvent the abstractness of 
naming to ‘know’ by way of felt, emotional, empathic dimensions 
of behavior. Questions of naming, what is being felt, which part is 
which, who is doing what, are not necessarily unanswerable, but 
also not so important in terms of our learning from the aesthetic 
dimension of experience. What is important to the performer is 
the direct perception-expression of particular qualities. 
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The artistic view holds a qualitative difference between an 
observable action and a transactional experience, which includes 
an internal ‘feel’ for the emotional responses and volitional actions 
of ourselves and others. Dewey (1949/1989) defines transactional 
inquiry as:
inquiry of a type in which existing descriptions of events 
are accepted only as tentative and preliminary, so that new 
descriptions of the aspects and phases of events, whether in 
widened or narrowed form, may freely be made at any and 
all stages of the inquiry. (p. 113)
This occurs in the flux of sensorial experience and amid linguistic 
categorization. We feel the connections, the contours of experience, 
rhythms, or Dewey’s (1934) “organizations of energies” directly 
and viscerally, communicating independent of the organization 
of symbolic and linguistic systems. 
Being embodied, humans are involved in an ambiguous logic 
of both-and, an ever-present process of sensing and learning, meet-
ing a stimulus and corresponding with it, “There is an adaptation 
of the stimulus and response to each other” (Dewey as cited in 
(Miller, 1963, p. 15). The transactional treatment of behavior con-
notes a bidirectional relationship between cause and effect, each 
affecting the other. It does not have the same feeling of causal 
logic, but aesthetically is comprised of a sensation of mutuality or 
reciprocity, a feeling Dewey calls “organic.” In short, a transaction 
is an adaptive behavior that expresses a relationship between the 
organism and the environment. 
For example, even with a relationship that is seemingly 
straightforward like giving and receiving, the concentrated and 
intimate sensing of the manipulation exercise exposes a profound 
uncertainty in terms of “naming” the roles of the partnership, par-
ticularly when both partners are open and responsive. In a kind of 
reciprocal causality, action has the sensation of being open-ended 
in that both partner’s actions internally and externally contribute to 
the experience. Moshe Feldenkrais (1995), developer of self-aware-
ness through movement, describes this feeling of reciprocal cau-
sality in the relationship in the following way:
Through touch, two persons, the toucher and the touched, 
can become a new ensemble; two bodies when connected 
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by two arms and hands are a new entity. These hands sense 
at the same time as they direct. Both the touched and the 
toucher feel what the sense through connecting hands, 
even if they do not understand and do not know what is 
being done. The touched person becomes aware of what 
the touching persons feels and, without understanding, 
alters his configuration to conform to what he senses is 
wanted from him. (p. 139)
Both sensations of moving and being moved are in the embodied 
experience of both roles of the exercise, as the giver and the receiver. 
I cannot actually refer to a particular procedure of giving > receiving 
with the action expressed as a cause-effect. Being embodied minds 
is not an “either-or affair.” The feeling is that both roles are always 
intentional and willful and both are a mix of giving and receiving. 
I have to ask what is happening in this relationship — which part 
is actually active or passive? Is it not also that I experience giving 
<> receiving, a reciprocity? There is an integral dynamic between 
intention and action and release and control at a micro level, where 
to exert will or force and where “let things come.” 
This degree of intimacy illustrates that this relationship is 
an energetic flow and rhythm, given the kind of aesthetic sense of 
volition and effort (force of will) involved with the way we actively 
interpret and engage with the world around us. Ida Rolf (1995) 
identifies with this in a statement about how, when working with 
the body there is never one cause, it is not one way or another, 
but that there are circular processes of reality that, “do not act in 
body but are the body. The body process is not linear, it is circu-
lar; always it is circular” (p. 174). Moving and sensing moment to 
moment does not prioritize divisions, but through the continuity 
of perception and action coming from the sorts of emotions, im-
pulses, and intuitions we experience, we subconsciously feel and 
read into our contact with others.
With respect to the transactional view, this pre-linguistic 
participation in direct experience has no absolute attribution of 
“knowledge” in an objective sense. It is understood that a trans-
actional relationship between organism and the environment is in 
flux, ambiguous, and never fully “knowable.” Dewey (1949/1989) 
distinguishes, rather, the linguistic aspect of human behavior, what 
he refers to as “naming.” Here he describes “naming” as a phase in 
the transactional process:
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the procedure which observes men talking and writing, 
with their word-behaviors and other representational 
activities connected with their thing-perceivings and ma-
nipulations, and which permits a full treatment, descriptive 
and functional. Of the whole process, inclusive of all its 
“contents,” whether called “inners” or “outers,” in whatever 
way the advancing techniques of inquiry require. (p. 114)
Our linguistic behavior of naming allows us to make things, qual-
ities, and actions available in functional terms. So “knowledge” 
as “naming,” serves a practical purpose because distinctions aid 
our specific intentions of action at different moments. But every-
thing that is named, even that which is distinguished as “inner” 
thoughts or “outer” objects, is open to redetermination and renam-
ing depending on the circumstances (Dewey, 1949/1989). We are 
in motion. What we internalize in direct experience is its ultimate 
ambiguity, that it is simultaneously knowable and unknowable 
(Batchelor, 1997; Tarthang, 1994). 
A larger point to be made with using sensation and feeling to 
form qualities of relations in experience, as with art-based practice, 
means there is no radical separation between inquiry and learning. 
Dewey suggests that transactional behavior is the intrinsic organi-
zation of social life and all of our learning behavior. He describes 
how in all of our ordinary everyday behaviors, if we examine them 
closely in a transactional way, we would find that our social rela-
tionships are all characterized by the embodied relation of moving 
and being moved. This is an idea that recurs throughout Dewey’s 
(1938) writings. For instance, in Experience an Education, he dis-
cusses the learning process in terms as a “co-operative enterprise,” 
rather than a one-directional kind of dictation. In this enterprise, 
he writes, “The development occurs through reciprocal give-and-
take, the teacher taking but not being afraid also to give. The es-
sential point is that the purpose grows and takes shape through 
the process…” (Dewey, 1938/1997, p. 72). He sees living behavioral 
processes as being adaptive or responsive, a “progressive organiza-
tion of subject-matter,” where further experience is never absolute 
but based on contingencies and correspondence between subject 
(percept) and matter (object). Dewey, then, emphasizes that this 
learning behavior, particularly with respect to the aesthetic dimen-
sion, is an issue of the present. The materials we have are immediate. 
Formulations of ideas that are future-oriented, their arrangement 
and conditions, are actually situated in present experience.
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6
Discussion of the Embodied  
Experience of Form-Giving
The question I have confronted in this research concerns what 
kinds of experience and qualities of relations I as a designer seek 
in a creative approach to design. I have taken from my background 
in architecture, and with support from design literature, the idea 
of an attitude of openness to experience, and that there must be 
a concrete way to experience a quality of openness and perhaps 
to become the architect of my own experience. That is, to shape 
my relations in a way to allow for a perceptual openness means 
encountering a visceral sensation of uncertainty when working 
outside my comfort zone or taking risks. 
To do this I have drawn on an artistic method of movement 
improvisation, one, to feel a physical sensation of openness from 
an explicitly aesthetic, embodied approach to experience; and 
two, to train myself and learn how movement practitioners have a 
methodology and vocabulary to communicate and describe their 
bodily sensations and conditions for working with relations in 
the moment. My reasoning for using Butoh is that it presents 
a practical context of rigor and concentration with an aesthetic 
mode of internal awareness. It practitioners have developed spe-
cific techniques, the result of years of experimentation, for relax-
ing and creating a rapport with the body and with feelings and 
emotions — “listening” with the body, which is deliberately more 
receptive than “looking.” These techniques are precise in their in-
structions to pay attention to the present and try not to become 
distracted by self-identifying thoughts, expectations, fears, inse-
curities, and so on. They present a practical approach to training 
an ability to be fully present to sensory experience and, in turn, 
have a greater potential for a quality of integrated experience or a 
creative experience of flow. 
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Summary of Lessons for an Aesthetic  
Approach to Experience
In my analysis of Butoh movement inquiry in the previous chapter, 
with the help of pragmatism and embodied cognition, I showed 
how and what an aesthetic approach to experience actually en-
tails psychologically and physically. I identified nine broad lessons 
with special regard to the integrative experience of an activity of 
form-giving. These lessons are a combination of attitudinal dispo-
sitions, which include how the work is approached philosophically, 
along with methodological practices. They are experience-based 
lessons that deal with somatic sensation as much as with cognitive 
abilities or methods. In that sense, they encompass an artistic way 
of learning and approaching the world, so they apply to design as 
much as to other art disciplines. They also pertain to the relation-
ship between experience in the arts and a basic design attitude of 
openness and creativity. 
In the following section, I summarize these nine lessons in 
order to clarify what an embodied experience of form-giving actu-
ally teaches us with particular respect to a quality of openness. The 
capacity for a disposition of openness is what makes practices of 
art and design valuable in many contexts of inquiry. As presented 
above, ‘openness to experience’ has been highlighted as a key char-
acteristic of creativity (McCrae, 1987), as well as of a design attitude 
mentality championed by design professionals (Boland & Collopy, 
2004). This attitude is common to artistic fields of education and a 
conception of artistically rooted forms of practice (Eisner, 2002a). 
It has much to do with an artist’s overall ability to trust and enhance 
his/her own capacity to explore in their experience. This ability 
can be seen more generally as a characteristic of creative practice 
that has been addressed as self-direction (Edström, 2008; Williams, 
2000). Self-direction can be seen as an embodied learning process 
in which learners are independent and taking responsibility for 
managing, initiating, and evaluating their own learning. Again, this 
begins from an anti-essentialist view of ‘self ’ that acknowledges a 
volitional, subjective capacity that comes from within the individual 
to apply personal (physical-mental) control and direction over one’s 
bodily and perceptive activities. 
Because many of these lessons relate very closely to the find-
ings of arts-based education (Eisner, 2002a; Hetland et al., 2007), 
and in particular self-direction (Edström, 2008), they build on 
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the work of those investigations. They support a return to direct 
experience and a feeling of art in the Deweyan view, which as a 
way of learning is foundational to a Pragmatist forms of artistic 
inquiry, discussed in earlier chapters. 
Awareness of ‘Stream of Thought’ in the Present
From the Butoh exercises that work from direct experience, I show 
how the performers pay close attention to what is happening from 
one moment to the next as physical sensations. In the post-exercise 
discussions, we talk about the kinds of sensory information received 
from the environment and from one another, along with our inner 
personal thoughts, feelings, and responses to this information. For 
instance, the performers discuss how they feel and the kinds of 
sensations and impressions that come up during an improvisation, 
which indicates how they are actively relating to this information. 
In short, we develop a skill of conscious attention to the internal 
sensations and feelings of inner-outer connections, which I refer 
to as a pre-reflective awareness. 
Artistically, awareness in the present helps us learn to per-
ceptually sense a continuity or wholeness of experience. Becoming 
very concrete about the kind of structuring, or stream, or ‘feel’ of 
our thought as it comes helps us put emphasis on the qualities and 
feeling of our experience. Likewise, because we maintain perceptual 
continuity between thinking-feeling, we learn an artistic lesson con-
cerning how to take form and content together — the how and the 
what. This integration of form and content connect to the ability 
of the artist or designer to have a kind of feelingful relation to the 
world and to “frame” experience and meaning in terms of aesthetic 
qualities and relations, not merely in terms of symbolic frames. 
Lastly, it is with the concentration in the moment, being 
focused in a new way, that we really are able truly to perceive our 
experiences since our habitual discriminations and ways of moving 
and doing blur and deform. In this case, awareness is really the 
direct starting point for opening up one’s perception, which is 
considered a core creative skill. 
'Self'-Awareness of Habits and Patterns 
In Butoh we use the strategy of discussion to help detail our aware-
ness by reflecting on our perceptions during the exercises. Within 
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those discussions, we are encouraged to explore the intricacies of 
our experiences and what they reveal about ourselves. For example, 
we carefully observe the kinds of environmental circumstances and 
relations in which particular sensations, inhibitions, defenses, reac-
tions, inclinations arise in our movement. This helps us continually 
recognize where we acting in familiar ways and the patterns that 
dictate our performance. I refer to this as a lesson of self-awareness 
that comes about through reflection and learning to notice our 
perception of ‘self,’ which is grounded in embodied habits and 
patterns of behavior. Seeing oneself in terms of habits (Dewey, 
1922/2002) helps us to not only experience our own individuality 
in our work (our own process), but also helps us to experience 
change in our selves. That is because noticing our habits also reveals 
our unconscious inhibitions, preconceptions, and limitations in 
thought. In Butoh I show, for example, that we work on literally 
sensing discomfort in order to learn to stretch and push ourselves 
to go past habitual ways of doing that feel familiar.
Self-awareness, therefore, is an important artistic lesson to 
learn in order to develop work to be more self-directed in terms of 
being able to reconceive habits, projects, and selves — to continually 
learn. It is already well argued that becoming self-aware of our 
tendencies in action and thought allows us to become reflective of 
practice (Schön, 1983). But, beyond this, self-awareness is said to be 
foundational to social relationships and “emotional intelligence” 
or empathy (Goleman, 2013; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Obviously 
self-awareness must be applied in any kind of practice or work 
environment, where individuals want to find meaning. By looking 
inside ourselves, we are better able to manage our emotional world 
and our relationships in order to make and do things that have 
the kinds of meaning and value with which we want to identify. 
Awareness lets us focus on what has meaning, on what matters.
Concretization of Qualities Through Feeling and Effort
As I showed in the exercises, when we physically investigate con-
cepts like “mutuality,” we have to revisit and re-question the expe-
rience of that concept through ‘felt’ sensations. As in our investi-
gation of mutuality in a partnership, we must physically learn to 
‘read’ each other by applying force and responding. In this way, 
the sense of mutuality and its meaning are constructed in the par-
ticularity of our partnership and through the concreteness of that 
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physical feeling and effort. Artistically, it is important for us to 
learn to sense how our intention is directed by our physical effort, 
for instance, how much pressure to apply to one another’s body 
so that neither or us feel like the other one is leading, but that we 
are equally guiding. Communicating viscerally and palpably this 
way, like a dance, requires us to move away from thinking about 
representing mutuality in images or symbolic forms. 
Therefore, it can be seen how we train in an artistic craft to 
precisely grasp and convey meaning through the qualitative feel of 
material. Notably, this involves a sensory and somatic perception 
that goes beyond simply visualizing, but includes direct expres-
sion through the physical and energetic qualities of experience. It 
is therefore both a technical skill and a sensitivity to be concrete 
with our feelings, as our Butoh teachers stress, for us to learn to 
feel rather than merely to contemplate.
Willingness to be Moved or Affected 
The detail of the exercise of giving and receiving with a partner 
is a reciprocal encounter in which we somatically have to open 
ourselves up to our partner. When we emphasize the bodily feel-
ing of that experience, there is not only the physical sensation of 
our body being moved by our partner, but there is the internal 
affect. The physical feeling of letting our partners support us carries 
with it, to some degree, a sensation of loss of self-possession or 
self-control. Therefore, to be moved requires that we consciously 
work on emotionally opening ourselves up to a tangible feeling 
of vulnerability and giving up our need to control. This requires 
us to expand our capacity to “surrender” to the present and let the 
external world affect us (Dewey, 1934/2005), which commonly in 
training is expressed as “letting go” in order to emotionally connect 
or to be able “to meet the others halfway.” 
In this way, letting oneself be affected, the artist discovers 
the breadth and depth of what he/she is actually capable of expe-
riencing (Eisner, 2002a). 
In the detail of the partnership can be seen how this receptive 
ability, which I refer to as “plasticity,” takes voluntary effort and 
exercise by the individual. I emphasize this as a willingness to be 
moved because, to some degree, it is about consciously choosing 
to trust in the situation and in the other. Therefore, a willingness 
to be moved also enhances a capacity to show empathy and trust. 
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Thus, we can see how the capacity to surrender control and 
to voluntarily act in uncertainty and to ‘put oneself out there,’ so 
to speak, is directly related to the creative attitude of risk-taking 
and a tolerance for ambiguity. Plasticity is obviously also important 
to a creative practice that requires actively adjusting and adapting. 
Exercising the ability to keep oneself movable clearly helps the artist 
work against routinization and, in this way, the artist must exercise 
the ability to continually reorganize his/her habits and patterns.
Expressive Form-Giving Through Emotions
Butoh employs an expressive technique in which the performer 
learns to embody an emotion in order to effectively express the 
emotion. I describe this empathetic technique as “filling in,” like in 
the example where we concretely investigated the emotion of “kind-
ness” by testing and perceiving how it is to move without tension. 
This technique specifically starts from inside the artist and with the 
sensation of energy through the body, in contrast to mimicking or 
representing the outward expression of an emotion like kindness. The 
specificity of this embodiment technique requires a meta-awareness 
placing attention on an emotion as an energized thought pattern, so 
it is not identified with part of one’s personal history. 
The example from Butoh specifically highlights how the art-
ist’s use of emotion in an embodied sense is not just emotive, 
sentimental, fuzzy or intangible, but involves precise attention, 
insight, and control over visceral activities within the body. In an 
artistic sense, by training a sensitivity and intimacy to differenti-
ating emotional responses, we train a capacity to better manage 
our body as a physical and emotional tool. We become skilled and 
disciplined with the body as a material, through which we convey, 
and essentially give form to, emotional content. And given our use 
of emotions as an artistic medium, the precision in this technique 
is not about making bodily “knowledge” explicit or functionalizing 
it, but in making emotional sensations and responses available as 
an expressive form in experience. 
This ability to form and understand experience through em-
pathetic uses of emotion is clearly in line with an empathetic or 
human-centered approach taken by many artists and designers. 
Working from experience, the artist draws on the emotional con-
sequences of physical action. Therefore, the route taken to fully 
embody or express meaning is inherently an empathetic one. 
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Attending to Details with Sensation and Imagery
I have discussed how in Butoh we work to concretize qualities of 
relations through feeling. One way that we practice attending to 
the detail of the ‘feel’ of the movement is by generating specific 
images from our imaginations. For instance, we are given instruc-
tions to explore the quality of fluidity, how it moves through space, 
the dynamics and changes in the motion, how it travels through 
your different body parts, and so on. Thus, the improvisations 
that operate with imagery are a way to practice internalizing an 
imaginative experience. Because the feeling is always the tangible 
point of departure for the work, meaning the tactile, sensorimo-
tor perception, we are never fully abstract or “immaterial” in our 
thinking. The Butoh teachers actually stress that we keep the work 
tangible down to the last detail.
These imaginative explorations help us exercise the use of 
imagination as a source of content, which is an important feature 
in artistic work (Eisner, 2002a). The practice of imagination helps 
to support an exploratory nature, allowing artists to go beyond 
what they would normally do and literally break from a practical 
acceptance and existing habits in the world ‘as it is’ to discover 
new ways of moving, new impressions, and new interpretations of 
‘reality.’ Possibilities are generated not merely by mental imagery, 
but are also suggested through fully embodied attention to details 
and participation in the surroundings. Because the performers fully 
immerse themselves in the materiality of imagery, the experience 
carries an energetic weight and a character of absorption or feeling 
of transcendence (Dewey, 1934/2005; James, 1902/2012). Taking 
pleasure in the sheer exploration of the sensory potential of the 
body embellishes the present and helps it achieve aesthetic meaning 
and fulfillment in terms of the intrinsic quality of the experience. 
Merging Action and Awareness to Stay in the Present
Through the previous lessons we see how important it is to learn 
personal awareness in order to remain present in action and what 
is at hand. In Butoh, for instance, in the slow exercise, the work 
is framed to place emphasis on the experience of movement and 
slowed perception. Heightening attention to the detail and qual-
ities in the present is how we connect directly to the ‘felt’ content 
of what we are doing, beyond just the form of what we are doing. 
This is important to artistic work because in creative “flow,” the 
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present is where there is a possibility of actually detaching from 
‘reality’ and encountering the world with curiosity, wonder, care, 
struggle, and passion. The present is where the practitioner feels 
freedom to explore in unconstrained ways and to disappear into 
his/her imagination. This ability to merge action and awareness 
also means that we have to be free from worries and distractions, 
and the judgments of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ that pull us away from 
what we are doing.
In this way, the ‘now’ provides and a space of discovery, en-
joyment, pain, and fascination. Butoh methodologically provides 
strategies for this experience, for example, with the use of tech-
niques for relaxation, imagery, and play that are practically aimed 
at helping to generate a light or playful context. For example, the 
exercises are often framed with instructions to “just investigate,” “to 
make mistakes” or to “have a nice experience,” which place emphasis 
on the experience in and of itself. This promotes risk-taking, going 
outside our comfort zones, making mistakes, ‘lightening up,’ and 
in a sense to not take ourselves so seriously. Metaphorically, we 
have to learn to ‘let our guard down’ with regards to the need for 
self-preservation.
Emphasizing the present helps us learn to appreciate and trust 
the use of the body as part of the process to explore, develop and 
embody our work. Therefore, as a self-directed form of practice, 
space, and time are individualized to each person’s way of working 
through thoughts and feelings. This means that we each literally 
move at our own pace in terms of physical and sensory learning. 
In other words, we need the time and space to make material sense 
of our intentions, to make mistakes, to consider alternatives, to 
make adjustments, and to apply judgment in experience rather 
than before it (Schön, 1983).
Developing a Relation to One’s Own Process
In the slow exercise of Butoh, I show how in its intimacy I must 
practice a kind of “craftsmanship” to maintain the pace and inten-
sity of the slow movement (the form-giving) with my body (ma-
terial). I actually learn the material craft with my body, my physical 
and emotional limits and potentials, in relation to my ability to give 
a quality or form or expression of slow movement. For example, 
in order to precisely express what I want to do, I have to develop 
technical and physical skills, strength, control, and dexterity with 
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my body, but I also have to continue to refine a sensibility to my 
ways of behaving, feeling, perceiving, and acting. 
Therefore, since the outcome of the work is ultimately is un-
certain, I demonstrate how I have to gain a detailed and conscious 
relation to my practice, in order to make the work self-determined. 
It requires listening and adapting. Noticing possibilities within 
situations is critical to any practice-based craft (Schön, 1983.) Thus, 
it is necessary to develop a relation to “my process” as it is expressed 
in artistic practice, which is how any artist essentially becomes 
self-directed in their work. Although knowing his/her own “tools” 
and approach to the work implies a greater range of self-direction 
and autonomy, it also implies a need for self-discipline. An artist 
continually develops and refines his/her practice by being able to 
sense what he/she needs to improve, to know what and how much 
work to put in, and to ultimately persist (Hetland et al., 2007). 
This empathetic outlook on one’s practice is described in Butoh 
is “letting it come,” which suggests an important attitude in ap-
proaching a living process that cannot be forced or made rigid. In 
many ways, this has to do with learning to be comfortable with a 
sensation of genuine uncertainty and to embrace social qualities 
such as tolerance, nurturance, compassion, and care in the way of 
animate relations that require a degree of intimacy, inner mobility, 
and pliancy. 
Accepting Feelings That Are Knowable but Not Namable
The detail of the somatic work in Butoh demonstrates, particularly 
with the exercise of giving and receiving that became ambiguous in 
the actual sensations during the experience, that practitioners have 
to learn to be present to ambiguity. I have to accept the feeling for 
relations that cannot be named. Accepting ambiguity, however, 
does not imply that we do not sense or ‘know’ a feeling or that 
we do not know how to respond in action. It does not discredit 
our ability for action. In this way, the mutability of “naming” in 
direct experience shows how art-making is a kind of nonverbal or 
relational intelligence because an artist still acts on and responds to 
feeling. This is extremely important in terms of creative action and 
in that artistic inquiry is not only about identifying or objectifying 
the world, but also concerns seeking an experience of inquiry that 
involves the continuity of experience, the emotional wholeness, 
that which makes it fulfilling. 
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This ability to be in direct experience, being perceptually 
open to being touched and moved, and to know sensations and 
feelings without having the certainty of words is inherent to em-
bodied practice in the arts. This is consistent with the holistic or 
integrative view of the artist or designer, which does not reduce 
the embodied and ‘felt’ experience and his/her acceptance of and 
comfort with the ambiguous.
Relations that are Internally Felt
These lessons help articulate the relationship between aes-
thetic experience of form-giving and the creative approach found 
in a design attitude. The empirical detail from the Butoh somatic 
exercises show how such a way of inquiring, in which there is no 
objective criteria, takes a creative approach to shaping and framing 
experience in ways that are meaningful and purposeful. This form 
of work and learning develops an openness, flexibility, reflexivity, 
and tolerance in one’s approach to dealing with multiple and chang-
ing demands in a situation that is uncertain. But engaging in the 
aesthetic aspects of work also contributes to the development of 
imagination, a willingness to experiment and take risks, and a ho-
listic and empathetic stance that are said to be central to the creative 
aspects of designers’ approaches and thinking styles (Brown, 2008; 
Cooper et al., 2009; Fraser, 2007; Michlewski, 2008). Embodied 
form-giving, for example, shows how the “experience of design 
practice matters beyond being adept at applying design methods” 
(Jahnke, 2013, p. 338), while also speaking to how designers can be 
comfortable in ambiguity and emotional experience.
However, a critical point here is that beyond the kinds of 
objective characterizations that a design attitude consists of, in 
general, these lessons underscore a felt perception of ‘self ’ or the 
experience of subjectivity. The virtue of this experience coincides 
with the Pragmatist’s critique of science by taking seriously the 
internal and affective sensations of the individual. Dewey (Dewey, 
1938/1997) says that the freedom of intelligence and judgement is 
“exercised in behalf of purposes that are intrinsically worth while” 
cannot be limited by fixed arrangements with the stipulation that 
the “external and physical side of activity cannot be separated 
from the internal side of activity; freedom of thought, desire and 
purpose” (p. 61). Experience itself engages thought and feeling 
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together and therefore requires “qualitative forms of intelligence” 
(Eisner, 2002a, p. 232). 
From an aesthetic perspective, the emotional and felt areas 
of human experience that fall outside of the rational paradigm are 
put back in place or given more weight. Because of this, the work 
of art or design is perceived as intrinsically valuable because it is a 
source that allows for experiencing the range and contours of one’s 
own capacities and emotional ‘self ’ (Eisner, 2002a). Accepting that 
humans possess an impulse for ‘self ’-understanding or finding 
‘self ’ in their work, the meaning of inquiry in art and design is not 
limited to the merely functional. There is an existential sense of 
value for inquiry and a self-initiated pursuit of leaning. 
The possibility for creative action is in many ways the basis of 
the Pragmatist assertion that perceptual, sensorimotor experience 
not be regarded as separate from cognition. In this respect, the 
lessons each conspicuously direct our attention to understanding 
design as part of one’s own bodily experience and to what is not 
only an objective view, but equally an inward process that includes 
sensations, feelings, memories, thoughts, curiosities, impulses, 
instincts, and responses. In other words, the tactile feelings of re-
lations are at the heart of the creative act of forming ideas, frames, 
hypothesis, impressions, and notions about the world. This is 
critical to a Pragmatist conception of creativity in experience that 
centers around the perception and feel for how it is to act (move) 
creatively, meaning to act in ways that are risky, or without truly 
knowing what the consequence will be, where there is a tangible 
sensation of discomfort and vulnerability. 
The lens of subjectivity, therefore, embraces the Pragmatist 
premise of a whole person in possession of self-determination, 
freewill, and a ‘self ’ that is center-less and changing. Creativity, 
in the Pragmatist view, must be subject to internal control by the 
individual (Joas, 1996). In a context of human intentionality, for 
example, the creative individual, with creative will and the volition 
to generate meanings is not an identity that is constituted by a static 
condition, an ego, personality, or a person with canned routines 
and habits. In experience, there is the sensation of a socially con-
stituted individual who has the sensorimotor guidance of a ‘feel’ 
for things, or emotional markers embedded in habits and patterns 
of behavior (Damasio, 2005). This is how the individual naturally 
confronts his/her own psychosomatic constraints and potentialities, 
which are necessary to notice and move beyond our own boundar-
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ies of perception and similarly to revise and change our own posi-
tion or identity as we act. “There is no intellectual growth without 
some reconstruction, some remaking, of impulses and desires in 
the form in which they first show themselves” (Dewey, 1938/1997, 
p. 64). Therefore, intelligent behavior in the Pragmatist view is 
predicated on the ways in which individuals act upon the world.
This said, what is significant about this Pragmatists’ perspec-
tive on the aesthetic is that design is not the product of certain 
internal and external interactions, but resides in a designer’s relation 
to the world including his/her relation to ‘self.’ Design to some 
extent necessarily involves designing one’s own relations to the 
world, others, and the ‘self.’ An embodied approach conspicuously 
entails bodily action in the present as a source of novelty, and more 
so, a substance of ‘self ’ discovery and formation. Physical sensation, 
situation-specific behavior and the perception of one’s own body 
are intertwined with reflective identification, i.e., the social and 
psychological image of ‘self ’ (Mead, 1934/1967). We must touch 
on our inner feelings in order to make, do, and express anything 
new, but that inner feeling naturally touches on an inner sense of 
‘self,’ which is connected to habits and patterns (Dewey, 1922/2002; 
Mead, 1934/1967). 
Awareness and Willingness
From a Pragmatist perspective on creative action, I find that the 
lessons can be further distilled into two main points about the 
perception of subjectivity: awareness and willingness. Awareness and 
willingness are taken as two indispensable dimensions of a felt ex-
perience of meaning, which especially reflects William James’s em-
bodied psychology and his introspective explanation of a non-de-
terministic subjectivity or volitional ‘self ’ (see p. 81 for more detail). 
This pragmatic view is critical to confronting a view of creativity 
and openness that is in pursuit of action entwined with internal, 
affective meaning versus one in pursuit of externally defined goals. 
Accessing perceptual experience of inner operations in this research 
is intended toward a non-dualistic view of subject/object integrality 
in direct experience and should not be misunderstood as slipping 
toward a notion of subjectivity apart from experience. 
The first dimension, awareness, is in large part what the em-
pirical work establishes again and again in different ways — that 
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aesthetic inquiry requires a core awareness of relations in the pres-
ent. For example, Butoh is about cultivating a conscious relation 
to the changes going on inside and outside the performer. I show 
how we become skilled at expanding our subjective awareness to 
such features as the force and effort of our focus; the link between 
feeling, emotion, and imagination in the movement; the experience 
of the interaction of being moved and moving; and the physical 
sensations of concepts. 
In the way that I use the term, awareness carries an appreci-
ation for a full, somatic mode of perception, not merely visualiza-
tion, thinking or Schön’s (1983) “reflection-in-action,” for example. 
Awareness explicitly entails a different kind of focus from with the 
analysis of the parts and a functional character in thinking what 
we want to do with things and of things. It puts emphasis on the 
continuity of experience, its qualities and feeling so that, “the dif-
ference that is thus made is not one of just intellectual classification. 
A difference is made in appreciative perception and in a direct way” 
(Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 50). Such appreciative perception speaks to 
the way that the designer seeks holistic meaning and frames that 
are coherent across aesthetic, emotional, and rational dimensions 
(Michlewski, 2008). This has been identified as a critical artistic skill 
of paying close attention to experience within experience. “One 
of the large lessons the arts teach is how to secure the feelingful 
experience that slowed perception makes possible; the arts help 
student learn how to savor qualities by taking the time to really 
look so that they can see” (Eisner, 2002a, p. 24). 
While the awareness of the present has to do with paying 
attention to an internal sensation of feelings in action, there is 
also a meta-awareness or self-awareness that comes about through 
reflection and noticing internal feelings of relations with the ma-
terials. This again possesses an appreciation for awareness of so-
matic experience, but the intricacies of those experiences reveal 
our perception of self over the course of working physically to 
give form. This self-awareness and a sensitivity toward habitual 
patterns of behavior affect the quality of our experience in the 
present because they contribute to the potential to open oneself 
up in direct experience. The search for novelty and originality and 
pushing oneself to go past one’s preconceptions or limitations 
of thought has much to do with how one identifies with ‘self ’ in 
one’s actions. Therefore, this awareness of one’s own emotional 
identification, history, prejudices, habits of thought, tacit expec-
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tations and inhibitions opens the door to looking past one’s own 
patterns and ways of working. It is the internal dynamics of the 
creative process “in which new ideas present themselves, in which 
old ideas loosen their grip, in which the force of habit can be seen 
for what it is” (Epstein, 2004, p. 32).
The point about awareness brings me to the second dimen-
sion of felt experience that I call willingness. Willingness refers to 
the distinct feeling of volition and effort in trying to stay with the 
present. The sheer muscularity and effort to maintain focus in the 
present makes it obvious how awareness, or what some academics 
refer to as “mindfulness” (Langer, 2014; Shusterman, 2008; Stanley, 
2012), is not merely a passive state or attitude. It requires a physical 
effort and will that entails welcoming the sensation of discomfort 
that allows new perceptions and ideas to emerge. For example, I 
show from the somatic investigation that in order to continually 
confront experience anew and to ‘stay with the present,’ I must 
work to not be carried along by the kinds of familiar habits and 
comfortable patterns that allow me to mentally detach from my 
physical situation. Because this is a methodical and exacting exercise 
with emotional thought patterns, it is important to remember that 
awareness is voluntary and a learned function that can be expanded 
and trained. 
Openness-Capacity
Currently it is assumed that a design attitude of openness is consti-
tuted by certain qualities or creative features (Michlewski, 2008), 
but there is a lingering question about whether such a creative at-
titude is learned or a personality characteristic (Lawson, 2005). The 
pragmatic answer here is that, because design is ultimately com-
prised of physical actions performed by a designer, those actions 
must be subject to change by him/her. Creativity is an experience 
that is mutually constituted by the designer’s actions (thoughts) 
and material circumstances. So whether or not creativity is a nat-
ural trait or not is not really relevant in the Pragmatist sense of 
action — individuals can form new habits, develop new modes 
of action, and change their own ways of thinking. This carries 
an underlying assumption of creativity as a quality of experience 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; S. Johnson, 2016), and not merely an 
innate ability, mindset, personality trait, property, or type of tacit 
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knowledge. A strictly naturalistic assumption of openness misses 
the motivation and voluntary action on the part of the designer to 
resist closure, to actively keep his/her identity open to question, and 
to not only assert and express the ‘self,’ but to challenge the ‘self.’ 
As Dewey (1922/2002) puts it, it is “the difference between a self 
taken as something already made and a self still making through 
actions” (p. 139). 
Because managing one’s own process in terms of self-direction 
is considered a characteristic of artistic development (Edström, 
2008), many artists and designers specifically manage their process 
to be continually creative. This ability is considered by some in 
the arts to be the core of creativity (May, 1994; Tharp & Reiter, 
2003). It means seeking out the unusual, experimenting, pushing 
the boundaries, or as I have been told, “never being able to get 
comfortable.” In that sense, part of artistic development is working 
on losing inhibitions, being messy, making mistakes, and “stretch-
ing” oneself (Hetland et al., 2007). Therefore, pursuing openness 
in one’s own process comes from an intrinsic motivation on behalf 
of the designer to engage in a risky process of challenging his/her 
own habits and patterns that are comfortable. Creativity as a quality 
of experience holds that it is a result of hard work and discipline 
(Baker & Baker, 2012). 
I have stressed the point that sensing openness as an action 
tied to subjectivity and not just an attitude involves effort or will-
ingness. James’s sense of volition in terms of “will” means that 
designers themselves are what make openness happen. An im-
portant practical consequence of the embodied approach is that 
it demonstrates that openness is not a static entity, attitude, or 
facility, but comprises a cultivatable self-directed capacity on the 
part of the designer to stay “open” and change patterns. To express 
it in a commonplace way, it is not that a designer/researcher can 
talk or think his/her way to something, but it actually takes exer-
cise and discipline to change habits and routines to revisit his/her 
own positions. For example, in somatic practice we learn that new 
patterns and imaginative potentials are within us, but they are not 
actually accessible until we do them. Hence, it takes physical courage 
to discover new patterns, new forms, and new expressions within 
oneself (May, 1994). 
270
Relations in the Present
From the ideas touched upon regarding awareness and willingness 
in embodied activity, I elaborate upon two equal requisite experi-
ences of openness-capacity, which I refer to as control and surrender 
and trust. I arrive at these two concepts based upon the changing 
and fluctuating experiences of ‘self ’ and the fact that actions taken 
in the present contribute empirically to an ongoing process of self 
or self-forming. In the primacy and intimacy of this experience, 
there is a shift toward tactile feelings of experience that entail, 
in the Jamesian sense, a force of will — a sensation to voluntarily 
act that comes from within. Thus, there has to be corresponding 
features in the “the living act of perception” (James, 1902/2012, 
p. 347) and the ability to take creative action that exceeds a verbal 
and objective formulation of creativity. In the following section, I 
outline these felt features of subjectivity employing insights from 
the empirical work to describe how they are experienced as part 
of an openness-capacity. 
Control and Surrender
The nature of movement improvisation explicitly focuses the ability 
to engage in form-giving in the sense of feeling and shaping a way 
forward as one goes. This demonstrates a shift in attention from 
mental expectations, wants, and images of ‘self ’ to present cir-
cumstances so that action and movement are attended to through 
reference to immediately felt relations. As an artistic discipline, 
improvisation involves feelings of change and temporality of expe-
rience, which are explicitly not about force but about letting change 
happen. This integrative consciousness, as I have illustrated in this 
work, has a critical spatial and temporal dimension of the present. 
This is when space and time meet in action. One’s focus moves 
to sensing kinetic possibility and taking action toward what he/
she has immediate control over in the “corporeal here and now” 
(Sheets-Johnstone, 2011, p. 65) rather than trying to mentally de-
termine and plan for what he/she neither has the ability to predict 
nor has control over. The connection, then, between the possibility 
for creative action and the present is regarded as a main finding of 
this investigation. 
By practicing being in the present with our inner sensations 
and feelings and the kinesthetic and motor activity, I showed that 
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it is possible to become aware of the esthetic stream of thought in 
relation to the observational function and the perception of ‘self.’ 
The various terms used throughout this thesis to denote these 
continuous aspects of consciousness include:
While I try to integrate these two sides of experience in this re-
search, the dualistic model used here is intended to draw attention 
to the continuum between these two aesthetically. This will be made 
clearer in the next chapter, but I will note here that it became im-
portant in my own approach in the context of design management 
studies where I started my research, to first exaggerate or magnify 
this tension (“the problem”) to have a conceptual vocabulary for 
it. Being able to ‘see’ this tension provided me with a way to circle 
back to sensing it in the concrete and to refer to it in a direct and 
intimate way within experience. The point here is that we can 
never escape these types of dualisms or leave them behind, but we 
can become aware of the dynamic between them in the reality of 
experience, i.e., embodying them, instead of only seeing them as 
isolated qualities of experience. 
From a movement-based perspective, the explicit recognition 
of the present highlights a world that is viewed to be open-ended, 
creative, and non-deterministic. The performer can choose to move 
and act right here and now. Thoughts ‘pop into one’s head’ in 
accordance with the living body’s experience, so that a person’s 
streaming of thought is not apparently spontaneous but necessarily 
spontaneous (Sheets-Johnstone, 2011, p. 361). In the present we are 
always improvising, happening, ordering, performing, physically 
initiating, and reacting. Allowing that the fleeting quality of ex-
perience — moving from one ‘thing’ to another — can feel erratic 
and illogical, so in improvisational practice it emerges that we must 
Object body 
Reflective consciousness 
Self-identification
Naming
Subject body 
Esthetic, ‘felt’ consciousness (pre-linguistic)
“pure” / “raw” experience
Forming
Integrated experience of body-mind 
(embodied)
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first become aware of that non-discriminating quality of movement 
and try to have a radical acceptance for it, rather than trying to 
detach from it or to control it. In short, to let experience be open, 
changing, and unpredictable, I must control my attention to stay 
present with an embodied sense of ongoing movement and change. 
In this way, somatic work helps to focus our sensitivity on the 
psycho-physical continuity of feelings of control and surrender in 
that immediate experience. It is not an experience of simply being 
‘out of control,’ but it is a tension and release between reflective 
discernment and just feeling. I refer back to the example of the 
“unified body” when we practiced a stance of being both strong and 
flexible. If I think of being strong and flexible, I cannot embody the 
sensation because my attention is confined to being either strong 
or flexible so the sensation only becomes is unified in my posture 
and presence when I stop thinking in those terms.
I refer to this notion of the continuum between these two 
aspects of consciousness, the reflective and the esthetic present as 
control and surrender. Dewey (1934/2005) refers these two phases 
of consciousness in artistic work as “a rhythm of surrender and 
reflection,” saying that in aesthetic experience, “we interrupt our 
yielding to the object to ask where it is leading and how it is leading 
there” (p. 150). Surrender involves, as he says, the phase of pre-ana-
lytic and qualitative impression, “before knowing what the picture 
represents you are seized by its magical accord” (p. 151). Similarly, 
in James’s somatic introspection, he notes that the instrumental 
nature of our consciousness is to focus on the limb’s movement 
toward something instead of the internal feelings of movement. 
In movement practice, this relationship is articulated as iden-
tifying or discerning versus “letting go” or “letting things come.” I 
also heard my teachers use the phrase the looking “eye” versus the 
sensing “I.” I mostly refer to this dynamic in the empirical work 
in the following ways: 
Doing
Moving
Grasping
Discerning
Possessing, identifying
Control
Undergoing
Being moved
Letting go
Letting come
Releasing
Surrender
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To move forward from a perceptive, esthetic mode involves culti-
vating the ability to witness and be present without an estrange-
ment from the present due to “cognitive closure,” for example, and 
the qualification of experience through identification, discernment, 
judgment, or expectations. This generally involves taking a “feeling 
of the body” and having an acute sense of physical presence. The 
integrated, artistic approach requires what Dewey calls “esthetic 
understanding,” which he illustrates in the following: 
The esthetic or undergoing phase of experience is 
receptive. It involves surrender. But adequate yielding of 
the self is possible only through a controlled activity that 
may be well intense. In much of our intercourse with our 
surroundings we withdraw; sometimes from fear…To 
steep ourselves in a subject-matter we have first to plunge 
into it. (p. 53)
Specifically from my experiences with Butoh, the struggle to ac-
tually be able to ‘be at one’ with the present is the particular sen-
sation of surrender. Surrender comes to that experience when an 
individual voluntarily opens him/herself up to the experience of 
change (being moved), a palpable openness that carries with it 
simultaneously the sensation of giving up a degree of self-preserva-
tion or loss of control — what some in the field of improvisational 
arts call “surrender,” “letting go,” or “acceptance” to being in the 
present (Nachmanovitch, 1990). 
In this fundamental way, we can see that an openness-capacity 
means being with the particular feeling of the experience of surren-
der by being with the inherent insecurity of immediate experience, 
and not always having the words to describe it. To inquire from this 
aesthetic perspective and to not take away from direct perceptual 
experience that is active, there has to be openness in the sense of 
some things being left unspoken, undefined, and simply ‘felt.’ The 
ultimate ambiguity of experience is that it is simultaneously know-
able and unknowable, that we both grasp and also let go (Batchelor, 
1997). There is an artistic ability to be in the present with what is 
an indeterminate experience for an unspecified amount of time.
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Trust
We can see movement improvisation as a practical strategy for 
being present and meeting the pre-reflective and fluctuating char-
acter of consciousness. In the moment-to-moment experience 
of change, the relational experience of control and surrender goes 
hand in hand with a shift in feeling of not being able to answer in 
experience with certainty and the perceived control or validation 
of a reflective consciousness. This overlaps with the ability to con-
tinuously accept transience, impermanence, and change. There is 
movement from the feelings of possession or control of objective 
thought brings — familiarity, security, clarity, and safety — to the 
kinds of feelings that surrender brings — discomfort, unknow-
ability, and doubt. As the empirical work shows, the sense of vul-
nerability is inextricable from a dynamic experience of ‘self ’ that is 
truly open for being expanded, changed, and uncertain. In practice, 
this is discussed as dropping the ego, pride, or self-preservation 
to be emotionally available and empathetic in order to internally 
“connect” with one’s surroundings and the others. 
Therefore, truly opening oneself up to the indeterminacy of 
the present and natural feelings of fear — fear of loss of control, 
failure, rejection, as well as shame, ridicule, and vulnerability, lies 
in an ability to show trust. From a Pragmatist view, the willingness 
to act depends upon a “believing tendency” or trust. Thus, at the 
risk of sounding cliché, trust is not a feeling, but an ability and 
willingness to act in uncertainty. Here I use the notion of trust to 
describe the sensation of security that is developed directly within 
an artistic, embodied way of working and an openness-capacity. 
Working experimentally and/or improvisationally is not about 
eliminating uncertainty, but about having the trust to move and act 
and spite of sensations of being unsure, uncomfortable, or fearful. 
Assuming that uncertainty is a source of creativity (Langer, 2014), 
it is a matter of how to be with that sensation of surrender and let 
oneself see where things can go in unexpected ways. Consequently, 
there must be a value for, but also a trust in, that uncertainty and 
a method of working in immediate experience. 
There is a qualitative change that happens when we go from 
talking about a rationally determined context that provides a sense 
of security through repetition, predictability, and observable out-
comes to an embodied feeling of security. This brings us full circle 
to the founder of pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce, and his 
original pragmatic conception of understanding inquiry as con-
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stituted by a subjective feature. In dealing with real-life situations 
there will always be living doubt. And for Peirce, on the other side 
of living doubt is active belief, belief being defined as the sense upon 
which a person is prepared to act, a feeling of conviction (Scheffler, 
1974). In Peirce’s opinion, doubt brings discomfort or unease and 
humans are prone to seek belief, which offers a sensation of calm. 
To Peirce’s point, I contend that there needs to be a sensation of 
belief in order to act, but instead of using his term belief, I use the 
term trust, which is a more prevalent term today.
I develop here the notion of trust from the empirical work 
with somatic practice with respect to design and an openness-ca-
pacity, grouped into three interrelated, yet slightly distinct, aspects 
of trust. They include: Trust in feeling uncertain, trust in one’s own 
process, and trust in one another’s capacity. 
Trust in Feeling Uncertain
An openness-capacity requires the ability to cope with feelings 
of uncertainty or fear, vulnerability, and discomfort that change 
and openness to change bring. In Butoh, for example, it is critical 
to provide a context for learning and working with sensations of 
discomfort, since this is understood to be when creativity hap-
pens — in the experience of when you are testing new behavior, 
acting in new ways that feel unfamiliar, and going against your 
habits or patterns of thought.
In common understanding, the opposite of a sense of secu-
rity is perceived as a kind of ‘state of anxiety,’ which sets up a false 
equivalency between stability, on the one hand, and anxiety and 
fear, on the other. The feeling of anxiety emerges when having to 
make political or moral decisions (Kleinman, 2006), admitting 
to “not knowing,” not being in control of one’s image, or the in-
ability to predict, or to be truly certain. Thus, the fear of making 
a mistake, disappointment, feelings of incompetence, and so on 
create anxiety concerning taking responsibility for one’s personal 
judgment (Kleinman, 2006). 
As somatic practitioners point out, this perceived anxiety has 
to do with the structuring of modern education and institutions 
around a pursuit of certainty that is systematically eroding our 
ability to be with the feeling of instability (Rolf, 1995). The feeling 
of fear is suppressed through mechanisms that proceed from an 
emphasis on “objective” knowledge, more data and information, 
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and secure ground to stand on. As we learn in somatic awareness, 
it is natural to feel uncertain. Truthfully, the inner sensation of 
uncertainty and fear involved in doing anything empirically does 
not ever disappear. In the relational nature of the present, there is 
always a physical sensation of surrender and the feeling of insecu-
rity or uncertainty that comes with that does not have to lead to 
anxiety. Instead in personal experience, we learn that we develop 
the ability to feel insecure and to be okay with uncertainty. Work-
ing experimentally, we learn to let go of getting things ‘right’ and 
our inhibitions, to welcome mistakes as a source of learning and 
possibility. 
This ability to feel uncertain is closely shared with the follow-
ing condition of ‘trust in own process’ because, at the same time 
that we learn to be uncertain, we also find that a sensation of feeling 
secure in our process becomes about what we can do to change our 
own behavior, to act differently, and to figure out what we need 
to do. One way to see it is as a kind of meta-level consciousness 
of ourselves in relation to our process, as described in the lessons 
from the empirical work. We learn the subtle distinction between 
what has been pointed out as self-doubt versus the idea of doubt 
(Grant, 2016). While self-doubt can feel paralyzing because it is 
about one’s ‘self,’ by training and becoming familiar with our pro-
cess, we learn to feel when the process concerns the idea in which 
doubt means more research, more testing, reframing, and so on 
(Grant, 2016). This is tied to the creative approach and intimately 
learning the limitations and workings of our body-mind. Trust in 
uncertainty only comes about by developing a trust in one’s own 
senses and valuing the body as a means of empathy, emotions, and 
judgment. It also means having the awareness to listen to others 
and to refine one’s way of working, which constitutes of a sense 
of trust in others by being able to admit uncertainty and fear of 
failure when taking risks. 
Trust in One's Own Process 
The strong human desire for security or comfort in modern in-
stitutional and organizational environments is typically provided 
by rational and cognitive means and ways of progressing, that is, 
the scientific quest for certainty. Today, this sense of security is 
largely promoted by a culture of management so that qualities of 
control and predictability become valued in and of themselves for 
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the comfort they provide (Bauman & May, 2001). This leads to 
focus and effort on getting rid of the kinds of negative feelings that 
come with uncertainty or doubt, and restoring a sense of comfort in 
external structures or by acting in a way that can provide objective 
assurance. This makes a process feel safe, because it is clear, defined, 
and, moreover, reliable. So by knowing what one can expect from 
a given procedure, an individual can become a “passive spectator” 
and simply escape actually feeling uncertain — the personal doubt 
and anxiety of having to rely on one’s own judgment. It is easier to 
adopt a set of beliefs, procedures, and objective criteria, not to feel 
fear, insecurity, or doubt, but to “stay on track” and to feel you are 
doing the right thing. But in order to achieve this reliability, work 
processes are structured around habits and repetition, externalized 
rules and notions of “quality control.” 
Living with fears, tensions, a sense of unease or anxiety at 
not having objective criteria mean that the “artistic” entails phys-
ical sensation and bodily response to situations. The artist works 
in and deals with the aesthetics of relations in the wholeness of 
experience. By not neglecting his/her own experience in favor of 
theoretical certitude, the artist learns precisely the opposite — that 
he/she must learn to trust his/her feelings, intuition, and bodily 
sensations in the living integrality of his/her process. Especially in 
relation to creativity, the artist must use physical sensations and 
judgment to guide him/her outside of the comfort zone of expertise 
or context of “knowing.” 
It is also important to understand that the kind of self-aware-
ness practitioners develop in their own creative and expressive 
activity does not simply discard control or objectivity in favor of 
irrationality, an “anything goes” approach, the overly emotional, 
or the purely subjective. Self-awareness provides the practitioner 
with a indispensable self-objectivity and reflexivity to his/her own 
process so that intuition is not divided from rigorous thought; 
fantasy and enthusiasm from and reality testing; lightness from 
criticality, and so on. The freedom given to imagination and play-
fulness is wedded to self-management and an individual capacity 
for expression. In fact, as stated previously, increased autonomy 
and the exercising of self-determination and volition mean more 
self-discipline and self-management. 
In this regard, Butoh uses the metaphor of nature to teach 
that creativity is about determination and consistency to persevere 
and “stay with the problem,” as it is said, over qualities of speed or 
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force. As with the slow movement exercises, we are often encour-
aged to take a simple concept and develop it through persistence, 
commitment, consistency, long training, determination, and focus. 
The instructors have us work on the parts of our training that we 
sense are difficult for us. If we need more physical strength, we 
have to do pushups, squats, and abdominal crunches. If we cannot 
emotionally handle an exercise, we need to reflect on why, where 
the problem is, and how we can overcome it. We teach ourselves 
to persevere through our own frustration and unease. 
Movement training, therefore, intensifies how an artist must 
know his/her own body-mind and the kind of physical and mental 
self-discipline that is needed to make oneself a sensible and respon-
sible ‘instrument.’ By closely observing my moment-to-moment 
physical tendencies in Butoh, for instance, I simultaneously un-
covered long-term habits and patterns in the places that I struggle, 
as with my indecisiveness and sense of fear in making forceful and 
fluid movements. The trepidation I express toward decision-mak-
ing in Butoh received a similar critique in my architectural train-
ing, in that my drawings were too light and timid. Both artistic 
mediums (movement and drawings) possess the same feeling of 
too much deliberation and restraint, and not enough of expression, 
conviction, or energy of ‘going with it’ or ‘letting go.’ This is where 
I personally need continual training — in relaxing and being more 
emotionally present. 
Precisely because somatic awareness is a capacity tied to the 
embodied individual, it is tied to his/her responsibility to care for 
the self physically and emotionally. This self-directed capacity is 
exhibited by a form of personal discipline and management in 
our own work process, by taking responsibility for what we need 
to do. It is also expected, because our work is experiential, that 
we have to put time and effort into making sense of our process, 
developing our own expression, and contextualizing our work. 
Correspondingly, because it is a physical activity (as any activity 
is), we have to know our own boundaries, to treat our bodies with 
care and compassion, and to not hurry or make things happen, but 
to let them come. “Everything is already there for us,” our teachers 
say. It is learning to recognize and nurture a kind of empathetic 
relation to a creative process that has bodily and natural limitations. 
In this way, Butoh training fosters trust in using the body 
that allows the artist to “rest assured” in the changing relations 
to one’s own process (Edström, 2008) and not only relying on 
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rationalizations, comparisons, and plans for what to do. Training 
in Butoh strengthens our ability to be in the moment and, in my 
case, to mute my overwhelming urge to control my actions from 
the reflective aspect of my consciousness, but to “let things come” 
and to feel “on the edge,” as it is communicated in practice. This 
acceptance, along with the patterns and habits that we become 
intimately aware of, contributes to developing a qualitative relation 
to our own work in terms of a kind of familiarity or closeness to 
our process, not just consciously, but holistically and emotionally 
in action. We gain confidence in working improvisationally with 
our instincts, impulses, and gut reactions that can simultaneously 
pull us in different directions. We learn to trust that this is part of 
an integrated body-mind practice that is not always rational, but 
sometimes we need to just “see how it goes,” before we try make 
sense of the experience, of the corporeal and kinesthetic learning. 
Before most exercises, for example, Butoh teachers remind us that 
we have to “find our own way” or to take our own “time and 
space.” We are always told to “listen” to our bodies. This artistic 
approach puts value and trust in the time and space needed to 
physically explore, find out, and make discoveries.
Trust in one Another’s Capacity 
The social component of trust is equally as important as the other 
two, ‘trust in feeling uncertain’ and ‘trust in one’s own process’ 
because it offers the necessary contextual foundation for opening 
up, and feeling safe enough to express oneself honestly. Part of 
allowing oneself to become vulnerable and dependent on others, 
to help determine a process or project, is taking the risk of putting 
one’s feelings of self-control into someone else’s hands. Ultimately, 
unless a person actively places their faith in another, the feeling of 
security between people will not exist. There is a giving-receiving 
dynamic, as I illustrated in the Butoh exercise, where in order to 
begin to establish trust, it is also necessary to take the risk of trust-
ing. For that reason, what I am pointing out here is that ‘trust in 
one another’s capacity’ comes from the self-direction and self-trust 
developed in one’s own capabilities, identity, expression, and values. 
‘Trust in one’s own process’ is a precondition for the ability to trust 
in another person’s process, but also to trust oneself enough to be 
exposed and vulnerable. A person must have his/her own ability to 
sense and understand his/her own weaknesses and strengths and 
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to know when to ask for help or how to help stretch and challenge 
the other person when he/she needs it. 
In Butoh, for example, where there is a strong emphasis on 
an openness-capacity, there is an equally strong emphasis on culti-
vating trust in order to create a context where participants feel safe 
to literally act out or go beyond socially conditioned movement 
patterns. To “liberate” or “free” performers from their ‘ego,’ as it is 
sometimes called, there is a specific mixture of practical conditions 
which always have to be reestablished at the beginning of every 
course/session, since an instinctual and distorted way of behaving 
and moving is somewhat antithetical to one’s daily routine and 
patterns of movement governed by social norms. We essentially 
learn to play together through methods of relaxation, which help 
to mentally and physically open people up, establishing a lightness 
and playful energy to encourage the freeing of participants from 
expectations of “right” or “wrong” ways of moving, and the po-
tential for the practitioner to dare to push or extend him/herself 
in new ways. 
‘Trust in one another’s capacity’ helps establish a sense of 
mutual trust among actors, which means it is really supporting an 
ability to cooperate. By supporting the performer having a strong 
self-directed process, as creative actors we are able to connect and 
collaborate with one another on an equal level. Individuals have 
their own internal will. They have different preferences as to what 
they would like to do, and will act in a way to fulfill in some part 
their desires, needs, and concerns. Again, this is different from 
generating a sense of security in the form of consensus or an overall 
meaning to which everyone conforms. Rather, it is about having 
the sense of security through interpersonal dynamics that seems 
to be related to an openness-capacity. 
As the manipulation exercise with giving and receiving 
showed at a micro-level, every relationship between people has an 
interpersonal dynamic of being able to listen and respond to one 
another, to know how to open up when needed in order to meet 
the others halfway. In that respect, our close personal relationships 
require a characteristic of openness-capacity in terms of letting go 
of wanting to control from the perspective of one’s expectations 
of outcomes in order to also respond to and meet the others. This 
is about shifting from control towards expectations and outcomes 
to enable more improvisational behavior and the ability to sense 
and perceive opportunities in the moment. To some degree, it 
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takes acceptance of letting things happen, as my Butoh teachers 
expressed it, letting people do things in their own way at their 
own time, and not using force or control to see or know where 
things are headed. It requires being in the present with the other 
people and exercising judgment, based on feeling for the energy 
and dynamics of relations in context. By opening up perception, as 
somatic practitioners encourage, you thereby open your “options 
for sensitivity, awareness, ability to respond, and to feel successful 
in yourself and in your communication with others” (Cohen, 1995, 
p. 203). This is about listening to one another at an individual 
one-to-one level in order to form the kinds of relationships that 
foster respect for another’s process, in other words, supporting an 
empathic approach. 
This kind of direct interpersonal listening and responding 
has a critical qualitative aspect that is behavioral or gestural. In 
this sense, dance is really an apt metaphor here for how designers 
should be thinking about relations as dynamic and changing, and 
how designers must continually be able to develop the internal ca-
pacity to listen and respond to others with emotional and expressive 
content. Gestural qualities of humility, compassion, generosity, 
tolerance, respect, care and concern, positive intentions, acceptance, 
and belief provides the kind of opportunity for an sense of security 
(trust) to take root. As sentimental or old-fashioned as it sounds, 
trust needs to exist in order for people to open up. It is difficult 
for people to expose themselves by acting in new ways, if they do 
not feel safe to do so. There is socialized fear and shame that in-
hibits adult behavior, so in this sense they can become risk averse, 
adopt a skeptical stance, give into fears and doubts, and the want 
to protect themselves from the potential of feeling embarrassed, 
silly, rejected, ridiculed, and so on. 
Therefore, if design as a field of study is honest about inno-
vation and enhancing possibilities for creative action, like taking 
risks and doing anything novel, there has to be some part of open-
ness-capacity that addresses trust.12 In a context of action and co-
operation, the inherent uncertainty of creative action means that 
12.  Trust is already a large topic in theory related to cooperation and organizations (e.g., 
Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; G. R. Jones & George, 1998; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Mayer, Davis, 
& Schoorman, 1995; McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998). The benefits of trust with 
regard to social capital, networks, voluntary membership, and social action has been well 
established (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2000). Assuming that trust creates value and, to some 
extent, is necessary for innovation (Dovey, 2009), I highlight here the importance of recog-
nizing interpersonal trust with respect to creative action, and thus, design.
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people must feel a sense of security in social relations. In other 
words, acting in the social world, the consequences of one’s choices 
are not predictable and an individual does not have absolute control 
over the outcomes of a process. Accepting this indeterminacy in the 
view presented here, a sensation of security or trust in social rela-
tions comes from one’s own corporal capacity. Trust in the physical 
sense is a capacity that is facilitated, generated, and achieved in a 
self-directed approach to our relations with one another and within 
ourselves that allows us to open up and have courage to take action. 
Brief Summary
The purpose of this discussion has been to call attention to the 
lessons taught by the empirical work with Butoh that address a lack 
of embodied understanding for what it physically and perceptually 
means to have an attitude of openness in experience. Drawing 
upon those lessons, I present the need for an aesthetic view that 
incorporates the internal sensations of the designer in addressing 
relations in the present. This presents a shift in conceptualizing 
openness as merely an attitude or objective state to openness as 
a capacity for action. It is important to focus on design from this 
subjective perspective in order to address the exploratory capacity 
of a designer to deal with uncertain situations, to make judgments 
without objective criteria, to cope with contradiction, to take 
risks, to apply imagination, and to meaningfully frame experience 
through empathetic and qualitative means. This is important for 
the designer to experience design as exploration with the freedom 
to create and embrace different meanings and open-ended paths 
(Dorst, 2011).
 Especially in terms of openness and creativity, this means 
recognizing a designer’s internal capacities for awareness and will-
ingness to explore and create. A designer can practically learn to 
fight preconceptions and the desire to have mental clarity or to 
control expectations of what is produced, made, or “designed.” 
This points to his/her ability to stretch and refine his/her practice 
through perceptual experience specifically with respect to a sub-
jective, emotional dimension and a sense of ‘self.’ 
The empirical work demonstrates that in order to practically 
foster openness-capacity, there have be conditions for addressing 
this internal perspective of embodied relations. With that aim, 
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I present the two primary conditions of ‘control and surrender’ 
and ‘trust,’ which are special to an aesthetic way of addressing the 
world in immediate experience. In immediate and felt experience, 
these promote a self-directed or self-managed practice of creative 
exploration and openness-capacity. They also speak to the intrinsic 
and experiential meaning discovered through bodily practice that 
is equally as important to the designer and his/her practice as the 
discourse and symbolic meaning around the practice.
This discussion takes up a practically oriented perspective 
because it links Pragmatist theory to the embodied experience of 
design. It suggests the beginnings of a qualitative experience of 
form-giving as an embodied form of design experience and inquiry 
not secured in the current discourse on design research. This is 
not unique to design, but it is particular to an investigation and 
articulation of an aesthetic, embodied perspective of development 
and context of creativity. It illustrates how design can be physically 
sensed and experienced with respect to a feeling of openness, one 
that is self-directed.
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7 
Design Attitude as an 
Openness — Capacity
From an Externalized View  
to an Embodied Sense
To put this all in the context of professional design practice, design 
as an area of study has, for some time, been considered at the heart 
of human activity in a social reality and a means for meaning-mak-
ing and creativity (Buchanan, 2001; Dilnot, 1982). As framed in the 
chapter on design research, this view is predicated on the view that 
the traditional focus of design has moved from the production of 
discrete objects to social outcomes. As a result, in design research 
and practice it has become pertinent to ask, “Without the integrity 
of form-giving and making that lies at the core of design, what 
can the designer do that is not already within the sphere of other 
disciplines?” (Buchanan, 2008, p. 9). 
Again, my approach to this question has been to maintain 
that the “integrity of form-giving” in design is found in the direct 
physical interaction between the designer and the world. This 
begins from the Pragmatist insistence that all engagement with the 
world is embodied, and thus, all cognition and bases for meaning 
are situated within concrete experience. In the same way, what is 
at the “core of design” is living, physical experience. This has been 
the reason for using Pragmatism as a point of departure throughout 
this work — that the designer’s bodily experience is what grounds 
creative thought and symbolic interpretation. 
An embodied understanding of design practice requires an 
ontological shift from a world of objects to a relational, process-ori-
ented worldview. When applied, this has serious epistemological 
and practical consequences for design research and education. The 
Pragmatists put subtle and crucial emphasis, especially William 
James (1912/2003), on the fact that we do not just experience a 
world of objects to which we consciously attribute relations, but 
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that we sense and feel relations that are equally real to experience as 
objects. Relations themselves are experiences to one another. This 
entails a genuine consideration for the experience of form-giving 
from the aesthetic qualities of relations, which is a point that design 
research has largely ignored. Instead, the focus in form-giving 
has been primarily on an externalized some ‘thing’ or consciously 
explained relations, such as material phenomena and methods. 
In this respect, one main contribution of this work has been 
to earnestly pursue the embodied practice of designing and the 
radicalness of that experience in the Pragmatist sense. An aesthetic 
perspective on an embodied design process cannot be reached 
from the observational view of the process, but can only be part 
of direct experience. Therefore, I have tried to show a Pragmatist 
understanding of aesthetics through my physical engagement in 
form-giving, specifically that of a transitory, living, breathing ar-
tifact of movement improvisation. In that sense, the artifact is the 
experience of movement itself without a mediated outcome. 
This empirically demonstrates the profound Pragmatist point 
that our perception within experience is intrinsically aesthetic. There 
is an aesthetic dimension to all human action and form-giving, so 
aesthetics is the entry point, coming from aisthanesthai meaning “to 
feel and perceive,” to live through (Flusser, 2014). Aesthetics is how 
humans “think” given that our thinking is physiological. We use 
conceptual metaphors and frames in general to make sense of situa-
tions and to solve problems (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). An aesthetic 
feel even underlies what we perceive as a rational logic (M. Johnson, 
2007). Therefore, a holistic aestheticism based in experience in the 
pragmatic sense of the word is about developing patterns and ways 
of doing in action that ground the meaning in the situatedness of 
action, instead of in representations of an external reality. 
When design is recognized as an embodied activity, and not 
reduced to a representation of what one understands about it, 
design is not universally experienced. The “integrity of form-giv-
ing” demands that there must be some ‘body,’ a subjectivity, a 
“knower” that is the source of continuity for any “knowledge ex-
perience” (Dewey, 1905). The ‘core of design’ does not stand alone 
as some manifestation of “knowledge” or practice. Subject and 
object are not discrete entities that reject a notion of pure sub-
jectivity or that subject/object relations are in the world. Design 
and knowledge are not merely ‘out there’ but given meaning and 
form in action. It is therefore difficult to attribute certain bound-
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aries to actions and behaviors that can be readily recognized and 
determined as design in a dualistic construction. This is largely 
due to how action is irreducible and only adequately expressed or 
developed in relations in the present. 
Taking subject and object together in immediate experience 
most importantly highlights the changing subject/object relations, 
and that ‘self ’ and the world mutually affect each another. In the 
Pragmatist tradition of speaking in terms of continuities instead 
of dichotomies, this present experience is a ‘transactional’ affair of 
double resolve. For example, in the analysis of my experience with 
this transient process, I called attention to the internal relations in 
that process with particular regard to a mode of thinking-feeling 
integration. This embodied experience is one that is integrative and 
allows us to grasp experience in synthetic terms, where emotion, 
thinking, imagination, and feeling are together. Therefore, the pres-
ent is vital to a perceptual openness and provides an opportunity 
to consciously engage with action and a certain feel or quality for 
action, instead of only toward the object. 
An orientation toward action in the present, and an empirical 
emphasis of it, most notably demonstrate the unmistakable feel of 
an effort or will for action that comes from within. This feature of 
subjectivity is indivisible from any non-dualistic theoretical con-
cept of a “design attitude” or approach, which claims openness to 
experience as a means to creativity. The embodied approach shows 
that openness is not passive, but is action. A quality of openness 
and exploration in experience requires a cultivated capacity to open 
oneself up to potential feelings of vulnerability, uncertainty, expo-
sure, fear, or discomfort that come with taking a risk. 
In this project, I refer to this subjective, self-directed feature 
of action as openness-capacity. The notion of self-direction comes 
from an embodied view of arts-based learning that focuses on de-
veloping trust in one’s process and the ability to face uncertainty 
and the absence of rules, to go into the unknown, and to stretch 
oneself outside of the comfort zone (Eisner, 2002a; Hetland et al., 
2007). Self-direction shifts the burden of learning and exploration 
to the designer, again as an active participant, and to his/her at-
tention to the aesthetic dimension of experience, which entails a 
sensibility of the immediate sensorial presence of relations, what 
is actually happening and felt, rather than to objects of thought. 
This relational experience is a matter of the dynamics of work-
ing through time, developing perceptual gestalt and emotional 
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frames of relations, and sensing energetic rhythms and flows. This 
response and approach inform an ability to “create both physical 
space and time as well as a space inside of them that valued, nur-
tured, and supported their exploration of feel and creative experi-
ences” (Lussier-Ley & Durand-Bush, 2009, p. 213).
This inquiry lies in understanding how an openness-ca-
pacity is learned artistically, through what is a direct empirical 
approach — a hands-on approach to feeling and sensing — and 
accepting being without words or visual clarity. As exemplified in 
the lessons in the last chapter, this is about how arts-based train-
ing with bodily integrity and learning-by-doing helps develops a 
general perceptual capacity to be present to experience, without 
objectifying and pushing things to happen but rather “letting things 
come.” This openness-capacity means letting go of psycho-physical 
defenses connected to ‘self ’ in order to open oneself up to being 
affected. In other words, because openness requires the designer 
to connect with and trust in others, to adapt, cope, deal, and em-
pathize with the world around him/her, subjective dimensions of 
awareness and willingness are indispensable to embodying a design 
attitude. Opening up requires an awareness and willingness to 
express vulnerability and ambiguity. 
What openness-capacity calls attention to is the connection 
between design and physical action and the internal sensation of 
that action. Empirically it is not different from other approaches 
to inquiry in the fact that it is experienced by the designer at the 
individual level in firsthand relations. It is at a level where there is 
concern with what is felt emotionally and physically as a conduit 
for meaning. There is emphasis on the internal capacity of the 
designer. The decision and embodied habit to act with a quality of 
openness come from within. The difference in approach is there-
fore in how the designer chooses to experience the world, what 
kinds of relations to which he/she chooses to attend and how. The 
designer chooses whether or not his/her relations are treated as 
primarily objective (functional) or emphasized as more embodied 
(relational), and thus integrated. To engage with the latter, action 
must be taken with the internal feel and affect of truly opening up 
and connecting to one’s craft or process. This entails empathic and 
emotional expressions of human qualities of experience like care, 
nurture, respect, compassion, kindness, and trust which, according 
to the Pragmatists, cannot have artificial substitutions because they 
occupy natural and moral relations to the living body.
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The following table is for rough comparison between: on the 
left side, an externalized view that sees relations in terms of objects 
and which revolves around rationalization and clarity, and, on the 
right side, an embodied perspective that sees relations as qualitative 
and ceaselessly changing. The right side covers an artistic way of 
experiencing from the present, the relation of the designer to his/
her own process, and the sense of security in that relation as part 
of the development of his/her creative practice and openness-ca-
pacity. This is only used to draw attention to the general difference 
between understanding design from an analytical view and from 
an artistic, creative point of view that takes an embodied approach. 
This is not intended to be an either/or representation. 
Table 1
Externalized 
Attitude or mindset
Prescriptive
Determinacy
Objective intent
Functionalization
External sense of security
Need to feel certain:
Feel in control of ‘self ’ 
image as expert in role
Trust in system: 
Rationalizing and visualizing 
“the process”
Objective validation, goals, 
methods “Quality control”
Knowing what others are doing:
Use of universals, principals,  
directives, standardization,  
habits of action
Embodied
Openness-Capacity
Self-directed
Indeterminacy
Present relations
Control and Surrender
Internal and relational sense of security 
Trust in feeling uncertain: 
Feeling alright being in the unknown,  
feeling silly or vulnerable to critique,  
making mistakes, learning own limitations 
Trust in one’s own process: 
‘Feel’ for gestalt, use of emotion, intuition, 
learning and using judgment for specific 
aesthetic qualities 
 
Trust in one another’s capacity:
Caring, nurturing, tolerance, acceptance
sensitivity to interpersonal relationships
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From Form-Giving Objects  
to Relational Form-Giving
If we view design in a relational paradigm, we speak of profes-
sionals who, at some level, have a concern with the tangible aes-
thetic qualities and feelings of human relations, both with what is 
happening between individuals and in relation to his/her context, 
but also with what is happening internally in the designer, the dif-
ferent emotional, intuitive, and inferential dimensions of thought 
in action. To engage with form-giving as actively relating by the 
designer, design as a field of study must not only consider the ways 
in which the designer engages in social contexts, but also the way 
that the world engages the designer. A relational worldview most 
notably prompts a shift in practice from an objective focus to an 
awareness of relations in the present, which takes with it, as Dewey 
(1928/1981) says, “esthetic, affectional, moral relations” (p. 31). 
This might not seem very controversial, since designers in 
many areas of application of design (user-centered, social inno-
vation, co-design, participatory design, design thinking) cur-
rently claim to engage in human-centric and empathetic practices 
(Bjögvinsson et al., 2012). Given this premise, they have shifted the 
focus from form-giving of an object up to the level of form-giving 
of “systems” and “organizations,” which requires a shift in tools, 
approaches, and methods of participation or engaging others in a 
“design process.” But design focused on the process, even in this 
admittedly relational paradigm, generally approaches the world as 
an object of manipulation, meaning that the intent is to grasp the 
social world within the scientific view of a phenomenon external 
to oneself, i.e., approaching the world in an ‘object-like’ way. 
Thus, a Pragmatist philosophical and methodological stance 
makes it clear why rationalistic and outside-in perspectives on 
design practice and research cannot advance very far in addressing 
creative action and form-giving processes that include the volitional 
capacity and emotional content of ‘self ’ to create meaning. The 
externalized approach to creativity as an outcome is embedded in 
methods, processes, procedures, and environments, like co-design 
for example, that give individuals tools and methods for inducing 
creativity (Sanders, 2002). “It is easier to enhance creativity by 
changing conditions in the environment than by trying to make 
people think more creatively” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, p. 1). Ap-
proaching creativity from the outside will always seem the easier 
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option. This constitutes a reduction of creative action that “explains 
why we attribute a will to power to others but not to ourselves” 
(Dewey, 1922/2002, p. 143). It serves persons with the idea of se-
curity in something outside themselves, rather than forcing them 
to look inside to the source of creativity. 
 Along the same lines, it is easy to say that designers have an 
open attitude because objectification indicates that the designer 
is open as a state of mind or that they allow the world to change 
them. This again reduces the subjective ability for creative action to 
a reflection of the nature of openness. Because of this, the generally 
adopted research approach is to do more research to clarify how 
openness works by making it static and inanimate through progres-
sive differentiation (of features and/or relationships). Rationally 
advancing “knowledge” in this way will consistently chart a course 
toward the instrumental production of “creativity” via externalized 
formulations and better and more precise concepts. This is rooted 
in a view of rational action and an incremental, problem-solving 
logic found in the scientific method. While this empirical method is 
known to also lead to paradigm shifts (Kuhn, 1962), it is not about 
living, breathing, and internalizing creative action, the quality of 
creative experience or, for that matter, “radical innovation” pro-
moted in some design literature (Verganti, 2009). 
It has been pointed out by researchers that part of what makes 
design as a practice meaningful for designers is the freedom to 
explore and behave differently (Dorst, 2011; Michlewski, 2008). 
Just as designers want “ownership” over or self-identity with their 
design processes, embodiment demonstrates that it is inherent in 
human action and personal experience, generally, to have a sense 
of identity with and a desire to exert control in appropriating and 
altering the world around us. As this thesis argues, design in a 
really fundamental way is about the potential to “design” one’s 
own relations and perceptions. Part of what makes design a profes-
sionalization is the designer’s participation in his/her own self-de-
velopment as a designer, his/her own reflection and familiarity 
on their process, a willingness to experiment, and the ability for 
self-criticism or self-evaluation (Adams et al., 2011). Becoming 
a professional designer is not merely about the methods, tools, 
and skills, but also in part goes back to the aesthetic training that 
designers receive to embody a creative disposition and reflexivity 
by doing and making, and perceiving and dealing with materials 
and situations through hands-on experience. 
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Understanding creativity as a quality of experience and a 
matter of voluntary will is a major source of conflict for design-
ers who receive studio-based training and develop an embodied 
approach to their art/craft and then go to work in organizational 
settings and contexts built upon industrial imperatives. The knowl-
edge paradigm in this context does not value an approach to the 
whole individual and self-directed learning. As this research shows, 
to practice creativity, a designer has to have a felt and formative 
experience of a ‘self ’ who acts in the world without being deter-
mined and, in many senses, without routine situations. So to act 
creatively, a designer has to have the perceived opportunity and 
freedom to do so. This is about providing the opportunity for a 
qualitative experience of being immersed in the present, a chance to 
work, play, relax, and exercise the imagination without constraints 
or directives (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996).
It is also here where there is a major contradiction upon which 
a lot of design research lays emphasis. That is the nature of the 
practice of design in “objective conditions” and scientific knowl-
edge-claims, when an essential aspect of the practice is that designers 
themselves often seek personal direction and meaning from the 
creative experience of form-giving. Designers are shown to be moti-
vated to think and behave differently, to exert their will or imagina-
tive capacity, and to learn by self-directed means (Michlewski, 2008). 
Since the observational paradigm is often set on externally defined 
relationships and criteria, it really cannot address the psychological 
motivations, emotional responses, and will of designers (or any 
person) to act and move in unscripted, unspecified ways. And as 
long as a designer’s role or identity is rationalized for purposes of 
action, it essentially disciplines the creative resistance that the per-
ceptive body offers (Joas, 1996), resistance in the form of impulse, 
spontaneity, nonlinearity, non-linguistic, ambiguous, non-instru-
mental, and divergent relations. This resistance in some sense is 
what defines a “design attitude” and why, physically, designers see 
their work as pliable, accepting of open-endedness, nonlinearity and 
change, and going with intuition and ‘feel,’ to trust in an indetermi-
nate process — essentially all the qualities that are claimed to make 
design creatively valuable. It is known that a degree of uncertainty is 
a distinguishing feature of creativity (Langer, 2014) and artistic work 
(Eisner, 2002b), so the ability to experience design as an embodied 
uncertainty is requisite for a designer’s creative experience. Design 
is a method of creative action and learning for designers.
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Implication of Classical Pragmatist  
View of Experience 
This research illuminates the value of a Classical Pragmatist view to 
help deepen an understanding of how aesthetic experience consti-
tutes self-directed approaches. A Pragmatist outlook to design in-
quiry lays emphasis on the continuity of immediate experience. The 
Pragmatic view is often misinterpreted as being overly instrumental 
and used to make practice-based interpretations of research without 
empirical details. Yet, Pragmatism’s founders expressly stressed the 
creative character of human action that must be understood differ-
ently from a rational model of action (Joas, 1996). This emphasis 
has crucial implications for how design research and education, if 
focused on creativity, must be radically and explicitly empirical. In a 
Pragmatist view, this means starting with the concreteness of direct 
experience, which includes what is actually felt by the designer, and 
to some degree the ongoing relational sense of ‘self.’ 
The non-dualistic commitment of Classical Pragmatism, if 
more than loosely understood as practice-based, generally offers 
a research foundation for design not limited to abstractions and 
Cartesian doubt in terms of ‘problem situations.’ Returning to 
direct experience is foundational to a Pragmatist form of inquiry 
in terms of a continuity in “knowledge experience” as discussed 
in Pragmatist theory. This commonsense view promotes a holistic 
and emphatic approach to learning and approaching the world 
without the dualisms of art/science, practical/aesthetic, individual/
collective (that are obviously useful for many kinds of study and 
other contexts of inquiry). Instead, by understanding the continuity 
and integrality of perception and action, subjective sensations and 
feelings of making and doing are not subordinate to words, and 
furthermore, the latter cannot constitute the former. 
The designer, put into contact with qualities of meaning in 
experience, the intuitive ‘feel’ for things, and the emotional and 
self-reflexive tension of work has perceptually more freedom to 
explore and more reason to be empirically experimental. Thus, the 
plurality of the writings by all four of the founders of Pragmatism 
contributes to the philosophical platform in different respects as 
to why an aesthetic focus is so significant in design pedagogy, and 
moreover, for a self-directed and openness-capacity for action. 
Instead of the search for an essential nature of a design attitude or 
creativity, the strength of Pragmatism is that it calls for focus to 
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practically on how a designer seeks to answer questions, not just 
questions of usefulness and what works, but on how a designer 
actively manifests and surrenders a sense of ‘self ’ in relation to 
the world. A felt empathic approach to form-giving, including 
form-giving in social forms, will need to empirically address the 
physical and emotional dimensions of action, where “there is con-
tinuous movement between fixed and fluid states — holding things 
constant and letting them loose, and choosing to push things and 
letting them go” (Yoo, Boland Jr, & Lyytinen, 2006, p. 227).
On the ground, the pluralistic strength of Pragmatist meth-
odology is also its limitation. The theory is limited by the inter-
pretation and habits and patterns of the designer, and by how 
much he/she is willing to overcome tendencies toward dualistic 
thinking. Pragmatism opens up a necessary discussion about what 
a self-directed practice of design really means in terms of opening 
up to the kinds of experiences and values that designers want to 
manifest and give form to, and how they are educated to do so. It 
suggests that design research working in the social sphere should 
not reduce forms of action or lose the sense of resistance, tension, 
and existential mediation involved in a seeking safer ground and 
validation in objectivity. The Pragmatist lens opens up for con-
sideration the volitional and identity-oriented actions of design 
researchers and an understanding of design based on aesthetic 
experience and intrinsic values of self-exploration, discovery, and 
learning found within direct qualities of experience. 
This brings me to an important Pragmatist distinction, which 
is that awareness of an aesthetic experience of design should not 
be simply applied toward functionalizing the use of the body to 
design interactions, but should concern the designer’s own feeling 
and learning experience. The lessons provided in this thesis from 
the empirical work, while they offer a kind of description of what 
is experienced in form-giving, are not meant to serve to perform a 
function of “design” or as design skills. The experiences themselves 
also must be understood in connection with the intrinsic subjective 
experience of learning. This cannot be framed as or substituted 
with a functional paradigm. Those concrete experiences provided 
me with a time and space to explore and discover my own learn-
ing objectives. Such lessons must be experienced, in order to be 
understood as a capacity. 
A view of self-directed learning has to be more than an objec-
tive knowledge orientation of productivity. This form of learning 
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underlies a design epistemology and pedagogical view that in-
cludes subjectivity and a holistic view of human life happening in 
an environment. For example, one of the points of Shusterman’s 
(2012) perspective of someasthetics that becomes glossed over in 
a functionalist paradigm of education is that someasthetics offers 
a practical approach to personal cultivation or self-knowledge, 
as from traditions of meditation or Eastern philosophy, which 
contributes to one’s personal ability for a “disciplined, reflective, 
corporeal practice” (p. 45). The designer’s working habits, pat-
terns, feelings, and thoughts cannot be ignored but, in fact, should 
be brought out and reflected upon to provide the designer with 
insights into his his/her own process and body-mind awareness. 
Cultivating the designer’s sensibility, mastery of bodily capacities, 
and the ability to engage emotions and to tune in and focus on 
aesthetic qualities of experience should be an outcome of design 
education and not merely a means to an end.
The main takeaway from the Pragmatist aesthetic experience 
and this empirical research is that a reflective understanding of 
design fundamentally misses the subjective dimensions of awareness 
and willingness in how a designer chooses to discipline his/her craft 
in terms of the qualities of relations. The empirical lessons from a 
Pragmatic theoretical outlook emphasize that an aesthetic mode 
of inquiry is self-directed. It is a mode of perceptual action that 
happens at one’s own pace and in relation to one’s own purposes. 
This fact makes it crucial to remember that creativity cannot be 
reached merely by external objectives. The designer must be will-
ing to internalize what kinds of relations he/she wants to have to 
his/her practice. A relational view requires revisiting the aesthetic 
qualities of experience that constitute the actual giving of form 
in terms of an organization of energies or emotional rhythm and 
tone in social settings. 
Design research that aims to include the active, subjective 
side of experience has new thinking and practice ahead. By way of 
illustration, there are those in somatic practice who suggest that the 
tangibility of physical practices present the possibility for a “science 
of subjectivity” (Johnson, 2004, p. 118). I think this is an interesting 
point for design, since the Pragmatists also claimed that there are 
innumerable varieties of sense experiences that could fall under 
the purview of what we call “science.” Design research especially 
should not limit itself to the objective side of what can be “seen” 
(Pallasmaa, 1996) and to rational explanations of experience, but 
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learn to appreciate the significance of physical experience and the 
innumerable ways that is empirically sensed and felt. Perceptual 
awareness of feelings and qualities of experience require ‘designerly’ 
methods that are rigorous, disciplined, teachable, systematic, and 
also expressible. 
An Embodied Approach to Design Research
While this research can be seen as an extension of practice-based 
views of design, the embodied approach really makes evident the 
inadequacy of existing theoretical frameworks for studying the 
subjective dimensions in the physical activity of designing. The 
implications of pragmatism with regard to embodied experience 
here are primarily methodological instead of theoretical. Because 
this is an early attempt to address and connect different dimensions 
of an embodied approach to design, there is admittedly much more 
research required from within the field to develop these ideas. 
There are no significant studies available in design that address 
embodied experience from a direct experiential, artistic point of 
view. As one of the first studies in this respect, this research serves 
as an example of how close examination of immediate experience 
can lead to a more detailed discussion of the interrelations between 
what is considered practice-based research and the kinds of physi-
cal-mental capacities and strategies a designer trains and embodies. 
This research includes practical-aesthetic methods for engaging in 
artistic inquiry and the lessons that that form of inquiry teaches. 
Thus, one methodological contribution to an embodied perspec-
tive of design research here is in the turn to one’s own physical, 
material practice and learning concretely how to view something 
from a new perspective presumed by a “design attitude.”
I have specifically taken an approach of movement-based 
inquiry to turn my awareness to the intricacies of physical experi-
ence of form-giving, but there are many other ways to do this with 
material processes of making and crafting external to the body. 
This kind of research approach to explore the process of making, 
for example, has been raised as a perspective of “process aesthetics” 
and the experience of “making that cannot be reached with the 
outcomes of the process” (Falin & Falin, 2014, p. 11). These kinds 
of approaches draw on the imperceptible, tacit features of design-
ing, not just material outcomes, but the perception and action of 
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making and form-giving. Butoh as a method of movement impro-
visation gave me a first opportunity to employ a somatic technique 
and expressive form-giving outside of fields of design. The limita-
tions of Butoh with respect to design are largely due to the fact 
that the practice serves its own form of movement improvisation, 
with a particular ideology toward getting rid of social constraints. 
Its abstractness presents a practical challenge to trying to directly 
translate Butoh into a method within design as a field of study. 
Not taking Butoh methods formally, however, the art form 
reveals general lessons for aesthetic inquiry and how openness is not 
purely theoretical but physically achievable. Butoh demonstrates, 
for one, a pedagogical strategy specifically aimed toward personal 
creativity, since it puts a premium on both working experimentally 
and developing a personal expressive capacity. This strategy is de-
liberately directed to training a physical and sensorial awareness. It 
is not aimed at specific theoretical concepts, but how an integrated 
mode of thinking-feeling in the present is practically supported. In 
this respect, the responsibility is put on us as performers to learn 
our own habits, emotional capabilities, and ways of working in 
order to be able to change those.
To this point, there are concrete techniques that performers 
learn to deliberately and selectively keep their perception open 
in different ways. One example is that in some exercises, we con-
sciously work to not let our thoughts roam or pass to external 
labels or object categories, but instead to tune into the immediate 
kinesthetic and sense data like weight, verticality, gravity, volume, 
tension, stretch, release, timing, and spatial orientation of our 
movement and relations. This type of exercise of following impulses 
and playful instincts without suppression requires us to retrain 
our normal habits of attention. We have to practice responding 
freely with our bodies and get used to the sensation of erraticism, 
spontaneity, or feeling ‘out of control’ that that kind of unedited 
behavior brings. And although this feels unfamiliar due to social 
conditioning toward rational action, we find that we are not merely 
losing control, but we are shifting it (I discuss the continuity be-
tween control and surrender on p. 270). It takes disciplined practice 
to be present to this form of associative ‘wandering’ action and 
knowing specifically how to ‘let go’ of our familiar behavior, since 
we are not supposed to allow ourselves to revert to our normal 
ways of moving that feel familiar and/or ‘acceptable.’ 
This type of active training with body-mind integration builds 
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our awareness of sensations and feelings and streams of thought 
in the present. For example, we learn to sense discomfort as a 
signal of learning because as long as we are inclined to want to 
feel security and in control over what we are doing and the kinds 
of forms we produce, then we are not being with the sensation of 
exploration. It is difficult to develop new and expressive content 
if we are seeking security or being resistant to change. Therefore, 
we learn to not let our actions and behavior define our image of 
‘self.’ Nurturing an attentiveness to present sensation and emotional 
energy actually helps with a distancing of ‘self ’ from the perceived 
identification with external forms of movement. The performers 
question self-consciousness to see that actions and behaviors are 
malleable and that we have the capacity to embody a vast array of 
qualities and emotional energies that we do not typically see as part 
of our identity. When we learn to let go of a desire to control our 
identity or to look cool or interesting, our work can, in fact, can 
become both more objective and expressive. 
Butoh’s close attention to training this perceptive experience 
also makes obvious how much a self-directed capacity relies on 
cultivating trust in an individual way of working, and also how, in 
the empathy of that approach, there is a strong sense of trust built 
among performers. The personal capacity we each work on so as 
to be affected, to surrender aesthetic control, to meet the others 
halfway, to be uncomfortable, and to feel exposed comes with a 
sense of vulnerability. There has to be a willingness to show one’s 
vulnerability, which, at the same time, shows trust among one an-
other. This emphatic connection builds a social context of support 
and reassurance to be comfortable with the sensation of openness. 
Specifically, one-on-one partner work helps us become intimate 
with having to non-verbally exhibit trust to relax in one another’s 
presence. The Butoh art form, therefore, presents a contextual 
contingency for exploration that comes from the performers’ active 
willingness to show courage and to trespass fears. By creating an 
atmosphere where feeling exposed and vulnerable is encouraged, 
it allows performers to let go of established social norms and ex-
pectations in order to explore and play. Interpersonal trust fosters 
experimenting, going beyond, mucking around, not worrying, 
letting go of ‘reality,’ making mistakes, breaking habits, letting go, 
and lightening up. 
As a result, what experimental and radical practices like move-
ment improvisation can serve to exemplify is a more direct rela-
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tionship between self-directed capacity and trust. The content and 
form of the social context in which artistic practices are managed 
and practiced “influences the kind of meaning” and capacity for 
inquiry that designers are “likely to derive from the work” (Eisner, 
2002a, p. 27). In other words, the concern for embodied creative 
experience revolves a physical energy and dynamics of immediate 
experience so that managing for outcomes also means managing 
for mobility and feelingful content in the present. In the case of 
Butoh, emotional feelings of doubt, fear, and vulnerability require 
a social form that equally expresses and invites empathy, concern, 
acceptance, and tolerance toward one another’s process. 
I will briefly mention two other points about Butoh that 
come from its process-oriented approach and dismissal of dichot-
omies that are noteworthy for design research methods. The first 
concerns the possibility of questioning the existence of one’s ‘self,’ 
to train oneself to “drop the ego” or let one’s guard down to “meet” 
others, as opposed to a need for self-preservation. For instance, the 
design field is known for celebrating the celebrity personality of the 
designer and this places focus on the individual. But the backlash 
to this is to turn to collective forms of collaborative participatory 
design and consensus-building (Quental, 2015). There is not full 
consideration of the kinds of methods used and for what is lost by 
moving from the individual to take up diversity in teambuilding, 
cooperation, decentralization, open-source systems, and networks. 
Butoh demonstrates how, by specifically dealing with the intersec-
tion of self/no-self, there is a possibility of exploring the nuances 
of personal relations and manifestations of self-identity or ego 
in the designer’s work. Moreover, there are methods that can be 
used to corporally practice and exhibit empathy (a willingness to 
be moved). With all of this, there is potential to deeply question 
the presumed dichotomy between the individual and the collective 
in design. Butoh does not begin with this division. All the work 
is collective (in a group setting or as an aggregation of individual 
interests), but it is not necessarily collaborative (with a common 
goal). This integrative stance could open up fruitful investigation 
of self-directed capacity and the freedom to both develop individual 
projects and personal expression, as well as to collaborate at will. 
A second point is the way that the Japanese influence of aes-
thetics in Butoh revolves around the premise of embodying what 
would be thought of as mixed aesthetic qualities like spiky-gentle, 
dismal-splendor, sweet-melancholy, rough-tranquil, subdued-in-
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trusive. The precise focus on an aesthetic experience connected 
through intuition and perception offers interesting directions for 
design research to move away from dualistic thinking to more 
poetic interpretations. In current design discourse, for example, 
there is a predilection for taking up inverse descriptions to convey 
a concept (e.g., making/unmaking, learning/unlearning, managing/
unmanaging). While calling out either/or propositions functions 
to conceptually parse opposites, this is not particularly helpful in 
that these are already tacitly understood. Conveying a gestalt and 
‘feel’ found in relational experience means calling directly upon 
aesthetic associations. Sensed physical qualities operate directly 
to “turn our stomach” opposed to concepts of “disgustingness” 
(James, 1912/2003, p. 80), because qualities are not conceptual 
entities (M. Johnson, 2015, p. 28). This suggests that poetic and 
metaphorical methods of use of language, not purely in the ab-
stract, but tied to sensory perception and modes of interaction, can 
help refer back to qualities of aliveness and uncertainty rather than 
entities of possession. For example, the Japanese use methods of 
juxtaposition, assemblages, and bricolage to generate such dynamic 
types of perceptive experiences (Richie, 2007).
Implications of an Embodied Approach 
A contribution of this research is that it calls attention to the inte-
gral role of design research to influence design education. Given the 
dramatic changes the discipline has seen over past decades, design 
research is key to understanding and/or articulating methodolo-
gies and approaches used to teach and learn design with respect 
to particular philosophical outlooks. Design education should 
not just follow design practice and take up the tools and meth-
ods, but in some way, it is the responsibility of design research to 
critically reflect on the epistemological implications of those tools 
and methods (Buchanan, 1998). Design research is often ahead of 
the conditions of design practice and is in the position to make 
recommendations with philosophical bearings. 
For example, some design educators are calling for design 
programs to “move beyond basic aesthetics and ‘form giving’” to 
“participate in strategic planning, innovative product development, 
and interdisciplinary collaboration” (Kolko, 2005, p. 1). Especially 
in programs promoting design thinking, participatory, and tran-
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sciplinary design, is where it is suggested that design education 
supplement aesthetics and form-giving with business development 
and user-centered design (e.g., Kolko, 2005). These initiatives need 
to be scrutinized and considered for how they support aspects of 
an embodied creative practice and the kind of capabilities necessary 
to actually pursue qualitative experiences and not just technical 
expertise and skills directed at an industrialized view of education. 
A subversive result of holding on to objective methods, skills, and 
tools to conduct an activity and/or the intellectual apprehension of 
experience is an erosion of trust in the ability to be with discom-
fort, the uncertain, and to find and represent meaning through the 
non-instrumental aspects of human experience. There is a disregard 
for the “subjective,” sensitivity, and admission of idea-doubt when 
these aspects are part of an expressive process that involves a dis-
position of “letting come” and being able to surrender.
In particular, a pedagogical approach aimed toward a self-di-
rected capacity for exploring and learning raises issues surrounding 
the view of “knowledge” and behavior that is encouraged in the cur-
rent trend with visually-oriented and systems-oriented approaches 
in the fields of design. Many fields of design currently lack an ap-
preciation for artistic modes of thinking-feeling integration and the 
kind of aesthetic capacity that relies on a ‘feel’ for a design gestalt or 
wholeness through bodily perception. In many ways this has been 
implicitly assumed in design, but an understanding of how design’s 
aesthetic tradition explicitly contributes to designer’s self-directed 
capacity for creative inquiry seems necessary when, for some, the 
concept of design is understood to be dematerialized. Self-direction 
is timely when there is so much confusion in the field around what 
is ‘core to design’ and while design is being aimed more broadly 
at social learning situations and having a professed cultural rele-
vance amid today’s increasing economic complexity, the want for 
innovation, the fear of declining community participation, and the 
rise of a concern for sustainability (e.g., Fuad-Luke, 2009; Julier, 
2013; Manzini, 2014). Focusing on the use of sensory modalities 
and the basic ability to discern qualitative and expressive features 
of experience now becomes important in a social climate where 
designers and individuals are generally becoming more dependent 
on visualization, information technologies, and data-driven deci-
sion-making as bases for action. That is, turning inward to concrete 
experience as a source of expressive and creative action and to find 
meaning is increasingly valuable amid empty abstractions. 
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The embodied approach, like Pragmatism, is a return to an 
old way of thinking and doing. Relational concerns from the prag-
matic view present a living question of how to integrate design 
form-giving into the direct physical experience of human relations. 
Form-giving in design does not simply disappear at the level of the 
‘social.’ The areas of design that promote participation and collab-
oration should appreciate how qualities of action and perception 
are aesthetically oriented toward social experience and, in particu-
lar, empathy and trust. Expressive and nonverbal communicative 
qualities like gesture, demeanor, effort, and feeling underlie how 
we actually make and interpret intersubjective meaning (Bergen, 
2012). These are tangible, embodied experiences of form-giving. 
Just looking at the field of performing arts, for example, one sees 
how there are possibilities for embodying and materializing social 
concerns in aesthetic forms. 
One challenge to considering the embodied experience of 
form-giving is that currently in the design research community 
“there is a slight tendency in design research to also be mostly in-
terested in the final product” (Krogh et al., 2015, p. 42). Likewise, 
many designers want aesthetic control over design outcomes, since 
this is, in a sense, what they are trained to do. It not unreasonable 
to presume that many design researchers want to make things 
that look good, to have a sense of control over their self in that 
image, and to be cultural ambassadors of taste and style (Julier, 
2006; Tonkinwise, 2011). The fact that much of design research 
relies on interpretive “accounts” of the designer’s process instead 
of ideas of aesthetic judgment, which start with perceptual aware-
ness, is revealing of the commitment to a dualistic thinking. Part 
of the analytical focus in design is also related to how designers 
and design researchers learn to write about their decisions, choices, 
and understandings. Many important theories in design research 
make the case that there should be a more analytical and reflective 
methodology within design (Buchanan, 1995; Cross, 2006; Krip-
pendorff, 1989; Simon, 1969). Design research has not fully come 
to grips with the Pragmatic implication that the objective existence 
of design methods or designed artifacts alone does not discern 
what can be observed as design knowledge, taste, or style — that 
which is subjectively felt. 
Seeing skills and methods as objects generates misunderstand-
ings for design educators concerning what and how to train for 
general design sensibilities and judgments. By way of example, in 
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fields like interaction design one answer to this has been to train 
students in detailed methods of how to do to design in order to 
contribute to “the development of personal judgment of what is 
good design what is not” (Kuutti, 2009, p. 45). Clearer methods 
appear to offer more specific accounts of the kinds of things that 
designers do as part of personal judgments or decision-making, 
rather than something internal to designer. The design theorist 
Jeffery Bardzell (2011) frames this conflict in the following way:
 
Whereas user-centered design positions the designer in an 
almost passive position of discovering existing needs using 
scientific methods and then designing around and for what 
is discovered in that activity, traditional design activates 
the designer as a perceptive, insightful, and imaginative 
meaning-maker, an ability that is individualistic to a certain 
degree and dependent on judgment rather than data, and 
offers a radically different view of the foundations of a 
design problematic. (21.10.1)
 
Bardzell presents the struggle within the discipline that wants to 
prioritize the “subjective expertise of the designer — as an active 
meaning-maker and speculative reasoner” (21.10.1) as the founda-
tion of design and, at the same time, wants to address objective 
validations of ‘good’ or ‘bad.’ Of course in practice, as Bardzell 
clarifies, there is not “an exclusive opposition between expert judg-
ment-based approaches and methods” (21.10.1) but the tendency 
of design research to seek intellectual authority in formulating 
“knowledge problems” by abstraction and separation tends to 
legitimize scientific and/or industrial approaches to learning. This 
thereby influences design education to appeal to generating clarity 
and certainty in their approaches from similar values.
If design education is serious about creativity, reflection on 
the empirical qualities of relations of design has to happen at a 
deeper level than claiming a kind of pseudo-objectivity via methods 
for participation, systems, and infrastructuring processes in man-
agerial matters of design. An embodied approach cannot regard 
design methods and work as precious and absolute and have the 
design student learn them passively. It involves critically asking if 
designers themselves are trained to cope with the uncertainty of 
creative action. Practical concern must be for how to address the 
personal attitude, responsibility, and self-directed capacity of the 
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designer to seek and stretch his/herself outside of familiar terri-
tory, to be willing to engage emphatically, touching on emotional 
responses. To take the Pragmatist route, in experience itself the 
knowledge problem is a false problem. The answer is a matter for 
design research to be able to emphasize the learning experience 
over an analytical discussion that is favored in a view of “knowledge 
production.” Embodied, perceptive, and internal capabilities as 
part of undergoing an experience cannot be overlooked as part of a 
designer’s art-based training. This experience of meaning and ‘self ’ 
has to be given space in the design studio in an increasingly ratio-
nalized and deterministic approach to education (Danvers, 2003).
There is a lot that can be done toward building up areas of 
design as a field of study from an embodied perspective. But design 
communities truly focused on the empathetic and relational aspects 
of designing, and especially creativity and an openness-capacity, will 
only be furthered by research that dares to participate in an aesthetic 
approach and the empirical and subjective experience of action. 
Such exploratory research is going to have to be, in the embodied 
sense, comfortable with the uncertainty and ultimate indeterminacy 
that being present to the changing nature of reality brings. 
Implications of a Self-Directed Capacity  
for Design Education 
One major implication of openness and creativity as a self-directed 
capacity is that designers must actively show a willingness to take 
risks and present a ‘self ’ open to change and revision through action. 
So if there is a genuine interest in developing a openness-capacity 
in design education, there has to be some acknowledgement by 
the designer to critically call into question his/her practice and to 
take personal responsibility in a context where there are actually 
no objective criteria. To truly explore different modes of action, to 
try and fail, to experiment, and to dare to put oneself ‘out there,’ 
there has to be an artistic ability to surrender or ‘let go’ and to be 
with the sensation of not knowing where things are headed. As this 
research shows, this carries physical sensations of vulnerability, fear 
of failure, exposure, which are counteracted by the ability to show 
trust. Developing a sense of trust in one’s own way of working is 
actually to be without a safety net of methods by being able to apply 
personal judgment to concrete aesthetic qualities in lived experience. 
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One point about self-direction that should be emphasized 
is that it is not an individual focus on ‘self ’ from a notion of ra-
tional self-interest. Again, from an anti-dualistic perspective, this 
is about the designer’s ability and empathic attitude to focus on 
the quality of the experience of a design activity that is comprised 
of both internal and external relations. With that there must be a 
self-awareness and tuning into habits and emotional dimensions, 
which is not excessive introspection, but should be seen in terms of 
understanding where personal inhibitions, defensive patterns, and 
habits of thought stem from. This is an important part of manag-
ing a creative relationship with one’s process and being able to be 
explicit about actions that are taken and to call into question how 
relations are being perceived. It is also about overcoming a sense 
of ego or self-consciousness to have connection and partnership. 
Thus, a self-directed capacity for openness and trust is really the 
cornerstone of carrying out exploratory design collaborations.
 ‘Self ’ actually provides the link to an experience of creative 
action, rather than being pushed aside in favor of rational descrip-
tions of “creativity.” The experience of ‘self ’ and the freedom to act 
and create cannot be addressed from dualistic perspectives where 
the intellectual is isolated from physical and emotional experience, 
or where what gives the individual internal meaning and feeling and 
sense for inquiry is separated from just the doing. Discipline and 
emotion are not incompatible in experience, but it is because they 
are not addressed from an embodied perspective that it is not often 
recognized that working creatively requires an emotional dimension 
that is also intensely reflexive (Radford, 2004). Dewey (1922/2002) 
writes, “there is here no antagonism between creative expression and 
the production of results which endure and which give a sense of 
accomplishment” (p. 143). Openness is not unbridled creative free-
dom or the opinion that everything is relative, but it is wedded to an 
increased responsibility of ‘self ’ and to managing one’s behavior and 
action toward the unexpected and unforeseen. The designer must 
develop his/her own relation to inquiry and learning design through 
self-awareness of his/her own limitations, capacities, interests, moti-
vations, and aesthetic judgment. This requires not just drawing from 
objective means, abstract data, and “thinking,” but turning inward 
and focusing on experience and emotional connections. This is how 
the designer can be expected to define and find personal motivation 
for meaningful possibilities for action and critique, and not simply 
serve the client’s wishes or ‘business as usual.’ 
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An argument made in this work is that the nature of a self-di-
rected approach is rooted in the embodied approach of art educa-
tion (Edström, 2008). While there is no single vision of the aims 
of design education, the results of this research contribute to a 
pedagogical perspective grounded in the distinctive values of art 
and design. In many ways, the arts-based tradition of learning by 
doing can be viewed as an active, relational approach that does not 
reduce experience, but takes part in its indeterminacy and continual 
change. This perspective is still a large part of design education and 
it has much to say about why design is actually valued as a means 
for creativity, risk-taking, exploration, and a meaning-framing ac-
tivity in other contexts of inquiry, but often overlooked because 
of how designers talk about their work through an objective lens.
An embodied view resists the current trend toward ‘scientific’ 
management of objective qualities in the sense of “quality assur-
ance” by standards, principles, or methods to stand in for what is 
‘good’ or ‘bad.’ Instead, the designer’s self-direction involves how 
he/she wants an experience to feel in order to evaluate and coordi-
nate his/her own experience through aesthetic experience of action, 
not merely as a rationalized process. This relies on tuning into 
and being able to describe what qualities one is specifically talking 
about and what ‘good’ or ‘bad’ empirically means in relation to a 
particular context and intent that has an embodied, aesthetic ‘feel’ 
for form. The designer will have to go beyond stating and not be 
afraid to express his/her feelings.
The qualitative shift to self-direction rests in a combination 
of an aesthetic vocabulary, or way of talking about emotional 
relations, and a sensory ‘feel’ and training with that aesthetic sen-
sibility and the trust to apply it. I elaborate these two aspects 
further as some preliminary recommendations for educational 
research in design. 
Vocabulary: Going Beyond the “Tacit”
As discussed in earlier chapters, in the field of design, design knowl-
edge has been maintained as a form of practical or tacit knowledge 
that cannot be made explicit. An implication of this research is 
that it is critical for design research to look beyond the ‘object’ of 
knowledge, or rest on a practice-based view of design, and actu-
ally tackle what seeking and inquiry feel like, how those work in 
experience. Even referring to “reflection-in-action” does not give 
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enough articulation and shading to the perceptual, sensorimotor 
processing happening within the body and which can be discussed 
as concrete, tangible, aesthetic information. Designers are notori-
ous for struggling to put words to what design is. But as long as 
they rely on the kinds of descriptions and terms that generalize their 
“knowledge” from an outside viewpoint, it actually keeps design 
tethered to a need for objective justification and being assimilated 
to mental images of “thinking” or a design process. 
These terms do not sufficiently allow for the kind of detailed 
training designers receive in aesthetics and perceptual awareness in 
an arts-based tradition. Instead, because this kind of perceptual, 
sensorial processes cannot be “seen” or made explicit, really be-
cause it is not given a vocabulary in a context of rationality, there 
is increasing fear that design attitude and creativity will become 
a loose idea like creative thinking. This has much to do with the 
impression of creativity as occurring in some mysterious realm or 
with the personality of an unreflective, unbridled, autonomous 
‘free spirit.’ Designers must be encouraged to develop an ade-
quate aesthetic vocabulary to express the emotional and visceral 
content of their physical conditions. This internal awareness of 
design experiences must be critically reflected upon by designers. 
However, there is little discussion about how the design researcher 
organizes information based on an intuitive and inferential feel 
for direct qualitative aspects and being very concrete and specific 
about those. 
For example, in Butoh we use reflective discussion to connect 
back to the ‘feel’ of the work and describe our emotional responses 
and psycho-physical sources of movement, rather than logical ex-
planations. This is different from my architectural training, where 
there was a strong emphasis on articulating our projects from an 
observational perspective and in terms of various theories, concepts, 
and programmatic requirements. But the forms I developed were 
based in the aesthetic, the feel, and sensation of the relations. I 
actually learned to design a building from a parti, which refers to 
the organizing concept of the design. It is presented in a simple 
sketch of form and movement, which means it is about directly 
conveying qualities of spatial relationships that communicate an 
aesthetic concept, which includes an emotional and ‘felt’ sensation 
of relations, rather than reducing a concept to words. It is intended 
to have a metaphorical clarity and a sense of artistic intent that helps 
drive the wholeness, form, or gestalt of the design. 
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As the parti shows, there is a form of aesthetic judgment and 
sensitivity learned in my architectural training for an expression of 
qualities of experience that becomes lost at a ‘higher level’ abstrac-
tion of architectural design. Given how we relate through both 
form and content, designers should qualitative and metaphorical 
descriptions that allow them to tune and refer back to their actual 
experiences and to their “sensory intentions” (Pallasmaa, 1996, 
p. 49), instead of doggedly aligning to certain philosophical dis-
courses and dualistic frames. The changing feelings and sensations 
in the making, organizing, and moving through perceptive qualities 
is what helps discern and clarify patterns, images, metaphors, and 
emotional content. This dynamic is what helps the designer realize 
an overall gestalt or emotional tone. 
Training: A Specificity with a ‘Feel’ of Experience 
Taking into account the above points, a key artistic ability here is 
sensitivity toward one’s own bodily condition and specifically being 
able to be affected or moved. Evidence from this research suggests 
that practically introducing somatic training with listening to the 
body and developing awareness in the phenomenological present 
should help designers to think and feel in emotional and qualita-
tive terms, as much as in formal ones. This internal awareness is 
where the designer learns to physically sense when he/she is stuck 
or trapped by inhibitions, habits, insecurities, preconceptions, or 
tendencies to action. At the same time, it is where one challenges 
a sense of ‘self,’ to change habits and move past fears. Therefore, 
using the body should not feel ‘silly’ or unfamiliar, but should 
be understood as the source for designers to imaginatively play, 
learn, and explore the world. Bodily behavior is how the designer 
opens him/herself to the potential breadth and depth of experience, 
to pain, kindness, liveliness, sensuality, and poetry. This open-
ness-capacity is where the designer’s creative process is expanded, 
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by acquiring more tolerance for and expression of different kinds 
of emotions and bodily behavior. 
The empirical lessons also show how important an embodied 
learning process is to building awareness of one’s own “tools” or 
way of doing and making. This self-awareness, a personal objec-
tivity to one’s own process, is necessary as a creative ability for the 
artist to know when he/she needs to focus, to be exhausted, to get 
some fresh air, to relax, or to push him/herself to be uncomfortable. 
The designer can develop “tools” as part of a self-directed approach 
and to ultimately self-manage his/her physical process. This moves 
away from a scientific management need to visualize a creative 
process through models or steps, and towards being able to ‘rest 
assured’ in a state of trust in one’s own ability (Edström, 2008).
For example, the kind of bodily form of trust with the process 
in Butoh, particularly an awareness of one’s own bodily experience, 
is very similar to something that I learned in my architecture studio 
training. By using the process of form-giving to explore how to 
make ideas available to the senses, in architecture we cultivated and 
relied on our bodily perception to materially express, reexamine, and 
question our relations to the world. The mantra in my architecture 
courses to “trust the process” expressed the idea that physical actions 
are a way of working through thoughts. “Trust the process” reflects 
this same comfort with the body and with a physical process that is 
uncertain as in Butoh. My architecture professors encouraged the 
students, just like my Butoh teachers, to experiment, play, make 
mistakes, to see accidents as new material, and to not be concerned 
with the outcome. This attitude is reflected in discussions of the 
way that design practitioners embrace open-endedness and a kind 
of “let’s see how it goes” approach (Michlewski, 2008) and the way 
that it is said that the designer learns by “tackling problems rather 
than acquiring theory then applying it” (Lawson, 2005, p. 156). 
The focus on movement and change magnifies the tempo-
rality of the form-giving experience and that awareness and the 
concreteness of the quality of openness. When I must practice 
keeping my posture and demeanor movable and elastic, while 
having an attitude of “letting things come” without discrimination, 
this is not a static faculty or innate ability but requires constant 
physical-mental work and discipline. It should be thought of like 
training or exercise, rather than in conceptual terms. Training to 
show empathy, to continually see where I can be stretched and 
challenged, and to have a connection with others and/or the sur-
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roundings makes it important to recognize that internal sensations 
and a sense of openness are, in fact, detailed and able to be con-
sciously identified, articulated, and therefore nurtured, cared for 
and given space and time to be practiced. 
The Present
In particular, the experience of physical sensation in the present 
without relying on naming or trying to determine or force relations 
is what really allows designers to trust — to trust their senses and 
to trust in their own physical emotional processes when there is 
no objective validation. Direct experience — here and now — is the 
space where a designer can actually be less fearful of distinctions 
between right and wrong, but let him/herself be in and learn from 
the ambiguity that is experience. It is the time and space where 
there is possibility for action. Dewey’s (1934) thesis is a reminder 
that art is a matter of when it happens more than of what it is. 
Turning attention toward the qualities of the immediate present 
and being able to pursue and explore that experience aesthetically, 
instead of only having the pressure of a future or externalized pur-
pose, is key to designers being able to learn to be with sensations 
and feelings that are not always nameable but are knowable. This 
is when it comes to terms with the changing, impermanence of 
experience. This space for uncertainty and the emphasis on the 
present is where designers will be able practically counteract the 
drift towards an overly narrow cognitive and rational approach to 
viewing design “knowledge.”
Further Research
As basic research into an embodied view of experience, this project 
brings to bear the Pragmatist perspective of embodied experience 
and Pragmatist insights on subjectivity in inquiry to design. As 
far as I have found, this embodied perspective is relatively new 
territory in terms of design research and theory. It should be fur-
thered as a theoretical and practical means to aid designers in an 
aesthetic-based foundation for their inquiry. 
Addressing all the applied implications of this for design 
practice is outside the scope of this project. Instead, it should be 
generally seen that with the embodied perspective there is potential 
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for incorporating a descriptive aesthetic vocabulary with practical 
exercises, like perceptual awareness and emotional reflexivity, into 
design research. This research specifically introduces movement as 
a methodological strategy for this type of approach. 
The pedagogical view of pragmatism, if not reduced to an in-
strumental view but grounded in radical empiricist stance, provides 
an alternative perspective to the way in which learning is typically 
conceptualized in terms of skills. This Pragmatist sensitivity em-
braces the holistic and emotional development of the designer to 
learn in and from the experience of designing. By implication it 
suggests how important empathic and expressive ways of inquir-
ing are to design, especially if design as a field of study takes on 
an artistic domain of inquiry. In the long run it will be critical for 
design research to establish how practical ways of working with 
emotion and feeling build a foundation for self-directed learning 
and a sense of trust in design practice. 
The empirical lessons of this research raise an elemental issue 
for the field of design about what arts-based inquiry with an aes-
thetic focus really brings to design education. For one, the embod-
ied approach challenges the tacit assumption in design research that 
does not question the empirical basis of design as practice-based 
phenomenon of “knowledge creation.” Design researchers must 
be explicit in how and what they do and undergo is ‘designerly’ or 
creative or open. Determining what is ‘designerly’ can only come 
from action. It is tied to form-giving and the creative sensations of 
searching, exploring and wandering, or to following the curiosity, 
impulse, spontaneity, impermanence, and unpredictability of bodily 
experience not limited to what we can say. 
That said, it is imperative that designers continue to show and 
describe how form in their practice is not only a matter of objects, 
but also a kinesthetic and perceptual experience that is embodied. 
The embodied experience advanced here is critical to how design 
relates to the kind of skills and abilities coming from training as 
a designer. First, embodiment puts emphasis on the subjective, 
internal relations of an experience felt by the designer, which also 
points to the relevance of working through feelings and emotions 
by using sense modalities. Being attentive to how to open up and 
sense qualities will affect how the meaning of design form-giving 
is expressed. Second, embodiment raises the possibility for action 
in the face of uncertainty and voluntary movement as a source of 
immediate spontaneity. This makes it important to expose and 
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discuss design inquiry and aesthetic ways of acting, creating and 
learning, not just observing and finding out how things work. 
“Embodied meaning-making” (Scarinzi, 2015), or how it is to 
make, create, do and what that feels like as the subject, is where 
the designer’s expertise is based. 
While Pragmatism relates design to an “epistemology of an 
expert subject” in the form of “disciplined embodied practices” 
(Bardzell, 2011, 21.10.2), there are any number of other artistic 
methods that could contribute to an aesthetic and relational orien-
tation to design. In general, from the perspective of an embodied 
mind thesis, a more creative application of bodily behavior and 
emotions in exploring experience is assumed to contribute to a 
designer’s expansion and refinement of perceptual, imaginative, and 
expressive abilities. Here is where it will be helpful for researchers 
to unpack how specific methods and different forms of experiential 
and sensory training with awareness, bodily perception, and use 
of emotions can extend and enhance current design approaches. 
I think that the somatic route is promising for further de-
veloping some of the ideas touched on in this work, including 
empathic relations to others and environment, opening the per-
ception of ‘self,’ and aspects of temporality and the present. Besides 
movement improvisation, for example, there are numerous forms 
of somatic practice and performing arts that offer practical exer-
cises in introspection, mindfulness, somatic awareness, focusing, 
personal expression, somaesthetics (e.g., Johnson, 2004; Langer, 
2014; Shusterman, 2014; Stanley, 2012) that would serve future 
design research. Beyond this, particular concepts like ‘resonance,’ 
‘rhythm,’ and ‘phrasing,’ for example, could be developed method-
ologically to help designers think temporally, improvisationally, 
and about form in terms of moving qualities of perception and 
emotional progression (e.g., Atienza & Sand, 2016; Höök, 2010; 
Lussier-Ley & Durand-Bush, 2009). In terms of the form of the 
research document, where I took a safe route by using a scientific 
structure, this could be integrated more succinctly from an aes-
thetic and expressive approach through performative, architectural, 
choreographic, poetic, and dramaturgical structures. Philosophical 
works like Rhythmanalysis by Henri Lefebvre (2004) or Gestures 
by Vilém Flusser (2014), for example, draw attention to the inter-
relations of body and movement and space and time and open up 
for styles and forms of non-linear analysis that are expressive of 
the transaction between the world and the one doing the analysis.
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Moreover, an embodied view could benefit from other philo-
sophical perspectives such as feminist theory and other postmodern 
theories that challenge essentialist views. These offer promising ave-
nues with regard to other vocabularies and methodologies for sub-
ject/object integrations and ongoing materializations of the world. 
They could provide a more critical stance and complex readings of 
relations of power, legitimacy, identity, the personal, economics, 
industry and so on. The question to continually ask will be what 
such terms methodologically do and how to help connect with the 
continuity of experience rather than analytical abstractions. Walking 
as a method of movement, for one example, has long been utilized 
among philosophers and scholars (Benjamin, 1968; Certeau, 1984; 
Guattari, 2014), artists (Debord, 2006; Schaub, 2005; Thoreau, 
1862/2010), and has been more recently tested in other fields of re-
search as a theoretical approach to embodied engagement, sensory 
experience, and memory (e.g., Pink, 2015; Schine, 2010; Stevenson, 
2014). In this respect, there are an infinite number of frames of 
human behavior that do not rest on a dualism of internal/external 
‘reality,’ but provide examples of perceptual play and imagination 
in connecting with our surroundings. 
I see this thesis as a first step in my practice as a researcher 
with which I have been trying to become clearer in my philo-
sophical stance and approach to design while also trying to place 
where I stand in a professional field of activity with other design 
researchers. Noted previously, there are numerous individual design 
and architecture researchers exploring methods to multisensory 
and embodied experience (e.g., Höök, 2010; McLean, 2016; Orru, 
2016; Vaughan, 2006), but their research is not specifically aimed 
toward a view of design pedagogy. In this respect, there are many 
examples of contemporary artists working at the intersection of art 
and pedagogy (see Bishop (2012) on pedagogic projects), and to my 
knowledge there are some examples of academics philosophically 
engaged with experimental pedagogical formats and exchanging 
creative/artistic practices such as SenseLab in Montreal. Coming 
to the end of my studies, I now see that there needs to be contin-
ued investigation for more examples and approaches, including 
historical ones, to education that includes social, ‘managerial’, or 
subject-oriented forms of learning and creating. This would help 
to philosophically connect the subjective learning experience of 
form-giving to a vision of design as an aesthetic discipline and 
self-directed learning regardless of the production of particular 
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outcomes or the use of particular materials. One next step in my 
practice will be to test my recommendations by trying to create 
new forms/models of design that integrate embodied approaches, 
emotional and somatic intelligence, and/or sensory awareness. 
Final remarks
The point of this research is to help provide philosophical ground-
ing for the artistic origins of design and equally for design as an 
embodied and creative practice. This work begins to shine a light 
on the different aesthetic dimensions of designing, particularly 
the feel and the physical and emotional aspects in the activity of 
form-giving. It contributes to basic design research on creative 
action and focuses predominately on the quality of an experience 
of openness or exploration, rather than the outcome of creativity. 
Consequently, this research offers an early example of embodying 
exploration and creativity in experience and the ideas explored here 
hopefully inspire other design researchers to have the courage to 
explore the unfamiliar, to express their own learning process, and 
to address matters of the heart. 
Secondly, the embodied perspective should be seen as a call 
to action for design researchers and educators who are interested 
in supporting creativity. It shows how philosophically and me-
thodically there must be a turn to the inner experience of what 
creativity entails in empirical design conditions. The learning im-
plications of an embodied, aesthetic approach to exploration and 
action are tremendous. The embodied thesis ultimately represents 
a shift in worldview for design from an objective stance to include 
a subjective, internal one. Referring back to Table 1 (p. 289), this 
approach turns on the relation between the designer and his/her 
own creative development and is founded upon a philosophical 
perspective of learning from experience and the continuity of that 
experience. This, in turn, relies on the opportunity to engage with 
self-direction, trust, compassion, and a sense of empathy toward 
others in the intimacy of firsthand relations. Our encounters cannot 
be solely determined by rational intellect, but some form of somatic 
and emotional intelligence, an aesthetic sensitivity and expressive-
ness, is necessary to create embodied meaning (M. Johnson, 2007). 
In this view, it is really the appreciation for feeling that marks 
our humanity and the qualities of action that are “warm and sym-
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pathetic” (Dewey, 1928/1981, p. 30). Nurturing feeling and the 
freedom to choose how to act will not provide easy conditions 
for comfort or certainty. An embodied approach, thus, requires 
designers to trust in their own capacities for action enough to be 
willing to surrender and open themselves up toward learning and 
shaping new experiences with uncertainty. This capacity, what I call 
openness-capacity, is crucial, given the recognition that much of 
education, design and arts education included, is headed toward 
external learning objectives and frameworks to seek solutions and 
generic terms of “quality assurance” (Skelton, 2012). This research 
starts to outline how openness-capacity, which actually depends 
on aesthetic sensibilities and trust, is critical in developing any 
kind of self-direction in one’s own learning process. Self-direction 
is consistent with an artistic ability of finding expressive, sensual, 
and poetic ways to construct and find meaning (Eisner, 2002a). 
Basically it is an artistic way of learning from experience that inte-
grates thinking and feeling. 
The critical point here is that the current calls for design re-
search to turn to more methodological rigor, the adoption of ‘lan-
guage games,’ and the dependence on rhetorical value to legitimize 
design’s form of inquiry all miss an opportunity for artistic views 
of design education and the designer’s embodied “capacity to rest 
assured in the intimate and in the work process” (Edström, 2008). 
The danger is that the more that design educators and researchers 
endorse strategic compliance and feelings of comfort in external 
evaluations, the more they devalue specific and fundamental aspects 
of designer’s embodied approach and ability for creative action. 
The externalized accountability for action narrows the designer’s 
internal creative capacity for openness and feelings of being com-
fortable with discomfort, insecurity, and vulnerability.
The question that design educators and research need to be 
asking is if design should be adopting industry and management 
methods of problem-solving and decision-making or if it should be 
developing self-directed capacities of exploration and innovation. 
The arts and arts-based education is one of the few places left in 
our institutions in which embodied practice and open-endedness in 
the ability to choose what to do is still explicitly exercised. Creative 
action requires going into the unknown with aliveness, emotion, 
and curiosity. This highlights why learning through the arts and 
training aesthetic sensibilities like listening to intuition, develop-
ing emotional reflexivity, and following an ‘inner rudder’ are so 
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important to dealing with many contexts of study (Eisner, 2002a). 
An artistic approach integrates subjective awareness, sensitivity, 
and feeling into how to take action. Subjective content is taken 
with the giving of form. 
Artistic views of design cannot take inner sensations of explo-
ration and openness for granted in a research turn to more mana-
gerial frames and objective process-based methodologies. Rather 
than assuming scientific views of knowledge, practice-based design 
research will need to be specific and concrete in artistic capacities 
as part of an aesthetic approach to inquiry. Especially with respect 
to inquiry and self-direction, design education should also focus 
on artistic forms of pedagogy that support the designer’s abilities 
to work with sensory and emotional awareness in the present, 
the ability to transcend the ‘self,’ and to ultimately build trust and 
comfort in an aesthetic way of working. 
In the bigger picture, as we culturally turn more and more 
to externalized forms of accountability for our own experiences, 
we are experiencing a crisis in our capacities of emotional intelli-
gence, self-management, mindfulness, and moral will (Goleman, 
1995; Langer, 1997; Schwartz & Sharpe, 2010). Externally deter-
mined “quality assurance” and fears of getting things ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’ overreach into our inner worlds and embodied abilities 
to self-determine and specify different aesthetic qualities of ex-
perience. People feel fear and anxiety with regard to their own 
decision-making and even struggle to recognize what they are 
feeling in situations (Gendlin, 2003). Furthermore, work stress, 
constant distractions, and the pursuit of an end diminish our ability 
to focus in the present. Being able to be present, relax, and open 
is critical to the quality of attention that a creative “flow” and the 
emergence of new associations and thought patterns thrive on 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Goleman, 2013). There is a space of time 
needed to be physically without the security of labels and to find 
‘felt’ meaning through what we do and make (Dewey, 1934/2005).
Our basic loss of the value and practicality of our senses and 
even the sense of ‘self ’ is comparable to the warnings issued by the 
Pragmatist philosophers a century ago. They pointed out that a 
cultural emphasis on what is identifiable and measurable is to the 
detriment of lived experience. For example, the trend today toward 
technocratic and deterministic approaches to education (Danvers, 
2003), and similarly the excessive reliance on rules and incentives 
in our institutional conditions, are said to dehumanize activities 
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and deprive students of the opportunity to exercise their own self 
will to action (Schwartz, 2011). Withdrawing from learning in the 
present essentially squelches curiosity and capacity for action that 
is alive with “purpose and desire” (Dewey, 1928/1981, p. 30). This 
is essentially Dewey’s (1922/2002) argument for self-management 
and learning from experience that was raised by Schön (1983). 
The field of design, principally if wanting to promote explo-
ration and creativity, should be moving in the direction toward 
embodied capacities and artistic form-giving and the aesthetic 
methods to make abstract ideas concrete. This comes from an inte-
grative wholeness of experience that does not disembody subjective 
feelings and emotions from action. The creative will for explorative 
and empathetic participation with the world involves an internal 
openness-capacity. This cannot come from mechanically imposed 
methods of organization and separatist terms, but rather comes 
from feelings of trust and intuition and the willingness to surren-
der to the sensuality of the ineffable. In the end, popular themes 
in design today like sustainability and innovation, or speculative, 
fictional agendas will not matter very much without trust and value 
in the designer’s own senses. To make change, to act upon what is 
felt, and to pursue subjective interests and expressive qualities of 
experience beyond those that are comfortable and safe, but that 
are new and varying, necessitate an openness and willingness to 
change. Embracing failure, internally identifying the sources of dis-
comfort and/or sources of curiosity, and being with the uncertainty 
of the work process are critical parts of creative development in the 
arts. It will be crucial for design research to take on aesthetic expe-
rience, and really the dynamics, imagination, and unpredictability 
of the present, to continue to broaden artistic understanding and 
practices of exploration and learning within the field of design. 
Lastly, in terms of my own openness-capacity for artistic in-
quiry, I had to experiment methodologically with ways to challenge 
myself in order to feel a sensation of exploration and being in the 
unknown. In the same way, I had to be able to sense where my 
own habits of thought come from and how to practice ‘letting go’ 
of those to face my vulnerabilities and fears. By seeking a quality 
of openness in inquiry, the how and when that quality of openness 
can take shape in experience is a finding of this research. In my 
case, I found a quality of openness in my design approach through 
Butoh method and specifically within the integrated experience of 
the present. Somatic practice became a way for me to explore and 
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connect with the present without the overwhelming concern for 
producing an outcome. Likewise, the present became a way for me 
to make space for experience, an inner space, without necessarily 
creating an artifact. 
In my work I kept returning to Dewey’s (1934/2005) point 
that part of the artistic experience is about expressing that oppor-
tunity for “movement” in thinking, a sense of “roominess” and 
“a chance to be, live and move” (p. 217). Perhaps coming from 
architecture, it follows that I would be intensely curious about 
space and “roominess” and how that perception of space can be 
achieved in experience. But finding such freedom in the “space of 
time” reminds me that, as a designer, I must learn to make a habit 
of valuing the uniqueness of the here and now and to be alive and 
alert with an aesthetic quality of openness. 
To go back to a Pragmatist outlook, an embodied approach, 
by integrating the ‘self,’ invites a way to find personal meaning in 
inquiry. It turns on the actual feeling of exploration that is rooted in 
existential concerns, the living doubt and questioning and seeking 
of experience. It also offers a stance toward an aesthetic dimension 
of living where parts of human experience can and must be left 
unsaid just like “every work of art must have about it something 
not understood to obtain its full effect” (Coleridge as quoted by 
Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 202). This involvement in experience is not 
about acquiring or proving anything, but entails surrendering to 
the poetry of that which is unknowable and impermanent. Pragma-
tism ultimately offers a philosophical platform for design research 
to be able explore how design can help us understand who we are, 
to express feelings and ideas that words cannot, and to enhance 
one’s own sense of ‘self ’ through the freedom to explore and the 
desire to create. 
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Svensk sammanfattning
Att förkroppsliga öppenhet
Ett pragmatistiskt utforskande  
av den estetiska upplevelsen av  
gestaltande i design
Bakgrund
Detta forskningsprojekt har utvecklats ur mitt intresse för design 
som en konstnärlig, kreativ process. Med denna utgångspunkt 
ifrågasätter jag en syn på kunskap grundad i observation, vilken do-
minerar designforskningen idag. Detta synsätt begränsar förståelsen 
av design genom att fokusera på den reflektiva, medvetna erfaren-
heten som distinkt och separerad från en fenomenologisk, estetisk 
känsla av upplevelsen. Det har också praktiska konsekvenser för den 
kunskapssyn som förs fram i designteori, och i förlängningen för 
hur en ”designattityd”, som står för öppenhet och kreativitet, lärs 
ut i designutbildningar. 
Design som förhållningssätt till kreativitet beskrivs allt oftare 
som en speciell ”attityd”, eller ett ”mind-set”. Denna attityd utmärks 
av ett öppet förhållningssätt som tillåter många olika sätt att se och 
förstå en situation (Boland & Collopy, 2004; Michlewski, 2008). 
Vidare karaktäriseras den, enligt designlitteraturen, av tolerans för 
mångtydighet, ett experimentellt och utforskande förhållningssätt, 
öppenhet för risktagande, en förmåga att hantera komplexitet och 
omfamna det icke sammanhängande, samt en öppen form av ab-
duktion (Boland & Collopy, 2004; Brown, 2008; Buchanan, 1992; 
Dorst, 2011; Hassi & Lakso, 2011; Michlewski, 2008). Forskare har 
också påpekat att möjligheten att tänka och handla fritt och vara 
öppen för förändring för att inte begränsa den kreativa processen, 
utgör viktiga aspekter av vad som gör design meningsfullt för 
designer (Dorst, 2011; Michlewski, 2008).
Det uppstår ett spänningsförhållande inom designpraktiken 
när designer marknadsför design som en kreativ process frikopplad 
från materialitet och gestaltning (exempelvis genom koncept som 
”designtänkande”), samtidigt som själva praktiken utgår ifrån ett 
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kroppsligt förhållningssätt till det egna hantverket (Tonkinwise, 
2011). Designer söker legitimitet för sin praktik inom företag och 
offentlig sektor, sammanhang som ofta kräver objektiv validitet 
för beslutsfattande, och försöker därför att konceptuellt klargöra 
vad design är eller gör. Men dessa försök att externalisera och ver-
balisera design för att enkelt kunna kommunicera dess värde leder 
ofta till missförstånd av de kroppsliga, estetiska dimensionerna av 
designarbete som är centrala för gestaltning. 
Detta spänningsfält inom designers praktik återspeglas i det 
förhållningssätt inom forskningen som försöker förstå de estetiska 
och emotionella dimensionerna av design genom att observera och 
beskriva dem inom ramen för rationella paradigm. Utifrån ett sådant 
reflektivt synsätt begränsas design till en snäv version av rationell 
erfarenhet som endast kan undersökas i termer av vad som kan 
studeras objektivt och beskrivas konceptuellt. Den roll som den 
estetiska upplevelsen spelar, olika aspekter av sinnesförnimmelser, 
känslor och intuition i det gestaltande designarbetet, har inte studer-
ats i någon större utsträckning inom designforskningen. Kroppsliga 
dimensioner av den empiriska upplevelsen av designarbete, eller de 
estetiska aspekterna av detta arbete, har därför inte heller fått någon 
större uppmärksamhet. Det saknas därför väl grundad förståelse 
inom designforskningen för vad och hur designer faktiskt lär sig 
gestaltning utifrån en konstnärlig grund så att mening och kvaliteter 
av upplevelser uttrycks och förkroppsligas. Sådan kunskap är dock 
viktig eftersom utforskandet av kreativa handlingar genom upple-
velsen specifikt involverar känslor av osäkerhet (Langer 1989/2014). 
Forskningsfrågor
Det finns således viktiga aspekter av den kroppsliga upplevelsen 
av designers gestaltningsarbete som inte kan hanteras med tradi-
tionella forskningsmetoder som utgår ifrån Cartesianska subjekt/
objekt distinktioner och analytiska kriterier för att skilja mellan 
olika upplevelser. Detta projekt utgår istället ifrån en kroppslig 
ansats och den inre perceptuella upplevelsen av att gestalta. Istället 
för att reducera förmågan till ”öppenhet” till en statisk attityd eller 
ett mind-set, fokuserar jag i detta projekt på att försöka uppleva 
känslan av ”öppenhet” och utforska vad detta innebär i termer 
av min egen upplevelse och kvaliteterna av relationerna i denna 
upplevelse. Det kreativa utforskandet som är källan till skapande 
och lärande utgår ifrån görandet (Mead 1934/1967), vilket bygger 
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på en icke-dualistisk syn på upplevelsen. Kort sagt, för att uppleva 
kontinuiteten av relationer krävs en kroppslig ansats.  
För att konkretisera den kroppsliga perceptuella upplevelsen, 
inriktar jag mig på gestaltning som anses vara en central kompetens 
inom designpraktiken (Hjelm, 2009). Jag bedriver grundläggande 
forskning för att utforska konstnärlig kreativitet genom upplevelse 
och ställer följande forskningsfrågor: 
Hur kan jag erfara öppenhet från ett kroppsligt perspektiv? 
- Hur kan jag konceptuellt förstå och förkroppsliga 
kontinuiteten av upplevelsen, d.v.s. en integrerad 
tänka-känna upplevelse av medvetandet? 
- Hur kan jag metodologiskt utforska ett kroppsligt 
perspektiv utifrån en relationell ontologi, d.v.s. 
genom aktivt relaterande i fysiska möten med 
omvärlden? 
- Vad betyder detta specifikt för design som en konst-
närlig förmåga som har en kvalitet eller attityd av 
öppenhet? 
Teoretiskt ramverk
John Deweys bok Art as Experience (1934/2005) utgör ett viktigt 
bidrag till filosofin om konsten och dess relation till upplevelsen/
erfarandet. Deweys tes, vilken spelar en central roll i detta arbete, är 
att analytiska teorier om estetik står i motsats till estetisk upplevelse. 
Det senare involverar en perceptuell kontinuitet av relationer, sek-
venser av ”råa” sensationer vilka endast står att finna i upplevelsen, 
och specifikt i den direkta, icke-objektifierade upplevelsen. 
Deweys vision av konst som upplevelse speglar den filosofiska 
rörelse han var en del av, som har sina rötter i det sena 1800-talets 
USA, den klassiska pragmatismen. Denna tradition inkluderar 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839 –1914), William James (1842 –1910), 
John Dewey (1859 –1952) och George Herbert Mead (1862 –1931), 
och är känd för att bryta ner traditionella filosofiska distinktioner 
genom att hävda det direkta erfarandet som grunden för all kun-
skap. En av pragmatisternas centrala utgångspunkter är att tänkande 
är kroppsligt förankrat, och utgår ifrån en icke-reducerande syn 
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på mänskligt erfarande. Detta innebär att känslan av relationerna 
mellan ”ting” är empiriskt lika verkliga som själva tingen; känslorna 
är inte bara subjektiva utan både subjektiva och objektiva. 
Genom att vara kroppsligt förankrad är tanken till sin natur es-
tetisk, eller upplevd, och därför inte möjlig att separera ut som funk-
tionellt intellektuell eller kognitiv (Johnson, 2007; Scarinzi, 2015; 
Shusterman, 2008). Den estetiska dimensionen betonar den kreativa 
och kroppsliga karaktären av handling, eller avsikt, vilken är upplevd 
och kan därför inte bestämmas av rationellt tillskrivna relationer. 
Detta har starka implikationer för kreativ handling och en känsla av 
”jaget”, eftersom det lyfter fram en viktig roll för det subjektiva och 
icke förutbestämda som en integrerad del i det kreativa görandet, 
och i förlängningen för lärande (Joas, 1996). Den pragmatistiska 
synen på handling och dess perceptuella, emotionella och empatiska 
dimensioner förutsåg många av de framsteg kognitionsteori gjort 
på senare år. Den utvecklar också den process-baserade relationella 
ontologi enligt vilken alla traditionella metafysiska dualismer, som 
kropp/sinne, subjekt/objekt, förnuft/känsla, representation/upple-
velse, endast är abstraktioner (Johnson & Rohrer, 2007). 
Empiriskt material
För att komplettera pragmatisternas syn på kontinuitet använder 
jag en strategi av rörelsebaserat utforskande för att kunna ta mig 
bortom de dominerande forskningsstrategier som grundar sig 
på observation. Genom rörelsen agerar jag i direkt respons till 
omvärlden, så att rörelsen utgör en grundläggande metod för att 
kunna fånga den estetiska integrationen i nuet. Att utgå ifrån rörel-
sen är därför en explicit strategi för att aktivt undvika en rationell 
process som startar från ”medvetandet”, att försöka identifiera ett 
problem för att sedan lösa det. Denna strategi syftar istället till 
att agera kreativt, i avsaknad av tryggheten av förutbestämda mål 
eller processer, där sinnesförnimmelser och känslor är omöjliga 
att separera. Rörelseimprovisation erbjuder metoder för att kon-
kretisera den estetiska upplevelsen av gestaltande genom fysiskt 
agerande. På så vis fångas den totala immersionen i en aktivitet i 
nuet som är gemensam för all varseblivning i gestaltande. Eftersom 
rörelseimprovisation som designartefakt är efemär till sin karaktär, 
är dess materiella form den varseblivande och gestaltande kroppen. 
Jag har valt Butoh, en japansk tradition av rörelseimprovi-
sation, eftersom det är en av de mest radikala i sin ambition att 
331
vara en experimentell och uttrycksfull metod utan någon speciell 
stil eller mål vad gäller form. Butoh är en form av rörelseimpro-
visation som grundades av Tatsumi Hijikata och Kazuo Ohno i 
Japan under det sena 1950-talet och beskrivs som en filosofi såväl 
som en rörelsepraktik.  Den är präglad av buddistisk filosofi och 
österländska praktiker för att integrera kropp och medvetande, där 
det grundläggande syftet är att utveckla ”jaget”. Dess direkta fokus 
på kroppsliga upplevelser innebär en förhöjd uppmärksamhet på 
individens subjektiva upplevelse, eller ”interiör” (kroppen som 
subjekt) genom kroppsliga träningstekniker (kroppen som objekt). 
Butoh erbjuder på så sätt en relevant konstnärlig och icke-dualistisk 
metod för utforskande eftersom den har specifika träningstekniker 
för att vara i nuet med inre sensationer och känslor, och specifikt 
”öppna upp” det subjektiva ”jaget” för olika sätt att röra och föra 
sig utanför sin egen trygghetszon. 
Denna studies empiriska material består av fyra direkta 
upplevelser från min Butohträning. De fyra upplevelserna kallas 
Praktisera ”jaget”, Mötas halvvägs, Förkroppsliga form, Känsla av 
process, och har till syfte att utforska en estetisk integration i nuet 
genom gestaltning. Buthos fysiska improvisationstekniker och 
formella förutsättningar relaterar till ett integrerat medvetande i 
nuet. De fyra upplevelserna belyser alltså, var och en på sitt sätt, 
en konkret och kontextualiserad situation av den direkt upplevda, 
kroppsliga känslan av att tänka, och de ständigt föränderliga inre 
relationerna i gestaltning. Varje exempel utgör ett empiriskt un-
derlag för att utforska en viss kvalitet av ”öppenhet” genom den 
kroppsliga upplevelsen, och för att lyfta fram kontinuiteten mellan 
objektiv reflektion, känslan av själv-kontroll och självbevarelsedrift 
med en kroppslig, fenomenologisk närvaro, utan att särskilja det 
från ”jaget”. Dessa exempel visar på den kroppsliga upplevelsens 
komplexa dynamik, vilken inkluderar handling, känslor, minnen 
och sinnesstämningar, samt hur jag lär mig att få syn på mönster 
för hur jag förnimmer och uppfattar form genom rörelse. Detta 
kroppsliga utforskande hjälper mig att upptäcka min konstnärliga 
kapacitet för kroppslig känsla och uttryck. 
Diskussion
Jag sammanfattar nio insikter från det empiriska arbetet med Butoh 
för att utveckla förståelsen för vad det innebär att fysiskt och per-
ceptuellt anta en attityd av öppenhet genom upplevelsen. De nio 
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insikterna är: (1) uppmärksamhet på ”tankeflödet” i nuet, (2) självme-
dvetenhet om vanor och mönster, (3) konkretisering av kvaliteter genom 
känslor och ansträngning, (4) vilja att beröras, (5) uttrycksfull gestalt-
ning genom känslor, (6) fokus på detaljer genom sinnesförnimmelser 
och bildspråk, (7) sammansmältande av handling och medvetande för 
att vara i nuet, (8) utveckling av relation till den egna processen, (9) 
acceptans av kunskap som kan upplevas men inte namnges. 
Utifrån dessa insikter beskriver jag behovet av ett estetiskt 
perspektiv som utgår ifrån designerns inre upplevelser för ta sig an 
relationer i nuet. Dessa konkreta upplevelsebaserade insikter be-
handlar kroppsliga intryck och uttryck likväl som kognitiva förmå-
gor eller metoder. Detta innebär ett skifte från att betrakta öppenhet 
som en attityd eller ett objektivt tillstånd, till en syn på öppenhet 
som kapacitet för handling. Den subjektiva upplevelsen är central 
för denna utforskande kapacitet för att kunna hantera osäkerhet, ta 
designbeslut utan objektiva kriterier, hantera motsägelser, ta risker, 
använda sin fantasi för att meningsfullt kunna uttrycka upplevelser 
på empatiska och kvalitativa sätt. Detta är viktigt för att designer 
ska kunna se design som ett utforskande med frihet att skapa och 
omfamna olika betydelser och möjliga vägar framåt (Dorst, 2011). 
Dessa insikter belyser vikten av att erkänna vikten av desig-
nerns inre förmåga till medvetenhet och villighet att utforska och 
skapa, i synnerhet för öppenhet och kreativitet. En designer kan 
genom praktiska övningar lära sig att aktivt motverka förutfattade 
meningar och önskan att ha mental tydlighet, eller att kontrollera 
förväntningar av vad som ska produceras eller ”designas”. Detta 
pekar på hens förmåga att utmana och förfina sin praktik genom 
kroppslig upplevelse, och specifikt i relation till den subjektiva, 
emotionella dimensionen och känslan av ”jaget”. 
Det empiriska materialet indikerar att det måste finnas vissa 
förutsättningar för att kunna arbeta med detta inre perspektiv av 
kroppsliga relationer som krävs för att praktiskt utveckla kapaciteten 
för öppenhet. Jag sammanfattar de två grundläggande förutsätt-
ningarna som kontrollera och kapitulera och förtroende vilka är speci-
ella för ett estetiskt sätt att förhålla sig till omvärlden i den direkta 
upplevelsen. De sammanfaller med en själv-styrd praktik av kreativt 
utforskande och kapacitet för öppenhet. Denna estetiska form av 
utforskande samstämmer också med den inre upplevelsebaserade 
mening som uppstår genom kroppslig praktik, vilken är lika viktig 
för en designers praktik som dess diskursiva symboliska mening. 
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Slutsats
Förhoppningen är att denna avhandling ska bidra till att beskriva 
designs konstnärliga grund i filosofiska termer. Den kopplar 
samman pragmatismen med den kvalitativa upplevelsen av ge-
staltning, speciellt vad gäller de olika estetiska dimensionerna som 
de perceptuella, kroppsliga och emotionella aspekterna. Teoretiskt 
visar avhandlingen att ett pragmatistiskt, icke-dualistiskt perspektiv 
av upplevelse utgör en grund för en relationell ontologi som bidrar 
till förståelsen för design som en kroppslig form av utforskande. 
Genom att företrädelsevis fokusera på kvaliteterna av upplevelsen 
av öppenhet, eller utforskande, snarare än utkomsten av kreati-
vitet, bidrar detta arbete till att bygga en teoretisk plattform för 
design. Detta är speciellt viktigt för att utveckla pedagogiska för-
hållningssätt till kreativitet och lärande som utgår ifrån upplevelsen 
som helhet, och därmed inte tolkas rationellt eller reduceras till 
symboliska eller retoriska utsagor. I synnerhet positionerar denna 
avhandling en subjektiv, självstyrd kapacitet för öppenhet som 
central för ett estetiskt angreppssätt till pedagogik, vilket förhåller 
sig till designers förmåga till uttrycksfullt och empatiskt lärande 
genom upplevelsen. 
Avhandlingen bidrar också till grundläggande designforsk-
ning om kreativ handling genom ett empiriskt utforskande av 
upplevelsen av att gestalta. Detta är ett första steg till att praktiskt 
bemöta bristen på förståelse för vad det kroppsligt, perceptuellt 
innebär att inta en attityd av öppenhet i upplevelsen. Det empiriska 
arbetet visar hur design kan fysiskt förnimmas och upplevas i rela-
tion till en känsla och en kvalitet av öppenhet som är självdriven. 
Avhandlingen bidrar till metodutveckling genom att intro-
ducera en rörelsebaserad metodologi. Detta representerar ett skifte 
från ett objektivt fokus på designs utkomster och form, till ett 
fokus på upplevelsen av att gestalta, baserad på ett estetiskt för-
hållningssätt som framhåller förmågan att vara i nuet genom att 
kroppsligt och känslomässigt lyssna av och respondera till omgiv-
ningen och ”jaget”. Detta praktiska fokus sätter upp en relation 
mellan en konstnärlig, eller kreativ, attityd till utforskande och 
konstnärliga metoder för att utveckla medvetande och känslighet 
inför de fysiska förutsättningar som medger en kvalitet av öppenhet 
och förkroppsligad kapacitet till öppenhet. 
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Noë, A. (2009). Out of our heads: Why you are not your brain, and other 
lessons from the biology of consciousness (1st ed.). New York, NY: 
Hill and Wang. 
Norman, D. A. (2010, June 25). Design thinking: A useful myth. 
Core77. Retrieved from http://www.core77.com/posts/16790/
design-thinking-a-useful-myth-16790
Norman, D. A., & Verganti, R. (2014). Incremental and radical 
innovation: Design research vs technology and meaning 
change. Design Issues, 30(1), 78–96. doi:10.1162/DESI_a_00250
Nussbaum, B. (2011, April 5). Design Thinking Is A Failed 
Experiment. So What’s Next? Fast Company.  Retrieved 
from https://www.fastcodesign.com/1663558/
design-thinking-is-a-failed-experiment-so-whats-next
Orru, A. M. (2016). Organoleptic interfaces: Exploring embodied methods 
in foodscapes. (Licentiate), Chalmers University of Technology, 
Gothenburg, Sweden.   
Owen, C. (2007). Design thinking: Notes on its nature and use. Design 
Research Quarterly, 2(1), 16–27. 
Pallasmaa, J. (1996). The eyes of the skin: Architecture and the senses. 
London, UK: Academy Editions. 
Paxton, S. (1979). About Contact Improvisation (CI). Contact 
Quarterly. Retrieved from https://contactquarterly.com/
contact-improvisation/about/.   
Perry-Smith, J. E., & Shalley, C. E. (2003). The social side of creativity: 
A static and dynamic social network perspective. The Academy 
of Management Review, 28(1), 89–106. doi:10.2307/30040691
Person, O., Schoormans, J., Snelders, D., & Karjalainen, T-M. (2008). 
Should new products look similar or different? The influence 
of the market environment on strategic product styling. Design 
Studies, 29(1), 30–48. 
Pink, S. (2015). Doing sensory ethnography (2nd ed.). London, UK: Sage 
Publications. 
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American 
community. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. 
350
Quental, L. (2015). From star designers to design constellations. 
Retrieved from https://www.interaction-design.org/literature/
article/article-560418adbd7c7
Radford, M. (2004). Emotion and creativity. The journal of aesthetic 
education, 38(1), 53–64. 
Rauth, I., Carlgren, L., & Elmquist, M. (2014). Making it happen: 
Legitimizing design thinking in large organizations. Design 
Management Journal, 9(1), 47–60. 
Redström, J. (2006). Towards user design? On the shift from object to 
user as the subject of design. Design Studies, 27(2), 123–139. 
Richie, D. (2007). A tractate on Japanese aesthetics. Berkeley, CA: Stone 
Bridge Press. 
Robertson, T., & Simonsen, J. (2012). Challenges and opportunities in 
contemporary participatory design. Design Issues, 28(3), 3–9. 
Rolf, I. (1995). Ida Rolf talks about Rolfing and physical reality 
(excerpts). In D. Johnson (Ed.), Bone, breath & gesture: 
Practices of embodiment (pp. 172–181). Berkeley, CA: North 
Atlantic Books. 
Rosch, E. (2004). If You Depict a Bird, Give It Space to Fly. In J. Baas 
& M. J. Jacob (Eds.), Buddha mind in contemporary art (pp. 
37–47). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Rosenthal, S. B., & Bourgeois, P. L. (1980). Pragmatism and 
phenomenology: A philosophic encounter. Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing. 
Rylander, A. (2009). Design thinking as knowledge work: 
Epistemological foundations and practical implications. Design 
Management Journal, 4(1), 7–19. 
Rylander, A. (2012). Pragmatism and Design Research- An 
Overview (pp. 1–41). Stockholm: Designfakultetens 
kunskapssammanställningar, KTH. Retrieved from 
http://www.designfakulteten.kth.se/sites/default/files/
designfpragdesignrapport_18.4.pdf
Ryle, G. (1962). The concept of mind. (Penguin ed.) London, UK: 
Penguin Books. (Original work published 1949) 
Salovey, P., & Mayer, J. D. (1990). Emotional intelligence. Imagination, 
cognition and personality, 9(3), 185–211. 
Sanders, E. B. N. (2002). From user-centered to participatory design 
approaches. In J. Frascara (Ed.), Design and the social sciences: 
Making connections (pp. 1–8). London, UK: Taylor & Francis. 
Sanders, E. B. N. (2008). An evolving map of design practice and 
design research. Interactions, 15(6), 13–17. 
Sanders, E. B. N., & Stappers, P. J. (2008). Co-creation and the new 
landscapes of design. CoDesign, 4(1), 5–18. 
351
Sanders, V. (1988). Dancing and the dark soul of Japan: An aesthetic 
analysis of “buto”. Asian Theatre Journal, 5(2), 148–163. 
Sara, R., & Sara, A. (2006). Between the lines: Experiencing space 
through dance. CEBE Transactions, 3(1), 95–105. Retrieved 
from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download? 
doi=10.1.1.580.5045&rep=rep1 &type=pdf
Sato, S. (2009). Beyond good: Great innovations through 
design. Journal of Business Strategy, 30(2/3), 40–49. 
doi:10.1108/02756660910942454
Scarinzi, A. E. (2015). Aesthetics and the embodied mind: Beyond art 
theory and the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy A. Scarinzi (Ed.)   
doi:10.1007/978-94-017-9379-7
Schaub, M. (2005). Janet Cardiff: The walk book (V. Thyssen-Bornemisza 
Art Contemporary & N. Y. Public Art Fund Eds.). Köln, 
Germany: Walther König. 
Scheffler, I. (1974). Four pragmatists: A critical introduction to Peirce, 
James, Mead, and Dewey. London, UK: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
Schine, J. (2010). Movement, memory & the senses in soundscape 
studies. Canadian Acoustics, 38(3), 100–101. 
Schleicher, D., Jones, P., & Kachur, O. (2010). Bodystorming as 
embodied designing. Interactions, 17(6), 47–51. 
Schwartz, B. (2011). Practical wisdom and organizations. Research in 
Organizational Behavior, 31 (2011), 3–23.  
Schwartz, B., & Sharpe, K. (2010). Practical wisdom: The right way to do 
the right thing. New York, NY: Riverhead Books. 
Schön, D. A. (1987). Educating the reflective practitioner:  
Toward a new design for teaching and learning in the professions 
(1st ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass. 
Schön, D. A. (1983). The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in 
action. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Selver, C. (1995). Interview with Charlotte Selver (John Schick). In D. 
Johnson (Ed.), Bone, breath & gesture: Practices of embodiment 
(pp. 17–22). Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books. 
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2011). The primacy of movement (Expanded 
2nd ed.). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins 
Publishing.
Shneiderman, B. (2002). Creativity support tools: Accelerating 
discovery and innovation. Communications of the ACM, 50, 
20–32.
Shusterman, R. (2006). Thinking through the body, educating for the 
humanities: A plea for somaesthetics. The Journal of Aesthetic 
Education, 40(1), 1–21. 
352
Shusterman, R. (2008). Body consciousness: A philosophy of mindfulness and 
somaesthetics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Shusterman, R. (2012). Thinking through the body: Essays in somaesthetics. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Shusterman, R. (2014). Somaesthetics. In M. Soegaard & D. F. Rikke 
(Eds.), The Encyclopedia of Human-Computer Interaction 
(2nd ed.) Aarhus, Denmark: The Interaction Design 
Foundation. Retrieved from https://www.interaction-design.
org/encyclopedia/somaesthetics.html.  
Simon, H. A. (1969). The sciences of the artificial. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Skelton, A. (2012). Colonised by quality? Teacher identities in a 
research-led institution. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 
33(6), 793–811. doi:10.1080/01425692.2012.692047
Stanley, S. (2012). Intimate distances: William James’ introspection, 
Buddhist mindfulness, and experiential inquiry. New Ideas in 
Psychology, 30(2), 201–211. 
Steen, M. (2013). Co-design as a process of joint inquiry and 
imagination. Design Issues, 29(2), 16–28. doi:10.1162/
DESI_a_00207
Stephens, J. P., & Boland, B. J. (2014). The aesthetic knowledge 
problem of problem-solving with design thinking. Journal of 
Management Inquiry, 1–14. doi:10.1177/1056492614564677
Stevenson, A. (2014). We came here to remember: Using participatory 
sensory ethnography to explore memory as emplaced, 
embodied practice. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 11(4), 
335–349. doi:10.1080/14780887.2014.908990
Stompff, G. (2012). Facilitating team cognition: How designers mirror 
what NPD teams do. (Doctoral dissertation), Oce Business 
Services Maastricht, Maastricht, The Netherlands.   
Stuhr, J. J. (2010). 100 years of pragmatism: William James’s revolutionary 
philosophy. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
Sutton, R. I. (2001). The weird rules of creativity. Harvard Business 
Review, 79(8), 94–103, 161. 
Tadao, N. (Photographer). (1968). Hijikata Tatsumi to Nihonjin: 
Nikutai no hanran [Photograph]. Retrieved from http://
archive.jpf.org.au/jpfevents/14-noh-to-now/1.html.
Tarthang, T. (1994). Dynamics of time and space: Transcending limits of 
knowledge. Berkeley, CA: Dharma Publishing. 
Taylor, G. (2010). Empty? A critique of the notion of ‘emptiness’ 
in Butoh and Body Weather training. Theatre, Dance and 
Performance Training, 1(1), 72–87. 
Tharp, T., & Reiter, M. (2003). The creative habit: Learn it and use it for 
life: A practical guide. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. 
353
Thayer, H. S. E. (Ed.) (1982). Pragmatism, the classic writings. 
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. 
Thoreau, H. D. (2010). Walking (1st ed.). Madison, WI: Cricket House 
Books. (Original work published 1862)
Thrift, N. J. (2008). Non-representational theory: Space, politics, affect. 
Oxford, UK: Routledge. 
Todres, L. A. (2000). Embracing ambiguity: Transpersonal 
development and the phenomenological tradition. Journal of 
Religion and Health, 39(3), 227–238. doi:10.1023/a:1010358507163
Tonkinwise, C. (2011). A taste for practices: Unrepressing style in design 
thinking. Design Studies, 32(6), 533–545.  
Tsoukas, H. (1998). The word and the world: A critique of 
representationalism in management research. International 
Journal of Public Administration, 21(5), 781–817. 
Tuisku, H. (2017). Developing embodied pedagogies of acting for youth 
theatre education: Psychophysical actor training as a source for 
new openings. (Doctoral dissertation), University of the Arts 
Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland.  
van de Ven. (Photographer). (2003). Body Weather [Photograph]. 
Retrieved from http://photos1.blogger.com/
blogger/1646/2673/1600/bwpic1.jpg
Vaughan, L. (2006). Embodying design: The lived relationship between 
artefact, user and the lived experience of design. Paper presented 
at the Proceedings from PDC 2006: The Ninth Participatory 
Design Conference, Trento, Italy (pp. 41–46). doi: 
10.1145/1147261.1147268
Verganti, R. (2009). Design-driven innovation: Changing the rules of 
competition by radically innovating what things mean. Boston, 
MA: Harvard Business Press. 
Von Krogh, G., Ichijo, K., & Nonaka, I. (2000). Enabling knowledge 
creation: How to unlock the mystery of tacit knowledge and release 
the power of innovation. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Waychoff, B. (2009). Butoh, bodies, and being. Kaleidoscope: A 
Graduate Journal of Qualitative Communication Research, 8(1), 
37–53. 
Wetter Edman, K. (2014). Design for service: A framework for articulating 
designers’ contribution as interpreter of users’ experience. (Doctoral 
dissertation), University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, 
Sweden.   
Whitcomb, A. (2016). (re)Forming accounts of ethics in design: Anecdote 
as a way to express the experience of designing together. (Doctoral 
dissertation), University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, 
Sweden.   
354
Whitehouse, M. (1995). The tao of the body. In D. Johnson (Ed.), 
Bone, breath & gesture: Practices of embodiment (pp. 241–251). 
Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books. 
Williams, K. (2000, Sept. 21–23). Self directed learning in the visual arts. 
Paper presented at the 9th Annual Teaching Learning Forum, 
Perth, AU. 
Yeung, B. (2002, July 17). Dancing with the Butoh masters. 
SF Weekly.  Retrieved from http://www.sfweekly.
com/sanfrancisco/dancing-with-the-butoh-masters/
Content?oid=2145414&showFullText=true
Yoo, Y., Boland Jr, R. J., & Lyytinen, K. (2006). From organization 
design to organization designing. Organization Science, 17(2), 
215–229. 
Yuasa, Y. (1993). The body, self-cultivation, and ki-energy (S. Nagatomo & 
M. S. Hull, Trans.). Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press. 
Zaporah, R. (1995). Action theater: The improvisation of presence. Berkeley, 
CA: North Atlantic Books. 
Ziemke, T., Zlatev, J., & Frank, R. M. (2007). Body, language, and mind 
(Vol. 1: Embodiment). Berlin, Germany: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Zimmerman, J., Stolterman, E., & Forlizzi, J. (2010, August 16–20). 
An analysis and critique of research through design: Towards a 
formalization of a research approach. Paper presented at the 
Proceedings from DIS’10: 8th ACM Conference on Designing 
Interactive Systems, Aarhus, Denmark (pp. 310–319). doi: 
10.1145/1858171.1858228
Östman, L. E. (2005). A pragmatist theory of design: The impact of the 
pragmatist philosophy of John Dewey on architecture and design. 
(Doctoral dissertation), Royal Institute of Technology, 
Stockholm, Sweden.
Photos
Olga Nikolaeva (2017), p. 36–37, p. 193, p. 195
Hanka Syrová (2014), p. 175
Anita Saij (2015), p. 207, p. 218–219, p. 243,
Patricia Suarez Hermosilla (2015), p. 162, p. 182, p. 210–211, p. 241

Doctoral dissertations and licentiate theses 
published at the Faculty of Fine, Applied and 
Performing Arts, University of Gothenburg:
1. Monica Lindgren (Music Education)
Att skapa ordning för det estetiska i skolan. Diskur-
siva positioneringar i
samtal med lärare och skolledare
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2006
isbn: 91-975911-1-4
2. Jeoung-Ah Kim (Design)
Paper-Composite Porcelain. Characterisation of 
Material Properties and Workability from a Ceramic 
Art Design Perspective
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2006
isbn: 91-975911-2-2
3. Kaja Tooming (Design)
Toward a Poetics of Fibre Art and Design. Aesthetic 
and Acoustic Qualities of Hand-tufted Materials in 
Interior Spatial Design
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2007
isbn: 978-91-975911-5-7
4. Vidar Vikören 
(Musical Performance and Interpretation)
Studier omkring artikulasjon i tysk romantisk 
orgelmusikk, 1800–1850. Med et tillegg om regis-
treringspraksis
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2007
isbn: 978-91-975911-6-4
5. Maria Bania 
(Musical Performance and Interpretation)
“Sweetenings” and “Babylonish Gabble”: Flute 
Vibrato and Articulation of Fast Passages in the 
18th and 19th centuries
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2008
isbn: 978-91-975911-7-1
6. Svein Erik Tandberg 
(Musical Performance and Interpretation)
Imagination, Form, Movement and Sound – 
Studies in Musical Improvisation
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2008
isbn: 978-91-975911-8-8
7. Mike Bode and Staffan Schmidt (Fine Arts)
Off the Grid
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2008
isbn: 978-91-977757-0-0
8. Otto von Busch (Design)
Fashion-Able: Hacktivism and Engaged 
Fashion Design
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2008
isbn: 978-91-977757-2-4
9. Magali Ljungar Chapelon 
(Digital Representation)
Actor-Spectator in a Virtual Reality Arts Play. 
Towards new artistic experiences in between illusion 
and reality in immersive virtual environments
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2008
isbn: 978-91-977757-1-7
10. Marie-Helene Zimmerman Nilsson 
(Music Education)
Musiklärares val av undervisningsinnehåll. En 
studie om musikundervisning i ensemble och gehörs- 
och musiklära inom gymnasieskolan
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2009
isbn: 978-91-977757-5-5
11. Bryndís Snæbjörnsdóttir (Fine Arts)
Spaces of Encounter: Art and Revision in Hu-
man-Animal Relations
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2009
isbn: 978-91-977757-6-2
12. Anders Tykesson 
(Musical Performance and Interpretation)
Musik som handling: Verkanalys, interpretation och 
musikalisk gestaltning. Med ett studium av Anders 
Eliassons Quartetto d‘Archi
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2009
isbn: 978-91-977757-7-9
13. Harald Stenström 
(Musical Performance and Interpretation)
Free Ensemble Improvisation
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2009
isbn: 978-91-977757-8-6
14. Ragnhild Sandberg Jurström 
(Music Education)
Att ge form åt musikaliska gestaltningar. En 
socialsemiotisk studie av körledares multimodala 
kommunikation i kör
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2009
isbn: 978-91-977757-9-3
15. David Crawford (Digital Representation)
Art and the Real-time Archive:
Relocation, Remix, Response
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2009
isbn: 978-91-977758-1-6
16. Kajsa G Eriksson (Design)
Concrete Fashion: Dress, Art, and 
Engagement in Public Space
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2009
isbn: 978-91-977758-4-7
17. Henric Benesch (Design)
Kroppar under träd – en miljö för
konstnärlig forskning
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2010
isbn: 978-91-977758-6-1
18. Olle Zandén (Music Education)
Samtal om samspel. Kvalitetsuppfattningar i 
musiklärares dialoger om ensemblespel på gymnasiet
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2010
isbn: 978-91-977758-7-8
19. Magnus Bärtås (Fine Arts)
You Told Me – work stories and video essays / verk-
berättelser och videoessäer
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2010
isbn: 978-91-977758-8-5
20. Sven Kristersson 
(Musical Performance and Interpretation)
Sångaren på den tomma spelplatsen – en poetik. 
Att gestalta Gilgamesheposet och sånger av John 
Dowland och Evert Taube
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2010
isbn: 978-91-977758-9-2
21. Cecilia Wallerstedt 
(Research on Arts Education)
Att peka ut det osynliga i rörelse. En 
didaktisk studie av taktart i musik
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2010
isbn: 978-91-978477-0-4
22. Cecilia Björck (Music Education)
Claiming Space: Discourses on Gender,
Popular Music, and Social Change
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2011
isbn: 978-91-978477-1-1
23. Andreas Gedin (Fine Arts)
Jag hör röster överallt – Step by Step
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2011
isbn: 978-91-978477-2-8
24. Lars Wallsten 
(Photographic Representation)
Anteckningar om Spår
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2011
isbn: 978-91-978477-3-5
Art Monitor
25. Elisabeth Belgrano
(Performance in Theatre and Drama)
“Lasciatemi morire” o farò “La Finta Pazza”: 
Embodying Vocal Nothingness on Stage in Italian 
and French 17th century Operatic Laments and 
Mad Scenes  
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2011
isbn: 978-91-978477-4-2
26. Christian Wideberg 
(Research on Arts Education)
Ateljésamtalets utmaning – ett bildningsperspektiv
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2011
isbn: 978-91-978477-5-9
27. Katharina Dahlbäck 
(Research on Arts Education)
Musik och språk i samverkan. En aktionsforsknings-
studie i årskurs 1
ArtMonitor, licentiate thesis. Göteborg, 2011
isbn: 978-91-978477-6-6
28. Katharina Wetter Edman (Design)
Service design – a conceptualization 
of an emerging practice
ArtMonitor, licentiate thesis. Göteborg, 2011
isbn: 978-91-978477-7-3
29. Tina Carlsson (Fine Arts)
the sky is blue
Kning Disk, diss. Göteborg, 2011
isbn: 978-91-976667-2-5
30. Per Anders Nilsson 
(Musical Performance and Interpretation)
A Field of Possibilities: Designing and Playing 
Digital Musical Instruments
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2011
isbn: 978-91-977477-8-0
31. Katarina A Karlsson 
(Musical Performance and Interpretation)
Think’st thou to seduce me then? 
Impersonating female personas in songs 
by Thomas Campion (1567-1620)
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2011
isbn: 978-91-978477-9-7
32. Lena Dahlén 
(Performance in Theatre and Drama)
Jag går från läsning till gestaltning 
– beskrivningar ur en monologpraktik
Gidlunds förlag, diss. Göteborg, 2012
isbn: 978-91-7844-840-1
33. Martín Ávila (Design)
Devices. On Hospitality, Hostility and Design
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2012
isbn: 978-91-979993-0-4
34. Anniqa Lagergren 
(Research on Arts Education)
Barns musikkomponerande i tradition
 och förändring
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2012
isbn: 978-91-979993-1-1
35. Ulrika Wänström Lindh (Design)
Light Shapes Spaces: Experience of Distribution 
of Light and Visual Spatial Boundaries
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2012
isbn: 978-91-979993-2-8
36. Sten Sandell 
(Musical Performance and Interpretation)
På insidan av tystnaden
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2013
isbn: 978-91-979993-3-5
37. Per Högberg 
(Musical Performance and Interpretation)
Orgelsång och psalmspel. Musikalisk gestaltning 
av församlingssång
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2013
isbn: 978-91-979993-4-2
38. Fredrik Nyberg 
(Literary Composition, Poetry and Prose)
Hur låter dikten? Att bli ved II
Autor, diss. Göteborg, 2013
isbn: 978-91-979948-2-8
39. Marco Muñoz (Digital Representation)
Infrafaces: Essays on the Artistic Interaction
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2013
isbn: 978-91-979993-5-9
40. Kim Hedås 
(Musical Performance and Interpretation)
Linjer. Musikens rörelser – komposition i förändring
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2013
isbn: 978-91-979993-6-6
41. Annika Hellman 
(Research on Arts Education)
Intermezzon i medieundervisningen – gym-
nasieelevers visuella röster och subjektspositioneringar
ArtMonitor, licentiate thesis. Göteborg, 2013
isbn: 978-91-979993-8-0 (printed version)
isbn: 978-91-981712-5-9 (digital version)
42. Marcus Jahnke (Design)
Meaning in the Making. An Experimental Study 
on Conveying the Innovation Potential of Design 
Practice to Non-designerly Companies
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg, 2013
isbn: 978-91-979993-7-3
43. Anders Hultqvist (Musicology. Artistic track)
Komposition. Trädgården – som förgrenar sig. 
Några ingångar till en kompositorisk praktik
Skrifter från musikvetenskap nr.102, diss. 
Göteborg 2013.
isbn: 978-91-85974-19-1
Department of Cultural Sciences, Faculty of Arts, 
in cooperation with Academy of Music and Dra-
ma, Faculty of Fine, Applied and Performing Arts
44. Ulf Friberg 
(Performance in Theatre and Drama)
Den kapitalistiska skådespelaren
– aktör eller leverantör?
Bokförlaget Korpen, diss. Göteborg 2014
isbn: 978-91-7374-813-1
45. Katarina Wetter Edman (Design)
Design for Service: A framework for 
exploring designers’ contribution as 
interpreter of users’ experience
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg 2014
isbn 978-91-979993-9-7
46. Niclas Östlind (Photography)
Performing History. Fotografi i Sverige 1970-2014
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg 2014
isbn: 978-91-981712-0-4
47. Carina Borgström Källén 
(Research on Arts Education)
När musik gör skillnad – genus och 
genrepraktiker i samspel
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg 2014
isbn: 978-91-981712-1-1 (printed version)
isbn: 978-91-981712-2-8 (digital version)
48. Tina Kullenberg 
(Research on Arts Education)
Signing and Singing – Children in 
Teaching Dialogues
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg 2014
isbn: 978-91-981712-3-5 (printed version)
isbn: 978-91-981712-4-2 (digital version)
Art Monitor
49. Helga Krook 
(Literary Composition, Poetry and Prose)
Minnesrörelser
Autor, diss. Göteborg 2015
isbn 978-91-979948-7-3
50. Mara Lee Gerdén 
(Literary Composition, Poetry and Prose)
När andra skriver: skrivande som motstånd, 
ansvar och tid
Glänta produktion, diss. Göteborg 2014
isbn: 978-91-86133-58-0
51. João Segurado 
(Musical Performance and Interpretation, in co-
operation with Luleå University of Technology)
Never Heard Before – A Musical Exploration 
of Organ Voicing
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg/Luleå 2015
isbn: 978-91-981712-6-6 (printed version)
isbn: 978-91-981712-7-3 (digital version)
52. Marie-Louise Hansson Stenhammar (Re-
search on Arts Education)
En avestetiserad skol- och lärandekultur. En studie 
om lärprocessers estetiska dimensioner
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg 2015
isbn: 978-91-981712-8-0 (printed version)
isbn: 978-91-981712-9-7 (digital version)
53. Lisa Tan (Fine Arts)
For every word has its own shadow
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg 2015
isbn 978-91-982422-0-1 (printed version)
isbn 978-91-982422-1-8 (digital version)
54. Elke Marhöfer (Fine Arts)
Ecologies of Practices and Thinking
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg 2015
isbn 978-91-982422-2-5 (printed version)
isbn 978-91-982422-3-2 (digital version)
55. Birgitta Nordström (Crafts)
I ritens rum – om mötet mellan tyg och människa
ArtMonitor, licentiatuppsats. Göteborg 2016
isbn: 978-91-982422-4-9 (printed version)
isbn 978-91-982422-5-6 (digital version)
56. Thomas Laurien (Design)
Händelser på ytan – shibori som kunskapande rörelse
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg 2016
isbn: 978-91-982422-8-7 (printed version)
isbn 978-91-982422-9-4 (digital version)
57. Annica Karlsson Rixon (Photography)
Queer Community through Photographic Acts. Three 
Entrances to an Artistic Research Project Approach-
ing LGBTQIA Russia
Art and Theory Publishing, diss. Stockholm 2016
isbn: 978-91-88031-03-7 (printed version) 
isbn: 978-91-88031-30-3 (digital version)
58. Johan Petri 
(Performance in Theatre and Music Drama)
The Rhythm of Thinking. Immanence and Ethics 
in Theater Performance
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg 2016
isbn: 978-91-982423-0-0 (printed version)
isbn: 978-91-982423-1-7 (digital version)
59. Cecilia Grönberg (Photography)
Händelsehorisont || Event horizon. 
Distribuerad fotografi
oei editör, diss. Stockholm 2016
isbn:  978-91-85905-85-0 (printed version)
isbn:  978-91-85905-86-7 (digital version)
60. Andrew Whitcomb (Design)
(re)Forming Accounts of Ethics in Design: 
Anecdote as a Way to Express the Experience 
of Designing Together
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg 2016
isbn: 978-91-982423-2-4 (printed version)
isbn: 978-91-982423-3-1 (digital version)
61. Märtha Pastorek Gripson 
(Research in Arts Education)
Positioner i dans – om genus, handlingsutrymme 
och dansrörelser i grundskolans praktik
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg 2016
isbn 978-91-982422-6-3 (printed version)   
isbn 978-91-982422-7-0 (digital version)
62. Mårten Medbo (Crafts)
Lerbaserad erfarenhet och språklighet
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg 2016
isbn: 978-91-982423-4-8 (printed version)
isbn: 978-91-982423-5-5 (digital version)
63. Ariana Amacker (Design)
Embodying Openness: A Pragmatist Exploration 
into the Aesthetic Experience of Design Form-Giving
ArtMonitor, diss. Göteborg 2017
isbn: 978-91-982423-6-2 (printed version)
isbn: 978-91-982423-7-9 (digital version)
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